OPINION
MEYER, Justice.
We are asked to decide whether a corporation may escape an arbitration clause in a contested contract and obtain court jurisdiction by claiming that the contract is void as the result of an interested-director transaction or ultra vires transaction. In addition, the parties dispute whether non-signatories to the contract may compel arbitration of claims brought by signatories. The court of appeals held that the claims must be arbitrated. We reverse.
Appellant Onvoy, Inc. (Onvoy) is a privately held Minnesota telecommunications company, formerly known as Minnesota Equal Access Network Services, Inc., or MEANS. Sixty-five local telephone service providers founded Onvoy in 1988 to give the providers better access to long [348]*348distance service. Respondent SHAL, LLC (SHAL) is a Minnesota company comprised of three local telephone service providers, all of whom are also shareholders of Onvoy. SHAL constructs and maintains fiber-optic telecommunication transport facilities, mostly for the companies who own it. SHAL is also a “segment provider” for Onvoy, meaning it provides one segment of the transmission capacity that Onvoy needs to transfer long distance traffic from local providers to Onvoy.
In 1997 and 1998, Onvoy planned a new fiber network with two routes within Minnesota, one of which extended from Plymouth to Moorhead. Onvoy planned to lease the fiber network if leasing would cost less than constructing, owning, and operating the fiber network itself. Onvoy invited segment providers to submit bids for Onvoy to lease portions of the new network from the providers.
Onvoy’s Network Committee developed the “cost benchmark” — the estimated cost of building and owning the Plymouth-Moorhead route — the cost below which segment providers had to bid to receive a leasing contract. In May of 1999, Onvoy requested bids from 50 local telephone service providers. SHAL bid on the Plymouth-Moorhead route. Onvoy’s board of directors approved the negotiation of a contract with SHAL and executed a ten-year lease with SHAL on October 25,1999. The lease is signed by the president of SHAL on one side, and the president of Network Technologies, a working group within Onvoy, on the other side. The lease contained a clause mandating arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association and elected Minnesota law under a choice-of-law provision.
The individually-named defendants, respondents here, all had close affiliations with both SHAL and Onvoy during the negotiation of the lease in question. Walter Clay was a member of both corporations’ boards of directors, and also served on Onvoy’s Finance and Audit Committee. Robert Eddy was a member of both corporations’ boards of directors, and additionally served on Onvoy’s Network Committee. Darrel Westrum was an employee of SHAL, and served on Onvoy’s Network Committee. Tom Dahl is the general manager of one of the three telephone service providers in SHAL, and served on Onvoy’s Network Committee.
At the same time that Onvoy was receiving bids on its new fiber optic routes, it was also seeking investors in this new venture. In September of 1999, two investment companies of George Soros combined to purchase 50,000 shares of convertible preferred stock in Onvoy for $50,000,000. As part of that deal, Onvoy shareholders amended Onvoy’s articles of incorporation on September 1, 1999, giving the Soros shareholders the right to elect three members of Onvoy’s board of directors and requiring that at least one of the Soros directors approve certain types of corporate actions, including contracting with affiliates and entering into or amending any material contract.
Neither Onvoy nor SHAL offers much information about what transpired between the execution of the lease in October of 1999 and Onvoy’s filing of the complaint in this action in August of 2001.1 SHAL notes that during that time Onvoy used the fiber optic network and paid SHAL in accordance with the lease. In May of 2001, Onvoy convened an independent committee to look into the lease’s terms [349]*349and circumstances and subsequently filed its complaint in Hennepin County District Court seeking reformation of the lease, among other relief. Onvoy then amended its complaint in November of 2001 and sought rescission.
In its amended complaint, Onvoy alleged that the SHAL lease is several times more expensive than the market price. Onvoy asked for a declaratory judgment that the lease is unlawful and subject to rescission, injunctive relief, damages in excess of $50,000, and attorney fees incurred. Against SHAL, Onvoy first alleged the lease between SHAL and ONVOY is an interested-director transaction, prohibited by Minn.Stat. § 302A.255 (2002). Second, Onvoy alleged that the lease is an ultra vires transaction (one without authority), because the board of directors did not approve it under the amended articles of incorporation, which required a vote by at least one of the Soros directors. Onvoy also alleged SHAL has been unjustly enriched, and conspired with the individual defendants to commit tortious conduct. In multiple counts against the individual defendants, Onvoy alleged that defendants Clay, Eddy, Westrum, and Dahl breached fiduciary duties and/or duties of loyalty to Onvoy, made material misrepresentations that induced Onvoy to enter into the lease, and negligently misrepresented the terms of the lease and bidding process.
The district court denied motions by SHAL and the individual defendants to dismiss plaintiffs complaint and compel arbitration. The district court concluded that Onvoy was not compelled to arbitrate the dispute under Minnesota law, citing Ateas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972), because the arbitration clause did not encompass the claims and arbitration is not appropriate when one party seeks to rescind the contract. The district court also concluded that federal arbitration law does not preempt Minnesota law. The district court did not discuss whether the individual defendants could compel arbitration.
The court of appeals reversed. After concluding that federal arbitration law did not preempt Minnesota law, because “Minnesota arbitration law favors arbitration on these facts,” the court of appeals applied Minnesota contract law. The court decided that Onvoy must arbitrate its claims because its complaint sought monetary damages and not mere rescission of the contract. The court did not address whether individual defendants could compel arbitration. We granted On-voy’s petition for further review.
I.
This court has de novo review when reviewing arbitration clauses. See Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn.1995). Whether Onvoy may be compelled to arbitrate its claims depends in large measure on the language of the arbitration clause and other lease terms between SHAL and Onvoy. In analyzing arbitration clauses, courts should “enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989); see also Johnson, 530 N.W.2d at 795. The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving that the dispute is outside the scope of the agreement. In addition the party bears an especially high burden if that party drafted the arbitration agreement. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000); Gabriel M. Wil-ner, Domke on Commercial Arbitration § 12.04 at 14 (1983).
[350]*350The arbitration clause in the lease between SHAL and Onvoy reads:
Mediation and Arbitration. Any unresolved disputes arising under this Lease shall be first submitted to mediation. Unless the dispute is resolved after consultation between the liaisons of each party, a mediator shall be selected by agreement of the chief operation officers of each party. In the event that a dispute cannot be resolved by mediation, then the parties agree that the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
(Emphasis added.) Onvoy urges us to apply the Minnesota Arbitration Act and our case law interpreting that act to determine that the “arising under” language does not evince an intent to arbitrate claims relating to the making of the contract. SHAL argues that the parties intended to arbitrate claims about the making of the contract, relying in part on an argument that “arising under” is broad enough to encompass Onvoy’s claims.
Reviewing the district court’s analysis of this case highlights the status of Minnesota law on arbitration. The district court first considered the Minnesota Arbitration Act. Minnesota Statutes § 572.08 (2002), declares that “a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” In 1972, we interpreted this act to determine whether a plaintiff could escape an arbitration clause in his franchise agreement by claiming there was fraud in the inducement of the contract. Ateas, 292 Minn, at 336, 197 N.W.2d at 450. In holding that the parties had not intended to arbitrate the issue of fraud in the inducement, and therefore that the dispute should remain in court, we stated that “[w]hen the making of the agreement itself is put in issue, as is the result of a claim of fraud in the inducement, that issue is more properly determined by those trained in the law.” Id. at 350, 197 N.W.2d at 457.
The district court used the legal framework we set out in Ateas to conclude that Onvoy’s claims regarding the formation of the lease would not be compelled into arbitration. Ateas instructed courts to commence an analysis of a motion to compel arbitration by looking at the language of the arbitration clause at issue to see if it is broad enough to cover the plaintiffs claims; if so, courts should verify that the plaintiff seeks total rescission of the contract. See Ateas, 292 Minn, at 347-48, 197 N.W.2d at 456. The district court determined that the language of the arbitration clause did not evince the parties’ intent to arbitrate Onvoy’s claims regarding the making of the contract and that Onvoy properly sought complete rescission of the contract. The court therefore concluded that, under Ateas, Onvoy’s “claims are not subject to compelled arbitration under Minnesota law.”
The district court then considered the impact of federal arbitration case law on its decision. The court concluded that “because the Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that the Minnesota Arbitration Act [is] not preempted by the FAA and that the Minnesota Arbitration Act therefore applies to cases brought in state courts involving arbitration agreements, [Onvoy] cannot be compelled to arbitrate the matter under the FAA” (relying on our decision in Thayer v. American Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599 (Minn.1982)). In Thayer, we acknowledged that federal law diverged from our holding in Ateas, especially on the issue of the severability of arbitration clauses,2 and determined that [351]*351Ateas was not preempted by federal case law. Thayer, 322 N.W.2d at 603.3
While the district court’s analysis is a correct application of Minnesota law under Ateas and Thayer, that reasoning now conflicts with and is preempted by federal law. Since our decision in Thayer, the Supreme Court has decided that Congress intended to use its full commerce power in drafting the FAA, so that it applies to all transactions that involve or affect interstate commerce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271-72, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995). The' Court explained further that the FAA applies to transactions that in fact involve interstate commerce, whether or not the parties anticipated an interstate impact. Id. at 273-74.4 It is now clear that Minnesota courts must apply the FAA to transactions that affect interstate commerce.
Because respondents do not dispute that the fiber-optic transmission lease involves interstate commerce within the meaning of Terminix, the arbitration clause in the lease between SHAL and Onvoy must be analyzed under federal law and, therefore, the district court and court of appeals erred in analyzing this case under Ateas. We overrule Ateas to the extent it conflicts with the holding in Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995). The instant case must be analyzed under the Federal Arbitration Act and the federal cases interpreting that act. The FAA voices a strong presumption in favor of arbitration. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248. It declares that written arbitration clauses are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999). Any doubt with respect to the intent of the parties regarding the scope of arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476,109 S.Ct. 1248.
The question is whether, under federal law, agreeing to arbitrate claims “arising under” the contract encompasses claims that the lease is void as an interested-director transaction or as an ultra vires transaction. The Supreme Court held that similar language in an arbitration clause, “any controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement, was broad enough to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs claims of fraudulent representations.” See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508, 519-20, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). The Third Circuit recently reviewed federal case law interpreting arbitration clauses containing the term “arising under” or substantially similar terms and concluded that the majority of circuits have interpreted those terms to include claims regarding contract formation. Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 725-27 (3d Cir.2000) (noting that “when phrases such as ‘arising under’ * * * appear in arbitration provisions, they are normally given broad construction, and are generally construed to encompass claims going to [352]*352the formation of the underlying agreements”). See generally Domke § 12.05 at 14 (noting that an agreement to arbitrate “[a]ny claim or controversy arising out of or relating to th[e] agreement” is the paradigmatic broad arbitration clause). Applying the reasoning set forth in these cases, we conclude that the language “arising under” in the arbitration clause at issue appears broad enough to encompass some issues regarding contract formation.5
In concluding that the arbitration clause in question is broad and prescribes arbitration of most claims, we do not mean to indicate that we will find all future arbitration clauses broad enough to encompass all claims.6 We limit our determination to the facts of this case and the particular arbitration clause at issue. Parties who want the courts to retain jurisdiction over matters of contract formation, or any other particular issues they foresee may arise in the business relationship, must expressly state such an intent when drafting the arbitration clause in the contract. Presented with a clear statement of the parties’ intent, courts will honor the plain language of the document and either retain jurisdiction of the case or compel arbitration. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (noting that the “[FAA] does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so”); Peggy Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Minn.2002) (clarifying that “parties may agree to arbitrate any type of dispute”); see generally Domke § 12.05 at 13 (“Parties may agree to submit to arbitration nearly any controversy that could be normally dealt with in ordinary court proceedings.”).
Onvoy urges us to rely on the decisions of certain federal circuit courts of appeals that have held that some claims about the very existence of the contract must be heard by a court, despite the scope of the arbitration agreement. SHAL argues that a Supreme Court case, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967), is dispositive and mandates that Onvoy arbitrate its claims.
In Prima Paint the Supreme Court declared that in order for a plaintiff to es[353]*353cape arbitration of his or her claim, the plaintiff must allege a problem with the making of the arbitration clause itself, not the contract as a whole. Id. at 403, 87 S.Ct. 1801. The Court reached that result because arbitration clauses are severable from the remainder of the contract under the FAA.7 Prim a Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801. In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court compelled arbitration notwithstanding the plaintiffs allegation that there was fraud in the inducement of the contract. Id. The Court held that the plaintiff could not escape compelled arbitration unless it showed that the arbitration clause itself was induced by fraud. Id. In cases where plaintiffs do not direct claims of fraud to the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be enforced and the parties will be forced to arbitrate their claims under the FAA. Id. SHAL argues that Prima Paint is disposi-tive of Onvoy’s case and mandates that Onvoy arbitrate its claims. Onvoy responds that Prima Paint did not address the facts of the instant case, where the existence of the agreement itself is at issue, and therefore the severability doctrine does not apply.
Because Onvoy has not alleged any problem particular to the making of the arbitration clause in this case, a simple application of Prima Paint would send Onvoy to arbitration.8 However, some federal circuit courts have carved out an exception to the Prima Paint rule that allows a court to hear challenges that are not directed at the arbitration clause itself. This exception allows a court to hear a plaintiffs claim that the disputed contract is void, while claims that a contract is voidable must be arbitrated.9 See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 32 (2d Cir.2001); Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 106-08 (3d Cir.2000); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir.1991). These federal courts reason that parties should not be forced to arbitrate under an agreement that they allege never existed.
SHAL argues that neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit has adopted the distinction between void and voidable contracts and, therefore, neither should this court. However, no circuit has explicitly disavowed the distinction and all federal circuits seem to have at least ac[354]*354cepted a similar rule that courts have jurisdiction when one party denies the very existence of the contract. See, e.g., Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir.1992); I.S. Joseph Co. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 400 (8th Cir.1986). We find the distinction made by the Second Circuit in Sandvik persuasive and adopt the exception to the Prima Paint doctrine enunciated therein; parties may not be compelled to arbitrate claims if they have alleged that the contract at issue never legally existed. Therefore, allegations that a contract is void may be heard by a court, even if not specifically directed to the arbitration clause, while allegations that a contract is voidable must be sent to arbitration.
II.
Applying this rule of law, we must consider whether Onvo/s claims about the formation of the lease render the lease void, as opposed to rendering it merely voidable. Onvoy makes two claims as to how the lease is void under Minnesota law — it claims the lease was an illicit ultra vires transaction and that it was an illicit interested-director transaction. In determining whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, courts look to applicable state law, as long as the state law invoked applies to contracts generally and is not aimed at arbitration clauses specifically. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); Shaw Group, Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir.2003).
A Ultra Vires Acts
We consider whether Onvoy’s ultra vires claim, if successful, would render the lease void or voidable. Onvoy asserts that the lease is ultra vires because it was not approved by a majority of the Onvoy board of directors and one Soros director as required by the amended articles of incorporation. Because the lease was entered into without authority, Onvoy claims that its lease with SHAL is void. SHAL posits that any such defect would not void the lease, and the arbitration clause would still be valid. The district court found that Onvoy had set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief under Minn.Stat. § 302A.165, and therefore denied SHAL’s motion to dismiss the claim. The court of appeals did not reach this issue.
Minnesota Statutes § 302A.165 governs ultra vires acts. The statute presumes contracts are valid; an otherwise lawful contract “is not invalid because the corporation was without the power to * * * perform the contract.” Minn.Stat. § 302A.165. However, the statute delineates three situations in which a contract or transaction can be declared invalid by a court because it was entered into without authority.10 Most applicable for this case is part (b) of the statute, which allows a corporation to bring an action “against the incumbent or former officers or directors of the corporation for exceeding or otherwise violating their authority” in a state court and have the contract declared invalid.
Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 218, 113 N.W. 271, 273 (1907), set out two types of ultra vires contracts. The first type, a more serious violation, describes “a contract which is not within the scope of the powers of a corporation to make under any circumstances, or for any purposes.” Id. The second type refers to contracts within the corporation’s power, but with “some irregularity or defect in the actual exercise [355]*355of the power.” Id. at 219,113 N.W. at 273. Acts that are ultra vires of the first type are void, while those of the second type are not automatically void. Id. at 219, 113 N.W. at 274. A similar distinction is put forward in Fletcher’s treatise, describing true ultra vires contracts as those outside the express or implied powers of the corporation fixed in its charter, statutes, or common law, and distinguishing acts that have been performed in the interest of the corporation but “beyond the authority of management.” 7A Fletcher Cyc. Corporations §§ 3399, 3402.
The facts of the present case approximate the second type of ultra vires act described in Bell more closely than the first, suggesting that Onvoy’s ultra vires claim would not render the lease void under Minn.Stat. § 302A.165. Onvoy had authority to enter into leases of this type and regularly did so; Onvoy alleges simply a “defect” in the exercise of its corporate power in failing to approve the lease by a majority of the Onvoy board of directors and one Soros director. Because it was not outside the authority of the corporation to enter into the lease and Minn.Stat. § 302A.165 presumes contracts are valid, we conclude that Onvoy’s claim that the lease is ultra vires, even if proven, would not be sufficient to declare the lease void, and therefore must be arbitrated.11
B. Interested-Director Transaction
Onvoy also asserts the lease is void and not subject to arbitration because the individually-named defendants negotiated the lease on behalf of Onvoy while either being board members or employees of SHAL. Onvoy alleges that Onvoy’s Network Corn-mittee made multiple decisions that unnecessarily ratcheted up the cost benchmark, making it more likely that SHAL could win the bid. Onvoy claims that this amounts to self-dealing, which is void under Minnesota law as an “interested director” contract. SHAL maintains that a transaction involving interested directors makes a lease at most voidable. The district court, in analyzing SHAL’s motion to dismiss, found that Onvoy had “adequately [pled] a claim for rescission based upon an interested director transaction.” The court of appeals did not reach this issue.
A claim that interested directors sullied a transaction is governed by statute in Minnesota. Minnesota Statutes § 302A.255 (2002) presumes a transaction is “not void or voidable,” even if approved by directors, officers, or legal representatives with a “material financial interest” as long as the party asserting the validity of the transaction can satisfy one of four safe harbor provisions. The defendant (in this case SHAL and the individually-named defendants) has the burden of proving the validity of the transaction. See 18 John H. Matheson & Philip S. Garon, Minnesota Practice, Corporation Law and Practice § 3.32 at 93 (1996). The defendant must show either (1) that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation at the time it was approved; (2) that material facts about the contract and the directors’ interest were fully disclosed and the contract was approved in good faith by at least two-thirds of the disinterested corporate shareholders; (3) that material facts about the contract and the directors’ conflicts were known by a board or committee who authorized the transaction without the vote of interested directors; or (4) that the [356]*356contract is a distribution, merger, or exchange. See Minn.Stat. § 302A.255. On-voy alleges in its complaint that none of the statute’s safe harbor provisions apply to the facts of this case.
Minnesota Statutes § 302A.255 leaves open the possibility that a transaction may be void as a result of the participation of an interested director. Because Onvoy alleges that interested directors improperly negotiated the lease, the burden shifts to SHAL and the individually-named defendants to establish the existence of one of the safe harbors. At this stage in the proceedings, SHAL and the individually-named defendants have not had the opportunity to develop a record on this issue and, therefore, it is not ripe for decision. Therefore, we remand to the district court to determine whether this lease is the product of an interested-director transaction sufficient to void the lease under Minn.Stat. § 302A.255. If the district court determines the lease is void under our corporate law statute, Onvoy’s interested-director claim may be heard by the district court instead of an arbitrator. If the district court determines the lease is only voidable, Onvoy’s claims must be compelled to arbitration pursuant to the Pri-ma Paint ruling. See Sphere Drake, 263 F.3d at 32.
III.
The final issue we must decide is whether the four individual defendants are entitled to enforce the arbitration provision of the lease between Onvoy and SHAL. Generally, arbitration clauses are contractual and cannot be enforced by persons who are not parties to the contract. Domke, supra, § 10.00. There are exceptions to the rule, however. Federal cases have set out at least three principles on which a nonsignatory to a contract can compel arbitration: equitable estoppel, agency, and third-party beneficiary. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 111 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir.1999).12 Equitable es-toppel prevents a signatory from relying on the underlying contract to make his or her claim against the nonsignatory. See id.; Domke, supra, § 10.07. Principles of agency work to “prevent circumvention of arbitration agreements but also to effectuate the intent of the signatory parties to protect individuals acting on behalf of the principal in furtherance of the agreement.” Domke, supra, § 10.02. Finally, nonsigna-tories who are third-party beneficiaries may enforce an arbitration clause if the “contracting parties intended the third party to directly benefit from the contract.” Domke, supra, § 10.08. The individual defendants claim Onvoy is equitably estopped from seeking court jurisdiction and that the defendants are agents of SHAL.
We note that the individual defendants appear to be employees or agents of SHAL, with the exception of Tom Dahl, whose status is unclear from the record. For those defendants who are agents of SHAL, their ability to compel arbitration of their claims is linked to SHAL’s ability to compel arbitration — if SHAL can compel arbitration of Onvoy’s claims against it, the individuals can also compel arbitration of Onvoy’s claims against them as agents of SHAL, because to do otherwise would be to subvert the intent of the signatories. See MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947; see also Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 1 F.3d 1110, 1122 (3d Cir. [357]*3571993); Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1281 (6th Cir.1990); Letizia, v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185, 1187-88 (9th Cir.1986). Because we have remanded to the district court for further inquiry into SHAL’s ability to compel arbitration, we must also remand the issue of the individual signatories. However, it is worth clarifying that the agency theory cannot extend to claims that the individuals breached them duties to Onvoy; it only applies to their actions as agents of SHAL, the principal. If the district court determines SHAL can compel arbitration, and some of the individual defendants are not agents of SHAL, the district court shall also rule on the ability of those individuals to rely on equitable estoppel to compel arbitration. If the individual defendants are neither agents of SHAL nor entitled to use the principle of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration of a particular claim, that claim must remain in district court.
We reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
HANSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.