Olivo v. United States of America

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 3, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-09339
StatusUnknown

This text of Olivo v. United States of America (Olivo v. United States of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Olivo v. United States of America, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ERNESTO OLIVO, Plaintiff, 19-CV-9339 (CM) -against- ORDERTO AMEND JANE OR JOHN DOE, et al., Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, brings this pro seaction under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that Defendants transported him, a paraplegic, in a non-wheelchair-accessible vehicle on multiple occasions.By order dated November 15, 2019,the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 30days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b);see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1).Plaintiff did not file a prisoner authorization with his complaint. After the Court ordered him to do so, he filed his authorization on October 28, 2019. 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).The court must also dismiss a complaint ifthe court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,”Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the“special solicitude”in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim,pro sepleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to statea claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.”Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable forthe alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,”which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S.at 555.After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief.Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the complaint: On an unspecified date, at an unspecified location, prison officials “transported [Plaintiff] in a van to medical appointments and to and from the courthouse without certifying a [Bureau of Prisons’form] stating that he was in a stable medical condition.”(ECF No. 2, at 2.) The van used by Defendants “was not a special handicapped vehicle and it was impossible for plaintiff to maneuver his body and to adjust and reposition his body in order to minimize pressure and relieve pressure from his ulcer and bedsores.” (Id.) Plaintiff names as defendants the United States and John Doe defendants Bureau of

Prisons’(BOP) “Medical Designator” and Mid-Atlantic Regional Medical Designator. He seeks money damages. DISCUSSION The United States of America is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action. See28 U.S.C. § 2679(a), (b)(1). And “[a]ny civil action on a tort claim against the United States under [the FTCA] may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b). For venue purpose, “district courts in this Circuit have determined that where a prisoner is located does not necessarily establish residence.”Santamaria v. Holder,ECF 1:11-CV-1267, 38,2012 WL 566073, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2012), report and recommendation adopted,ECF

1:11-CV-1267,39,2012 WL 892180 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2012); see, e.g.,Spaulding v. Mayorkas, 725 F.Supp.2d 303, 308 (D.Conn.2010) (transferring actionto the District of Connecticut based on plaintiff’s pre-incarceration residence); Edme v. District Director, U.S. I.N.S., No. 03-CV- 0824, 2004 WL 792708, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.31, 2004) (holding that “[r]egardless of what the rule might be with respect to a very long prison term, it does not appear appropriate to consider Edme as a resident of Beacon, New York because of his temporary incarceration [of up to eight years] there”). Here, it is not clear whether this Court is a proper venue, and if not, which district would be a proper venue. First, Plaintiff does not assert any facts stating where he was incarcerated during the events giving rise to his claims. Second, he does not state where he resides and whether he resided in this District or in some other district before his incarceration. Third, he does not explain why he names an officer from theMid-Atlantic Region when that region covers

several federal districts not including the Southern District of New York.2 The Court therefore grants Plaintiff 30 days’leave to amend his complaint to assert facts showing that this District is the proper venue to litigate his FTCA claims. Should the amended complaint suggest that this District is not the proper venue, the Court shall transfer the action to a proper venue. CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within thirtydays of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended

Complaint,”and label the document with docket number 19-CV-9339(CM). An Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Spaulding v. Mayorkas
725 F. Supp. 2d 303 (D. Connecticut, 2010)

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Bluebook (online)
Olivo v. United States of America, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/olivo-v-united-states-of-america-nysd-2019.