Oneal v. Roberts

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided October 27, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-01732·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Ryan A. Oneal, No. CV-20-01732-PHX-SPL (MTM)

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Stephen Roberts,

Defendant. Before the Court is Defendant Roberts’ Motion to Stay Proceedings (doc. 4), filed September 23, 2020. Defendant requests that this Court stay this action on the grounds that Plaintiff’s excessive use of force claims in his civil proceeding are closely associated with an ongoing state court criminal proceeding. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff responded (doc. 5) opposing the motion on October 12, 2020, and Defendant replied (doc. 6) on October 19, 2020. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion, and stays these proceedings pending resolution of Plaintiff’s state court criminal proceeding. I. Background. This case is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Roberts used excessive force in arresting Plaintiff by deploying a Taser into Plaintiff without justification. (Doc. 1, Ex. A at 8). The events at issue took place on May 5, 2018. According to the Complaint originally filed in Maricopa County Superior Court, Plaintiff was crossing 32nd Street in Phoenix when three City of Phoenix Police officers—including Defendant—approached him. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff states that upon seeing the officers, Plaintiff placed his hands on his knees, as he was “tired and dehydrated from being out in the sun.” (Id). Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant deployed his Taser into Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to fall on his face to the ground. (Id). Plaintiff also alleges that while on the ground but before he was handcuffed by police, Defendant shocked Plaintiff four additional times as a “pain compliance tool” even though Plaintiff offered no resistance to the officers. (Id. at 6-7). Plaintiff was charged with two misdemeanors in Phoenix Municipal Court on November 9, 2018. Count One alleges Plaintiff recklessly interfered with the passage of a highway or public thoroughfare, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2906(A). (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 10). Count Two alleges that Plaintiff intentionally prevented or attempted to prevent a police officer, acting under color of official authority, from effecting an arrest by using or threatening to use physical force, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2508(A)(1) and A.R.S. § 13- 604. (Id). The case was docketed as No. 5366107 in Phoenix Municipal Court. Plaintiff filed an action in Maricopa County Superior Court on April 30, 2020. The state court complaint was served on Defendant on August 14, 2020. On September 3, 2020, Defendant removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and LRCiv 3.6, as the state court civil complaint asserted a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. II. Motion to Stay. Defendant argues that this matter should be stayed under the abstention doctrine outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). (Doc. 4 at 3). Defendant argues that the ongoing state proceeding is inextricably intertwined with the factual issues in this action, and that Younger counsels this Court to stay consideration of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims until after the state criminal case has concluded. (Id. at 4). Defendant also states in the Reply that staying this proceeding will not bar Plaintiff from seeking damages under Section 1983 after the state proceeding concludes, because the action was filed before the limitations period for Section 1983 claims in Arizona expired, and because the stay does not impact the statute of limitations. (Doc. 6 at 3-4, citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, Defendant concludes, Plaintiff’s interests will not be prejudiced by granting a stay of this action. Plaintiff argues in response that the facts at issue in this case do not rely on the same factual basis as the criminal charges in the state court proceeding. (Doc. 5 at 3). Plaintiff states that, because the excessive force claim in this Court concerns the deployment of a Taser by Defendant after Plaintiff was already on the ground, the excessive force claim has no bearing on whether Plaintiff actually resisted arrest. (Id. at 4-5). Therefore, Plaintiff concludes, Younger abstention is inappropriate. (Id. at 6-7). III. Principles of Law. Under Younger abstention, federal courts are generally required to abstain from hearing cases related to ongoing state court proceedings. Younger abstention applies to state criminal proceedings as well as state civil proceedings. King v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 885 F.3d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 2018)(citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics. Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Younger abstention applies when the state court proceeding is (1) ongoing; (2) implicates an important state interest, and (3) allows litigants to raise a federal challenge. Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Cnty. of Alameda, 953 F.3d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 2020)(citing ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014)). If these conditions are satisfied, a federal court may abstain under Younger if the federal action “would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings.” Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2019)(internal citations omitted). IV. Analysis. A. Ongoing State Proceeding. A stay of these proceedings until resolution of Plaintiff’s state criminal proceeding is appropriate. The first of the three conditions outlined in Citizens for Free Speech is easily satisfied; Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding remains pending in state court while this action remains pending in federal court. (See doc. 5 at 3). B. Important State Interest. The second prerequisite for Younger abstention—that the state proceeding implicates an important state interest—is satisfied as well. Plaintiff is accused of violating two Arizona criminal statutes. Arizona has an important interest in administering its own criminal justice system. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“[T]he States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court granting equitable types of relief”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45); see also Nichols v. Brown, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“Indeed, Younger, which involved abstention due to a pending criminal proceeding, explicitly recognized that a state must be permitted to ‘enforce ... laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.’”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 51-52). The state proceeding in this case implicates an importan

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Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Kelly v. Robinson
479 U.S. 36 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Wallace v. Kato
127 S. Ct. 1091 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Banner Health v. Sebelius
945 F. Supp. 2d 1 (District of Columbia, 2013)
William King v. County of Los Angeles
885 F.3d 548 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
William Herrera v. City of Palmdale
918 F.3d 1037 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
State v. Matthews
428 P.3d 198 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2018)
Tworivers v. Lewis
174 F.3d 987 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)