Oneal v. Roberts

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: October 27, 2020
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01732
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ryan A. Oneal, No. CV-20-01732-PHX-SPL (MTM)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Stephen Roberts,

13 Defendant. 14 15 16 Before the Court is Defendant Roberts’ Motion to Stay Proceedings (doc. 4), filed 17 September 23, 2020. Defendant requests that this Court stay this action on the grounds that 18 Plaintiff’s excessive use of force claims in his civil proceeding are closely associated with 19 an ongoing state court criminal proceeding. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff responded (doc. 5) opposing 20 the motion on October 12, 2020, and Defendant replied (doc. 6) on October 19, 2020. For 21 the reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion, and stays these proceedings 22 pending resolution of Plaintiff’s state court criminal proceeding. 23 I. Background. 24 This case is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges Defendant 25 Roberts used excessive force in arresting Plaintiff by deploying a Taser into Plaintiff 26 without justification. (Doc. 1, Ex. A at 8). 27 The events at issue took place on May 5, 2018. According to the Complaint 28 originally filed in Maricopa County Superior Court, Plaintiff was crossing 32nd Street in 1 Phoenix when three City of Phoenix Police officers—including Defendant—approached 2 him. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff states that upon seeing the officers, Plaintiff placed his hands 3 on his knees, as he was “tired and dehydrated from being out in the sun.” (Id). Plaintiff 4 next alleges that Defendant deployed his Taser into Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to fall on his 5 face to the ground. (Id). Plaintiff also alleges that while on the ground but before he was 6 handcuffed by police, Defendant shocked Plaintiff four additional times as a “pain 7 compliance tool” even though Plaintiff offered no resistance to the officers. (Id. at 6-7). 8 Plaintiff was charged with two misdemeanors in Phoenix Municipal Court on 9 November 9, 2018. Count One alleges Plaintiff recklessly interfered with the passage of a 10 highway or public thoroughfare, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2906(A). (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 11 10). Count Two alleges that Plaintiff intentionally prevented or attempted to prevent a 12 police officer, acting under color of official authority, from effecting an arrest by using or 13 threatening to use physical force, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2508(A)(1) and A.R.S. § 13- 14 604. (Id). The case was docketed as No. 5366107 in Phoenix Municipal Court. 15 Plaintiff filed an action in Maricopa County Superior Court on April 30, 2020. The 16 state court complaint was served on Defendant on August 14, 2020. On September 3, 2020, 17 Defendant removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and LRCiv 3.6, as the 18 state court civil complaint asserted a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 II. Motion to Stay. 20 Defendant argues that this matter should be stayed under the abstention doctrine 21 outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965 22 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). (Doc. 4 at 3). Defendant argues that the ongoing state proceeding 23 is inextricably intertwined with the factual issues in this action, and that Younger counsels 24 this Court to stay consideration of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims until after the state 25 criminal case has concluded. (Id. at 4). 26 Defendant also states in the Reply that staying this proceeding will not bar Plaintiff 27 from seeking damages under Section 1983 after the state proceeding concludes, because 28 the action was filed before the limitations period for Section 1983 claims in Arizona 1 expired, and because the stay does not impact the statute of limitations. (Doc. 6 at 3-4, 2 citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 3 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, Defendant concludes, Plaintiff’s interests will not be 4 prejudiced by granting a stay of this action. 5 Plaintiff argues in response that the facts at issue in this case do not rely on the same 6 factual basis as the criminal charges in the state court proceeding. (Doc. 5 at 3). Plaintiff 7 states that, because the excessive force claim in this Court concerns the deployment of a 8 Taser by Defendant after Plaintiff was already on the ground, the excessive force claim has 9 no bearing on whether Plaintiff actually resisted arrest. (Id. at 4-5). Therefore, Plaintiff 10 concludes, Younger abstention is inappropriate. (Id. at 6-7). 11 III. Principles of Law. 12 Under Younger abstention, federal courts are generally required to abstain from 13 hearing cases related to ongoing state court proceedings. Younger abstention applies to 14 state criminal proceedings as well as state civil proceedings. King v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 15 885 F.3d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 2018)(citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics. Comm. v. Garden State 16 Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). 17 Younger abstention applies when the state court proceeding is (1) ongoing; (2) 18 implicates an important state interest, and (3) allows litigants to raise a federal challenge. 19 Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Cnty. of Alameda, 953 F.3d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 20 2020)(citing ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th 21 Cir. 2014)). If these conditions are satisfied, a federal court may abstain under Younger if 22 the federal action “would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings.” 23 Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2019)(internal citations 24 omitted). 25 IV. Analysis. 26 A. Ongoing State Proceeding. 27 A stay of these proceedings until resolution of Plaintiff’s state criminal proceeding 28 is appropriate. The first of the three conditions outlined in Citizens for Free Speech is easily 1 satisfied; Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding remains pending in state court while this action 2 remains pending in federal court. (See doc. 5 at 3). 3 B. Important State Interest. 4 The second prerequisite for Younger abstention—that the state proceeding 5 implicates an important state interest—is satisfied as well. Plaintiff is accused of violating 6 two Arizona criminal statutes. Arizona has an important interest in administering its own 7 criminal justice system. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“[T]he States’ interest 8 in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the 9 most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court granting equitable types 10 of relief”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45); see also Nichols v. Brown, 945 F. Supp. 2d 11 1079, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“Indeed, Younger, which involved abstention due to a 12 pending criminal proceeding, explicitly recognized that a state must be permitted to 13 ‘enforce ... laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be 14 punishable under its laws and the Constitution.’”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 51-52). The 15 state proceeding in this case implicates an important state interest, satisfying the second 16 prerequisite for Younger abstention. 17 C. Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims. 18 Finally, the third prerequisite for Younger abstention—that the state proceeding will 19 allow Plaintiff to raise his federal claims—is met. In Plaintiff’s response to the state’s 20 request for discovery in the state proceeding, Plaintiff states that he may raise an 21 affirmative defense of self-defense in response to Defendant’s “use or attempted use of 22 unlawful physical force.” (Doc. 4, Ex. A at 22). Arizona state law provides that resisting 23 arrest is lawful as a response to a police officer’s use of excessive force. See State v. 24 Matthews, 428 P.3d 198, 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (citing A.R.S. § 13-404(B)(2)). 25 Therefore, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to demonstrate Defendant used excessive 26 force in violation of Plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights while arresting Plaintiff during 27 his state proceedings. 28 // 1 D. Effectively Enjoin State Proceedings. 2 The Court concludes adjudicating this action would have the practical effect of 3 enjoining Plaintiff’s state proceeding. Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies at least two different 4 instances when Tasers were allegedly deployed: Paragraph 24 states that Tasers were 5 deployed before Plaintiff was on the ground, and Paragraph 24 states that Tasers were 6 deployed after Plaintiff was on the ground. (See doc. 1 at 6). 7 As explained in Section IV(C), supra, it is a defense to resisting arrest under Arizona 8 law if the criminal defendant is resisting a police officer’s use of excessive force. Matthews, 9 428 P.3d at 203. Were this Court to rule in favor of Plaintiff, the ruling would have the 10 practical effect of enjoining the state proceeding, because the Court would necessarily have 11 to determine that Defendant’s deployment of the Taser in the course of arresting Plaintiff 12 constituted excessive force. Therefore, Plaintiff could argue in state court that Plaintiff 13 cannot be convicted of a violation of A.R.S. 13-2508(A)(1), because, based on the ruling 14 in this Court that Defendant used excessive force, Plaintiff was entitled to use physical 15 force under A.R.S. § 13-404(B)(2). Younger abstention is appropriate here. 16 Plaintiff argues that the excessive force allegations in the federal action have 17 “completely separate factual predicates” from the state crimes Plaintiff is accused of 18 committing. (Doc. 5 at 5). However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not merely identify the 19 deployment of the Taser once Plaintiff was on the ground as excessive. Count One of the 20 Complaint alleges that “Defendant Roberts tasered Plaintiff in a manner that was not 21 reasonable or justified under the circumstances.” (Id. at 8). Count One does not distinguish 22 between the two time periods when Tasers were deployed. Because Plaintiff also contests 23 the allegation that he was in a “fighting stance” prior to the first deployment of the Taser 24 by Defendant (see doc. 4 at 19; doc. 5 at 3), the Court concludes that the state court 25 proceeding and this proceeding do not involve “completely separate factual predicates” as 26 Plaintiff argues. 27 // 28 // V. Conclusion. 2 A stay of these proceedings, rather than outright dismissal, strikes the proper || balance between federalism interests and Plaintiff's prerogative to choose his own forum 4|| to litigate disputes. See Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1042 (“To stay instead of to dismiss the federal || action preserves the state’s interests in its own procedures, the federal plaintiff’s || opportunity to seek compensation in the forum of his choice, and an appropriate balance 7\| of federal-state jurisdiction.”) (citing Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 984). Out of respect for the 8 || independence of state judicial proceedings, application of Younger abstention is 9|| appropriate in this case. Defendant’s motion is granted. 10 IT IS ORDERED: 11 (1) Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings (doc. 4) is granted. 12 (2) This action is stayed pending resolution of City of Phoenix Municipal Court 13} Case No. 5366107. 14 (3) Defendant shall promptly notify this Court once Plaintiffs state court 15 || proceeding has concluded. Defendant’s notification shall include the date the proceeding 16 || terminated and the ultimate disposition of the state court proceeding. 17 (4) Defendant shall, no later than twenty-one (21) days after the conclusion of 18 || the state court proceeding, file a responsive pleading in this action. Should Defendant seek || dismissal of this action under Rule 12(b), Defendant must comply with the requirements of Rule 12.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure prior to filing a motion to dismiss. 21 Dated this 27th day of October, 2020. 22 23 24 LS 25 26 27 28

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