Oscar v. United States of America

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 29, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-01636
StatusUnknown

This text of Oscar v. United States of America (Oscar v. United States of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oscar v. United States of America, (M.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEAN E. OSCAR, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-1636

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

UNITED STATES, et al., : : Defendants

MEMORANDUM

I. Background Plaintiff, Jean E. Oscar, an inmate confined in the Federal Correctional Complex, Coleman, Florida, filed the above caption Bivens1 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, alleging that he is falsely imprisoned. (Doc. 1). The named Defendants are the United States of America and the Social Security Commissioner. Id. Along with his complaint, the Plaintiff filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3). At this time, the Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which

1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant

Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Legal Standard A. Screening and Dismissal of Prisoner Complaints Under 28 U.S.C. §1915A, federal district courts must “review ... a

complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If a complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted,” the Court must dismiss the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1). District courts have a similar screening obligation with respect to actions filed by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis and prisoners challenging prison conditions. See 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or appeal ... is frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted....”); 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c)(1)

(“The Court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.

See Mitchell v. Horn, 381 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)). When deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, district courts apply the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, No. 15- 01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under

§1915A(b)(1), §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or §1997e(c)(1) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to §1915A, “a court

employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that its claims are

facially plausible. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable

for the alleged misconduct. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the court accepts as true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679;

In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the court must not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a

motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Based on this standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court must take

when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are “not entitled” to the assumption of truth;

and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded factual allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). In addition, in the

specific context of pro se prisoner litigation, a district court must be mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully

pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106) (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Bivens Claims

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