Navarro v. Charlie Thomas Chevrolet, Ltd.

223 F. Supp. 3d 655, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187470, 2015 WL 13310246
District Court, S.D. Texas·Decided July 10, 2015·No. CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-399·Published

Opinion

ORDER TO PROCEED TO ARBITRATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CASE

EWING WERLEIN, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Among other motions pending are Defendant Charlie Thomas Chevrolet, Ltd. d/b/a AutoNation Mitsubishi’s (“AutoNation”) Motion to Compel Arbitration and for Stay or Dismissal of Litigation (Document No. 8), to which Plaintiff is unopposed,1 and Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (Document No. 18), to which Defendant American Credit Acceptance, LLC has filed its response in opposition. After carefully considering the motions, response, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the parties’ dispute should be submitted to arbitration and this case dismissed without prejudice on the merits.

On March 21, 2014, Plaintiff Christian Navarro (“Plaintiff’) purchased a used 2007 Honda Civic from AutoNation.2 Auto-Nation then assigned its interest in the sales contract to Defendant American Credit Acceptance, LLC (“American”).3 The Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Contract (the “Sales Contract”) signed by Plaintiff and AutoNation contains an Arbitration Clause (the “Arbitration Clause”) permitting either party to [657] “CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL.”4 The Arbitration Clause further provides that:

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise ... between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.5

At the scheduling conference on June 19, 2015, American acknowledged that it is bound by the Sales Contract.

Plaintiff alleges that when he purchased the vehicle, AutoNation told him it had 92,687 miles on it, but Plaintiff soon had trouble with the engine, which he discovered had been taken from a salvage car and had over 138,438 miles on it, voiding his remaining warranty.6 Plaintiff filed suit, alleging against both Defendants claims for violations of the Federal Odometer Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32701 et seq,, and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), and for breach of express warranties, fraud, and intentional misrepresentation.7

AutoNation moves to compel arbitration based on the Arbitration Clause and to stay or dismiss this suit.8 American moves to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against it, and seeks to recover its attorney’s fees under the DTPA.9 Plaintiff has filed his opposition to American’s motion and declared his concurrence with AutoNation’s motion to compel arbitration (Document No. 22). Plaintiff, separately conceding that Auto-Nation’s motion to compel arbitration should be granted, moves voluntarily to dismiss his suit so that he can pursue his claims in arbitration.10 American opposes Plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal, arguing that Plaintiff waived his right to arbitrate by filing suit and that Plaintiffs claims against American should be dismissed with prejudice.11

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),12 “[a] two-step inquiry governs whether parties should be compelled to arbitrate a dispute. First, the court must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. Once the court finds that the parties agreed to arbitrate, it must consider whether any federal statute or policy renders the claims non-arbitrable.” Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The first step requires the Court to determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties and whether [658] the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement. Id. (citing Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1996)). “[0]nce a court determines that an agreement to arbitrate exists, the court must pay careful attention to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and must resolve all ambiguities in favor of arbitration.” Id. “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983).

It is undisputed that Plaintiff and Auto-Nation agreed to the Arbitration Clause, that American as assignee of AutoNation’s rights in the Sales Contract is bound by the Arbitration Clause, that the Arbitration Clause is valid, and that the parties’ dispute is within the scope of the Arbitration Clause. Based on these undisputed facts, Plaintiff agrees that AutoNation’s Motion to Compel Arbitration should be granted. Although American opposes Plaintiffs motion voluntarily to dismiss his suit, arguing that Plaintiff waived his right to arbitrate, American has filed no opposition to AutoNation’s motion to “compel the parties to arbitration, [and to] stay or dismiss the pending litigation.”13

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Navarro v. Charlie Thomas Chevrolet, Ltd., 223 F. Supp. 3d 655, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187470, 2015 WL 13310246 (S.D. Tex. 2015).

223 F. Supp. 3d 655 (Navarro v. Charlie Thomas Chevrolet, Ltd.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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