Nix v. Sullivan

744 F. Supp. 855, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10423, 1990 WL 114452
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 12, 1990
DocketCiv. F 89-232
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 744 F. Supp. 855 (Nix v. Sullivan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nix v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 855, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10423, 1990 WL 114452 (N.D. Ind. 1990).

Opinion

ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This is an action for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant Secretary of *856 Health and Human Services denying plaintiffs application for the establishment of a period of disability under Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act and for disability insurance benefits as provided by Section 223 of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i); 42 U.S.C. § 423. Section 205(g) of the Act provides, inter alia, “Ms part of his answer, the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing.” It also provides, “[t]he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive_” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The law provides that an applicant for disability insurance benefits must establish an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months....” 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(l); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). It is not enough for plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.1962), ce rt. denied, 372 U.S. 945, 83 S.Ct. 938, 9 L.Ed.2d 970 (1963); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D.Ill.1979). It is well established that the burden of proving entitlement to disability insurance benefits is on the plaintiff. See Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.1971); Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir.1970).

Given the foregoing framework, “[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Secretary’s findings.” Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir.1984) citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir.1982); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir.1984) quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); see Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir.1977). “If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), unless there has been an error of law.” Garfield, supra at 607; see also Schmoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir.1980).

In the present matter, after consideration of the entire record, the Appeals Council made the following findings:

1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on August 28, 1987, the date he stated he became unable to work, and continues to meet them through the date of this decision.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 28, 1987.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe anky-losing spondylitis, psoriasis and re-tral bulbar neuritis of the right eye with diminished vision, but that he does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant’s testimony as to his limitations was found to be somewhat exaggerated and was not substantiated by the medical evidence.
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertion and nonexertional requirements of work except for work requiring prolonged standing or lifting more than 10 pounds. He also cannot bend constantly, climb, work *857 around chemicals or irritants, or do work which requires fine visual acuity. He must also alternate between sitting and standing, and his concentration is affected in a mild to moderate way (20 CFR 404.1545).
6. The claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work as an inspector, a shop helper, a service station attendant, a machine operator or a coil winder.
7. The claimant’s residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work is reduced by the above listed nonexertional limitations.
8. The claimant is 37 years old, which is defined as a younger person (20 CFR 404.1563).
9. The claimant has completed high school (20 CFR 404.1564).
10.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Darley v. Berryhill
N.D. Illinois, 2018
Ferguson v. Astrue
541 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (E.D. Wisconsin, 2008)
Ortiz v. Chater
986 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Illinois, 1997)
Wright v. Chater
969 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. New York, 1997)
White v. Shalala
823 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Indiana, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
744 F. Supp. 855, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10423, 1990 WL 114452, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nix-v-sullivan-innd-1990.