OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of our federal constitution protects a defendant from [56]*56twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.1 Embodied within that guarantee is the doctrine of collateral estoppel — “the principle that bars relitigation between the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 445-46, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1193, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 474, 476 (1970). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether this federal doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the State from seeking the death penalty against appellant in the instant case under the circumstances here presented.2
On September 20, 1983, in Cause No. 10,082, appellant was convicted of the capital murder of Howard McCIaflin, one of three victims killed in the course of a robbery committed by appellant. The jury then answered Special Issues Nos. 1 and 3 affirmatively. (R. VI-49, Exhibit #5, p. 1451-52). See Art. 37.071(b)(1) & (3). However, the jury was unable to answer Special Issue No. 2. (R. VI-49, Exhibit # 5, p. 1451-52).3 Therefore, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for life in the Texas Department of Corrections.4
In Cause No. 10,083, the State then attempted to try appellant for the capital murder of Shirley Thompson, another victim in the same robbery. Appellant filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus, which contained a special plea of former jeopardy to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty in the instant case. See Art. 11.07, § 1, V.A.C.C.P. In particular, appellant argued that the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 in his trial for the capital murder of Howard McCIaflin constituted an express negative finding that collaterally estopped the State from relitigating the issue in his trial for the capital murder of Shirley Thompson.
The trial court denied appellant habeas corpus relief, and appellant appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals under the authority of Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); see also Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. Ex parte Padgett v. State, 673 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984).
The Court of Appeals held that the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 during the penalty phase of appellant’s trial for the capital murder of Howard McCIaf-lin did not amount to a fact determination that resolved the issue of appellant’s future dangerousness. Padgett, supra, at 306. Although the Court of Appeals was unable to locate any direct support for its holding in the prior decisions by this Court, it found an Illinois appellate court’s reasoning persuasive:
The essential problem with the estop-pel argument advanced by the defense is the fact that the jury did not affirmatively find that the aggravating factor did not exist. Rather, the jury was unable [57]*57to unanimously find that the factor did exist. From the record, then, all that can be concluded is that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous conclusion about the presence or absence of the aggravating factor.[5] Thus there was never any conclusive decision by the jury on this factual issue sufficient to act as a bar by way of estoppel. While collateral estop-pel applies to criminal proceedings, an essential predicate to its application is the presence of a valid and final determination of an issue of ultimate fact, [citation omitted].
Padgett, supra, at 306, quoting People v. Hipkins, 97 Ill.App.3d 174, 53 Ill.Dec. 16, 20, 423 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1981). Accord People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill.App.3d 243, 73 Ill.Dec. 854, 454 N.E.2d 1103 (1983); People v. Scaggs, 111 Ill.App.3d 633, 67 Ill.Dec. 438, 444 N.E.2d 674 (1982). Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the State could seek the death penalty in the instant cause. Id.
Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals erred because the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 in his first capital murder trial constituted a final determination of a fact issue. Invoking the collateral estoppel doctrine originally advanced in Ashe, supra, appellant argues that this fact determination precludes the State from relitigating that issue by seeking the death penalty in the instant cause. We disagree.
In Ashe, supra, a defendant had been charged with having robbed six poker players. The State had first tried the defendant Ashe for robbing one of the poker players. In that trial, the jury acquitted Ashe. The only contested issue in the trial had been whether the defendant Ashe was in fact one of the robbers. The State then attempted to try Ashe for the robbery of another of the poker players. The Supreme Court held that the collateral estop-pel doctrine, as embodied within the Fifth Amendment, prohibited the State from prosecuting Ashe for the robbery of any of the other five poker players because a jury had already decided that Ashe was not one of the robbers. Id., 397 U.S. at 446, 90 S.Ct. at 1195-96.
Presuming that the Fifth Amendment requires that the doctrine of collateral estop-pel be applied to the punishment phases of different capital murder trials, we must now determine whether the jury actually decided Special Issue No. 2 in appellant’s first capital murder trial.6 If it did, then the State would be collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue, thus preventing it from seeking the death penalty in the instant case.
To determine whether a state is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue in a criminal case, the Supreme Court offered the following guidance:
[A court should] ... examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration [footnote omitted]. The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the [58]*58circumstances of the proceedings [cite omitted].
Id., at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. See also generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Introduction notes, comment d; Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 Iowa L.Rev. 281 (1980); Comment, The Double Jeopardy Clause: Refining the Constitutional Proscription Against Successive Prosecutions, 19 U.C. L.A. L.Rev. 804 (1972).
In the instant case, appellant seeks to foreclose the jury from considering the death penalty because of a prior jury’s inability to answer a punishment question in the affirmative.
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OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of our federal constitution protects a defendant from [56]*56twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.1 Embodied within that guarantee is the doctrine of collateral estoppel — “the principle that bars relitigation between the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 445-46, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1193, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 474, 476 (1970). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether this federal doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the State from seeking the death penalty against appellant in the instant case under the circumstances here presented.2
On September 20, 1983, in Cause No. 10,082, appellant was convicted of the capital murder of Howard McCIaflin, one of three victims killed in the course of a robbery committed by appellant. The jury then answered Special Issues Nos. 1 and 3 affirmatively. (R. VI-49, Exhibit #5, p. 1451-52). See Art. 37.071(b)(1) & (3). However, the jury was unable to answer Special Issue No. 2. (R. VI-49, Exhibit # 5, p. 1451-52).3 Therefore, the trial court sentenced appellant to confinement for life in the Texas Department of Corrections.4
In Cause No. 10,083, the State then attempted to try appellant for the capital murder of Shirley Thompson, another victim in the same robbery. Appellant filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus, which contained a special plea of former jeopardy to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty in the instant case. See Art. 11.07, § 1, V.A.C.C.P. In particular, appellant argued that the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 in his trial for the capital murder of Howard McCIaflin constituted an express negative finding that collaterally estopped the State from relitigating the issue in his trial for the capital murder of Shirley Thompson.
The trial court denied appellant habeas corpus relief, and appellant appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals under the authority of Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); see also Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. Ex parte Padgett v. State, 673 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984).
The Court of Appeals held that the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 during the penalty phase of appellant’s trial for the capital murder of Howard McCIaf-lin did not amount to a fact determination that resolved the issue of appellant’s future dangerousness. Padgett, supra, at 306. Although the Court of Appeals was unable to locate any direct support for its holding in the prior decisions by this Court, it found an Illinois appellate court’s reasoning persuasive:
The essential problem with the estop-pel argument advanced by the defense is the fact that the jury did not affirmatively find that the aggravating factor did not exist. Rather, the jury was unable [57]*57to unanimously find that the factor did exist. From the record, then, all that can be concluded is that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous conclusion about the presence or absence of the aggravating factor.[5] Thus there was never any conclusive decision by the jury on this factual issue sufficient to act as a bar by way of estoppel. While collateral estop-pel applies to criminal proceedings, an essential predicate to its application is the presence of a valid and final determination of an issue of ultimate fact, [citation omitted].
Padgett, supra, at 306, quoting People v. Hipkins, 97 Ill.App.3d 174, 53 Ill.Dec. 16, 20, 423 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1981). Accord People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill.App.3d 243, 73 Ill.Dec. 854, 454 N.E.2d 1103 (1983); People v. Scaggs, 111 Ill.App.3d 633, 67 Ill.Dec. 438, 444 N.E.2d 674 (1982). Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the State could seek the death penalty in the instant cause. Id.
Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals erred because the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 in his first capital murder trial constituted a final determination of a fact issue. Invoking the collateral estoppel doctrine originally advanced in Ashe, supra, appellant argues that this fact determination precludes the State from relitigating that issue by seeking the death penalty in the instant cause. We disagree.
In Ashe, supra, a defendant had been charged with having robbed six poker players. The State had first tried the defendant Ashe for robbing one of the poker players. In that trial, the jury acquitted Ashe. The only contested issue in the trial had been whether the defendant Ashe was in fact one of the robbers. The State then attempted to try Ashe for the robbery of another of the poker players. The Supreme Court held that the collateral estop-pel doctrine, as embodied within the Fifth Amendment, prohibited the State from prosecuting Ashe for the robbery of any of the other five poker players because a jury had already decided that Ashe was not one of the robbers. Id., 397 U.S. at 446, 90 S.Ct. at 1195-96.
Presuming that the Fifth Amendment requires that the doctrine of collateral estop-pel be applied to the punishment phases of different capital murder trials, we must now determine whether the jury actually decided Special Issue No. 2 in appellant’s first capital murder trial.6 If it did, then the State would be collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue, thus preventing it from seeking the death penalty in the instant case.
To determine whether a state is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue in a criminal case, the Supreme Court offered the following guidance:
[A court should] ... examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration [footnote omitted]. The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the [58]*58circumstances of the proceedings [cite omitted].
Id., at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. See also generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Introduction notes, comment d; Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 Iowa L.Rev. 281 (1980); Comment, The Double Jeopardy Clause: Refining the Constitutional Proscription Against Successive Prosecutions, 19 U.C. L.A. L.Rev. 804 (1972).
In the instant case, appellant seeks to foreclose the jury from considering the death penalty because of a prior jury’s inability to answer a punishment question in the affirmative. We agree that in appellant’s first trial for capital murder, the jury was presented with a narrow issue: “whether there is a probability that [appellant] would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Art. 37.071(b)(2), supra. However, the jury did not answer the question affirmatively or negatively. Instead, it was unable to answer the question.
Prior to 1981, that circumstance would have resulted in a hung jury on punishment, requiring the trial court to declare a mistrial. See Art. 37.07, § 3(c), V.A.C.C.P. (1981); Eads v. State, 598 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Cr.App.1980). However, in 1981, the Legislature amended Article 37.071(e), supra, to require the trial court to sentence appellant to life imprisonment if the jury “is unable to answer any issue submitted” under Article 37.071, supra. Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 2673, ch. 725, § 1, eff. Aug. 31, 1981. See Art. 37.071(e), V.A.C.C.P. (Supp.1986). In capjtal murder cases, this special provision of Article 37.071(e), supra, now controls over the general provision of Article 37.07, § 3(c), supra. Cf. Holandés v. State, 571 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Therefore, a jury’s inability to answer a punishment question in a capital murder case has the same sentencing effect as a negative answer. See Art. 37.071(e), supra.
As the Court of Appeals noted, the legislative history to Article 37.071(e) indicates that the Legislature included the “unable to to answer” provision “to avoid having the lengthy delay and great expense of retrying the guilt/innocence and punishment of the defendant for capital murder.” Padgett, supra, at 305, citing House Comm, on Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex.H.B. 1164, 67th Leg. (1981). See also House Comm, on Criminal Jurisprudence, Hearings on H.B. 1164, April 1, 1981. Nothing in the legislative history of H.B. 1164 indicates that the Legislature intended that a jury’s nonanswer be converted into a negative answer for the purpose of collateral estoppel.
Additionally, the Legislature provided that “[t]he court, the attorney for the state, or the attorney for the defendant may not inform a juror or a prospective juror of the effect of failure of the jury to agree on an issue submitted under [Article 37.071, supra].” Art. 37.071(g), supra (Supp.1986). Therefore, the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 in appellant’s first capital murder trial could not be interpreted as anything more than a nonanswer. As the Court of Appeals held, “[a] strained construction of general statutory language will not transform such a failure to reach a finding into a finding so that the principles of estoppel will be applied....” Padgett, supra, at 306, quoting Hipkins, supra, 53 IU.Dec. at 21, 423 N.E.2d at 213.
Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the jury’s inability to answer Special Issue No. 2 in appellant’s trial for the capital murder of Howard McClaflin (Cause No. 10,082) was not an actual determination of that issue. Without such a determination, the State is not collaterally estopped from relitigating that, issue by trying appellant for the capital murder of Shirley Thompson (Cause No. 10,083). Therefore, the State is not estopped from seeking the death penalty in that cause.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.