LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) seeks to enforce its cease and desist order against MDI Commercial Services, Inc. (“MDI”), for violations of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3). The dispute arose after an unsuccessful organizing campaign by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the '“Union”) at MDI’s plant in Grand [624]*624Rapids, Minnesota. Adopting the recommendations of its Administrative Law Judge with one change in legal theory, the Board ruled that MDI committed unfair labor practices by restraining and coercing employees prior to the union election in December 1994; by discharging four employees because of their pro-union activities; and by delaying the recall of ten union sympathizers after a shortage of work caused severe layoffs in January 1995. We enforce the Board’s order except as to two of the recalled employees, Douglas Jaeger and LaVonne MacAdams, and two of the discharged employees, Regina and Edward Saric.
I. Election and Post-Election Issues.
MDI’s parent is a non-profit corporation that employs disabled and other disadvantaged workers. MDI was formed in early 1994 to build a plant in Grand Rapids funded by a grant from a large local employer. When the United States Postal Service elected not to contract out work the Grand Rapids plant had hoped to perform, MDI was left to find assembly, packaging, and other projects for its new plant in the private sector. During the time in question (the fall of 1994 through the spring of 1995), the Grand Rapids plant was in precarious financial condition, incurring on-going losses that resulted in major employee layoffs in September 1994 and January 1995.
After the Union began its organizing campaign, supporters arranged meetings and wore union buttons and emblems at work. MDI’s President, James Maher, repeatedly traveled from the Twin Cities to Grand Rapids to encourage employees not to support the Union. The plant’s supervisors, though instructed by MDI not to pressure employees on the union issue, engaged in conduct the Board later found coercive. The Union petitioned the Board for an election. It was held on December 16, and the Union lost, 53 to 20. Due to a downturn in business, MDI temporarily laid off most employees on January 18, 1995. Union supporters Keith Hawkinson and Ricky Thayer were permanently laid off. Business improved, and by March 1995 all but thirteen of the other employees had been recalled. MDI recalled the last thirteen in late April; ten were active union supporters. The Union then filed its unfair labor practice charges.
The Board concluded that MDI engaged in coercive and improper tactics pri- or to the December 1994 election, and then discriminated and retaliated against union supporters by permanently discharging Hawkinson and Thayer in January 1995, and by delaying its recall of ten union supporters until late April. MDI does not contest the findings and conclusions that it committed unfair labor practices prior to the election — for example, by telling employees a raise was not feasible because of the Union’s campaign, by questioning employees about their support of the Union, by monitoring a Union-sponsored dinner meeting and reprimanding union supporters just before the election, and by warning employees that MDI’s owner hated unions and would close the plant if the Union won. We summarily enforce these portions of the Board’s order and consider the Board’s uncontested findings of anti-union animus in reviewing the contested portions of its order. See Radisson Plaza Minneapolis v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1376, 1381-82 (8th Cir.1993).
Turning to post-election events, the Board’s General Counsel did not contest MDI’s economic decision to lay off most employees in January 1995. However, he did challenge the permanent layoffs of Hawkinson and Thayer and the late recall of ten employees who supported the Union in the December 1994 election. The ALJ found that these employment actions violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3)1 because they [625]*625were motivated by a desire to retaliate against union supporters and to discourage further attempts to secure union representation. The Board agreed.
On appeal, MDI argues these portions of the Board’s order should not be enforced because they are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the standard of review prescribed in 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Pace Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1299, 140 L.Ed.2d 466 (1998). “Put differently, we must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the Board’s eonclusion[s].” Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 118 S.Ct. 818, 823, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998). In deciding wrongful discharge and layoff issues of this kind, the Board’s General Counsel has the burden of proving that an employee’s protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment action. If the General Counsel meets this burden, the conduct is unlawful unless the employer proves it would have taken the same action absent the protected activity. See NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401-03, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983); NLRB v. DBM, Inc., 987 F.2d 540, 542-43 (8th Cir.1993).2
The Board concluded the General Counsel met his burden of proving these employees’ protected activities were a motivating factor in the terminations and late recalls. There is substantial record evidence supporting this conclusion. First, and most importantly, the uncontested pre-election unfair labor practices provided evidence of union hostility. Second, as MDI concedes, all twelve employees had been open and active union supporters pri- or to the election, so any lingering anti-union animus would logically have been directed at them. Third, because the Union won only 20 of 73 votes in the election, it is not likely a coincidence when ten of the last thirteen employees to be recalled were union supporters. From this evidence, the Board could reasonably infer that MDI’s hostility to unions and desire to discourage future organizing activity were motivating factors in the adverse employment actions. See DBM, 987 F.2d at 543; Ballou Brick Co. v. NLRB, 798 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir.1986).
In its defense, MDI presented evidence that Thayer and Hawkinson were selected for permanent layoff because of their excessive lateness, absenteeism, and low productivity. Turning to the late recall of ten other union supporters, MDI presented evidence that as business rebounded in early 1995, it recalled workers best suited to the projects on hand, typically those familiar with the types of work then available.
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
The National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) seeks to enforce its cease and desist order against MDI Commercial Services, Inc. (“MDI”), for violations of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3). The dispute arose after an unsuccessful organizing campaign by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the '“Union”) at MDI’s plant in Grand [624]*624Rapids, Minnesota. Adopting the recommendations of its Administrative Law Judge with one change in legal theory, the Board ruled that MDI committed unfair labor practices by restraining and coercing employees prior to the union election in December 1994; by discharging four employees because of their pro-union activities; and by delaying the recall of ten union sympathizers after a shortage of work caused severe layoffs in January 1995. We enforce the Board’s order except as to two of the recalled employees, Douglas Jaeger and LaVonne MacAdams, and two of the discharged employees, Regina and Edward Saric.
I. Election and Post-Election Issues.
MDI’s parent is a non-profit corporation that employs disabled and other disadvantaged workers. MDI was formed in early 1994 to build a plant in Grand Rapids funded by a grant from a large local employer. When the United States Postal Service elected not to contract out work the Grand Rapids plant had hoped to perform, MDI was left to find assembly, packaging, and other projects for its new plant in the private sector. During the time in question (the fall of 1994 through the spring of 1995), the Grand Rapids plant was in precarious financial condition, incurring on-going losses that resulted in major employee layoffs in September 1994 and January 1995.
After the Union began its organizing campaign, supporters arranged meetings and wore union buttons and emblems at work. MDI’s President, James Maher, repeatedly traveled from the Twin Cities to Grand Rapids to encourage employees not to support the Union. The plant’s supervisors, though instructed by MDI not to pressure employees on the union issue, engaged in conduct the Board later found coercive. The Union petitioned the Board for an election. It was held on December 16, and the Union lost, 53 to 20. Due to a downturn in business, MDI temporarily laid off most employees on January 18, 1995. Union supporters Keith Hawkinson and Ricky Thayer were permanently laid off. Business improved, and by March 1995 all but thirteen of the other employees had been recalled. MDI recalled the last thirteen in late April; ten were active union supporters. The Union then filed its unfair labor practice charges.
The Board concluded that MDI engaged in coercive and improper tactics pri- or to the December 1994 election, and then discriminated and retaliated against union supporters by permanently discharging Hawkinson and Thayer in January 1995, and by delaying its recall of ten union supporters until late April. MDI does not contest the findings and conclusions that it committed unfair labor practices prior to the election — for example, by telling employees a raise was not feasible because of the Union’s campaign, by questioning employees about their support of the Union, by monitoring a Union-sponsored dinner meeting and reprimanding union supporters just before the election, and by warning employees that MDI’s owner hated unions and would close the plant if the Union won. We summarily enforce these portions of the Board’s order and consider the Board’s uncontested findings of anti-union animus in reviewing the contested portions of its order. See Radisson Plaza Minneapolis v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1376, 1381-82 (8th Cir.1993).
Turning to post-election events, the Board’s General Counsel did not contest MDI’s economic decision to lay off most employees in January 1995. However, he did challenge the permanent layoffs of Hawkinson and Thayer and the late recall of ten employees who supported the Union in the December 1994 election. The ALJ found that these employment actions violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3)1 because they [625]*625were motivated by a desire to retaliate against union supporters and to discourage further attempts to secure union representation. The Board agreed.
On appeal, MDI argues these portions of the Board’s order should not be enforced because they are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the standard of review prescribed in 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Pace Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 1299, 140 L.Ed.2d 466 (1998). “Put differently, we must decide whether on this record it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the Board’s eonclusion[s].” Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 118 S.Ct. 818, 823, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998). In deciding wrongful discharge and layoff issues of this kind, the Board’s General Counsel has the burden of proving that an employee’s protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment action. If the General Counsel meets this burden, the conduct is unlawful unless the employer proves it would have taken the same action absent the protected activity. See NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401-03, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983); NLRB v. DBM, Inc., 987 F.2d 540, 542-43 (8th Cir.1993).2
The Board concluded the General Counsel met his burden of proving these employees’ protected activities were a motivating factor in the terminations and late recalls. There is substantial record evidence supporting this conclusion. First, and most importantly, the uncontested pre-election unfair labor practices provided evidence of union hostility. Second, as MDI concedes, all twelve employees had been open and active union supporters pri- or to the election, so any lingering anti-union animus would logically have been directed at them. Third, because the Union won only 20 of 73 votes in the election, it is not likely a coincidence when ten of the last thirteen employees to be recalled were union supporters. From this evidence, the Board could reasonably infer that MDI’s hostility to unions and desire to discourage future organizing activity were motivating factors in the adverse employment actions. See DBM, 987 F.2d at 543; Ballou Brick Co. v. NLRB, 798 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir.1986).
In its defense, MDI presented evidence that Thayer and Hawkinson were selected for permanent layoff because of their excessive lateness, absenteeism, and low productivity. Turning to the late recall of ten other union supporters, MDI presented evidence that as business rebounded in early 1995, it recalled workers best suited to the projects on hand, typically those familiar with the types of work then available. MDI witnesses also pointed to specific performance deficiencies and physical disabilities of the ten employees, and explained that MDI first recalled its most productive employees regardless of their Union support. In rebuttal, the General Counsel presented detailed evidence that MDI had no fixed practice of disciplining employees for lateness or absenteeism; that MDI has a history of tolerating performance deficiencies, particularly from its disabled employees; that employees recalled earlier were no more produc[626]*626tive; that many new employees were hired before the ten union supporters were recalled; and that management reports contradicted MDI’s “familiar work” explanation. The evidence on these issues was conflicting, and we may not preempt “the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views” of that evidence. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456. After careful review of the record as a whole, we conclude, with two exceptions, that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that MDI failed to prove it would have permanently laid off Haw-kinson and Thayer and would have delayed recalling the other ten absent its anti-union animus. See United Exposition Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir.1991); Hall v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 684, 688-89 (8th Cir.1991); York Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 881 F.2d 542, 545-46 (8th Cir.1989).
The two exceptions are late-recalled employees Douglas Jaeger and LaVonne MacAdams. MDI presented evidence that the late recall of these employees was due to specific physical disabilities, not simply low productivity or poor work performance. Jaeger suffered a stroke that allowed him to use only one hand and made it difficult for him to stay awake during work hours. The Grand Rapids plant manager, Lorraine Bunn, testified that MDI was not able to configure a work station for Jaeger and provide him needed on-the-job assistance until late April. Jaeger did not testify, and the General Counsel introduced no evidence rebutting this testimony. Mac-Adams injured her thumb at work in December 1994. When the thumb did not heal, she claimed workers compensation benefits from MDI in early March. MDI presented documentary evidence MacAdams was not released for work by her treating physician until the day she was recalled, April 25, 1995. Though MacAdams testified about other subjects during the General Counsel’s case-in-chief, she was not recalled to rebut this evidence.
The ALJ did not address whether Jae-ger was physically qualified for earlier recall, except to note MDI always intended to recall him. As to MacAdams, the ALJ noted a handwritten entry on a medical release form that her disability period was “14 Apr to 24 Apr” and construed that as meaning she could have been recalled before April 14. That is rank speculation, and it conflicts with the undisputed evidence that MacAdams came to MDI in early March with her claim for treatment of a disabling condition. Obviously, Jae-ger and MacAdams were the persons most able to rebut MDI’s evidence that physical and medical reasons precluded their earlier recall. The Board erred in not drawing an adverse inference from the General Counsel’s failure to present testimony by the alleged diseriminatees on those issues. See Rockingham Machine-Lunex Co. v. NLRB, 665 F.2d 303, 304-05 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107, 102 S.Ct. 2907, 73 L.Ed.2d 1316 (1982). In these circumstances, we conclude substantial evidence does not support the Board’s rejection of MDI’s affirmative defense that it would not have recalled Jaeger and Mac-Adams any sooner absent its anti-union animus. See GSX Corp. of Mo. v. NLRB, 918 F.2d 1351, 1360 (8th Cir.1990).
II. The Terminations of Regina and Edward Saric.
Edward Saric was one of the first employees hired for MDI’s new Grand Rapids plant. His duties included opening and closing the plant, shipping and receiving, plant maintenance, and building tools and fixtures to assist disabled workers. Shortly after the plant opened, his wife Regina was hired as a production worker and soon became administrative assistant to plant manager Bunn. The Sarics were included in meetings of the plant’s management team and were put in charge of the plant when Bunn and the production supervisors were out of town. However, by the fall of [627]*6271994, the Sarics were dissatisfied with their compensation, and Edward was upset that others were sometimes asked to perform some of his duties. The Sarics signed union authorization cards but were not active Union organizers.
On Monday, October 31, 1994, manager Bunn returned to the plant after a business trip to find employees upset because Regina Saric had distributed a Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”) that caused employees to fear OSHA was about to close the plant, when in fact OSHA had inspected MDI’s use of the packaging material in question and considered it safe. Bunn angrily reprimanded Regina for disseminating the MSDS in this manner. Regina then left the plant. After she left, Bunn met with Edward Saric and asked him to give her the keys to the plant. Upset, Edward phoned Regina from Bunn’s office to get a ride home. Bunn asked Edward if he was quitting. Edward responded he “might as well” and signed a voluntary termination form. After Edward left the plant, Bunn told employees Edward quit and Regina walked out. The next day, neither Saric came to work, and MDI mailed their final paychecks and posted their positions as vacant. The Board concluded MDI violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) by firing Regina and Edward for their support of the Union. MDI argues we should not enforce those portions of the Board’s order. We will consider the Sar-ics separately because their termination issues are somewhat different.
A. Regina Saric. After her unpleasant meeting with Bunn regarding distribution of the MSDS sheet, Regina Saric left the Grand Rapids plant and never returned. She later applied for unemployment compensation benefits, claiming she was discharged, and testified at a contested hearing. The Minnesota Department of Economic Security denied her claim:
We conclude, in the present case, that [Regina] was the moving party. She left work on October 31, 1994 after being reprimanded by her supervisor. She was not told that she was “fired” and she did not say that she quit. [Regina] testified that she intended to leave the job site in order to give her supervisor an opportunity to “cool off.” [Regina] stated that she intended to later return to work. However, later that day she was informed that her husband had been “forced to quit.” In addition, she also was informed that her supervisor had informed other employees that [she] and her husband “were gone.”
However, the evidence shows that [Regina] walked off the job without notice to [MDI], [MDI] had work available for [Regina] and she was scheduled to work on November 1, 1994. [Regina] did not call her supervisor or any other person in management to discuss her job. Later [Regina] received a letter from [MDI] which stated that [Regina] had resigned from her position. She did not contact [MDI] to indicate that she was not resigning.
We conclude that [Regina] made a “freewill choice” not to return to work for [MDI] .... [Regina] did not have a reasonable basis to believe that she had been fired.... [A] reasonable employee in those circumstances would have at least contacted [MDI] to determine his or her job status.
Regina E. Saric v. Minnesota Diversified, No. 1147 UC 95, at 4 (Mn.Dept.Econ.Sec. Jun. 30, 1995). At the Board’s hearing, Bunn testified consistently with the above-quoted portions of the unemployment compensation decision. Regina Saric did not testify. Edward testified that he told Bunn Regina had gone home with a headache. Resolving all credibility issues against MDI and ignoring the unemployment compensation decision altogether, the ALJ ruled “the credible evidence leaves little room for a conclusion other than that Regina Saric had been fired.” Then, relying on subsequent anti-union statements of a low-level supervisor who had nothing to do with Regina’s departure, the ALJ found she was discharged because [628]*628of MDI’s “suspicion that Ms. Saric had been supporting the Union.” The Board summarily affirmed these findings. We decline to enforce this portion of its order.
To prove a wrongful discharge, it is not essential that the employee be formally fired, but it is necessary to prove that “the words or action of the employer would logically lead a prudent person to believe his tenure had been terminated.” NLRB v. Hale Mfg. Co., 570 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir.1978) (quotation omitted). Here, the only relevant document was a memorandum sent to Regina with her final paycheck stating that she had resigned. To prove Regina was fired in the face of this evidence she quit, her own testimony was indispensable. The General Counsel had to prove that manager Bunn gave Regina reason to believe she had been fired. That required full exploration of the October 31 confrontation between Bunn and Regina, and its aftermath. Without Regina’s testimony, the record contains no satisfactory answer to questions such as what Bunn said on October 31 to make Regina think she had been fired, why she went home, what personal belongings she took with her, what the Sarics discussed after Edward left the plant later that day, why Regina did not go to work on November 1, and why she did not immediately challenge MDI’s memorandum stating she had quit.
Regina Saric, an alleged discriminatee, was a potential witness within the General Counsel’s control. The failure of a charging party to testify requires an inference that her testimony would have been unfavorable to the General Counsel’s case. See Rockingham, 665 F.2d at 304-05; International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335-40 (D.C.Cir.1972); Meier v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir.1952). Here, we have more than an adverse inference that Regina’s testimony would not have supported the General Counsel’s theory. Regina testified in the state unemployment compensation proceedings, and her testimony was a basis for the Department’s decision that she had quit. Of course, the Board is not required to follow the decision of a state unemployment compensation agency. But the testimony of MDI’s witnesses was consistent with that decision, and Regina- — the witness most critical to proving a contrary position — failed to appear. “The production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse.” Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226, 59 S.Ct. 467, 83 L.Ed. 610 (1939).3
In these circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that substantial evidence on the record as a whole does not support the Board’s finding that Regina Saric was discharged. The Board “must draw all inferences that the evidence fairly demands.” Allentown Mack, 118 S.Ct. at 829. It erred in ignoring Regina’s failure to testify. We decline to enforce this portion of the Board’s order.
B. Edward Saric. The critical event relating to Edward’s departure from MDI was his meeting with plant manager Bunn on the morning of October 31, after [629]*629Regina left the plant. Edward Saric did testify at the Board’s hearing, and both he and Bunn described this meeting in detail. As the Board resolved all credibility issues in Edward’s favor, we set forth the portion of his testimony quoted in the Board’s opinion:
QUESTION (By General Counsel): .... So let me ask you a little bit about what happened on your last day of work.... Why don’t you go through the day with me?
-I*
ANSWER: And so I went into the office, sat down and Lorraine just started about this union, what is going on, what are you two up to, all this union crap. She won’t tolerate any union activities. She just didn’t want to hear about it.... So I said I don’t know anything about [the] union. I don’t want to jeopardize anything and she asked for the keys of the building from me. I said, “Why would you need my keys?” She said, “Well,” she said, she can’t trust me with my work anymore. She needs somebody responsible for — to do these duties and I was real surprised because nobody ever had any complaints about my work. Nobody ever said anything that I did wrong or anything to that matter.
$ $ $
QUESTION: .... So she asked for your keys back and then did you give her your keys back?
ANSWER: Yeah. I gave her my keys. I had a set of keys on my keychain. I gave her that and some other keys were in my locker so I went back to take those keys and I gave her back everything, and I asked her to use the phone to call my wife because we drive to work in [the] same vehicle and she left earlier. So I called my wife and told her to come and pick me up because I didn’t have a way to get home, and after I finished the conversation Lorraine was in the other office, opened [the] door and she just said “So you are quitting?” Those were her words.
I said, “Well, I needed a ride home and,” I said “you took my duties away, my keys.” I said “What else is there for me.” I said “Yeah, I might as well. I’ll quit.” And she already had some paper there that she gave me to sign and said that’s just a formality or something, and I was just angry and disappointed in the way she acted and the anger and I just signed the paper and I walked out.
QUESTION: Okay. Why did you call your wife after she — after Lorraine Bunn asked for your keys back and you said you went in and called your wife to pick you up. Why did you do that?
ANSWER: Well, after she took my keys away and I believe the rest of my duties — those were one of the main duties that I had. I believed I had no work there even though she didn’t say it yet but I just believed there was nothing else for me so I would go home for that day at least just to let her cool down and see what will happen tomorrow morning.
Rejecting the ALJs’ conclusion Edward Saric was constructively discharged, the Board concluded he was “effectively discharged.” But this theory is directly contrary to Edward’s testimony. According to Edward, Bunn never brought up the subject of termination until he called his wife for a ride home during working hours. When Bunn asked if he was quitting, Edward said yes and signed a resignation form. On cross examination, Edward testified he left the plant and never contacted MDI again except to ask for his unpaid vacation pay:
Q. And on November 1st you decided not to go in to work, true?
A. Well, if this says that I resigned I don’t see the reason why I have to go back.
[The ALJ]: All right. So on November 1 you did decide not to go in to work, right?
[630]*630THE WITNESS: I had no reason to go to work.
* H: * * *
Q. And you did contact MDI later that week and request payment for your vacation time, true?
Q. Yeah. I just wanted to make sure I’ll get paid for what I deserve.
Three other factors also make the Board’s conclusion unpersuasive. First, the ALJ and the Board both emphasized that Edward told Bunn Regina left early with a headache, to which Bunn responded, “Well, that’s an unexcused absence. That’s good.” The Board construed Bunn’s reference to “unexcused absence” as evidence she . was looking for a pretext to fire Regina, and also found in the comment a hostile backdrop for Bunn’s later conversation with Edward. But the ALJ misquoted this portion of the transcript. Edward in fact testified, “Lorraine said ‘Well, that’s an excused absence. That’s good.’ ” The actual testimony supports inferences contrary to the Board’s — Bunn was pleased Regina had a legitimate reason to leave the plant (“an excused absence”) and would not need to be disciplined, which in turns suggests Bunn did not think she had fired Regina and was not about to discharge Edward.
Second, on the question whether Edward Saric quit or was fired, the testimony of Regina Saric would have been highly relevant. In his above-quoted testimony, Edward was inconsistent, saying both that he quit, and that he went home to let Bunn cool off. If Edward quit, he was not discharged; if he went home with the intention of returning to work the next day, then something happened to change his mind. Regina Saric had first hand knowledge on this question. Applying the adverse inference rule, which requires an assumption that the missing testimony would not have favored the General Counsel’s case, it is reasonable to infer that the Sarics talked after they left the plant and decided not to return to MDI because their pay was too low, Edward’s job duties were being reduced, and they had been unfairly abused by plant manager Bunn.
Third, the Board placed great emphasis on Edward’s testimony Bunn told him she would not tolerate any “union crap.”4 Bunn denied this. The Board credited Edward’s testimony, as it was entitled to do, but in placing Bunn’s union remarks in the worst possible light for MDI, the Board disregarded the relevance of other undisputed testimony. Numerous MDI witnesses testified that MDI considered Edward Saric a supervisor. The Board rejected MDI’s legal defense that Saric was an exempt supervisor — that is not an issue on appeal. But the Board inexplicably ignored the factual significance of this testimony. Bunn knew MDI supervisors should avoid being involved in the Union’s organizing campaign. Viewed in that light, her concern over rumors that Edward Saric was involved is hardly sinister. On October 31, six weeks before the election was eventually held, Bunn’s inquiry as to Edward’s possible union activity simply will not bear the weight the Board gave it.
In considering whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, we must take into account “whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456. The Board may reject MDI’s reasons but may not “irrationally disregard” evidence supporting MDI’s position. See Allentown Mack, 118 S.Ct. at 824-25., Viewing the record as a whole as it relates to the events of October 31 and November 1, 1994, we conclude the Board’s decision that Edward Saric was discharged reflects “a complete disregard for sworn testimony,” particularly the contrary testimony of Edward himself, rein-[631]*631forced by the missing testimony of Regina. Banner Biscuit Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 765, 768 (8th Cir.1966). By Edward’s own admission, he quit before he had any reasonable basis for believing that Bunn was about either to discharge him or to take away substantially all of his job duties. Whether Edward quit because he was upset that Bunn asked about his union activity, or for some other reason, MDI did not discharge him. We decline to enforce the Board’s decision to the contrary.
III. Conclusion.
The Board asks us to enforce the Order adopted in its decision of November 8, 1997. For the foregoing reasons, we modify paragraphs 1(b), 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) of the Order, and the Notice to Employees contained in the Appendix to that Order, to delete all references to Douglas Jaeger, LaVonne MacAdams, Regina Saric, and Edward Saric. As so modified, the Order is enforced. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The parties should attempt to agree upon a modified form of Notice to Employees that is consistent with this opinion. If they cannot agree, the Board may file a motion with this court for approval of its modified Notice to Employees.