National Homeopathic Hospital Ass'n of District of Columbia v. Britton, Deputy Com'r

147 F.2d 561, 79 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 3444

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: January 8, 1945
• Docket: 8688
• Status: Published

Opinions

EDGERTON, Associate Justice.

This is a workman’s compensation case. Frank Tyler fell in the course of his work and fractured his right kneecap. Previous accidents, none of them connected with any employment, had fractured the same kneecap and had led to amputation of the left leg and left arm. The fracture, caused by the fall, combined with the previous fracture and amputations, caused permanent total disability. The Deputy Commissioner awarded compensation based upon permanent total disability and upon Tyler’s earning capacity at the time of the fall. The employer and the insurance carrier sued in the District Court to set aside the award, and they now appeal, from a judgment dismissing their complaint.

Appellants contend that the award, as against them, should be for permanent partial disability only. They base this contention upon the following language in § 908 (f) of the compensation act:¹ “If an employee receive an injury which of itself would only cause permanent partial disability but which, combined with a previous disability, does in fact cause permanent total disability,² the employer shall provide compensation only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury: Provided, however, That in addition to compensation for such permanent partial disability, and after the cessation of the páyments for the prescribed period of weeks, the employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for permanent total disability. Such additional compensation shall be paid out of the special fund established in section 944 of this chapter.” ' Ap-. pellants contend that Tyler’s permanent total disability is caused by his recent injury “combined with a previous disability.” It follows, they contend, that his employer should provide compensation only for partial disability and that the remainder of the compensation due for total disability should be paid out of the special fund.

If the compensation act used the words “disability” and “injury” in their ordinary senses, appellants’ position would be correct. But this is not the case. On the contrary, the act uses these words in special senses which it defines. “In such circumstances definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary * * * is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others.”³ The act provides that “ ‘disability’ means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” It provides further that “ ‘injury means accidental injury or death arising out, of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury, and includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment.”⁴ If the relevant parts of these definitions are read, as they must be read, in place of the defined word “disability,” the statutory phrase “combined with a previous disability” becomes: “combined with a previous incapacity because of accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” Since Tyler’s previous incapacity did not arise out of or in the course of employment, the statutory phrase has no application to this case. Appellants’ contention therefore fails.⁵

In opposition to this view, the argument has been advanced that it is not cricket to apply relevant parts and ignore irrelevant parts of the statutory definition of “injury.” If the words “or death” as well as the words “accidental injury” were read into § 908 (f) they would produce incongruous language, viz. “combined with a previous incapacity because of accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.”⁶ Therefore, it has been argued, no part of the statutory definition of “injury” should be applied; the words “arising out of and in the course of employment” should be ignored; and the word “injury” should be given its ordinary meaning. The fallacy of this argument appears if it is applied to other instances of the word “injury.” Examples may be taken from § 908 (f) itself. It provides: “If an employee receive an injury which of itself would only cause permanent partial disability but which, combined with a previous disability, does in fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall provide compensation only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury * * To insert the words “or death” as well as the words “accidental injury,” etc., in place of the sixth word, and of the last word, of the quotation would produce this language: “If an employee receive an accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment which of itself could only cause permanent partial disability, but which, combined with a previous disability, does in

fact cause permanent total disability, the employer shall provide compensation only for the disability caused by the subsequent accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.” Since this language is incongruous it follows, if the argument which has been advanced in support of appellants’ position is correct, that no part of the statutory definition of “injury” should be applied; that the words “arising out of and in the. course of employment” should be ignored; and that the word “injury” should be given its ordinary meaning: with the result that the employer must pay compensation for non-industrial as well as for industrial accidents. The argument in question would, in fact, make the entire compensation act apply to non-industrial as well as to industrial accidents.⁷ The flaw in the argument is simply that the statutory definition of “injury” comprises alternative events of different sorts. These events include “accidental injury” and “death.” It is not necessary that both occur in order that “injury” occur. The context of the word “injury” in any given clause of the statute shows the type or types of “injury” to which that clause refers. Obviously “accidental injury” is, and “death” is not, the sort of “injury” that causes “disability.” Since § 908 (f) deals with “disability,” it deals with “accidental injury” and it does not deal with “death.” But the express requirement of a connection between employment and injury applies to either sort of “injury.” There is no alternative to that requirement. To ignore it is to rewrite the statute.

In our opinion the meaning of the statute is so clear that there is no room for a choice between different constructions. But even if the meaning were obscure, settled principles of construction would lead to the result which we have reached. In a negligence case, the question is not what the accident would have done to a different man but what it actually did to its victim. This is equally true in compensation cases. Therefore the employer must, in general, compensate the workman for the consequences of an accident although his previous defects cooperated in producing them.⁸ Section 908 (f) creates an exception to that general principle. It should therefore be construed narrowly.⁹ Appellants ask us to construe it broadly. And the broad construction which they advocate would defeat not only the letter of the statute but its purpose. For the special fund established by § 944 is a small fund, supplied only by payments of $1,000 each which are required to be made in the exceptional death cases in which no person can be found who is entitled to receive compensation. The Deputy Commissioner says and we have no reason to doubt that the fund would soon be exhausted if it were to be drawn upon in every case in which a total disability results from the combination of an “injury” with a previous defect or incapacity. There would then be no way of paying the claims which Congress intended should be paid out of this fund. The totally disabled employees concerned would then receive 'compensation for partial disability only. “There is a presumption against a construction which would render a statute ineffective or inefficient or which would cause grave public injury or even inconvenience.”¹⁰ Perhaps Congress might better have established a larger special fund, subjected it to claims like the one in suit, and relieved employers of such claims, in order to encourage employment of handicapped men. But it would be injurious as well as unauthorized for a court to relieve employers of such claims and impose them upon the small fund which Congress did establish.

Affirmed.

1 Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 'U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq., § 908(f), 44 -Stat. 1424, 1429; made applicable in the District of Columbia as a workmen’s compensation act by D.C. Code, 1940, § 36-501, 45 Stat. 600, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 note.

2 Emphasis supplied.

3 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 337, 79 L.Ed. 780.

4 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(2), (10). Emphasis supplied.

5 Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v. Marshall, D.C., W.D.Wash., 36 F.2d 814; Liberty Stevedoring Co. v. Cardillo, D.C.E.D. N.Y., 18 F.Supp. 729. Decisions under the New York act, on which the federal act is based, aTe to similar effect. La Belle v. Britton Stone & Supply Corp., 247 App. Div. 843, 286 N.Y.S. 347; Van Ooteghem v. Sisters of the Good Shepherd, 249 App. Div. 898, 292 N.Y.S. 788. Cf. Turkish v. True Health Bakery, 254 App.Div. 791, 4 N.Y.S.2d 273, in which deduction for a prior industrial accident was approved.

Throughout the fifty sections of the compensation act the words “disability” and “injury” are used repeatedly in their specially defined senses. Appellants would read them differently in § 908(f). Bnt “disability” is used in some twenty other instances in § 908 itself, and in each instance it clearly carries its specially defined sense. We think Congress would have used a different word in § 908(f), or would have added a qualifying phrase, if it had intended to refer to incapacity or defect from whatever cause and not merely to “disability” as defined.

6 The incongruity of this reading would bo verbal only; the incongruous phrase “previous incapacity because of * * * death” would produce no legal or practical effects whatever.

7 To give another example of this fact: § 009 provides “If the injury causes death, the compensation * * * shall be payable * * To substitute the phrase “accidental injury or death” for the word “injury” in § 909 would produce this language: “If the accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment causes death, the compensation * * shall be payable !i‘ * * ” The argument in question would then proceed: since death, which is a part of the statutory definition of “injury,” cannot, sensibly be read in place of the word “injury” in § 909, no part of the definition should be applied; the words “arising out of and in tlie course of employment” should he ignored; and the word “injury” should he given its ordinary meaning; with the result that compensation must be paid whether or not there is a connection between the “injury” and the employment.

8 Hoage v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., 62 App.D.C. 77, 64 F.2d 715, certiorari denied. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Kerper, 290 U.S. 637, 54 S.Ct. 54, 78 L.Ed. 554; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hoage, 64 App.D.C. 158, 75 F.2d 677; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cardillo, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 127 F.2d 334.

9 Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. I. C. C„ 286 U.S. 299, 311, 52 S.Ct. 541, 76 L. Ed. 1115.

10 United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214, 217, 59 S.Ct. 805, 807, 83 L.Ed. 1245.