SABERS, Justice.
[¶ 1J Justice RICHARD W. SABERS delivers the majority opinion of the Court on Issue 1, which holds that hearsay statements by the decedent were admissible.
[¶ 2.] Justice SABERS delivers the majority opinion on Issue 2, which holds that Olson-Roti alleged a cause of action in her complaint and may pursue punitive damages.
[¶ 3.] The separate writings of Justice JOHN K. KONENKAMP, joined by Justice ROBERT A. AMUNDSON, and of Chief Justice DAVID GILBERTSON, joined by Justice STEVEN ZINTER, control Issue 3, and hold that a claim for punitive damages does not survive the tortfeasor’s death.
[¶ 4.] Justice SABERS dissents on Issue 3.
[¶ 5.] SABERS, Justice, writing the majority opinion on Issues 1 and 2.
[¶ 6.] Shirleen Olson-Roti and 11 others (collectively Olson-Roti) employed by Van Dyke Supply Company filed suit against Company and its owner, Bert Van Dyke, claiming damages for intentional and negligent exposure to dangerous chemicals. Van Dyke died prior to completion of the lawsuit and his daughter, Linda Kilcoin, was named personal representative of his estate and substituted as a defendant (collectively Company). Company now claims 1) on notice of review, that hearsay statements by decedent Van Dyke are inadmissible, 2) that Olson-Roti cannot pursue punitive damages without a separate cause of action, and 3) that a claim for punitive damages does not survive a tortfeasor’s death. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on Issue 3 and ruled that hearsay statements made by Van Dyke were admissible under SDCL 19-16-34. We affirm all issues through separate opinions.
FACTS
[¶ 7.] Van Dyke owned Company, located in Woonsocket, South Dakota. Among other products, Company manufactured eyes used by taxidermists. The eyes were made of glass and painted in [257]*257two “eye rooms.” Company employed approximately 30 women to paint the glass eyes.
[¶ 8.] Company purchased dry paint pigment from Ferro Corporation in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and mixed the dry pigment with other paints to create the paint used on the glass eyes. When delivered, the paint drums were labeled with content descriptions and were accompanied by material safety data sheets. The paints contained both lead and cadmium.1 After delivery, the paint was either stored in small jars, which were placed on the painting tables for the hand painters, or was attached to an airbrush for the paint sprayers. There were no labels on the jars used by the workers and the labels on the paint drums had been removed.
[¶ 9.] There was a general rule prohibiting eating in the eye rooms, but the rule was not strictly enforced until March 1994, when Van Dyke informed the employees that eating in the eye rooms was not permitted. He later posted signs indicating that eating in the eye rooms was prohibited.
[¶ 10.] In April 1994, Sally Weber, a supervisor in one of the eye rooms, underwent a blood test, which indicated a high level of lead in her blood. Upon learning the results, Weber advised another employee, Shirleen Olson-Roti, to visit hep doctor. She also underwent a blood test, which indicated a high level of lead in her blood. Olson-Roti reported the results of her blood test to Van Dyke and he suggested that all of the employees who worked in the eye rooms have their blood tested. Blood testing revealed that 8 women had toxic lead poisoning levels and 12 women had elevated levels.2 Olson-Roti claims the eye room workers were never informed of the presence of lead and cadmium in the paints they used.
[¶ 11.] In March 1995, Van Dyke sold Company to Cabela’s. Olson-Roti filed suit against Van Dyke and Company on February 27, 1996, alleging that Van Dyke and Company intentionally and negligently exposed employees to dangerous chemicals. An amended complaint was filed March 12, 1996 and a second amended complaint was filed February 5, 1997, which added Ferro Corporation as a defendant. Ferro Corporation was later dismissed by stipulation.
[¶ 12.] Company moved for summary judgment on May 4, 1999, arguing that the exclusivity provision under worker’s compensation law, SDCL 62-8-6, precluded Olson-Roti’s lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the exclusivity provision of SDCL 62-8-6 does not prohibit employees from bringing lawsuits for the intentional torts of their employers.
[¶ 13.] The motion for summary judgment was renewed on September 11, 2000. The trial court denied the renewed motion for summary judgment on October 30, 2000.
[¶ 14.] On August 22, 2001, Company filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that a claim for punitive damages did not survive the death of Van Dyke. Company also challenged the admissibility of hearsay statements made by Van Dyke and presented through the affidavits and [258]*258testimony of two former Company employees, Robert Rieger and Robert Kokesh.
[¶ 15.] The hearsay statements were those of Van Dyke and went directly to his knowledge of the dangers to the women and his refusal to warn them of those dangers. For example, when asked whether the women knew of the danger inherent in their work environment, Van Dyke replied, “[w]hat they don’t know won’t hurt them.” When advised that he should warn the women of the health risks inherent in working with the paint, he asked, “[w]ell, who would I get to paint this if they knew about this?” Kokesh also testified that he heard Van Dyke telling a plant manager that “the stuff would be gone in two weeks” and ordering the manager not to say a “... word about it to anyone else.”
[¶ 16.] A hearing was held on December 6, 2001. On January 3, 2002, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on punitive damages but determined that the hearsay statements were admissible.
[¶ 17.] Olson-Roti appeals the summary judgment on Issue 3 and Company filed notice of review on Issue 1. For the purposes of brevity and clarity, we address the notice of review first, as Issue 1. .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 18.] Our standard of review for summary judgment is well established and is “whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied.” Manuel v. Wilka, 2000 SD 61, ¶ 17, 610 N.W.2d 458, 462 (quoting Parmely v. Hildebrand, 1999 SD 157, ¶ 7, 603 N.W.2d 713, 715-16 (citations omitted)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without deference to the trial court. City of Colton v. Schwebach, 1997 SD 4, ¶ 8, 557 N.W.2d 769, 771 (citing Jasper v. Smith, 540 N.W.2d 399, 401 (S.D.1995)).
[¶ 19J “[E]videntiary rulings made by the trial court are presumed correct and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Perovich, 2001 SD 96, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d 12, 15 (citing State v. Goodroad, 1997 SD 46, ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d 126, 129). “The test is not whether we would have made the same ruling, but whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could have reasonably reached the same conclusion.” Goodroad, 1997 SD 46 at ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d at 129 (citing State v. Rufener,
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SABERS, Justice.
[¶ 1J Justice RICHARD W. SABERS delivers the majority opinion of the Court on Issue 1, which holds that hearsay statements by the decedent were admissible.
[¶ 2.] Justice SABERS delivers the majority opinion on Issue 2, which holds that Olson-Roti alleged a cause of action in her complaint and may pursue punitive damages.
[¶ 3.] The separate writings of Justice JOHN K. KONENKAMP, joined by Justice ROBERT A. AMUNDSON, and of Chief Justice DAVID GILBERTSON, joined by Justice STEVEN ZINTER, control Issue 3, and hold that a claim for punitive damages does not survive the tortfeasor’s death.
[¶ 4.] Justice SABERS dissents on Issue 3.
[¶ 5.] SABERS, Justice, writing the majority opinion on Issues 1 and 2.
[¶ 6.] Shirleen Olson-Roti and 11 others (collectively Olson-Roti) employed by Van Dyke Supply Company filed suit against Company and its owner, Bert Van Dyke, claiming damages for intentional and negligent exposure to dangerous chemicals. Van Dyke died prior to completion of the lawsuit and his daughter, Linda Kilcoin, was named personal representative of his estate and substituted as a defendant (collectively Company). Company now claims 1) on notice of review, that hearsay statements by decedent Van Dyke are inadmissible, 2) that Olson-Roti cannot pursue punitive damages without a separate cause of action, and 3) that a claim for punitive damages does not survive a tortfeasor’s death. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on Issue 3 and ruled that hearsay statements made by Van Dyke were admissible under SDCL 19-16-34. We affirm all issues through separate opinions.
FACTS
[¶ 7.] Van Dyke owned Company, located in Woonsocket, South Dakota. Among other products, Company manufactured eyes used by taxidermists. The eyes were made of glass and painted in [257]*257two “eye rooms.” Company employed approximately 30 women to paint the glass eyes.
[¶ 8.] Company purchased dry paint pigment from Ferro Corporation in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and mixed the dry pigment with other paints to create the paint used on the glass eyes. When delivered, the paint drums were labeled with content descriptions and were accompanied by material safety data sheets. The paints contained both lead and cadmium.1 After delivery, the paint was either stored in small jars, which were placed on the painting tables for the hand painters, or was attached to an airbrush for the paint sprayers. There were no labels on the jars used by the workers and the labels on the paint drums had been removed.
[¶ 9.] There was a general rule prohibiting eating in the eye rooms, but the rule was not strictly enforced until March 1994, when Van Dyke informed the employees that eating in the eye rooms was not permitted. He later posted signs indicating that eating in the eye rooms was prohibited.
[¶ 10.] In April 1994, Sally Weber, a supervisor in one of the eye rooms, underwent a blood test, which indicated a high level of lead in her blood. Upon learning the results, Weber advised another employee, Shirleen Olson-Roti, to visit hep doctor. She also underwent a blood test, which indicated a high level of lead in her blood. Olson-Roti reported the results of her blood test to Van Dyke and he suggested that all of the employees who worked in the eye rooms have their blood tested. Blood testing revealed that 8 women had toxic lead poisoning levels and 12 women had elevated levels.2 Olson-Roti claims the eye room workers were never informed of the presence of lead and cadmium in the paints they used.
[¶ 11.] In March 1995, Van Dyke sold Company to Cabela’s. Olson-Roti filed suit against Van Dyke and Company on February 27, 1996, alleging that Van Dyke and Company intentionally and negligently exposed employees to dangerous chemicals. An amended complaint was filed March 12, 1996 and a second amended complaint was filed February 5, 1997, which added Ferro Corporation as a defendant. Ferro Corporation was later dismissed by stipulation.
[¶ 12.] Company moved for summary judgment on May 4, 1999, arguing that the exclusivity provision under worker’s compensation law, SDCL 62-8-6, precluded Olson-Roti’s lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the exclusivity provision of SDCL 62-8-6 does not prohibit employees from bringing lawsuits for the intentional torts of their employers.
[¶ 13.] The motion for summary judgment was renewed on September 11, 2000. The trial court denied the renewed motion for summary judgment on October 30, 2000.
[¶ 14.] On August 22, 2001, Company filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that a claim for punitive damages did not survive the death of Van Dyke. Company also challenged the admissibility of hearsay statements made by Van Dyke and presented through the affidavits and [258]*258testimony of two former Company employees, Robert Rieger and Robert Kokesh.
[¶ 15.] The hearsay statements were those of Van Dyke and went directly to his knowledge of the dangers to the women and his refusal to warn them of those dangers. For example, when asked whether the women knew of the danger inherent in their work environment, Van Dyke replied, “[w]hat they don’t know won’t hurt them.” When advised that he should warn the women of the health risks inherent in working with the paint, he asked, “[w]ell, who would I get to paint this if they knew about this?” Kokesh also testified that he heard Van Dyke telling a plant manager that “the stuff would be gone in two weeks” and ordering the manager not to say a “... word about it to anyone else.”
[¶ 16.] A hearing was held on December 6, 2001. On January 3, 2002, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on punitive damages but determined that the hearsay statements were admissible.
[¶ 17.] Olson-Roti appeals the summary judgment on Issue 3 and Company filed notice of review on Issue 1. For the purposes of brevity and clarity, we address the notice of review first, as Issue 1. .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 18.] Our standard of review for summary judgment is well established and is “whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied.” Manuel v. Wilka, 2000 SD 61, ¶ 17, 610 N.W.2d 458, 462 (quoting Parmely v. Hildebrand, 1999 SD 157, ¶ 7, 603 N.W.2d 713, 715-16 (citations omitted)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without deference to the trial court. City of Colton v. Schwebach, 1997 SD 4, ¶ 8, 557 N.W.2d 769, 771 (citing Jasper v. Smith, 540 N.W.2d 399, 401 (S.D.1995)).
[¶ 19J “[E]videntiary rulings made by the trial court are presumed correct and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Perovich, 2001 SD 96, ¶ 11, 632 N.W.2d 12, 15 (citing State v. Goodroad, 1997 SD 46, ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d 126, 129). “The test is not whether we would have made the same ruling, but whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could have reasonably reached the same conclusion.” Goodroad, 1997 SD 46 at ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d at 129 (citing State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424, 426 (S.D.1986)). While the “ultimate decision to admit or not admit evidence is reviewable under the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard, the court’s preliminary determination of whether the hearsay, evidence is reliable will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844, 849 (S.D.1993) (quoting Matter of R.S.S., 474 N.W.2d 743, 749 (S.D.1991)).
[¶ 20.] 1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT VAN DYKE’S STATEMENTS ARE ADMISSIBLE UNDER SDCL 19-16-34.
[¶ 21.] Robert Rieger, an employee of Company, through an affidavit and live testimony, stated that he had discussions with Van Dyke regarding the exposure of the workers in the eye rooms to lead and cadmium. He stated that when he approached Van Dyke about the missing paint drum labels, Van Dyke told him, “[w]hat they don’t know won’t hurt them.” Robert Kokesh, a maintenance employee at Company, stated in a sworn affidavit, that he was ordered to clean up the eye rooms prior to the arrival of an OSHA inspector. He stated that because of his exposure to the paint, he became ill and learned that he had a high concentration of lead in his system. Kokesh stated that he [259]*259heard Van Dyke tell his son-in-law, Bill Kilcoin, that “the stuff would be gone in two weeks and they were not to say a ‘word about it’ to anyone.”
[¶ 22.] Following a hearing regarding the reliability of Rieger and Kokesh’s statements, the trial court concluded,that the statements were admissible under SDCL 19-16-34. Company argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Van Dyke’s statements were admissible through the testimony of Rieger and Kok-esh, claiming that the testimony is neither reliable nor corroborated by other evidence.
[¶ 23.] SDCL 19-16-34, which addresses the admissibility of a decedent’s statements, provides:
In actions, suits, or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased persons including proceedings for the probate of wills, any statement of the deceased, whether oral or written shall not he excluded as hearsay, provided that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was made by decedent, and that it was in good faith and on decedent’s personal knowledge.
(emphasis added). This Court liberally construes this statute so as to achieve its intended purpose. Estate of Regennitter, 1999 SD 26, 589 N.W.2d 920. The admission of a statement under SDCL 19-16-34 is within the trial court’s discretion. Martinson v. Holso, 424 N.W.2d 664, 667 (S.D.1988) (citing In re Congdon’s Estate, 74 S.D. 306, 310, 51 N.W.2d 877, 879 (1952); Cox v. Bowman, 71 S.D. 72, 75, 21 N.W.2d 277, 278-79 (1945)).
[¶ 24.] The trial court determined that Van Dyke’s statements were admissible. It stated:
[T]here is corroboration and [ ] we have two people having heard the statement from the decedentf.] [W]e also have the labels that were torn off the paint cans, and so there is sufficient corroboration to make it admissible.
Now, the balance of the arguments really go to the weight or credibility of the evidence in the jury’s determination should they base their decision on those statements. That’s up for the jury ultimately to determine, but the court does rule that they are admissible statements from decedent, and the court would allow the Plaintiffs to present that information.
The trial court determined that the testimony offered by Olson-Roti was based on personal knowledge and good faith affidavits. In addition, the trial court concluded that their testimony was corroborated by the missing labels on the paint cans. Company has failed to show that the trial court was clearly erroneous in determining that the hearsay statements are reliable or that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Van Dyke’s statements are admissible under SDCL 19-16-34. Therefore, we affirm.
[¶ 25.] 2. WHETHER OLSON-ROTI ALLEGED A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO SUPPORT HER CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
[¶ 26.] Company argues that South Dakota case law permits punitive damages only when they are supported by a separate cause of action. It argues that Olson-Roti is erroneously claiming that her claim for punitive damages is a separate cause of action, while it is only an element of damages. This point was conceded on oral argument by counsel for Olson-Roti.
[¶ 27.] This Court has stated that punitive damages are allowable only when supported by a cause of action. See Henry v. Henry, 2000 SD 4, ¶ 5, 604 N.W.2d [260]*260285, 288 (quoting Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 521 N.W.2d 921, 928 (S.D.1994) (holding that “punitive damages are not allowed absent an award for compensatory damages”)). “If a jury returns a verdict in the plaintiffs favor for zero damages in a case that requires proof of damages as an essential element, then the cause of action has not been proved, and no punitive damages can be awarded.” Henry, 2000 SD 4 at ¶ 7, 604 N.W.2d at 288, 289 (citing Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts § 2 (5th ed.1984)).
[¶ 28.] Olson-Roti- alleged 3 causes of action: 1) strict liability in tort, 2) intentional tort, and 3) negligent tort. In count 1 of her complaint, she stated: “[t]hat the operations, of the eye paint room using toxic chemicals, organic solvents, lead, cadmium, and heavy materials constituted an abnormally dangerous activity and Defendants are strictly liable therefore.” In count 2, she stated that: “Defendants knowingly exposed the Plaintiffs to injurious chemicals, including carcinogens, without warning them and without taking steps to provide proper ventilation, safety devices or testing. That Defendants knew that injuries to the Plaintiffs were substantially certain to result from the exposure to the toxic and carcinogenic substances.” In count 3, she alleged that: “[t]he Van Dyke Defendants were negligent in exposing the workers to toxic chemicals, cadmium, organic solvents, lead and heavy metals in the following manner[.]” Therefore, Olson-Roti alleged a cause of action in her complaint and she may pursue a claim for punitive damages.
[¶ 29.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, AMUNDSON, and, ZINTER, Justices, concur.
[¶ 30.] The holding of Issue 3, which is that a claim for punitive damages does not survive the tortfeasor’s death, is controlled by the writings of Justice KONENKAMP and Chief Justice GILBERTSON.
KONENKAMP, Justice.
[¶ 31.] It is not the policy of South Dakota law to punish the next generation for the wrongs of the last. And a dead wrongdoer is far beyond our temporal power to penalize. As the Restatement provides, in survival actions, “the death of the tortfeasor terminates liability for punitive damages.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 926(b) (1979); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (no punitive damages against representative of deceased tortfeasor in a death action).
[¶ 32.] Punitive damages in South Dakota are not designed to compensate victims. As Prosser explains, “it is generally ' agreed that punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff and not a matter of right[.]” Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 3, 14 (5th ed. 1984); cf. Mongold v. Estate of Gilbert, 114 Ohio Misc.2d 32, 758 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (Ct.Comm.Pl.2000) (punitive damages not awarded as additional compensation but to punish and deter conduct).
[¶ 33.] The punitive and deterrent aims of exemplary damages are inseparable. Our Legislature has spoken clearly on this point: a jury “may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant.” SDCL 21-3-2 (emphasis added). Therefore, both punishment of the tortfeasor and deterrence are required to satisfy the statutory punitive damage provision. As one California appeals court held in interpreting a similar provision, “[s]ince the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer for his acts ... and to deter him from the commission of like wrongs in the future, the reason for such damages ceases to exist with his death.” Whelan v. Rallo, 52 [261]*261Cal.App.4th 989, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 876, 877 (1997). Assessing punitive damages against an estate serves to neither punish nor deter the tortfeasor.
[¶ 34.] Concededly, the acts alleged against the decedent in this case describe reprehensible conduct. But we cannot ignore the clear language in our punitive damage statute declaring the purpose for punitive damages: to deter and punish wrongdoers, not their heirs.
[¶ 35.] Therefore, we affirm on Issue 3.
[¶ 36.] AMUNDSON, Retired Justice, concurs.
[¶ 37.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER, Justice, concur in result.
[¶ 38.] SABERS, Justice, dissents.