[558]*558Landis, J.
Appellees, as dependents of the decedent employee Zimmerman, filed application for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Burns’ Ann. Stat. Sec. 40-1201 et seq.) growing out of his death while diving into the lake at the lakeside summer home of his employers after the conclusion of a business meeting had at such summer residence. The Industrial Board granted an award of compensation which was reversed by a divided Appellate Court, the majority opinion appearing in 137 N. E. 2d 233, and the dissenting opinion at page 240. The case is now before us on appellees’ petition to transfer.
Appellants assert on this appeal that the award was contrary to law as there was no basis in the evidence to support the finding that decedent was injured and thereafter died from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
The hearing before the Industrial Board was tried upon a stipulation of facts, the material portion of which was as follows (Tr. pp. 34-40) :
“That on July 14, 1953, Melvin Louis Zimmerman was employed by Noble-Lincoln Mercury Company, an automobile agency in Kokomo, Indiana, at an average weekly wage of $70.00 per week, and had been so employed by said company for six (6) weeks previously thereto, the first five (5) weeks as a mechanic in the Service Department, and the last week as Assistant Manager of the Service Department. In the normal operation of the said automobile agency business it was the custom to hold a meeting approximately once a month of the staff of the Service and Parts Departments after the regular business hours. The usual purpose of said meeting was to improve service and sales of said business. No additional salary or wages were paid to the members of the staff of the Service and Parts Departments for attendance at such meetings. The said automobile agency was a partnership consisting of Orvis L. Noble and Dorothy Noble, general partners.
[559]*559“That the July meeting was arranged at a Kokomo hotel where dinner would be served and at said meeting discussions concerning points covered at a District Sales Meeting at Cincinnati sometime before was to be carried on. On the morning of July 14th, Orvis L. Noble, Managing Partner in said business, changed the meeting place from the hotel to the cottage and summer residence of Orvis L. Noble and his wife Dorothy Noble at Lake Freeman, Indiana, approximately 45 miles from Kokomo, Indiana. The change in the meeting place came about when Jerry Ball, Service Manager, suggested to Orvis L. Noble that because of the heat in town it would be pleasanter to hold the meeting at Lake Freeman and invite the wives and girl friends. The Service Manager, Jerry Ball, the Assistant Service Manager, Melvin Louis Zimmerman, the Parts Manager, Dick Huffman, and the Assistant Parts Manager, Palmer Timmons, were expected to and did attend said meeting, all of them leaving Kokomo, providing their own transportation, after the regular business closing hour of 5:00 P.M. Also invited were the wives or girl friends of the said employees and the girl friend of Jerry Ball did attend as did Evelyn R. Zimmerman, the wife of Melvin Louis Zimmerman. At the time the plans were made to shift the meeting place to Lake Freeman, it was understood by all of those attending that an evening meal would be furnished and served by Mr. and Mrs. Noble after the meeting and there would be an opportunity for swimming and rides in the 17 foot Chris-Craft Cabin cruiser which had been rented by Orvis L. Noble and Dorothy Noble with the cabin. Melvin Louis Zimmerman did take along to Lake Freeman his bathing suit anticipating that he would take advantage of the opportunity to go for a swim.
“That the cabin was on a bluff sitting above the lake with the property running down from the front door of the cabin to the lake front. There was a series of stairs leading from the cabin down the hill and more than half way down these stairs there was a landing and step-off onto the roof of [560]*560the boat house which roof was converted into a sun deck. The stairs continued down the few remaining steps to the level of the pier and the one wall of the boat house laid to the right of said stairs. At the bottom of the stairs the pier ran horizontally, principally to the left along the lake shore, at a level about 1 foot above the water line. To the right of the pier as one faced the lake was the doorway entrance into the boat house. The boat house had a wooden U shaped catwalk on the inside of the boat house on the three sides with no walk on the side facing onto the lake and through which side the boat entered and left the boat house. There was a door on the lake side but this had been partially raised. The boat normally was housed in this dock area within the boat house bounded on the three other sides by the wooden walk.
“. . . On the previous day he [Orvis L. Noble] had damaged the propeller on the said cruiser in the course of operating his boat, striking said propeller on a rock, and this required the straightening of said propeller by a repair establishment on the lake.
“During the afternoon of July 14, Orvis L. Noble did put the propeller back on the propeller shaft but was not sure that he had installed it properly. All the time he was working on said boat and up to and including the times mentioned herein, the said boat was on a lift in the boat house out of the water, the bow of the boat facing the shore within a few inches of the catwalk on the shore side, and the stern was between 4 to 6 feet inside the partially open lake side of the boat house. The water throughout the area of the boat house was between 2% and 3% feet deep. The propeller, while on the said lift was approximately 1 foot above the water level. Inspection of and installation and repair work on the propeller would require that a person stand in the water within the boat house area of the aforesaid depth of 2^ to 3 y% feet.
“. . . Mr. Ball and Mr. Zimmerman were delayed by the necessity of calling for the two ladies who were making the trip with them and thereafter all four left Kokomo in Jerry Ball’s [561]*561automobile. Jerry Ball paid the entire expense of his automobile for said trip and neither was reimbursed by Orvis L. Noble, nor was contribution made by Melvin Louis Zimmerman to said expense. When those traveling in Jerry Ball’s automobile arrived at the cabin the meeting was already in progress on the sun deck and in fact that part relating to the Parts Department had been completed. Thereupon, Jerry Ball and Melvin Louis Zimmerman joined the meeting and during the next 15 minutes to half an hour the part of said meeting relating to the Service Department was conducted, all of which ended and the meeting broke up at between 7:15 and 7:30 P.M., Daylight Saving Time.
“That after Jerry Ball and Melvin Louis Zimmerman reached Lake Freeman, Orvis Noble related to all the men present at the meeting how he had installed the repaired propeller that day and the difficulties he had had in putting it on principally because to get the propeller on and the cotter key in place, he had found it necessary to back the not [sic] off a trifle causing some ‘play’ or looseness in the propeller attachment. Jerry Ball thereupon suggested that it ought to be checked before they went for a boat ride, to which suggestion Orvis Noble assented. After the meeting broke up, Mr. Timmons and Mr. Huffman went back to the cabin where they had a bite to eat preparatory to making an early departure from the lake.
“, . . Melvin Louis Zimmerman was going to take a swim to cool off, and since Jerry Ball had blisters on his hands and expressed a preference of not getting in the water and working on the propeller with his sore hands, Melvin Louis Zimmerman told Jerry Ball that he would look at the propeller and fix it if it were necessary. He thereupon changed into his bathing suit inside the boat house, at which time Orvis Noble also was inside the boat house and Jerry Ball was outside the boat house on the pier in the company of the ladies. While Melvin Louis Zimmerman was putting on his bathing suit, he told Orvis Noble that he would look at the propeller and tighten it down [562]*562if it needed it, to which statement Orvis Noble answered ‘Okay.’ This was the first information Orvis Noble had that Melvin Louis Zimmerman was going to check the propeller.
“That Melvin Louis Zimmerman did not regard this proposed work on the propeller as one of his duties with Noble-Lincoln Mercury Company, he was not ordered to make such inspection by Orvis L. Noble, Dorothy Noble, or any supervisor of his on behalf of said partnership company, and he, Melvin Louis Zimmerman, regarded his intended work on the propeller as more or less of a friendly gesture to Orvis Noble.
“That after Melvin Louis Zimmerman had put on his bathing suit, he directed an inquiry to Orvis L. Noble while both were inside the boat house, as to the depth of the water. At the time, Orvis L. Noble was standing on the walk at the bottom of the U or along the side of the boat house facing the hill. At said time Melvin Louis Zimmerman was standing on the catwalk inside the boat house along the side adjoining the pier about half way between the ends of said boat house. Melvin Louis Zimmerman moved towards the opening at the end of the boat house facing the lake and inspected said opening. On the side facing the lake the opening extended up from the water line from 4 to 5 feet, leaving a 4 or 5 foot opening or clearance. Before Orvis L. Noble could tell Melvin Louis Zimmerman anything other than that depth of the water was about 2% feet in the area between the walks, Melvin Louis Zimmerman stepped back two or three steps away from the opening and then made a racing dive towards and through said opening, he arched his body to negotiate the maneuver of passing through the opening. He neither touched the bottom, the extended down wall of the boat house or any other thing in making the dive but by the act of suddenly arching his body and throwing back his head and neck, he did fracture a cervical vertebra, which injury subsequently resulted in his death on February 8, 1954. The water depth at the opening was about 31/2 feet and shortly beyond there was a drop-off or ledge to deeper water. Melvin Louis Zimmerman was an experi[563]*563enced swimmer and diver and negotiated said diving maneuver with good form and without striking any object as aforesaid.”
Appellants contend decedent’s act of diving from the boathouse of appellants out into the swimming area of the lake in which decedent injured himself, not by striking any object, but by arching his back and throwing back his head and neck, so as to fracture a cervical vertebra, was not an act of duty for his employers, nor a compensable recreational activity.
There is no question but that decedent attended the business meeting at his employers’ lake cottage as a part of his employment duties. The recreational activity following the meeting and consisting of eating, swimming, and boating, had been prearranged by the employer as indicated in the invitation to the meeting. The employer entirely arranged the outing, furnished the premises and facilities and controlled their use.
The general rule as to the liability of the employer for recreational activities has been stated by Schneider1 as follows:
“Generally, injuries suffered by an employee while watching, participating in, or going to or coming from recreational activities sponsored in whole or in part by the employer, are not compensable, since such injuries are usually sustained while the employee is not performing any duty for which he has been either expressly or impliedly employed. In other words the injury cannot ordinarily be said to have resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.
“A distinction is made, however, in those cases where the recreation which caused the injury, either directly or indirectly, was sponsored by the employer as a matter of business and not because [564]*564of altruistic motives. That is, the employer exercised control or domination over the recreation for the purpose of developing better service and greater efficiency among the employees, thereby reaping a direct business benefit from the recreations sponsored.”
Four Indiana cases have been cited by appellant as denying compensation in recreation cases,2 but it is believed they are distinguishable from the case before us.
In the Tom Joyce 7 Up case, the employee was injured about midnight in a traffic accident when he was returning from bowling on the “7 Up Team” organized by one of appellant’s distributors. The court conceded the inference could be drawn that some possible benefit might have occurred to the employer from advertising of its product by the bowling activities, but concluded that an employee while on his way home from such activities was not engaged in activities incidental to his employment.
In the Mishawaka Rubber case the employee was drowned while fishing on the employer’s premises at the noon hour, but the employer had not sponsored or encouraged any program of recreation on the company premises, including fishing in the river.
In the Block Co. case the evidence was conflicting as to whether the department store-employer had authorized one of its buyers to entertain a visiting sales lady representing a merchandise house when the injury occurred. The Industrial Board denied compensation and the Appellate Court affirmed, stating the court on ap[565]*565peal could not weigh the evidence or disturb the Industrial Board’s finding if there was competent evidence to support it.
The Buescher Band Co. case was one in which the employee was injured at an annual picnic attended by the company’s employees but sponsored by an unincorporated association, the board of directors of which was composed of two representatives of the employer. The employer did not restrict the activities of the association or its expenditure of funds except to stipulate that all employees, whether members of the association or not, could attend the annual Christmas party and picnic. The plant was closed the day of the picnic but all transportation was furnished by members of the association. The employer did not furnish the recreation grounds. There the Industrial Board’s denial of compensation was affirmed on appeal, the court citing the employee’s cited case of O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon (1951), 340 U. S. 504, 71 S. Ct. 470, 95 L. Ed. 483, for the rule that the court on appeal will look to the evidence and necessary inferences supporting the finding of the trier of the facts.
The above cited decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, held compensable an employee’s death which occurred on the island of Guam when deceased, who had spent the afternoon at employer’s recreation center, plunged into the water in attempting a rescue of two persons not in the employer’s service, undertaken in forbidden waters outside the employer’s premises. The court held the evidence and inferences were sufficient to support the Deputy Commissioner’s award of compensation. The opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court recognizes the rule that workmen’s compensation cases are not confined to the common law conceptions of the [566]*566scope of employment. Citing: Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 481, 91 L. Ed. 1028, 1038, 67 S. Ct. 801; Waters v. William J. Taylor Co., 218 N. Y. 248, 251, 112 N. E. 727, 728, L. R. A. 1917A 347. In the court’s words (340 U. S. 506, 507, 71 S. Ct. 471, 472, 95 L. Ed. 486):
“The test of recovery is not a causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and the accident. Thom v. Sinclair (Eng.) [1917], AC 127, 142, [Ann. Cas. 1917D 188—H. L.] Nor is it necessary that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the ‘obligations or conditions’ of employment create the ‘zone of special danger’ out of which the injury arose.”
The recent case of Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Com. (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 304, 128 N. E. 2d 699, 928, contains an extensive discussion of the recreational activity cases from many states and holds that injuries received by an employee while playing softball in an intracompany league competition after working hours and off the company premises were compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment.
Other cases of a similar nature and in which the employer’s sponsored recreational activities were held sufficiently connected with the employment to render the injuries within the Compensation Act are—Kenney, Respondent v. Lord & Taylor, Inc. (1930), 254 N. Y. 532, 173 N. E. 853, in which employee attended dinner given by dry goods store-employer and was injured while dancing after dinner; Linderman v. Cownie Furs (1944), 234 Iowa 708, 13 N. W. 2d 677, in which salesman was drowned on fishing trip paid for by employer for winning sales contest; Fagan v. Albany Evening Union Co. (1941), 261 App. Div. 861, 24 N. [567]*567Y. S. 2d 779, where newspaper carrier boy was drowned while attending picnic arranged by employer’s branch manager; Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co. (1952), 23 N. J. Super. 88, 92 A. 2d 506, where employee was killed by falling into ravine on annual outing sponsored by employer; Du Charme v. Columbia Engineering Co. (1954), 31 N. J. Super. 167, 106 A. 2d 23, where employee after work had ceased at 12:30 p.m. remained to receive a ham given gratuitously by employer as a bonus, and was injured in fall on stairway from employer’s plant.
In the instant case before us for decision the Industrial Board granted compensation to an employee’s dependents for injuries occurring during a recreational activity immediately following a business meeting called at the employers’ premises at their lakeside summer home.
According to the stipulation of facts, in the normal operation of appellants’ automobile agency it was customary to hold meetings once a month of the Service and Parts Departments after the regular business hours; that “[T]the usual purpose of said meeting was to improve service and sales of said business”; that “[N]no additional salary or wages were paid to the members of the staff at such meetings.” The stipulation states the meeting place was changed by one of the two partner-employers from the hotel at Kokomo to a point some 45 miles distant at employers’ lakeside cottage and summer residence at Lake Freeman, and that “because of the heat in town [in July] it would be pleasanter to hold the meeting at Lake Freeman and invite the wives and girl friends.” The stipulation further says, decedent, who was Assistant Service Manager, was “expected to and did attend the meeting” [568]*568and that “it was understood by all of those attending that an evening meal would be furnished and served by . . . [appellants-employers] after the meeting and there would .be an opportunity for swimming and rides in . . . [employers’] 17 foot Chris-Craft Cabin cruiser.”
There is little doubt a reasonable inference from this stipulation of facts would be that the dinner following the meeting and any boat ride in employers’ Chris-Craft cruiser at employers’ solicitation were reasonably incident to the business meeting and employment on the hot July night. Had deceased choked on a fish bone at the employers’ furnished repast or drowned during the employers’ offered boat ride, would it not be a reasonable inference that such activities following the meeting were sponsored by the employer as a matter of business and for developing better service and efficiency among the employees rather than being simply altruism? Doubtless the recreational inducements were utilized by the employers on a hot night in July to get better attendance at a business meeting which had as its admitted purpose the improvement of service and sales of appellants’-employers’ automobile business. It would not take a profound student of human nature to infer or deduce that the chances of a successful turnout at such a business meeting, for which the employees did not receive additional compensation, would be enhanced by having it at a cool lake cottage rather than in a hot hotel room. In fact, the stipulation almost expressly says this in reciting that the Service Manager Ball told one of the partner-employers before the site was selected, “that because of the heat in town it would be pleasanter to hold the meeting at Lake Freeman.”
[569]*569And, if eating, boating, and swimming were reasonably incident to the employment, how about the related pursuit of diving into the water?
The stipulation states the opportunity for swimming and boating was understood by all those attending, and that decedent took a bathing suit with him to the lake anticipating taking a swim. Decedent was not forbidden from diving by anyone, and it would be taking great liberties with the record evidence for this court on appeal to conclude that no reasonable inferences warranted the Industrial Board in concluding that decedent in being invited to swim was not invited to dive. The nature of the dive is not believed material as decedent was stipulated to be an experienced diver and swimmer, and only by a freak accident did he, in arching his back in making a dive with good form (and without striking any object), cause the fracture of a cervical vertebra resulting in his death. Indeed, the record does not indicate such an accident could not have occurred anywhere while diving. We further believe the evidence in this case that deceased had stated with the employers’ acquiescence that he would fix the propeller on the boat (which was to be used for any boat ride earlier offered as an inducement by the employers) and which was in the boat house from which he dived, could also give rise to the inference that decedent’s act in diving into the water was reasonably connected with or incident to his employers’ business and recreational outing at their lakeside premises.
We realize it is sometimes argued in recreational cases that if the court holds the recreational activity to be within the Compensation Act, it is exercising too great a degree of liberality in construing the act. However, in recent years it has become increasingly evident that employers are more and more utilizing recrea[570]*570tional programs for their employees, and properly so, in aiding and promoting better business relations with persons in their employ, calculating the same to benefit the employers’ best business interests.
In reviewing recreational cases from many jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the recent Jewel Tea Company case, supra, said (6 Ill. 2d 304, 316, 128 N. E. 2d 699, 705) :
“As defendant has quite properly argued, in accordance with established precedent it is not the province of this court to extend by judicial legislation the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act so as to convert it into a system of health insurance. However, this court cannot adjudicate rights in a vacuum, and predicate decisions on legal concepts divorced from practical realities. As stated in Juergen Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 420, 125 N. E. 337, such laws should be given a practical construction and application. Therefore, inasmuch as there was evidence in the record before the Industrial Commission from which it could be reasonably inferred that plaintiff’s participation in the defendant company . . . [recreational activity] under the circumstances was an incident of his employment, the injuries he sustained while playing in the particular game could properly be found to arise out of and in the course of his employment.”
In the case before us the evidence is stronger than in many recreation cases, as the stipulation of the parties expressly recites as a reason for connecting the business and recreational activities “that because of the heat in town it would be pleasanter to hold the meeting at Lake Freeman.” (Emphasis supplied.) How could it be made to appear more clearly that the employers’ sponsored recreation at the latter’s lakeside premises was the inducement for a better or more successful business meeting, admittedly held to improve [571]*571sales and service of employers’ business, and necessarily intended to aid the employers’ business so as to be incidental to the employment?
We believe from the foregoing treatment of the authorities that the facts stipulated to by the parties and the necessary inferences therefrom were sufficient for the Industrial Board, as the trier of the facts, properly to conclude that the decedent’s injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment.
The transfer of this cause from the Appellate Court to this Court is accordingly granted and the award of the Industrial Board is affirmed.
Emmert, C. J., and Arterburn, J., concur.
Bobbitt, J., dissents, in which Achor, J., concurs.