Northstar Industries, etc. v. Merrill Lynch, etc.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedAugust 17, 2009
Docket08-2480
StatusPublished

This text of Northstar Industries, etc. v. Merrill Lynch, etc. (Northstar Industries, etc. v. Merrill Lynch, etc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Northstar Industries, etc. v. Merrill Lynch, etc., (8th Cir. 2009).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ___________

No. 08-2480 ___________

Northstar Industries, Inc., a * Minnesota corporation, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District of * Minnesota. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. and Merrill * Lynch Global Private Equity, Inc., * f/k/a Merrill Lynch Global Partners, * Inc., foreign corporations, and Robert * F. End, individual, * * Defendants-Appellees. * ___________

Submitted: March 11, 2009 Filed: August 17, 2009 ___________

Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. ___________

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Northstar Industries, Inc. (“Northstar”) brought this action in the district court against Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, Inc. (“MLGPE”),1 and Robert F. End for the balance of a brokerage fee it claimed due in

1 Unless otherwise specified, we refer to Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, Inc. collectively as Merrill Lynch. the sum of $5.6 million. Northstar contended that fraudulent representations by Merrill Lynch caused Northstar to accept a lower fee than the amount to which it was entitled. On appeal, Northstar challenges the district court’s order granting Merrill Lynch’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court erroneously 1) dismissed the action based on factual findings directly contrary to the complaint, 2) failed to address Northstar’s prayer for rescission, and 3) concluded that Minnesota fraud law could not compensate Northstar’s damages. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I. Background2

For almost forty years, Northstar has provided services related to mergers and acquisitions. Its president, Thomas O’Connell, has closed well over 350 transactions during his career. For over twenty-five of these years, Northstar has maintained an ongoing business and personal relationship with Mr. Orville “Gene” Bicknell, former owner of NPC International, Inc., the world’s largest franchisee of Pizza Hut restaurants.

In January 2004, Northstar entered into a fee agreement with Stonington Partners, Inc., a company engaged in acquiring and investing in businesses (“Stonington Fee Agreement”). Stonington agreed that, if Northstar introduced Stonington to a business that it ultimately bought, Northstar would receive a finder’s fee in the amount of 2% of the first $100 million in transaction value and 1% of the value thereafter.

In late 2004 or early 2005, arising from this long-standing relationship between Northstar and Bicknell, Northstar learned that Bicknell was considering selling one

2 The facts in Northstar’s Amended Complaint must be taken as true for purposes of this appeal. -2- 2 of his companies, NPC. Northstar brought this information to Stonington. Stonington then referred Northstar to MLGPE as a potential NPC purchaser.

On March 4, 2005, Northstar and Merrill Lynch adopted the terms of the Stonington Fee Agreement (“March Fee Agreement”). Robert F. End, Managing Director of Merrill Lynch, then began negotiating with Bicknell and NPC for the possible purchase of NPC as directed by Merrill Lynch. Northstar did not participate in these negotiations. Around May 12, 2005, End and his Merrill Lynch colleague, Christopher J. Birosak, contacted Northstar by telephone and ordered Northstar to cease any further contact with Bicknell or NPC. Northstar did so and Merrill Lynch became Northstar’s only source of information about the deal.

In October 2005, after seven months of negotiations, End contacted Northstar and spoke to its Senior Vice President B. Wayne Quist. End stated that Bicknell’s purchase price was $615 million, and that this purchase price would result in a fee of $7.15 million due and payable to Northstar under the March Fee Agreement. However, in order to close the deal at $615 million, End stated that the fees associated with the transaction needed to be significantly reduced. End proposed to Quist that Northstar accept a “proportionate” fee reduction in relation to the other parties entitled to a fee in the transaction, all sacrificing “equally.” End stated that a “proportionate” or “pro rata” reduction would result in a fee of $1.5 million for Northstar (a 78% reduction that amounted to approximately $5.6 million). End told Quist that he needed an answer from Northstar no later than the start of the business day on Monday, October 17, 2005. Quist stated that he did not have the authority to approve such a fee reduction and would need to speak to O’Connell about End’s proposal.

After discussing the matter with O’Connell, Quist sent an e-mail message to End proposing that Northstar reduce its fee by approximately 50% to $3.6 million cash at closing, plus other considerations, based on “what you said [yesterday] . . . that you are willing to take pro rata cuts from the total fees and expenses.” Complaint ¶37. Minutes after receiving Quist’s e-mail, End replied electronically to Quist, stating that -3- 3 Northstar’s proposal would not work, and that, “The deal is dead and I will communicate this to [Bicknell] on Monday morning.” Complaint ¶38.

That Sunday, O’Connell called End. End reiterated that the $15 million shortfall in the transaction had to be compensated from the fees in the transaction, which could only work if everyone entitled a fee took a “proportionate” or “pro rata” fee reduction. Furthermore, End stated that Northstar would receive a cash fee of $1.5 million following such a “pro rata” reduction. End also assured O’Connell that “everyone due a fee would take a ‘pro rata’ reduction, that ‘all parties would be treated on the same basis,’ that there would be an accounting of all fee reductions, [and] that the total fees in the transaction would be reduced by at least $15 million in order to meet Bicknell’s price of $615 million.” Complaint ¶39.

Based on End’s representations, Northstar agreed to enter into a new fee agreement (“November Fee Agreement”) so as to reduce its fee to $1.5 million. “Had Northstar known the truth, Northstar would not have agreed to reduce its fee to $1.5 million and the transaction could have been closed without such a fee reduction to Northstar.” Complaint ¶ 42.

On or about October 20, 2005, four days after End’s representations concerning pro rata fee reductions for all parties, Merrill Lynch and Bicknell/NPC entered into a mutual exclusivity agreement for the sale of NPC to Merrill Lynch for $615 million. The purchase closed on May 3, 2006 and Northstar received its full $1.5 million fee.

In March 2007, Northstar saw NPC’s press release, as well as its 10K and S-8 forms, which companies publicly file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Northstar realized that the total fees paid at the closing of the transaction had not decreased from the May 9, 2005 proposed amount of $23.5 million, but in fact had increased to $24,270,000 at the time of closing. Thus, Northstar repeatedly requested that Merrill Lynch explain the increase in total fees paid in the transaction and provide an accounting of fees as promised by End. -4- 4 In response, on May 9, 2007, End called O’Connell and told him for the first time that the reduction in fees was in fact not “proportionate” or “pro rata.” End admitted that he told Quist and O’Connell that the fee reductions would be “proportionate” and “pro rata,” but stated to O’Connell that he regretted using the term “pro rata” because the fee reductions were not in fact so.

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