Navistar International Transportation Corporation v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

941 F.2d 1339, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21363, 33 ERC (BNA) 1801, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18412
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 12, 1991
Docket89-4006
StatusPublished
Cited by40 cases

This text of 941 F.2d 1339 (Navistar International Transportation Corporation v. United States Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Navistar International Transportation Corporation v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 941 F.2d 1339, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21363, 33 ERC (BNA) 1801, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18412 (6th Cir. 1991).

Opinion

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Navistar International Transportation Corporation (Navistar) petitions this court for review of the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision to disapprove a proposed revision to the Ohio State Implementation Plan (SIP), which is a plan for implementing federal air quality standards pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. 1 The revision, approved by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA), proposed to relax the requirements of the Ohio SIP regarding the limits on emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) at Navistar’s truck manufacturing and assembly facility in Springfield, Ohio.

The EPA’s determination is a final agency action subject to judicial review in the courts of appeals under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). The standard of review with regard to EPA action concerning a SIP is specified in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), which provides that agency action may be set aside only if it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Because we do not find the EPA’s determination here to have been arbitrary or capricious, the petition will be denied.

I.

A. Statutory and regulatory background

A combined state and federal program to control air pollution was formulated in 1970 through various amendments to the Clean Air Act. Pursuant to the mandates of sections 108 and 109 of the Act, the EPA promulgated national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for a variety of pollutants. The standards relevant to the case before us are those in effect for ozone. 2 In 1979, the EPA established the primary and secondary standards for ozone at 0.12 parts per million. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1988); see also id. at pt. 50, app. H (“Interpretation of the [NAAQS] for Ozone”).

The states were given the primary responsibility for achieving the federal air quality standards and, absent special circumstances, were required to do so by *1342 1975. In keeping with this responsibility, the states were required under section 110 of the Act to develop state implementation plans providing for “implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of the federal ambient air quality standards within their borders. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). The SIPs must be approved by the EPA and must provide, among other things, for the attainment of primary NAAQS “as expeditiously as practicable” and insure the “maintenance” of those standards. CAA § 110(a)(2)(A) and (B), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) and (B). The Supreme Court explained the review process as follows:

Under § 110(a)(2), the Agency is required to approve a state plan which provides for the timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of ambient air standards, and which also satisfies that section’s other general requirements. The Act gives the Agency no authority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of § 110(a)(2)_ Thus, so long as the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation.

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 1482, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975) (emphasis in original).

The states may also propose revisions to their SIPs. CAA § 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(A). Proposed revisions also are reviewed under the standards of section 110(a)(2). Section 110(a)(3)(A) of the Clean Air Act provides that the EPA “shall approve any revision of an implementation plan” if the EPA “determines that it meets the requirements of paragraph (2)” of section 110. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(A). When evaluating a revision to a state plan, “the logical inquiry for the EPA is to assess whether the proposed change interferes with attainment.” United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 633 F.2d 671, 674 (3d Cir.1980) (emphasis in original).

As of 1975, many states had air quality control regions (AQCR) 3 or portions thereof that did not meet the national standards, despite the existence of previously approved SIPs. If any region of a state fails to meet NAAQS, that region is designated as a “nonattainment area” for the particular pollutant exceeding the applicable standard. CAA § 171(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2); CAA § 107(d)(1)(A)-(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(l)(A)-(C). The Act was amended in 1977 in order to deal with these nonat-tainment areas. Under the amendment (now Part D of Title I of the Act), states were required to submit revisions to their SIPs demonstrating that NAAQS would be attained “as expeditiously as practicable,” though no later than the end of the 1982 calendar year. CAA § 172(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1). Part D leaves to the states the primary responsibility for meeting NAAQS and allows considerable discretion in devising an appropriate mix of emission limitations. Connecticut Fund for Environment, Inc. v. EPA, 696 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1982). However, any state that did not have an approved SIP providing for the attainment of primary NAAQS not later than 1982 was subject to a moratorium on the construction and modification of any “major stationary source” of pollution in nonattainment areas. CAA § 110(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I).

These Part D plans must meet the requirements of section 172(b) of the Act, which provides in pertinent part, that the SIP shall, inter alia:

(2) provide for the implementation of all reasonably available control measures as expeditiously as practicable;

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941 F.2d 1339, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21363, 33 ERC (BNA) 1801, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18412, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/navistar-international-transportation-corporation-v-united-states-ca6-1991.