Newman v. US Dept of Housing Urban Development

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 15, 2024·No. 1:23-cv-04807·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DAMON NEWMAN, Plaintiff, 23-CV-4807 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING URBAN WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD DEVELOPMENT (HUD), Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking federal question jurisdiction and asserting that the United States Department of Housing & Urban Development (“HUD”) has violated his “human rights” by denying him Section 8 vouchers to relocate to another apartment. (ECF 1, at 2.) He seeks an order to compel HUD to grant him the vouchers. By order dated June 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead his claims in a an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine

whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against HUD, alleging that since 2009, it has denied him Section 8 vouchers to relocate from his current apartment in Bronx, New York, to another apartment, causing him “to deal with violence and harassment from the housing company employees and some tenants at Karaus Management.” (ECF 1, at 5.) He asserts that he has caught three of Kraus Management’s employees “illegally breaking” into his apartment. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that the alleged events have caused him to suffer “blood pressure and several other health problems.” (Id. at 6.) He brings this action seeking HUD’s assistance to relocate to another address. Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a partial decision from a harassment proceeding that he filed in the Civil Court of the City of New York, County of Bronx, Housing Part (“Bronx

Housing Court”) against his landlords, Kraus Inc. and Kraus Management Inc., and the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (“HPD”). The Bronx Housing Court’s decision noted that Plaintiff was complaining that his neighbors were harassing him and that he had requested relocation to another HUD Section 8 unit. Bronx Housing Court Judge Malaika N. Scott-McLaughlin determined, after hearing oral argument on December 6, 2022, that Plaintiff had “failed to plead a colorable claim of harassment.” (Id. at 11.) Because Plaintiff does not attach the full decision, it is unclear what ruling Judge Scott-McLaughlin made with respect to his claims against HPD and his request for a transfer to another HUD Section 8 unit. Plaintiff also attaches to the complaint an “incident information slip” from the New York City Police Department dated June 6, 2019, indicating that he had reported a crime of petit larceny to

the police. (Id. at 8.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff, who is apparently a participant in the Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (“Section 8”), 42 U.S.C. § 1437f,1 brings this

1 The Section 8 program was created “for the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (a). Section 8 authorizes the Secretary of HUD to “enter into contracts with state and local public housing agencies (‘PHAs’) to provide financial assistance to low-income individuals or families renting housing on the private rental market.” Augusta v. Cmty Dev. Corp. of Long Island, Inc., No. 07–CV–0361, 2008 WL 5378386, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008). The PHAs receive funding from HUD for their corresponding costs. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1). HUD’s funding covers rental subsidy payments that PHAs make to building owners, as well as the costs that PHAs incur in administrating the program. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1). action against HUD to challenge its alleged decision to deny him Section 8 vouchers to relocate to a new apartment. Plaintiff’s claims against HUD, however, must be dismissed. A. Sovereign Immunity and the Administrative Procedure Act “Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, ‘the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be sued in any

court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990) (citations omitted). The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits against the federal government, including suits against federal agencies and federal officers sued in their official capacities, unless sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see Robinson v.

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Newman v. US Dept of Housing Urban Development, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

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