State v. Brabson

976 S.W.2d 182, 1998 WL 685359

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 30, 1998
• Docket: 1309-95
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION ON APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the Court in which

KELLER, PRICE, HOLLAND and WOMACK, Judges, joined.

In this case, we must decide whether the Dallas County District Attorney is collaterally estopped from litigating at a motion to suppress hearing in a criminal prosecution the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest when the Texas Department of Public Safety has received an adverse ruling on that issue in a prior administrative proceeding to revoke appellee’s driver’s license. We hold the Dallas County District Attorney is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest at the suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution.

Appellee was arrested for and eventually charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). The Texas Department of Public Safety sought to revoke appellee’s driver’s license at an administrative hearing pursuant to Article 670U-5, Section 2(f), V.A.C.S. However, the administrative judge declined to revoke appellee’s driver’s license. The administrative judge also made a written finding that the police lacked probable cause to arrest appellee.

In the DWI criminal prosecution, appellee sought to have evidence suppressed which he claimed was seized as a result of an illegal arrest based upon a lack of probable cause. Appellee contended the Dallas County District Attorney was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of probable cause for his arrest in the criminal prosecution because that issue had been decided adversely to the Texas Department of Public Safety in the administrative proceeding to revoke appel-lee’s driver’s license. The trial judge agreed and granted appellee’s motion to suppress.

On the Dallas County District Attorney’s direct appeal, the Court of Appeals, relying on Burrows v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 740 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.), reversed the trial court’s ruling, and held that collateral estoppel does not arise from administrative proceedings and that no other valid theories supported the trial court’s ruling on appellee’s motion to suppress. See State v. Brabson, 899 S.W.2d 741, 745-49 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1995). We granted appellee’s petition for discretionary review to examine the Court of Appeals’ holding on the collateral estoppel issue (ground one) and the Court of Appeals’ holding that no other valid theories supported the trial court’s ruling on appellee’s motion to suppress (grounds two and three).¹

This Court has adopted for criminal cases the federal common-law doctrine of “administrative collateral estoppel.”² See United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, 384 U.S. 394, 419-23, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1559-60, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966); Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Black’s Law Dictionary 45 (6th ed.1990). This doctrine states:

“When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of [ultimate] fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.” See Utah Construction and Mining Company[, 384 U.S. at 419-23], 86 S.Ct. at 1559-60; Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 199 (Emphasis Supplied); see also Dedrick [v. State], 623 S.W.2d [332] at 337 [(Tex.Cr.App.1981)] (McCormick, J., dissenting) (collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit).³

The first question we address is whether the parties in the administrative proceeding and the criminal prosecution are the same. The party that sought to revoke appellee’s driver’s license in the administrative proceeding was the Texas Department of Public Safety. See Article 6701¿-5, Section 2(f). The Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are not the same parties. Therefore, collateral estoppel principles do not preclude the Dallas County District Attorney from litigating the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest at the suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution.⁴

In addition, assuming the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are the same parties called the “State,” we would still have to decide whether the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest was “properly before” the administrative agency and whether the “State” had an “adequate opportunity” to litigate the issue. See Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 199; 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 21:2 (2d ed.1988) (the Utah Construction and Mining Company “administrative collateral estoppel” test was “carefully crafted” with each detail having significance). The law applicable to appellee’s case, Article 6701Í-5, Section 2(f),⁵ authorized the administrative judge to make only three findings: (1) whether probable cause existed that such person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, (2) whether the person was placed under arrest by the officer and was offered an opportunity to give a specimen under the provisions of the Act, and (3) whether such person refused to give a specimen upon the request of the officer. See State v. Groves, 837 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).

Article 67012 — 5, Section 2(f), does not authorize the administrative judge to make findings on the issue of probable cause for an arrest nor does it put the “State” on notice that this issue may be litigated at the administrative hearing. This is important for collateral estoppel purposes because the question of whether probable cause existed that appellee operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a different question from whether probable cause existed for his arrest. Cf. Neaves v. State, 767 S.W.2d 784, 786-87 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (whether probable cause to believe the defendant had been driving while intoxicated existed at the time the police requested a blood or breath specimen from the defendant is not an issue of ultimate fact in the defendant’s prosecution for driving while intoxicated). Resolution of the former question does not necessarily resolve the latter question. Cf. id. The ultimate issues to be resolved in the administrative proceeding and in the motion to suppress hearing in the criminal prosecution are not the same.

Therefore, it cannot be said the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest was “properly before” the administrative judge or that the “State” had an “adequate opportunity” to litigate that issue at the administrative proceeding. See Ex parte Tarver, 725 5.W.2d at 199; Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 417-21, 86 S.Ct. at 1558-59 (findings by administrative agency have no finality if they are not relevant to dispute over which the administrative agency has jurisdiction). Based on the foregoing, the administrative judge’s finding of no probable cause for appellee’s arrest does not preclude the “State” from litigating that issue in the criminal proceeding.

Our decision in this case makes sense when one also considers the underlying purpose of an exclusionary rule. An exclusionary rule excludes evidence at a defendant’s criminal trial if the government obtains that evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights. See Article 38.23(a), V.A.C.C.P., (providing that no evidence obtained “by an officer or other person in violation of’ the law shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904-13, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-15, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The “core” rationale of an exclusionary rule is to deter the police from illegally seizing evidence by making that evidence inadmissible at the defendant’s criminal trial. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 441-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2508.

An exclusionary rule does not apply to exclude evidence at an administrative proceeding to revoke a person’s driver’s license primarily because the “local law enforcement official is already ‘punished’ by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal trial.” See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-49, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029, 3027-35, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). Since an exclusionary rule does not apply to an administrative proceeding to revoke a person’s driver’s license, then there was no need for the administrative judge to make findings on the legality of appellee’s arrest.⁶

Finally, it has been suggested our decision in this case is inconsistent with this Court’s opinions in Tarver, Groves and Neaves, the latter two cases having been decided under the law applicable to appellee’s case — Article 6701l-5, Section 2(f). However, Groves and Neaves did not require this Court to decide whether collateral estoppel principles precluded the “State” from litigating at a criminal proceeding an ultimate fact issue that was decided adversely to the “State” in the prior administrative proceeding to revoke a person’s driver’s license. See Groves, 837 S.W.2d at 106 (nothing in the record indicated the issue of probable cause to arrest the defendant was previously litigated in the administrative proceeding); Neaves, 767 S.W.2d at 786-87 (since whether probable cause to believe the defendant had been driving while intoxicated existed at the time the police requested a breath or blood specimen from the defendant was not an issue of “ultimate” fact in the defendant’s criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated, analysis of the specific questions raised by the parties was pretermitted). Any suggestion in Groves and Neaves that collateral estoppel principles would apply in cases like this was pure dicta and unnecessary to our ultimate disposition of those eases.

Our opinion does not conflict with the “narrowness” of this Court’s holding in Tarver. See Tarver, 726 S.W.2d at 200. In Tarver, the parties were the same, the ultimate fact issue in the probation revocation proceeding and the subsequent criminal prosecution was the same, the ultimate fact issue was decided adversely to the “State” in the probation revocation proceeding, and that fact issue was “properly before” the trial court in the probation revocation proceeding. See id.

We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

MANSFIELD, J., concurs in the judgment of the Court. OVERSTREET, J., dissents.

1 . We dismiss grounds two and three of appellee’s petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted. Ground one of appellee's petition for discretionary review states:

"Did the Court of Appeals err in re-affirming its holding in Burrows v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 740 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.App.—Dallas, 1987, no pet.) that the issue preclusion component of the collateral estoppel doctrine cannot arise from administrative hearings on license revocation proceedings based on an accused’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test?”

2 . This case does not implicate the rule of collateral estoppel as "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy." See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-446, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Showery v. Samaniego, 814 F.2d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir.1987). Ashe holds the rule of collateral estoppel as "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy” may "bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts.” United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2860, 125 L.Ed.2d 556, 573 (1993) (citing Ashe) (Emphasis in Original).

3 . The distinction between whether an administrative agency is acting in a purely administrative capacity or in a judicial capacity turns on whether the administrative agency is performing "adjudicative" functions. See, e.g., Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 421-423, 86 S.Ct. at 1560 (example of administrative agency acting in a judicial capacity); Davis v. Young, 412 A.2d 1187, 1193-94 (D.C.1980) (administrative agency not acting in judicial capacity because there was no evidence it was acting in anything more than an investigative capacity); City Wide Learning Center, Inc. v. William C. Smith & Co., Inc., 488 A.2d 1310, 1313 (D.C.App.1985) (applicable statute conferred adjudicative functions on the administrative agency); see also 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 21:2 (2d ed.1983). Based on this, the administrative judge in this case was acting in a judicial capacity.

4 . We are not unmindful of this Court’s cases that hold law enforcement agencies and district attorneys are, in effect, the same parties for the analysis of claims falling within Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecution to disclose to the defendant exculpatory evidence in the prosecution’s possession). See Ex parte Mitchell, 853 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 864, 114 S.Ct. 183, 126 L.Ed.2d 142 (1993); Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 402-04 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (the prosecution, through its agent, the Smith County Sheriff's Department, failed to disclose Brady material). However, these cases do not apply in determining whether the Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are the same "parties” for collateral estoppel purposes.

This is because the underlying principle of Brady is the "avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.” See Thomas, 841 S.W.2d at 402. One of the underlying principles of the common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel is that a party should have an opportunity to litigate an issue of ultimate fact. Here, the Dallas County District Attorney had no opportunity to litigate the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest in the administrative proceeding to revoke appellee's driver’s license. It cannot be said that permitting the Dallas County District Attorney to litigate the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest at the suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution results in an "unfair trial to the accused.”

5 .Repealed by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, Section 24(a), eff. September 1, 1995.

6 . We note the current law for the administrative suspension of a person’s driver’s license based on that person's refusal to provide a breath or blood specimen is now contained in Subchapters , C and D of Chapter 724 of the Transportation Code which became effective on September 1, 1995. See Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, Section 1, eff. September 1, 1995. We note the Legislature has expressly authorized the administrative judge to make findings on whether "reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person.” See Texas Transportation Code, Section 724.042(1). However, we also note the Legislature has expressly provided that the determination of the administrative judge "does not preclude litigation of the same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution.” See Texas Transportation Code, Section 724.048(a)(3); see also Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991) (Congress may provide by statute that common-law collateral estoppel principles do not apply to findings of administrative agencies acting in a judicial capacity).