Palpallatoc v. The Boeing Company

Opinion

1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

7 NO. 22-cv-5728 ARCHELINO T. PALPALLATOC, 8 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiff, DENYING IN PART THE BOEING 9 COMPANY’S MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 THE BOEING COMPANY, et al., 11 Defendants. 12

13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff, Archelino Palpallatoc, brought this employment discrimination action against his 15 employer, The Boeing Company (“Boeing”), together with named and unnamed individual Boeing 16 managers and employees, alleging violations of the Washington Law Against Discrimination 17 (“WLAD”).1 Mr. Palpallatoc also asserted claims of intentional and negligent infliction of 18 emotional distress, which this Court dismissed. Order, ECF No. 28. Currently pending before the 19 Court is Boeing’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 51, which Mr. Palpallatoc opposes. 20 Having reviewed the parties’ filings,2 the record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the 21

22 1 Boeing is the only Defendant to have been served. 2 Mot., ECF No. 51; Opp’n, ECF No. 70; Reply, ECF No. 74, and Surreply, ECF No. 80-1, together with the accompanying exhibits and declarations. 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Court grants in part and denies in part Boeing’s motion. The reasoning for the Court’s decision 2 follows. 3 II. BACKGROUND3 4 Mr. Palpallatoc has been employed by Boeing since 1996. Compl. ¶ 3.5, ECF No. 32.4 On 5 April 27, 2019, an incident occurred between Mr. Palpallatoc and Kyle Churchill, a Boeing 6 manager, which escalated to Mr. Churchill screaming at Mr. Palpallatoc and having Mr. Palpallatoc 7 escorted from the work site by security. Id. ¶¶ 3.14-3.21. Mr. Palpallatoc lodged complaints 8 internally at Boeing, without satisfactory resolution. Id. ¶¶ 3.26-3.42. The stress from the 9 confrontation and the “hostile” work environment led to Mr. Palpallatoc being placed on medical 10 leave from May to July 2019. Id. ¶¶ 3.25, 3.35, 3.46. Mr. Palpallatoc alleges that the environment 11 remains hostile, but he “has planned to work until he is 70 years old to have maximum retirement

12 for his family,” so he takes medication and continues to suffer from depression and anxiety 13 associated with the workplace. Id. ¶¶ 3,109-3.111. 14 As a result of the incident, in May 2019, Mr. Palpallatoc filed a workers’ compensation 15 claim for “brain/mental/stress” injury. Accident Report, ECF No. 56-1. He was awarded $20,548.51 16 permanent partial disability, and the claim was closed on December 27, 2022. Claim Status Ltr., 17 ECF No. 56-4. But as a result of his ongoing stress over the incident, an alleged hostile work 18 environment, and alleged retaliation that he experienced due to his internal complaints, Mr. 19 Palpallatoc filed this lawsuit in September 2022 in the Pierce County Superior Court. State Ct. 20 21 3 For a more detailed background of the events leading up to the lawsuit, see Order Granting Defendants’ Partial 22 Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 28. 4 The operative complaint is Plaintiff’s Corrected First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32. Mr. Palpallatoc sought to amend his complaint a second time, but his motion to amend was denied. See Order, ECF No. 47. 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Compl., ECF No. 1-1. The case was removed to this Court on September 30, 2022. Not. Removal, 2 ECF No. 1. Mr. Palpallatoc makes claims of a hostile work environment, race/national origin 3 discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation. Boeing asserts that Mr. Palpallatoc fails to 4 present admissible evidence to support his claims and by its summary judgment motion, it seeks 5 dismissal of all claims. 6 III. LEGAL STANDARD 7 “Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 8 to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the movant is 9 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zetwick v. Cnty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2017) 10 (quoting United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Account No. Ending 8215, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162 11 (9th Cir. 2016)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying

12 portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a fact or facts necessary for one or more 13 essential elements of each claim.” InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 14 657 (9th Cir. 2020). “If the moving party meets this burden, the opposing party must then set out 15 specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial to defeat the motion.” Id. If the evidence proffered 16 by the opposing party “is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment 17 may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted). 18 “A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented 19 in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); cf. JL Beverage Co., LLC v. 20 Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that “at summary judgment a 21 district court may consider hearsay evidence submitted in an inadmissible form, so long as the

22 underlying evidence could be provided in an admissible form at trial, such as by live testimony”). 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 Mr. Palpallatoc asserts claims against Boeing for “violation of RCW 49.60.010 et seq, the 3 Washington Law Against Discrimination and RCW 49.44.090,” including claims of discrimination, 4 hostile work environment, and retaliation “as to which the following bases are alleged to be 5 ‘substantial factors’ in the discriminatory and retaliatory conduct: factors are alleged to include his 6 national origin, race and ethnicity, his association with his team of predominately minority 7 employees, his age being over 50, and his ‘protected activity’ of opposing practices forbidden by 8 RCW 49.60.” Compl. ¶ III.3. Although Mr. Palpallatoc’s claims are not a model of clarity, based 9 on the arguments presented by both parties, the Court addresses the following causes of action: (1) 10 hostile work environment; (2) race/national origin discrimination; (3) age discrimination; and (4) 11 retaliation.

12 A. Hostile Work Environment 13 In order to establish a hostile work environment claim under the Washington Law Against 14 Discrimination (“WLAD”), a plaintiff must show: (1) unwelcome harassment (2) that is attributable 15 to membership in a protected class (3) that affected the terms or conditions of employment and (4) 16 that can be imputed to the employer. Davis v. State, Washington State Patrol, 184 Wn. App. 1002, 17 2014 WL 5144762, at *9 (2014) (citing Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash., 175 Wn.2d 264, 275 (2012)). 18 WLAD requires that the conduct of unwelcome harassment be “sufficiently pervasive so as to alter 19 the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Glasgow v. Georgia– 20 Pacific, Corp., 103 Wn.2d 401, 406 (1985). Courts determine whether “an environment is 21 sufficiently hostile or abusive by looking at all the circumstances, including frequency of the

22 discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” 2 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998) (citation omitted); Glasgow, 103 3 Wn.2d at 407. “‘Simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely 4 serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” 5 Dominguez–Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 6 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). 7 Boeing argues that the Kyle Churchill incident in April 2019 is time-barred,5 and the vague 8 assertions of other complained-of acts do not rise to the severe and pervasive level required for a 9 hostile work environment claim. Mot. 15-17; Reply 4-8. Mr. Palpallatoc asserts that courts 10 recognize that individual acts may span the statute of limitations and argues that Churchill’s 11 offensive behavior was part of a pattern of the new management team put in place in 2018-19 that

12 used harassment as their management strategy over the minority workgroup. Opp’n 16-17. 13 To determine if an alleged act should be considered an exception to the statute of limitations 14 under the continuing violation doctrine, the Court considers whether the act was rooted in a 15 discriminatory policy or practice that continued into the limitations period (a systemic violation), 16 or whether there was a substantial relationship between the timely and untimely conduct (a serial 17 continuing violation). Antonius v. King Cnty., 153 Wn.2d 256, 262 (2004). As evidence of a 18 systemic violation, Mr. Palpallatoc cites the following: 19 • Manager Cary Fiske’s deposition at 246, ECF No. 70-6, stating that the team was largely made up of employees of color; 20 21

22 5 WLAD hostile work environment claims have a 3-year statute of limitations. RCW 49.60; RCW 4.16.080(2); Antonius v King Cnty., 153 Wn.2d 256, 261-62 (2004). 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 • Gustavo Martinez declaration and email dated May 10, 2019, Exhibit 2, ECF No. 70-1,6 which appears to describe the Churchill incident, and states in paragraph 46 2 that Mr. Palpallatoc set an example for speaking up, but after seeing how he was treated, especially the Asian workers were afraid to come forward about how they 3 were treated. Also, paragraphs 12-14, which describe the new manager team as “a group of Caucasian males in their 30’s who were chums with each other” and did 4 not show respect for Mr. Palpallatoc or the team of long-term mechanics who were mostly “people of color.” Mr. Martinez also described bullying and intimidating 5 behavior by the new managers over the team, micromanaging writing up minor non- disciplinary deviations as disciplinary “CAMS” that could be used as a basis for 6 termination, causing employees to be “terrified.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24. He described the environment as “degrading.” Id. ¶ 29. 7 “The standard for linking discriminatory acts together in the hostile work environment 8 context is not high.” Loeffelholz, 175 Wn.2d at 276. Boeing argues that even if there is evidence 9 of a hostile environment, Boeing’s management investigated and intervened, which destroyed the 10 connection between the earlier and later acts. Reply 5 (citing Fall v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. C- 11 15-919-JCC, 2016 WL 2962232 at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2016)). The “court’s task is to 12 determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable 13 hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period.” 14 Antonius, 153 Wn.2d at 271 (quoting Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 15 120 (2002)). Here, unlike the circumstances in Fall, the complained-of actions all relate to the 16 change in management over the team that had been previously been led by Mr. Palpallatoc. The 17 incidents are all part of the same claim of intimidating behavior by the team of new managers. And 18 viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Palpallatoc, the Court concludes that a 19 20 21

22 6 The Court notes that Boeing objects to the declarations included in ECF No. 70-1. Objs., ECF No. 75-1. The Court considers some of this evidence, because it is possible for it to be presented in an admissible form, such as testimony from a witness. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 reasonable jury could consider the Churchill incident as part of the overall alleged conduct that 2 constituted a hostile work environment. 3 Mr. Palpallatoc complains that after the Churchill incident, he was subjected to ongoing 4 hostile intimidation that caused him to be afraid to walk alone in the workplace and co-workers 5 began walking with him so he wouldn’t be so intimidated. Opp’n 17 (citing Martinez Decl. ¶¶ 17, 6 18, 25). The next specific act that Mr. Palpallatoc alleges contributed to a hostile work environment 7 occurred in January 2020 when Level 2 Manager Cary Fiske sent an email portraying three men in 8 a dungeon or jail cell with a large dog holding the key to the cell, which Mr. Palpallatoc interpreted 9 as racist and depicting slavery. Opp’n 17; Pl.’s Dep. 190, ECF No. 70-13. Third level manager, 10 Robert Lemley, counseled Mr. Fiske and other Level 2 managers to stop sending emails with 11 images because the images could be misinterpreted. Lemley Email, Ex. 14, ECF No. 70-8. Mr.

12 Palpallatoc also provided a declaration from another co-worker who “observed the workplace 13 become increasing tense for Mr. Palpallatoc because managers began to single out Mr. Palpallatoc 14 by reducing his work duties and cutting him out of the Over Time schedule when he previously 15 worked overtime often.” Huss Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 70-1. Mr. Huss added that he raised issues about 16 the hostile environment to his Union Steward, and he personally observed managers using offensive 17 language, yelling, and creating a tense and intimidating atmosphere in the workplace. Id. ¶¶ 15, 27, 18 29. 19 While a close call, considering all of the circumstances and viewing the evidence in the light 20 most favorable to Mr. Palpallatoc, the Court determines that a reasonable jury could find that the 21 acts of which Mr. Palpallatoc complains were more than isolated and unrelated incidents that

22 negatively affected the terms and conditions of Mr. Palpallatoc’s employment. The Court is mindful 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 that when “reviewing motions for summary judgment in the employment discrimination context, a 2 court must ‘zealously guard[ ] an employee’s right to a full trial, since discrimination claims are 3 frequently difficult to prove without a full airing of the evidence and an opportunity to evaluate the 4 credibility of the witnesses.’” Weil v. Citizens Telecom Servs. Co., LLC, 922 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th 5 Cir. 2019) (quoting McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004)). 6 B. Race/National Origin Discrimination 7 Mr. Palpallatoc claims that Boeing treated him less favorably because of his race/national 8 origin, as a Filipino. Compl. ¶ 3.5. When no direct evidence of discrimination exists, plaintiffs may 9 prove a discrimination claim through circumstantial evidence, following the three-step burden 10 shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See 11 Hines v. Todd Pac. Shipyards, 127 Wn. App. 356, 371 (2005). Initially, the plaintiff has the burden

12 of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of a specific employment 13 discrimination claim. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981) (citations 14 omitted). If the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some 15 legitimate, [nondiscriminatory] reason for” its actions. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 16 802, 804). If the employer successfully presents a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 17 actions, “the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and drops from the case.” St. 18 Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (citation omitted). At this point, the 19 employee has an opportunity to introduce evidence that “the proffered reason was not the true 20 reason for the employment decision, and that race was.” Id. at 508 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). 21 The court must consider whether the jury could infer discrimination from the plaintiff’s prima facie

22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 case and any other evidence the plaintiff offers to show that the actions were discriminatory or that 2 the non-discriminatory justification was pretextual. See id. 3 To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination due to disparate treatment under 4 WLAD, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was treated less 5 favorably in the terms or conditions of his employment (3) than a similarly situated, nonprotected 6 employee, and (4) he and the nonprotected “comparator” were doing substantially the same work.” 7 Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 80 Wn.App. 212, 227 (1996). Here, there is no dispute 8 that Mr. Palpallatoc is a member of a protected class. However, Boeing argues that Mr. Palpallatoc 9 fails to provide any evidence of an adverse employment action or that a nonprotected comparator 10 was treated more favorably. Mot. 20. Notably, Mr. Palpallatoc did not apply to, or otherwise seek 11 to fill, any management position, and he does not identify anyone who was promoted to a position

12 he might have wanted. Id. (citing Pl.’s Dep. 181-87, 287-88). In response, Mr. Palpallatoc fails to 13 put forth any evidence to establish that he applied for any position that was assigned to a similarly 14 situated, nonprotected employee. He argues that there were temporary manager positions filled 15 without being advertised, and that one position for which he was the most qualified, went to an 16 unqualified “Facebook friend” of Mr. Fiske’s family. Opp’n 23. However, Mr. Palpallatoc adds 17 that he was on medical leave at the time that position was filled, the individual hired was Hispanic, 18 and Mr. Palpallatoc did not apply for or indicate his interest in the position. Id. 19 Mr. Palpallatoc fails to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Therefore, the 20 Court will grant summary judgment on the racial discrimination claim. 21

22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 C. Age Discrimination 2 A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by demonstrating that 3 when the alleged failure to promote occurred, (1) he was at least forty years old, (2) he was qualified 4 for the position for which the plaintiff applied, (3) he was denied the position, and (4) the employer 5 gave the promotion to a substantially younger person. Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 608 (9th Cir. 6 2012). Boeing asserts that Mr. Palpallatoc fails to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, 7 because although there is no dispute that he is over the age of 40, he admits that he did not apply 8 for or express interest in any manager position until after filing this lawsuit. Mot. 27-28 (citing 9 Pl.’s Dep. 54-55, 72-74, 185-187, 287-289; ECF No. 52-1; Ex. H, ECF No. 56-8). 10 Although Mr. Palpallatoc does not explicitly concede his age discrimination claim, his 11 response to Boeing’s motion for summary judgment is silent as to this claim. See generally, Opp’n;

12 Surreply. And the record establishes that Boeing is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on 13 this ground. Therefore, the Court grants Boeing’s motion as to the age discrimination claim. 14 D. Retaliation 15 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the WLAD, a plaintiff must show: (1) 16 he engaged in a protected activity; (2) defendant took an adverse employment action; and (3) 17 retaliation was a substantial factor behind the adverse employment action. Sims v. Lakeside Sch., 18 2008 WL 2811164, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2008). Washington courts apply the McDonnell 19 Douglas burden-shifting framework to WLAD retaliation claims. Daniel v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 20 (1973); Dumont v. City of Seattle, 148 Wn. App. 850, 862 (2009). Under this framework, if the 21 plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendants to

22 advance legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for any adverse actions taken against the plaintiff. Sims, 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 2008 WL 2811164, at *3. The plaintiff then has the ultimate burden of showing the defendant’s 2 proffered reasons are pretextual. Id. Once the record contains reasonable but competing inferences 3 of both discrimination and nondiscrimination, it is for the jury to choose between the competing 4 inferences. Boyd v. State, Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 187 Wn. App. 1, 12 (2015). 5 Boeing moves for summary judgment contending that the undisputed material facts show 6 Mr. Palpallatoc did not suffer an adverse employment action, and no reasonable jury could find that 7 Boeing’s proffered reasons for the employment transfers were based on retaliation. Mot. 23-24. 8 “An adverse employment action involves a change in employment conditions that is more than an 9 inconvenience or alteration of one’s job responsibilities, such as reducing an employee’s workload 10 and pay.” Alonso v. Qwest Commc’ns Co., LLC, 178 Wn. App. 734, 746 (2013) (citing Campbell 11 v. State, 129 Wn.App. 10, 22 (2005)). “A demotion or an adverse transfer, or a hostile work

12 environment, may also amount to an adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Kirby v. City of 13 Tacoma, 124 Wn.App. 454, 465 (2004), review denied, 154 Wn.2d 1007 (2005)). The Court has 14 already found an issue of material fact with respect to the hostile work environment claim, but to 15 show the requisite causal link, Mr. Palpallatoc “must present evidence sufficient to raise the 16 inference that [the] protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.” Kelley v. Cnty. 17 of Ventura Pers. Dep’t, 28 F.3d 106 (9th Cir. 1994). Mr. Palpallatoc does not allege that his 18 protected activity caused the hostile work environment. Rather, he contends that he suffered an 19 adverse employment action because he “complained about 777 Unit’s managers’ racist conduct in 20 the workplace.” Opp’n 24. And Mr. Palpallatoc asserts that the adverse employment action was Mr. 21 Fiske transferring him from the 777-model production line to the 777X Low-Rate Initial Production

22 Line (“LRIP”). Opp’n 25. 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Mr. Palpallatoc argues that he was not given a body of work to complete and that although 2 he maintained his classification as a Team Lead, he was not assigned work as a Team Lead because 3 LRIP did not have a need for a team lead. Id. Boeing introduced evidence that Mr. Palpallatoc and 4 more than a dozen other employees were transferred to LRIP solely because they lived closer to the 5 location, and the decision was made by managers at a substantially higher level than Mr. Fiske or 6 Mr. Guzman. Mot. 22 (citing Mahan Decl. ¶¶ 8, 12, ECF No. 60). Although Mr. Palpallatoc’s 7 duties changed, he was allowed to retain his Team Lead title and Team Lead pay. Id. at 24. Mr. 8 Palpallatoc fails to show that his transfer was an adverse employment action. 9 Mr. Palpallatoc offers unfounded speculation that the transfer “seemed a little weird,” and 10 a declaration from a co-worker who was also transferred and “believes” that management was 11 retaliating against them after making threats to do so. Opp’n 26 (citing Jeans Dep. 105, 125, ECF

12 No.70-5; Huss Decl. ¶¶ 12, 16, ECF No. 70-1). Mr. Palpallatoc contends that his move was not a 13 “geomove” and argues that since he was loaned back to the 777 team after Mr. Fiske was transferred 14 out of the 777 management, it is evidence that the earlier restriction to the LRIP team was 15 retaliatory. Id. at 26-27. But Mr. Palpallatoc also admits that Boeing’s workforce experienced 16 significant changes between 2018 and 2021 due to the COVID pandemic, the Boeing 737-MAX 17 grounding in 2019, and the winddown of the 747 and 787 production lines, which resulted in layoffs 18 and involuntary transfers of numerous employees. Pl.’s Dep. 94-101, ECF No. 52-1. And he 19 admitted that he had been a candidate for a geomove in October 2020 based on his home address, 20 but he provided Boeing with a false change of address to avoid being transferred, and then later 21 changed it back. Id. at 39-41.

22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Mr. Palpallatoc’s conjecture regarding the circumstances of his transfer is not evidence that 2 the transfer was adverse, nor that he was transferred because of his complaints regarding 3 management’s racist conduct. A causal link can be inferred by close proximity in time. Kelley, 28 4 F.3d at 106. However, Mr. Palpallatoc has not provided evidence to support such an inference, 5 stating only that Mr. Fiske selected him for transfer “[a]t his earliest opportunity.” Opp’n 25. Mr. 6 Palpallatoc has not presented sufficient evidence of a causal link to establish a prima facie case. 7 Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment on Mr. Palpallatoc’s retaliation claim. 8 V. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons: 10 1. Boeing’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 51, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; 11 a. Boeing’s motion is GRANTED with regard to Mr. Palpallatoc’s claims 12 of Race/National Origin Discrimination, Age Discrimination, and Retaliation; 13 b. Boeing’s motion is DENIED with regard to Mr. Palpallatoc’s claim of 14 Hostile Work Environment. 2. Mr. Palpallatoc’s Hostile Work Environment claim shall proceed to trial, which 15 is scheduled to commence on July 22, 2024. 16 DATED this 29th day of March 2024. 17

A 18 19 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE BOEING COMPANY’S MOTION FOR 24 SUMMARY JUDGMENT