Odell v. Ford County Sheriff's Department

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: April 15, 2026
• Docket: 25-3104
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-3104 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 15, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court GRATTON CURTIS ODELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-3104 (D.C. No. 5:25-CV-03008-JWL) FORD COUNTY SHERIFF’S (D. Kan.) DEPARTMENT; BRYAN STAMMER; MATTHEW BOLMER; STEPHEN M. LIGON,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Gratton Curtis Odell, a Kansas prisoner proceeding pro se, brought this civil

rights action against the Ford County (Kansas) Sheriff’s Department and three of its

deputies. Mr. Odell accuses the deputies of using excessive force when they arrested

him. The district court dismissed his complaint at the screening phase. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-3104 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/15/2026 Page: 2

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Odell filed his pro se complaint on January 14, 2025. He alleged that, on

January 28, 2023, he was walking to work when a Ford County sheriff’s deputy

stopped him based on a domestic violence complaint made by his girlfriend earlier

that morning. Soon, four more deputies arrived and began questioning him.

Mr. Odell eventually explained that he had shoved his girlfriend and broken her

phone. The deputies then told him he was under arrest. Mr. Odell countered they

should talk to his girlfriend again, prompting the deputies to “man handle” him and

take him to the ground. R. at 12. And three of them—defendants Bryan Stammer,

Matthew Bolmer, and Stephen Ligons—began using their tasers on Mr. Odell.

Collectively, he alleged, they tased him twenty-three times.

Mr. Odell further alleged the deputies took him to jail, where he showed his

taser burns to a fellow inmate. He then bonded out of jail and went to the hospital.

Hospital employees counted forty-eight taser burns and told him they would be

willing to testify on his behalf. Mr. Odell, however, counted only forty-six closely

spaced burns—which is apparently how he concluded he had been tased twenty-three

times, i.e., each closely spaced pair of burns representing one taser strike. He took

pictures of these burns.

Mr. Odell asserted the number of taser strikes he received amounted to

excessive force. This was especially so, he argued, considering there were five

deputies on the scene. He therefore invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested

compensatory damages.

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Because Mr. Odell is a prisoner and his complaint asks for compensation from

governmental employees, the district court screened the complaint. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a) (“The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as

soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental

entity.”). The district court noted that online Kansas court records showed Mr. Odell

had pleaded no contest to “interference with law enforcement by

obstructing/resisting/opposing felony warrant service or execution” and “battery on a

law enforcement officer - no bodily harm.” R. at 22. The court therefore raised the

possibility that Mr. Odell’s excessive force claim might be barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck held that

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Id. at 487. But the district court could not tell, based on Mr. Odell’s allegations,

whether Heck would apply to this situation. The district court therefore ordered the

Ford County Sheriff’s Department to produce a Martinez report.

A Martinez report is a procedure we first approved in Martinez v. Aaron,

570 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1978). As explained in later cases, the procedure allows

the district court to “direct prison officials to respond in writing to the [prisoner’s]

various allegations, supporting their response by affidavits and copies of internal

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disciplinary rules and reports. The purpose of the Martinez report is to ascertain

whether there is a factual as well as a legal basis for the prisoner’s claims.” Gee v.

Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir. 1987).

The Sheriff’s Department produced a Martinez report, as ordered. The report

included bodycam footage from Deputies Stammer and Bolmer (two of the

defendants here) and from non-defendant Deputy Luis Marquez, who was also

present when Mr. Odell was arrested. The various videos show a roadside discussion

between Mr. Odell and the deputies about the girlfriend’s accusations, followed by

Deputy Marquez moving in, reaching for one of Mr. Odell’s wrists, and instructing

him to put his hands behind his back. Then, an approximately 90-second struggle

ensues between Mr. Odell and all the deputies. Mr. Odell tries to keep his hands in

front of him (before he was taken to the ground) or under him (after he was taken to

the ground) to prevent the officers from pulling his hands behind his back and cuffing

them.

During the portion of the struggle where Mr. Odell is still standing, a deputy

tells the others to take Mr. Odell to the ground and another officer—the Martinez

report says it is Deputy Bolmer—warns Mr. Odell that he will get tased. Shortly

after there is one taser deployment to the back of Mr. Odell’s right leg, also attributed

to Deputy Bolmer but described as a failed strike because Mr. Odell moved his leg

away too quickly. After Mr. Odell is on the ground but still struggling against the

officers’ arrest efforts, Deputy Bolmer’s bodycam shows him applying one successful

strike to the back of Mr. Odell’s right leg and four successful strikes to the back of

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Mr. Odell’s left leg. Each strike lasts between one and two seconds. Roughly twenty

seconds after the final strike, the deputies manage to cuff both hands behind Mr.

Odell’s back.

Based on the footage and Deputy Bolmer’s incident report, the Martinez report

claimed that only Deputy Bolmer used his taser six times (one unsuccessful strike

and five successful strikes). The Martinez report further detailed the charges later

brought against Mr. Odell and the ones to which he pleaded no contest. The charges

to which he pleaded no contest included interference with a felony arrest (i.e.,

resisting arrest in a case involving a felony—alleged aggravated battery of his

girlfriend) and battery of a law enforcement officer (referring to a single kick that

struck Deputy Ligons during the struggle). The report asserted the deputies’ use of

force had been reasonable.

The district court reviewed the Martinez report and ordered Mr. Odell to

respond. The district court explained the Martinez report raised two potentially fatal

problems for Mr. Odell’s complaint. First, in the district court’s view, the bodycam

footage blatantly contradicted Mr. Odell’s claim that he had been tased by the

defendants twenty-three times; he was tased by Deputy Bolmer (and no one else)

only a few times, and only when he was actively resisting arrest. Second, the district

court reasoned Heck barred Mr. Odell’s excessive force claim because success on that

claim would necessarily implicate his convictions for resisting arrest and battery of a

law enforcement officer.

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Mr. Odell viewed the bodycam footage before responding. In his response, he

noted Deputy Bolmer’s bodycam footage does not start until just before the five taser

strikes while he (Mr. Odell) was on the ground. From Deputy Stammer’s bodycam

video, he counted twenty-seven times that the officers said, “give me your hands”

and two times in which they said “stop resisting.” He believed a taser strike

accompanied most of these orders. He also stated, “I have pictures I would like to

submit to this case. Is there an e-mail address or address I can mail my pictures to?”

R. at 161. He also repeated that a fellow jail inmate and hospital employees saw his

burns.

A few weeks later, Mr. Odell submitted what appears to be a supplemental

response (there is no docket activity between his original response and the second

document). Mr. Odell stated that he had someone e-mail his photos to the attorneys

listed on the Martinez report with a request that they e-file them with the court. He

again requested a court e-mail if one was available. And he concluded by stating, “I

know I was tased 23 times[,] maybe only 7 or so by[] [Deputy] Bolmer but the officer

in front of him was tasing me to[o][,] you just can’t see it. And the other officer was

the one saying give me your hands every time he tased me.” R. at 162.

About a week after the supplemental response, Mr. Odell sent a third document

to the district court asking if the attorneys listed on the Martinez report had submitted

his photos. “Since the defendant[s] got to submit [their evidence] in the Martinez

Report,” he stated, “I feel it’s only fair I get to present mine.” R. at 163. He also

asked to submit his file from the hospital.

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The district court responded to Mr. Odell’s third filing with an order stating,

“If information that could be contained in the medical records and/or pictures

Plaintiff seeks to file is relevant to the disposition of this matter, the Court will

instruct Plaintiff on how to accomplish filing them and will grant him time in which

to do so.” R. at 164.

Soon after, the district court entered an order dismissing Mr. Odell’s

complaint. The reasons were essentially the same as those described in the order

giving Mr. Odell an opportunity to respond to the Martinez report: (1) the video

evidence blatantly contradicted Mr. Odell’s claim of being tased twenty-three times;

and, regardless, (2) a verdict in his favor would violate Heck because such a verdict

would undermine his conviction for resisting arrest and battery of a law enforcement

officer.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo a district court’s § 1915A screening dismissal. See

McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001).

A. The Video Evidence

This case raises questions about the proper use of Martinez reports when they

include video evidence, especially in light of our statement that “the district court

may not look to the Martinez report, or any other pleading outside the complaint

itself, to refute facts specifically pled by a plaintiff, or to resolve factual disputes,”

Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir. 1993). We will assume for present

purposes, however, that a district court at the screening phase may nonetheless

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consult video evidence submitted with a Martinez report to determine whether it

blatantly contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations.

The “blatantly contradicted” standard comes from Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 380 (2007). There, in the context of a summary judgment dispute, the Supreme

Court held, “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a

court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.” Id. The Court also held video evidence in the record “so

utterly discredited [the plaintiff’s version of events] that no reasonable jury could

have believed him.” Id. Thus, “[t]he Court of Appeals [which had adopted the

plaintiff’s version of events] should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should

have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 380–81.

Mr. Odell’s description of what happened to him is not rendered “visible

fiction” by the bodycam footage submitted with the Martinez report. Most of the

relevant footage is from very close range. None of the three angles is consistently far

enough away from the struggle to see what every other officer is doing. The videos

therefore do not rule out the possibility that Mr. Odell received more taser strikes

than those from Deputy Bolmer. Thus, the district court incorrectly concluded that

the bodycam footage blatantly contradicted Mr. Odell’s allegations.

Moreover, if the “blatantly contradicted” standard applies in the Martinez

report context, it surely provides an opportunity for the plaintiff to submit

countervailing objective evidence. Cf. Teetz ex rel. Lofton v. Stepien, 142 F.4th 705,

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720 (10th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he blatant contradiction exception does not apply where

documentary evidence could plausibly support two competing versions of events.”).

“This court has indicated that photographs are the kind of evidence that may satisfy

the blatant-contradiction standard.” Vette v. K-9 Unit Deputy Sanders, 989 F.3d 1154,

1165 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have also entertained

the possibility that third-party medical records may sometimes be considered in this

context. See Burke v. Pitts, 157 F.4th 1326, 1335 (10th Cir. 2025) (noting the

argument that an autopsy report might create a blatant contradiction but concluding

the report in question was insufficiently supported), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar.

6, 2026) (No. 25-1062).

Mr. Odell repeatedly asked for a way to submit photographs depicting

numerous taser burns, as well as hospital records from the same day he was arrested.

Before entering its dismissal order, the district court acknowledged these materials

might be relevant. In the dismissal order, however, the court discounted their

relevance because it concluded even twenty-three taser strikes could not state a claim

for relief in light of Heck. We therefore turn to that issue.

B. The Heck Issue

The district court alternatively dismissed for failure to address Heck. As we

explain, this is not an alternative basis to affirm in this case.

After receiving the Martinez report, the district court entered an order giving

Mr. Odell an opportunity to respond. That order described the Heck bar and stated:

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Plaintiff pled no contest to felony interference with law enforcement based on his obstruction, resistance, or opposition to Deputy Marquez, who initially attempted to handcuff him. Plaintiff also pled no contest to misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer for kicking Defendant Ligon during the ensuing struggle. A finding that Defendant Bolmer’s repeated but brief uses of the taser in drive stun mode during that struggle was unconstitutional would necessarily implicate the validity of Plaintiff’s convictions of interference with law enforcement and misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal.

R. at 142.

Then, in its dismissal order, the district court relied on this as an alternative

basis to dismiss the complaint. “[E]ven assuming that Plaintiff was in fact tased 23

times,” the district court reasoned, “the sole count in this matter remains subject to

dismissal” because

the Court granted Plaintiff time in which to show good cause why his claims should not be dismissed under Heck. Although Plaintiff has responded to [that order], his responses—even liberally construed—do not address the Heck bar identified in the [order] as a basis for dismissal of his claims in this matter.

R. at 167, 168 (citation omitted). Continuing, the district court stated, “Plaintiff has

provided no reason for this Court to reconsider its conclusion . . . that his claims in

this matter are barred by Heck. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed

because it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” R. at 169.

A district court’s finding that a party waived an argument by failing to timely

raise it is a “fact-intensive question” that this court reviews for abuse of discretion.

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O’Tool v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 387 F.3d 1188, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004). The district

court is correct that Mr. Odell’s response said nothing about Heck. The district

court’s alternative holding nonetheless relied on a misreading of the record and was

therefore an abuse of discretion.

When the district court called for a response to the Martinez report, its Heck

analysis explicitly adopted the defendants’ version of events, as supposedly

confirmed by the video evidence: “A finding that Defendant Bolmer’s repeated but

brief uses of the taser in drive stun mode during that struggle was unconstitutional

would necessarily implicate the validity of Plaintiff’s convictions . . . .” R. at 142

(emphasis added). Mr. Odell’s failure to respond to this assertion is understandable

given his consistent focus on proving this is not what actually happened. But the

district court’s dismissal order changed the focus. The district court faulted

Mr. Odell for failing to respond to the Heck issue “even assuming that [he] was in

fact tased 23 times.” R. at 167. The district court never gave Mr. Odell notice that

he needed to address Heck even assuming his own version of events was correct.

If the district court meant to say that, even under Mr. Odell’s version of events,

a finding in his favor would undermine his convictions, we do not believe the current

record can support such a conclusion. A person convicted of resisting arrest may still

bring an excessive force claim under the theory that the force used to overcome his or

her resistance was excessive. See Surat v. Klamser, 52 F.4th 1261, 1271–74 (10th

Cir. 2022) (concluding the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff could

support a finding that an officer used excessive force to overcome the plaintiff’s

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resistance, even though the plaintiff had been convicted of resisting arrest and the

jury in that case had rejected the plaintiff’s self-defense argument). And a person

convicted of battery on a police officer may bring an excessive force claim arising

out of that incident if, for example, “the officer used too much force to respond to the

assault or . . . the officer used force after the need for force had disappeared.”

Havens v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 776, 782 (10th Cir. 2015). On the record as it presently

exists, we cannot say as a matter of law that twenty-three taser strikes were

appropriate to subdue Mr. Odell.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s screening dismissal and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. We grant Mr. Odell’s motion to

proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees.

Entered for the Court

Veronica S. Rossman Circuit Judge