Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Cromer's Administratrix

40 S.E. 54, 99 Va. 763, 1901 Va. LEXIS 106
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedNovember 21, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 40 S.E. 54 (Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Cromer's Administratrix) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Cromer's Administratrix, 40 S.E. 54, 99 Va. 763, 1901 Va. LEXIS 106 (Va. 1901).

Opinion

Keith, R.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The west-bound passenger train on the Norfolk and Western •railway approached Pulaski, a station on that road, at about 8:15 P. M. on January 6, 1900, one hour and thirty minutes-late, .and within the station limits came into collision with some ■freight cars which had escaped from the siding upon which they were standing, and Cromer, the fireman on the passenger train, ■was killed. His administrator brought suit against the N. & W. Railway Company, charging its negligence as the cause of the accident. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff, and the case is before us upon a writ of error.

The evidence tends to show that the passenger train at the •time of the collision was running at the rate of thirty miles an hour; that the rules of the railway company required that “when within the limits of the various yards, all trains must be run with . great care, and under the control of the engineman. •

“Switching engines will have the right to' work within yard limits, upon the time of second and succeeding class trains, and .also upon the time of delayed first-class trains, but must clear [783]*783the track immediately upon their arrival. The main track must be kept clear for firshclass trains that are on time. ‘First-class’ trains means passenger trains, and ‘second-class’ trains means freight trains;” that rule 164, especially applicable to firemen, reads as follows: “When running upon the road they must keep a constant lookout ahead when not engaged in firing, and give notice to the engineman of any signals or indications of danger. If the engineman has to look away from the track in front for any reason, the fireman must maintain the watch until the engineman can resume it. They will not put coal in engines when coming into stations or at such other points as safety requires that they keep lookout ahead,” and that the deceased had been furnished with a book of rules; that the yard limits at Pulaski are about one-half mile east of the scene of the accident, which occurred at a point some hundreds of yards east of the station-house, and about fifty yards east of the point where the side tracks enter the main track; that on the evening of January 8th, thirteen freight cars loaded, some of them with iron, and others with coke for the use of the Pulaski furnace, were standing about 600 yards west of its intersection with the main track; that one of the cars had been inspected on the 2nd, seven of them on the 6th, and five of them on the 7th. of January; that they were sufficiently equipped with brakes, which were in good order, and that they were standing upon the siding controlled by the brakes at about six o’clock on the evening of the accident, and that the cars would not have been moved unless the brakes had in some way been released.

The following occurrence is of interest as tending to show the sufficiency of the brakes to control the cars upon the sidings: On Saturday preceding the accident, the employees of the company charged with that duty were putting cars in upon the siding, some of which were loaded with coke. When they came into contact with cars laden with ore standing towards the east-end of the siding, the coke cars, which were being pushed, and [784]*784the ore cars, which were at rest, did not couple, and the latter were put in motion by the jar. A brakeman sprang from the car upon which he was standing, overtook the ore cars, seven in number, which were moving off, applied brakes sufficient to stop them, and then at least two more brakes, out of abundant caution. It would seem that brakes which were sufficient to stop cars when in motion would be ample to hold them when at rest.

There is a suggestion on the part of counsel that the brakes might have been so affected by expansion and contraction, due to natural causes, as to render them ineffectual, but there is no evidence to that effect. At the junction of the siding with the main track there is a device known as the “Romapo Switch,” which works either by hand or automatically, and is so arranged that if thrown for the main line—that is to say, so adjusted that a car upon the siding, could pass to the main line1—or if a car were to run through the switch as the result of an accident, it would show a red light, or the absence of any light, should it chance to be extinguished or obscured from any cause, would be a warning of danger. In other words, a white light at the switch is the only assurance of safety. The rules prescribe, as we have seen, that within the limits of the yards trains must be “run with great care and under control of the engineman,” and the evidence shows that a train is under control when it can be stopped promptly or within the limit of vision.

It appears that at many points on the N. & W. railwav there are upon the sidings derailing switches, by which one of the rails is .moved so as to break the continuity of the track and derail a car passing over it; that there had been such a switch at Pulaski, which had been removed about six months before the accident, and there is no direct evidence that Cromer knew either of its former existence, or of its subsequent removal. There is evidence tending to show that such a contrivance is necessary to prevent the escape of cars placed upon sidings, and also evidence that they are used only where there is a continuous descending [785]*785grade from the siding to and upon the main track, so that a car escaping from the siding would ran wild upon the main track, and that at Pulaski there was not a continuous descending grade from the siding to the main track, but after passing out upon the main track the escaping car would be brought to a standstill by an up-grade.

There is a good deal of conflicting evidence as to the effect of a derailing switch, some witnesses regarding it as a complete protection against cars leaving a siding, while others state that when the derailer is placed at the usual point, near the intersection of the siding and the main track, a number of oars getting loose upon the siding, the one in front becoming derailed, a wreck would be caused if the cars had acquired any considerable momentum, and in case of a wreck it might block the main track, as no one could foretell in what direction wreckage would be thrown. That this had occurred at Pulaski on one occasion 'before the derailer was taken out, and the main track had been blocked. If the derailer were placed a sufficient distance from the main track this danger would be removed, but the side track between the derailer and the main track would be useless, and therefore derailers were placed a short distance from the point of intersection. The evidence fails to show at what precise time the freight cars escaped. They are shown to have been on the siding with sufficient brakes, in good order, and properly set, at about six o’clock on the evening of the accident. Collision occurred at about 8:15 P. hi. At what time intermediate between 6 and 8:15 they escaped is left to mere conjecture.

The evidence shows that the engines, cars, tracks, and general equipment of the road were in a reasonably safe condition, and the negligence imputed seems to rest upon the proposition that it was the duty of the road to maintain a derailing switch at this point; while the railroad company relies for its defence—.first, upon the absence of any proof of negligence on its part; and [786]*786.secondly, upon the charge of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. ,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Doe v. Terry
639 S.E.2d 197 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2007)
Burk v. Huntington Development & Gas Co.
58 S.E.2d 574 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1950)
Willhide v. Biggs
188 S.E. 876 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1936)
Wright v. D. Pender Grocery Co.
187 S.E. 564 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1936)
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works
170 S.E. 5 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1933)
Saunders v. Temple
153 S.E. 691 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1930)
Payne v. Blevins
280 F. 310 (Fourth Circuit, 1922)
Jeffress v. Virginia Railway & Power Co.
104 S.E. 393 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1920)
Abernathy v. Emporia Manufacturing Co.
95 S.E. 418 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1918)
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Ware
95 S.E. 183 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1918)
The Student
243 F. 807 (Fourth Circuit, 1917)
Vance v. Virginia Pocahontas Coal Co.
82 S.E. 1081 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1914)
Powhatan Lime Co. v. Affleck's Administrator
79 S.E. 1054 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1913)
Southern Railway Co. v. Baptist
77 S.E. 477 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1913)
Pulaski Mining Co. v. Hagan
196 F. 724 (Fourth Circuit, 1912)
Southern Railway Co. v. Childrey
74 S.E. 221 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1912)
Jessie v. Commonwealth
71 S.E. 612 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1911)
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Overton's Administrator
69 S.E. 1060 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1911)
Pond's Administratrix v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
69 S.E. 949 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1911)
Southern Railway Co. v. Bailey
67 S.E. 365 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1910)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
40 S.E. 54, 99 Va. 763, 1901 Va. LEXIS 106, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norfolk-western-railway-co-v-cromers-administratrix-va-1901.