Paul Renneisen v. American Airlines, Inc.

990 F.2d 918, 1993 WL 83293
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedApril 22, 1993
Docket92-1213
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 990 F.2d 918 (Paul Renneisen v. American Airlines, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Paul Renneisen v. American Airlines, Inc., 990 F.2d 918, 1993 WL 83293 (7th Cir. 1993).

Opinion

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

In 1983, American Airlines was losing money in the wake of airline deregulation and rising fuel prices. In order to cut labor costs, it struck a deal with the pilots’ union. The union, Allied Pilots Association, relinquished wage and benefit guarantees for pilots not yet hired;, in return American promised to preserve the wages and benefits of current pilots. On November 4, 1983, American and the union memorialized their deal in an “Agreement” that divided the union into A-scale pilots with wage and benefit guarantees, hired before November 4, and B-scale pilots without guarantees, hired afterwards. The Agreement further provided that the A-scale pilots' guarantees would not be rebargained unless a majority of the A-scale pilots voted to do so.

Plaintiffs are several B-scale pilots who sued American, claiming that the Agreement with the pilots’ union is an illegal restraint on collective bargaining under Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 152, and an illegal restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The RLA sends most disputes between transit workers and their employers to arbitral boards, so that district courts have limited jurisdiction over RLA claims. Because plaintiffs could not show that the Agreement struck “a fundamental blow to union or employer activity and -the collective bargaining process itself” under Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 442, 109 S.Ct. 1225, 1235, 103 L.Ed.2d 456, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ case for lack of jurisdiction. Without the RLA’s support, plaintiffs’ other counts crumbled as well: the district court found that antitrust labor exemptions barred plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims, and dismissed as moot plaintiffs’ motion to certify all B-scale pilots as a class. Plaintiffs appeal these dismissals.

We conclude that plaintiffs have sued American because they cannot persuade their own union to challenge an Agreement that gives more security to other workers in the union. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs have not stated a claim for which relief can be granted because RLA Section 2 does not give minority groups in a union a cause of action against their employer for adhering to agreements that the union decides not to challenge. Although the district court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear this case, its careful substantive analysis supports our dismissal of plaintiffs’ case" under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

*920 I.

In 1983, American lay supine, pinned by rising fuel costs and a fleet of aging, inefficient aircraft, while lower-cost carriers empowered by airline deregulation penetrated deeper into its market share. American states that between 1978 when deregulation began and 1983, its fleet shrank by 10 percent, it furloughed 10 percent of its pilots and it hired no new pilots (defendant’s brief at 3). American believed that fuel and capital improvement costs (aircraft maintenance and replacement) were relatively fixed industry-wide, but that labor costs were about 35 percent of its total budget, as against 20-25 percent for the low-cost carriers. To halt its declining market share and escape the threat posed by low-cost carriers, American decided it needed to cut labor costs. To this end, it consummated agreements with all its unions, including the pilots’ union.

The agreements shared a common premise: protect the wages and benefits of current workers, but hire new workers at “market” rates that matched more closely the wages and benefits paid by low-cost carriers. American styled this a “two-tier” proposal; it reached two-tier agreements with the mechanics’ union in February of 1983, and with the flight attendants’ and pilots’ unions in November of 1983. The Agreement between the pilots’ union and American, dated November 4, 1983, provided:

A. JOB SECURITY * * *
The Company [American] will guarantee employment and * * * job security forever * * * to all pilots * * * who were on * * * active flight payroll on November 1, 1983 * * *.
* * * * * *
B. PAY AND RETIREMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS FOR PILOTS HIRED PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 1, 1983
1. The Company agrees that it will take no action * * * to diminish the pay or the retirement benefit programs [of]
pilots hired prior to November 1, 1983
2. This Agreement * * * shall remain in effect so long as any pilot with job security remains in the [Company’s] active employ * * * [but] this Agreement may be changed by unanimous agreement between the parties and a majority of the pilots with job security * * *. ******
C.Nothing contained herein shall * * * restrict either party from negotiating a change in the differentials between the respective pay or the retirement benefit programs of the [A-scale and the B-scale] pilots * * *, provided, however, that neither party will attempt to totally eliminate the existing differentials. 1

Under other provisions of the Agreement, the pilots relinquished a 7 percent wage increase and accepted a reduced rate of vacation accruals. American promised to recall all furloughed pilots, and to add 200 planes to its fleet of 238. American’s plan to cut labor costs and make capital investments in its fleet was an unqualified success. Today American is a leader in the airline industry. Its success has allowed it to hire many new pilots — 59 percent of its pilots in fact — since it negotiated the Agreement with the pilots’ union.

Since 1983 the pilots’ union and American have met four times to negotiate the differentials between A-scale and B-scale pilots, most recently in 1991. American contends that as of 1991, the differentials have for practical purposes been eliminated, and that the A- and B-scale designations function as an integrated seniority system where senior B-scale pilots have effectively the same wages and benefits as A-scale pilots. The seven plaintiffs argue that differentials remain, and, more fundamentally, that the pilots’ union is weakened and divided by the Agreement, to the point that the Agreement unlawfully restrains the pilots’ ability to bargain collectively in violation of the RLA.

*921 Congress enacted the RLA in 1926 to ensure that labor unrest would not disrupt transportation networks so vital to the nation’s economy. The Act sought to give labor and transportation companies a framework to resolve disputes peacefully through protracted negotiations and compulsory mediation rather than through strikes. 45 U.S.C. § 151(a); Theodore Kheel, 9 Labor Law § 50.02.

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990 F.2d 918, 1993 WL 83293, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/paul-renneisen-v-american-airlines-inc-ca7-1993.