Northstar Industries, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co.

558 F. Supp. 2d 944, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44603, 2008 WL 2345792
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJune 5, 2008
DocketCivil 07-4282 (DSD/SRN)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 558 F. Supp. 2d 944 (Northstar Industries, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Northstar Industries, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 558 F. Supp. 2d 944, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44603, 2008 WL 2345792 (mnd 2008).

Opinion

ORDER

DAVID S. DOTY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon defendants’ motion to dismiss. Based upon a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

This business dispute arises from an agreement between plaintiff Northstar Industries, Inc. (“Northstar”) and defendant Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, Inc. (“MLGPE”). Northstar is a Minnesota corporation that provides services related to mergers and acquisitions. MLGPE is an investment firm incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New York. It is a subsidiary of defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”).

In January 2004, Northstar entered into a fee agreement (the “Stonington agreement”) with Stonington Partners, Inc. (“Stonington”), a private equity firm. Under that agreement, Stonington agreed to pay Northstar a fee in the event that Northstar provided the name of a business that led to an acquisition or investment by Stonington. Specifically, Stonington would pay Northstar two percent of the first $100 million in transaction value and one percent of the value thereafter.

In late 2004 or early 2005, Northstar learned that Gene Bicknell (“Bicknell”), chairman of NPC International, Inc. (“NPC”), was interested in selling one of his companies. Northstar brought the information to Stonington, which referred Northstar to MLGPE as a potential NPC purchaser. As a result, on March 4, 2005, Northstar and MLGPE entered into a fee agreement of their own that adopted the terms of the Stonington agreement and provided that if MLGPE purchased NPC, MLGPE would pay Northstar any fees due under the Stonington agreement. Northstar participated in an introductory meeting between Bicknell and MLGPE managing director Robert End (“End”) in March 2005 but then, upon instruction from MLGPE, played no role in the lengthy negotiations between NPC and MLGPE.

By October 2006, negotiations had stagnated after NPC requested a higher purchase price than MLGPE was willing to *947 pay. In an attempt to end the stalemate, MLGPE looked to cut costs associated with the purchase. To that end, MLGPE contacted Northstar and requested that it reduce its finder’s fee from the anticipated $7.1 million to $1.5 million to enable MLGPE to complete the deal. Northstar alleges that during conversations about reducing Northstar’s fee, End asserted that the fees of other companies involved in the deal would be reduced pro rata. North-star initially refused the reduction, counter-offering with a request for $3.6 million in fees and other consideration. End responded to Northstar by email that his request was a nonnegotiable “last stab at the deal” and that based on Northstar’s refusal to reduce its fee the “deal [was] dead.” (Def. App. at 7-8.)

End’s email ultimately prompted North-star to agree to the $1.5 million finder’s fee, and on November 1, 2005, Northstar and MLGPE entered into a revised fee agreement (the “November agreement”) reflecting that amount. The November agreement provided that “in no case shall [MLGPE] be obligated to pay any Fee in excess of [$1.5 million]” and noted that it was the “sole and entire agreement between the parties [with] no modification ... binding unless attached ... and signed by each party to the agreement.” (Id. at 1, 10.) MLGPE and NPC completed a stock-purchase deal in March 2006.

In March 2007, Northstar reviewed NPC’s press release and its Securities and Exchange Commission filings and concluded that the other companies involved in the NPC acquisition had not reduced their fees pro rata. Accordingly, on October 17, 2007, it filed this action alleging that Merrill Lynch, MLGPE and End breached certain fiduciary duties, breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing and engaged in fraud and misrepresentation. On December 20, 2007, defendants moved to dismiss all claims.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This statement does not require detailed factual allegations so long as it “give [s] the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). However, a court will dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if, after taking all facts alleged in the complaint as true, those facts fail “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. ---, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

I. Defendants’ Fiduciary Duty to Northstar

Northstar argues that defendants breached the fiduciary relationship that existed between the parties. Specifically, Northstar alleges that End’s instruction to cease talking to NPC gave defendants greater access to the facts surrounding the transaction and produced a fiduciary relationship. Defendants maintain that the arm’s length negotiations engaged in with Northstar — a sophisticated businesses— created no fiduciary relationship between the parties.

In Minnesota, the existence of a fiduciary duty is a question of fact. See Toombs v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 801, 809 (Minn.1985); Burgmeier v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, 499 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn.Ct.App.1993). A fiduciary relationship exists when

confidence is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on the other; and the relation and *948 duties involved in it need not be legal, but may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.... Disparity of business experience and invited confidence could be a legally sufficient basis for finding a fiduciary relationship.

Toombs, 361 N.W.2d at 809 (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, “special circumstances” must be present in a relationship between parties in order to establish a fiduciary relationship. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 738 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn.Ct.App.2007). Thus, “ordinary business relationships may involve reliance on a professional, a degree of trust, and a duty of good faith, and yet not fall within the class of fiduciary relationships.” Id. Relationships that involve competing interests and “often generate litigation” are “not compatible with the concept of a fiduciary.” Cheme Contracting Corp. v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 572 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Minn.Ct.App.1997).

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558 F. Supp. 2d 944, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44603, 2008 WL 2345792, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/northstar-industries-inc-v-merrill-lynch-co-mnd-2008.