[266]*266GRABER, J.
This case involves a product liability claim against defendants, who manufactured and sold a 1985 Honda Model ATC350X three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle (ATV) used by plaintiff. Plaintiff attempted to drive the ATV up a steep embankment; it overturned backward, injuring him. Plaintiff then brought this action against defendants, alleging that they were negligent in manufacturing, distributing, and selling the ATV, because they knew or should have known that it had an inherently dangerous design that rendered it unreasonably dangerous to users, and alleging strict liability.
A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding both general and punitive damages.1 Defendants appealed. They argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence excerpts of various documents generated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),2 relating to the safety of ATVs. Defendants also argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial on the basis of the discovery of new eyewitnesses to plaintiffs accident. Finally, they argued that the award of punitive damages was excessive and, therefore, violated their rights under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution3 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.4
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in admitting the excerpts from the CPSC documents, [267]*267because that evidence was used for the limited and relevant purpose of showing defendants’ knowledge of the allegedly dangerous characteristics of ATVs. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 108 Or App 43, 47-48, 814 P2d 517 (1991). The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for a new trial on the basis of the discovery of new eyewitnesses to plaintiffs accident, because the trial court was entitled to find that the newly discovered evidence probably would not have changed the verdict. Id. at 55-56. With respect to punitive damages, the court held that the award did not violate defendants’ rights under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, because that provision “does not apply in civil actions between private parties.” Id. at 49-50. Finally, the court held that the award of punitive damages did not violate defendants’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 50-55. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CPSC DOCUMENTS
Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to read to the jury excerpts from nine CPSC documents. The documents included seven CPSC internal staff memoranda on the safety of ATVs; a CPSC notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comments and data relating to the safety of ATVs; and a CPSC press release concerning ATV-related accidents and injuries.
A. Relevance
During the hearing on defendants’ motion in limine to exclude documents generated by the CPSC, plaintiff argued that the disputed material was relevant to show that defendants had “notice” of the alleged dangerousness of ATVs and that the material was, therefore, relevant to two issues: the foreseeability of plaintiffs injury and defendants’ reaction to the notice as bearing on punitive damages.
OEC 401 provides:
“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
[268]*268OEC 402 provides:
“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Oregon Evidence Code, by the Constitutions of the United States and Oregon, or by Oregon statutory and decisional law. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”
Defendants do not challenge the authenticity of the CPSC documents, and they stipulated that they had received each of the documents from which plaintiff read excerpts, at approximately the time of its publication. Defendants do not argue that their knowledge of ATVs’ potential instability was irrelevant to the issues at trial. Rather, they argue that the other ATVs and the other accidents described in the disputed documents were so unlike this ATV and this accident that knowledge of the documents did not give defendants notice of anything relevant.
First, defendants contend that the ATVs that were the subject of the CPSC documents were not “substantially similar’ ’ to the Honda ATV that allegedly caused the injury in this case. We are unpersuaded. The CPSC documents dealt with ATVs as a class of vehicles. As one of the documents stated, vehicles of that class are of similar design. The trial court was entitled to find that the ATVs that were the subject of the CPSC documents were sufficiently similar to the ATV that caused the injury in this case to provide notice to defendants of danger to persons in plaintiffs position.
Second, defendants contend that the accidents that were referred to or described in the CPSC documents were not “substantially similar” to the accident that caused plaintiffs injury here. Again, we disagree with defendants’ contention. One of the excerpts at issue concerned reports of the instability of ATVs as a class. Another concerned reports showing a “pattern of loss of control” specifically associated with ATVs manufactured by Honda. Three excerpts concerned reported incidents in which ATVs overturned backward, and three others more specifically concerned incidents in which ATVs overturned backward while climbing hills. As noted, the ninth excerpt concerned the similarity in configuration among all brands of ATVs. The trial court was entitled to find that the prior occurrences that were described in those [269]*269excerpts were sufficiently similar to the accident at issue in this case to make those occurrences relevant.
In summary, the excerpts from the CPSC documents, admitted by the trial court, were relevant to issues at trial. The trial court did not err in so holding.
B. Hearsay
We next consider defendants’ argument that, even if the excerpts from the CPSC documents were relevant to the issue whether defendants had notice of the dangerousness of the product, those excerpts were inadmissible because they were hearsay. OEC 801(3) provides:
“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
Defendants’ hearsay objections were not well taken, because the excerpts from the CPSC documents were not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein. Rather, those excerpts were offered for the limited and proper purpose of showing that defendants had knowledge of the potential dangerousness of ATVs. See Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 484-85 (2d ed 1989) (“[m]any out-of-court statements may be received in evidence because they are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted,” but for some other purpose, including the purpose of showing that the recipient of the statement had knowledge of the matter asserted therein).
It is clear that the trial court admitted the documents for the limited purpose for which plaintiff offered them. The court gave the following instruction just before the excerpts of CPSC documents were read to the jury:
“Jurors, I am now going to permit plaintiffs counsel to read to you excerpts from some documents of the federal agency. The documents that I will allow plaintiffs counsel to read to you are not admitted for the purpose of establishing the truth of the statements contained in those documents. That means that you should not assume that the statements in those documents are true.
“These documents are admitted for the limited purpose of notice. Plaintiff has alleged that these documents gave [270]*270defendants notice before the date of [plaintiffs] accident that the [ATVs] could overturn.
“I will not suggest to you that these documents constitute adequate notice. The adequacy of the notice is an issue for you to decide. The statements contained in these documents, the ones that will be read to you, may or may not be true. But we are not going to resolve their truth in this courtroom. In other words, they are coming in for a limited purpose on the basis that the plaintiff has alleged that [Defendants] had notice, and this is the evidence that’s submitted to you and you will make that ultimate determination.”
After plaintiffs counsel read the excerpts, the trial court told the jury:
“Jurors, again, I want to review with you the limitation that the Court has placed on this information. First, I want to remind you that you should not assume that these statements are true. The plaintiff claims that the excerpts that the lawyer just read to you gave [defendants] notice before plaintiffs accident that [ATVs] could overturn, and I’m not suggesting to you that the excerpts just read to you constitute adequate notice. That will be an issue that you will have to decide.”
The CPSC documents were not excludable as hearsay.
C. Prejudice
Defendants argued that the probative value of each of the CPSC documents was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98, 112, 806 P2d 110 (1991), this court explained:
“Under OEC 403, relevant evidence is admissible so long as its probative value is not ‘substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’
“OEC 403, like its federal counterpart, FRE 403,
“ ‘requires the trial judge to go through a conscious process of balancing the costs of the evidence against its benefits. Unless the judge concludes that the probative worth of the evidence is “substantially outweighed” by one or more of the countervailing factors, there is no discretion to exclude; the evidence must be admitted.’ ”
[271]*271(Quoting Wright & Graham, 22 Federal Practice and Procedure 263-64.)
The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court went through the conscious process that is required. The court carefully considered the evidentiary costs and benefits of the CPSC documents and concluded that the probative value of those documents was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The record permitted a reasonable trial court to draw that conclusion. Having permissibly drawn that conclusion, the trial court was required then to admit the disputed evidence. There was no error.
D. Conclusion
The excerpts' from the CPSC documents were authentic, were relevant, and were not hearsay. The trial court did not err in admitting them.
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
We next consider defendants’ argument that the trial court erred in denying their motion, made pursuant to ORCP 64B(4)5 and ORCP 71B(l)(b),6 for a new trial based on the discovery, after trial, of two eyewitnesses to part of the incident giving rise to plaintiffs injury. The witnesses were a man and his daughter, who was seven years old at the time of plaintiffs accident. Defendants assert that the testimony of those witnesses would have disputed the testimony of the only other eyewitnesses to the accident — plaintiffs two [272]*272brothers — in regard to plaintiffs location at the time he began the maneuver that culminated in his accident and in regard to his speed and his position on the ATV during the maneuver. Defendants argue that, because the witnesses would have provided the jury with “important new evidence” on many basic facts of the accident and because they were the only unbiased witnesses to the incident, it was probable that their testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial.
Plaintiff responds that, because the eyewitnesses did not see the ATV turn over, but only saw plaintiff as he started up the hill and again after he had been injured, the testimony of the eyewitnesses “provided no new insight into the nature of plaintiffs accident.”
This court has not previously considered what factors a trial court should weigh in ruling on a motion for a new trial, under ORCP 64B(4), based on the discovery of new evidence. ORCP 64B(4) is, however, materially identical to former OCLA 5-802(4) and former ORS 17.610(4). In reviewing the denial of motions made under those statutes, this court consistently stated that applications for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are not favored and that the grant or denial of such motions is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Skoog v. Minkoff, 260 Or 148, 150-51, 488 P2d 1364 (1971) (stating that principle); Larson v. Heintz Const. Co., 219 Or 25, 72, 345 P2d 835 (1959) (same); Newbern v. Exley Produce Express, 208 Or 622, 630-33, 303 P2d 231 (1956) (same); State v. Davis, 192 Or 575, 579, 235 P2d 761 (1951) (same). In State v. Davis, supra, 192 Or at 579, this court also stated:
“Newly discovered evidence which will justify a court in granting a new trial must meet the following requirements:
“ ‘(1) It must be such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) it must have been discovered since the trial; (3) it must be such as, with due diligence, could not have been discovered before the trial; (4) it must be material to the issue; (5) it must not be merely cumulative; (6) it must not be merely impeaching or contradicting of former evidence.’ § 5-802, O.C.L.A.” (Citation omitted.)
The trial court in this case found that there was no lack of diligence by defendants in their efforts to locate the [273]*273witnesses before trial. See ORCP 64B(4) (stating that prerequisite for granting a new trial for reason of newly discovered evidence); State v. Davis, supra (same under former law). After reviewing affidavits from the newly discovered witnesses and other information pertaining to their expected testimony, however, the trial court found that “the newly discovered evidence probably would not have changed the result” of the trial.
We conclude that, first, the trial court did not err in applying that standard to the newly discovered evidence. See ORCP 64B (new trial may be granted for specified “causes materially affecting the substantial rights” of aggrieved party); State v. Davis, supra (under former law, stating test of probable change of result). Second, having reviewed the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. We note, as did the Court of Appeals, the length of time between the accident and the witnesses’ statements (four years), the daughter’s young age at the time of the accident, the distance from which the witnesses observed plaintiff, the fact that neither witness actually saw the accident, and the fact that the father said that he did not disagree with plaintiffs testimony. Those factors suggest that the newly discovered evidence probably would not have changed the result of the trial.
The trial court did not err in denying defendants’ motion for a new trial on the basis of the discovery of the new witnesses.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
We next turn to defendants’ constitutional arguments. We first consider defendants’ state constitutional claim. See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316 (1983) (court considers state constitutional claims before federal ones).
A. Article I, section 16
Defendants argue that the award of punitive damages in this case violated their rights under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, set out in note 3, supra, to be [274]*274free from “excessive fines” and from penalties not “proportioned to the offense.” This court has not previously considered the application of that constitutional provision to a civil award of punitive damages.
We begin by examining the text and context of the provision. See Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-19, 840 P2d 65 (1992) (setting out method of construing another provision of Oregon Constitution). The first sentence of Article I, section 16, refers to what may be done before and after conviction of a crime. Article I, section 16, limits the amount of bail that may be required; bail relates to criminal proceedings. See Article I, section 14 (providing that offenses other than murder and treason shall be bailable). The first sentence of Article I, section 16, further specifies that “excessive fines” may not be imposed. That limitation follows the reference to bail and precedes two sentences relating only to criminal cases. Moreover, at the time that the Oregon Constitution was drafted (as now), a “fine” commonly referred to a criminal penalty. See Burrill’s Law Dictionary, Part 1, at 491 (1850) (“Fine” means “[a] payment of money imposed upon a party as a punishment for an offence [sic].” “To fine” means “[t]o impose a pecuniary punishment; to order, adjudge or sentence that an offender pay a certain sum of money as a punishment for his offence [sic].”).
The second sentence of Article I, section 16, uses two terms that refer to crimes: “punishments” and “offense.” Those terms appear in the two preceding constitutional provisions, where they clearly refer only to crimes. Article I, section 14, relates to bail for criminal “offences” [sic], and Article I, section 15, uses the word “punishment” to refer to punishment for crime. See State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 212, 752 P2d 1136 (1988) (Linde, J., dissenting) (“principles of humane penal laws” are “enshrined” in Article I, section 15, and Article I, section 16 (emphasis added)).
The final sentence of Article I, section 16, specifies that it applies “[i]n all criminal cases whatever.” That sentence mentions civil cases only as a benchmark, further suggesting that the section does not itself apply to civil cases.
Reading Article I, section 16, as a whole, and in context, we conclude that it applies only to criminal cases.
[275]*275History does not disprove what the text demonstrates. Article I, section 16 was modeled after the equivalent provision of the Indiana Constitution. Carey, The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1857, at 468 (1926). We have found no Indiana court decision or other source antedating Oregon’s adoption of the Indiana provision, which might inform us as to what the framers of our constitution understood. See Priest v. Pearce, supra, 314 Or at 418-19 (so stating).
We hold that Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, does not apply to civil awards of punitive damages. The award of punitive damages in this case, therefore, does not violate Article I, section 16.
B. Due Process
Finally, defendants argued on appeal that, because the award of punitive damages in this case was the product of an exercise of standardless discretion by the jury and was “excessive” and “disproportionate,” it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, set out at note 4, supra. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 US 1, 111 S Ct 1032, 113 L Ed 2d 1 (1991), which defendants cite in support of this argument, was decided after the trial in this case. In this court, defendants rely on Haslip for the proposition that, to afford due process, an award of punitive damages must be subject to comprehensive post-verdict trial and appellate court review and that, because Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution7 restricts the power of Oregon trial and [276]*276appellate courts to conduct such a review, the required safeguards were absent here.
In response, plaintiff contends that, in approving Alabama’s procedure for awarding punitive damages in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra, the United States Supreme Court did not establish standards for such awards beyond the general requirements of “reasonableness” and of “adequate guidance” to the jury by the trial court. Plaintiff also contends that the award of punitive damages in this case met those standards.
Because of its significance to our decision here, we begin by examining in detail the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra.
The jury awarded punitive damages; the trial court approved the award, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed it on appeal. The insurer sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, on the ground that the award of punitive damages was the product of unbridled jury discretion and that it therefore violated the insurer’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
In considering that assertion, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[pjunitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law, ’ ’ Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra, 111 S Ct at 1041, and that the common-law method of assessing those damages was not per se unconstitutional, id. at 1042-43. The Court described the common-law method as follows:
“Under the traditional common-law approach, the amount of the punitive award is initially determined by a jury [277]*277instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct. The jury’s determination is then reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable.”
Id. at 1042. The Court noted, that, on previous occasions, it had approved awards of punitive damages even where the “discretion of the jury * * * [was] not controlled by any very definite rules” and where “there was no statute fixing a maximum penalty, no rule for measuring damages, and no hearing.” Ibid.
The Court cautioned, however, that the mere fact that punitive damages “have been recognized for so long’ ’ did not mean that “their imposition is never unconstitutional.” Expressing concern about “punitive damages ‘run wild,’ ” the Court concluded that it must “determine whether the Due Process Clause renders the punitive damages award in this case constitutionally unacceptable.” Id. at 1043.
The Court’s analysis proceeded as follows:
“One must concede that unlimited juiy discretion — or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter — in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities. We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however, that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus. * * *
“ 1. We have carefully reviewed the instructions [given] to the jury [by the Alabama court in this case].[9] By these [278]*278instructions, the trial court expressly described for the jury the purpose of punitive damages. * * *
“To be sure, the instructions gave the jury significant discretion in its determination of punitive damages. But that discretion was not unlimited. It was confined to deterrence and retribution, the state policy concerns sought to be advanced. And if punitive damages were to be awarded, the jury ‘must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.’ * * *
“These instructions, we believe, reasonably accommodated [the defendant’s] interest in rational decisionmaking and Alabama’s interest in meaningful individualized assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution. * * * As long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied.
“2. Before the trial in this case took place, the Supreme Court of Alabama had established post-trial procedures for scrutinizing punitive awards. In Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So 2d 1374 (1986), it stated that trial courts are ‘to reflect in the record the reasons for interfering with a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on grounds of excessiveness of the damages.’ Among the factors deemed ‘appropriate for the trial court’s consideration’ are the ‘culpability of the defendant’s conduct,’ the ‘desirability of discouraging others from similar conduct,’ the ‘impact upon the parties,’ and ‘other factors, such as the impact on innocent third parties.’ The Hammond test ensures meaningful and adequate review by the trial court whenever a jury has fixed the punitive damages.
“3. By its review of punitive awards, the Alabama Supreme Court provides an additional check on the jury’s or trial court’s discretion. It first undertakes a comparative analysis. It then applies the detailed substantive standards it [279]*279has developed for evaluating punitive damages. In particular, it makes its review to ensure that the award does ‘not exceed an amount that will accomplish society’s goals of punishment and deterrence.’ Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So 2d 218 (1989)[.] This appellate review makes certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition.
“Also before its ruling in the present case, the Alabama Supreme Court had elaborated and refined the Hammond criteria for determining whether a punitive award is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence and retribution. Hornsby, [supra]. It was announced that the following could be taken into consideration in determining whether the award was excessive or inadequate: (a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant’s awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the ‘financial position’ of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
“The application of these standards, we conclude, imposes a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding punitive damages. * * *
“* * * The standards provide for a rational relationship in determining whether a particular award is greater than reasonably necessary to punish and deter. They surely are as specific as those adopted legislatively in [Ohio] and [Montana].
“[The insurer] had the benefit of the full panoply of Alabama’s procedural protections. The jury was adequately instructed. The trial court conducted a post-verdict hearing that conformed with Hammond. * * * [The Supreme Court of Alabama] applied the Hammond standards and approved the verdict thereunder. It brought to bear all the relevant factors recited in Hornsby.
[280]*280“We are aware that the punitive damages award in this case is more than 4 times the amount of compensatory-damages, is more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of [the plaintiff], and, of course, is much in excess of the fine that could be imposed for insurance fraud [under Alabama law], * * * While the monetary comparisons are wide and, indeed, may be close to the line, the award here did not lack objective criteria. We conclude, after careful consideration, that in this case it does not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety. Accordingly, [the defendant’s] due process challenge must be, and is, rejected.”
Ill S Ct at 1043-46 (footnotes omitted; some citations omitted).
In summary, the Supreme Court first identified the constitutional interests required to be safeguarded in the determination of an award of punitive damages: the constitutional interest in ensuring that the finder of fact has “adequate guidance” in making such an award and the constitutional interest in ensuring that the amount of the resulting award is “reasonable.” Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra, 111 S Ct at 1043.10 The Court then identified the criteria that are applied in Alabama when a jury makes, or a court approves, an award of punitive damages. Finally, the Court determined that the application of those criteria adequately safeguarded the constitutional interests identified, because the criteria “impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama fact-finders in awarding punitive damages,” id. at 1045, and because the criteria “provide[d] for a rational relationship” between the amount of an award and a defendant’s conduct, the need for punishment, and the need for deterrence, id. at 1045-46.
[281]*281We apply an equivalent analysis to the procedure for determining awards of punitive damages in Oregon product liability actions, to ascertain whether that procedure, although differing in some respects from the Alabama procedure, also adequately safeguards the due process rights of defendants in this state. We begin by setting out the statute establishing the substantive criteria to be considered by Oregon factfinders in deciding, in product liability actions, whether to make awards of punitive damages and in setting the amounts of those awards. ORS 30.925 provides:
“ (1) In a product liability civil action, punitive damages shall not be recoverable unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom punitive damages is sought has shown wanton disregard for the health, safety and welfare of others.
“(2) During the course of trial, evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay shall not be admitted unless and until the party entitled to recover establishes a prima facie right to recover under subsection (1) of this section.
“(3) Punitive damages, if any, shall be determined and awarded based upon the following criteria:
“ (a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s misconduct;
“(b) The degree of the defendant’s awareness of that likelihood;
“(c) The profitability of the defendant’s misconduct;
“(d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
“(e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
“(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and
“(g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed on the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive damage awards to persons in situations similar to the claimant’s and the severity of criminal penalties to which the defendant has been or may be subjected.”
In addition, ORS 41.315 provides:
“(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, a claim for punitive damages shall be established by clear and convincing evidence.
[282]*282“(2) In a civil action in which a party seeks punitive damages from another party, evidence of the financial condition of a party shall not be admissible until the party seeking such damages has presented evidence sufficient to justify to the court a prima facie claim of punitive damages.”11
More generally:
“ ‘Punitive damages are allowed in Oregon to punish a willful, wanton or malicious wrongdoer and to deter that wrongdoer and others similarly situated from like conduct in the future. Martin v. Cambas, 134 Or 257, 293 P 601 (1930); accord Noe v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 248 Or 420, 435 P2d 306 (1967).’ State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or 61, 65, 618 P2d 1268 (1980). Punitive damages ‘are not a substitute for compensatoiy awards nor an offset against litigation expense.’Id.; see also Andor v. United Air Lines, 303 Or 505, 511-13, 516-17, 739 P2d 18 (1987). * * *
“* * * [T]he appropriate line of analysis that this Court has said a jury should follow in cases involving potential awards of punitive damages [is]:
[283]*283“ ‘[t]he finder of fact must determine what punitive damages, if any, to award based on the proper premise of deterring future similar misconduct by the defendant or others. To this end, a number of factors may be relevant, including the seriousness of the hazard to the public, the attitude and conduct of the wrongdoer upon learning of the hazard, the number and position of employees involved in causing or covering up the misconduct, the duration of the misconduct and/or its cover-up, the financial condition of the wrongdoer, and prior and potential punishment from similarly situated plaintiffs or other sources.’
“State ex rel Young v. Crookham, supra, 290 Or at 72.”
Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310 Or 206, 210-11, 797 P2d 1019 (1990).
In summary, in Oregon, as in Alabama, the factfinder must consider the “culpability” of a defendant. ORS 30.925(1); Haslip, supra, ill S Ct at 1044. “Objective” criteria, see Haslip, supra, 111 S Ct at 1046, considered in Alabama, and required to be considered in Oregon product liability actions, include the likelihood of harm from a defendant’s conduct, the duration and profitability of the conduct, the defendant’s awareness or concealment of it, the defendant’s financial position, and the imposition of other sanctions on the defendant.12 Oregon law also provides an extra precaution; a plaintiff must prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence, rather than a mere preponderance. ORS 30.925(1); ORS 41.315(1). We conclude that, in product liability actions in Oregon, as in Alabama cases, application of objective criteria ensures that sufficiently definite and meaningful constraints are imposed on the finder of fact and ensures that the resulting award is not disproportionate to a defendant’s conduct and to the need to punish and deter.
Neither is the Oregon procedure in product liability actions rendered unconstitutional by the fact that objective [284]*284criteria are applied during the factfinder’s initial determination of the amount of an award of punitive damages, rather than during post-verdict or appellate review of the award. We do not interpret Haslip to hold that an award of punitive damages, to comport with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, always must be subject to a form of post-verdict or appellate review that includes the possibility of remittitur. See May, Fashioning Procedural and Substantive Due Process Arguments in Toxic and Other Tort Actions Involving Punitive Damages After Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 22 Envtl L 597, 601 (stating that Haslip leaves open that question); Union Nat. Bank of Little Rock v. Mosbacher, 933 F2d 1440, 1447-48 (8th Cir 1991) (reviewing the Haslip decision and stating that the Supreme Court considered Alabama’s jury instructions, post-trial scrutiny, and appellate review to be “significant factors” in determining the constitutionality of that state’s procedure).13 Rather, in Haslip, the Court determined only that the Alabama procedure, as a whole and in its net effect, did not violate the Due Process Clause. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra, 111 S Ct at 1043 (Court’s task was to determine whether the Due Process Clause rendered constitutionally unacceptable the punitive damages award in that case).
Similarly, we believe that Oregon’s procedure in product liability actions — as a whole and in its net effect — is constitutional. If anything, initial application of the constitutionally sufficient objective criteria enumerated in ORS 30.925, rather than post-hoc application of those criteria, increases the protective effect of the criteria. See Haslip, supra, 111 S Ct at 1060-61 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (Alabama system violates due process, because that system vests standardless discretion in the jury to fix a penalty and [285]*285provides for application of standards only on review of jury award; jury should be instructed in, and apply, Alabama criteria).
We also note that the trial court, after the verdict, and the appellate courts are not entirely powerless. If there is no evidence to support the jury’s decision — in this context, no evidence that the statutory prerequisites for the award of punitive damages were met — then the trial court or the appellate courts can intervene to vacate the award. See ORCP 64B(5) (trial court may grant a new trial if the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict or is against law); Hill v. Garner, 277 Or 641, 643, 561 P2d 1016 (1977) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict is to be granted when there is no evidence to support the verdict); State v. Brown, 306 Or 599, 604, 761 P2d 1300 (1988) (a fact decided by a jury may be re-examined when a reviewing court can say affirmatively that there is no evidence to support the jury’s decision).
Moreover, appellate review is available to test the sufficiency of the jury instructions. See ORCP 59 H (prescribing method of preserving alleged instructional error for appeal). Thus, defendants in Oregon can obtain post-verdict review to ensure that the jury was instructed properly and that there was evidence to support the jury’s award of punitive damages. See also Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., supra, 310 Or at 210-14 (holding that it was prejudicial error to instruct a jury that a portion of any punitive damages award would be used to pay the plaintiffs attorney fees and a portion would go to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account, and reversing award of punitive damages).
Those procedural protections, in turn, ensure that an award of punitive damages in a product liability action bears a rational relationship to a defendant’s conduct and to the need for punishment and deterrence. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F2d 1377, 1382 (5th Cir 1991):
“Under Haslip, an award of punitive damages does not meet constitutional requirements unless the circumstances of the case indicate that the award is reasonable. This condition, contrary to the assertion of [the defendant], is not a vehicle for expansive appellate review of punitive damages awards. * * *
[286]*286“ * * * Accordingly, in reviewing the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages, a court may not explicitly or implicitly recalculate the award of damages; moreover, it may not express an opinion whether the award is too high or too low. Rather, the court may only consider whether the circumstances of the case offer some support for the amount of the award. If there are any circumstances of probative value that support the amount of the award, then that award meets the ‘reasonableness’ prong of the due process test in Haslip.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.)
The court added that:
“the procedural protection adequate to support the constitutionality of a punitive damages award varies with the circumstances. * * * As long as there is some meaningful procedural assurance that the amount of the award is not an impulsive reaction to the wrongful conduct of the defendant, the award survives the procedural protection aspect of the due process analysis in Haslip.” Id. at 138.5.
The court concluded that the award of punitive damages in that case “did not lack support in the record.” Id. at 1382. See also Morgan v. Woessner, 975 F2d 629, 641 n 8 (9th Cir 1992) (stating, in the context of the defendant’s claim that the award of punitive damages violated due process, that the trial court’s instructions to the jury — that the jury must find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was culpable, must consider the relationship between the award and the harm suffered by the plaintiff, must consider deterrence and retribution, must not make an award out of passion or prejudice, and must consider the defendant’s financial worth — “appear to meet all the concerns of the Haslip court”); Herman v. Sunshine Chemical, 257 NJ Super 533, 608 A2d 978, 983 (1992) (“[wjhether to award punitive damages and their amount is within the discretion of the trier of fact”).14
We also note that the relatively narrow scope of appellate review of punitive damages awards in Oregon is similar to that available to federal appellate courts reviewing [287]*287awards of punitive damages made in federal district courts applying state law in cases involving diversity jurisdiction. See Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 US 257, 109 S Ct 2909, 2922-23, 106 L Ed 2d 219 (1989) (noting the limited scope of review of punitive damage awards by federal appellate courts in cases involving diversity jurisdiction). In Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F2d 95 (4th Cir 1991), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an award of punitive damages made by a federal district court applying South Carolina law. The court noted that its scope of review was restricted in part by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which applies only to federal courts and which provides:
“ ‘In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law.’ ”
Id. at 99 and 99 n 1.
The court examined the United States Supreme Court’s approval of the Alabama system of determining punitive damages:
“[Haslip’s] unusual approach of emphasizing post-verdict review to the extent of perhaps slighting a review of the pre-verdict process raises significant questions when federal courts, sitting in diversity cases, are confronted with the proper application of state punitive damages. The legitimizing constraints provided by the quasi de novo review process practiced under Alabama state law cannot be applied by a federal district court. * * *
u# % # %
“The law of South Carolina permits a jury to award punitive damages to punish, deter, and vindicate the rights of the plaintiff whenever the conduct of the defendant is willful, wanton or reckless. The plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct included a ‘consciousness of wrongdoing’ at the time of the conduct. Punitive damages may be awarded only if actual damages are awarded.
“The amount of the penalty is committed to the discretion of the jury. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has repeatedly announced that no formula applies in awarding [288]*288punitive damages and [that] their award and amount are ‘peculiarly within the judgment and discretion of the jury * * *.’ Thus, * * * there is no appropriate ratio between actual damages and punitive damages * * *. Similarly, there is no requirement that punitive damages bear any specified relationship to the wealth of the defendant. * * * Moreover, punitive damages awards would apparently be upheld in the absence of any evidence of the worth of the defendant.
“The only constraint on the award by the jury is provided by the discretion given to the trial court to review the award for excessiveness. The review by the appellate court is under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The appellate court will reverse a trial court’s refusal to set aside an award only when the award is ‘ “so shockingly excessive as manifestly to show” that the jury was actuated by caprice, passion or prejudice.’
“When the verdict is returned in a federal court * * *, no significantly greater restraint is provided.
“Since the argument in this case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina [has] adopted * * * a more elaborate post-trial review to be conducted in the future by state trial courts in an attempt to avoid due process challenges. * * * [T]he court announced new factors to be considered * * *.”
Id. at 99-100, 106. The factors announced by the South Carolina Supreme Court included the defendant’s degree of culpability, the duration of the culpable conduct, the defendant’s awareness or concealment of it, the existence of similar past conduct, the likelihood that the award would deter the defendant or others from similar conduct, the determination whether the award is reasonably related to the harm likely to result from the conduct, the defendant’s ability to pay, and “other factors” deemed appropriate. Id. at 106.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the defendant in the diversity jurisdiction case before it was denied due process, because the jury making the award exercised the unconstrained discretion permitted to it by South Carolina law and because the state’s newly elaborated substantive post-verdict constraints could not be applied by the federal appellate court. The court directed that, on remand, the federal district court “incorporate” those newly elaborated standards into its instructions to the jury. Id. at 105-10.
[289]*289The Fourth Circuit later reached a similar result in its review of an award of punitive damages made in federal district court under Virginia law. Johnson v. Hugo’s Skateway, 974 F2d 1408 (4th Cir 1992). Virginia law, like South Carolina law, provided minimal constraints on the discretion of juries in the determination of awards of punitive damages. Id. at 1415. The Fourth Circuit again concluded that the substantive criteria applied in Virginia’s post-verdict review process in state court must be applied in federal court by the factfinder. Id. at 1418.
ORS 30.925 provides essentially the same protection to defendants as the Fourth Circuit granted to the defendants on remand in Mattison and Johnson. In contrast to the unconstrained discretion allowed to factfinders by South Carolina and Virginia law in those cases, the criteria established by ORS 30.925 are detailed and objective, resulting in their also being constitutionally sufficient. The criteria need not be applied in post-verdict or appellate review, but are permissibly — even preferably — applied by juries in the initial determination of punitive damages awards.
The jury in this product liability action was instructed properly about the substantive criteria to be applied in considering punitive damages. There was evidence to support its determination. Accordingly, the punitive damages award in this case did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
9 The trial court’s instructions in that respect stated:
“Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion, when I use the word discretion, I say you don’t have to even find fraud, you wouldn’t have to, but you may, the law says you may award an amount of money known as punitive damages.
“This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant. * * *
“Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow money recovery to the plaintiffs, * * * by way of punishment of the defendant [278]*278and for the added purpose of protecting the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely discretionary with the jury. * * *
“Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.”
As required by Alabama law, evidence of the defendant’s financial worth was not submitted to the jury. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 US 1, 111 S Ct 1032, 1037 n 1, 1044, 113 L Ed 2d 1 (1991).