National Benevolent Ass'n of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP

333 F. App'x 822
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 11, 2009
Docket08-50677
StatusUnpublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 333 F. App'x 822 (National Benevolent Ass'n of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
National Benevolent Ass'n of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, 333 F. App'x 822 (5th Cir. 2009).

Opinion

PER CURIAM: *

The district court dismissed the debtor-appellant National Benevolent Association of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) (“NBA”)’s malpractice claims against appellee law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP (“Weil Gotshal”) on res judicata and estoppel grounds. NBA appealed from that dismissal. Weil Gotshal then filed in this court a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We now vacate the district court’s dismissal of NBA’s claims but grant Weil Gotshal’s motion to dismiss this case for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss NBA’s claims without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Prior to filing for bankruptcy, appellant NBA owned and operated eleven senior-care facilities, three special-care facilities for individuals who are developmentally disabled, and four children’s-care facilities. NBA also managed more than seventy adult low-income residential housing projects under a contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).

NBA financed its facilities with bond debt. In 2003, it had outstanding variable-rate bond debt of approximately $63 million and fixed rate bonds of approximately $150 million. For each variable-rate bond issue, KBC Bank of New York (“KBC”) issued a letter of credit to guarantee the payment of principal and interest on those bonds. UMB Bank (“UMB”) served as the master trustee for NBA’s bond and bank debt. Further, NBA maintained a revolving line of credit with the First Bank of St. Louis (“First Bank”) (collectively “the Banks”).

Between 1999 and 2003, NBA’s annual revenues ranged from $123 million to $145 million but between 2000 and 2003, NBA suffered significant losses. Consequently, in 2003 NBA anticipated a review of its letters of credit by KBC; the letters were due for renewal on September 1, 2003. If NBA could not renew its letters of credit, the variable-rate bonds would be subject to a mandatory purchase funded with draws on the letters of credit. In short, NBA would be obligated to repay KBC the entire amount on the letters of credit (approximately $63 million) over a period of eight quarters.

In spring of 2003, NBA hired Cain Brothers, a New York investment advisor, and defendant law firm of Weil Gotshal to advise on the upcoming review. Deryek Palmer was the partner-in-charge at Weil Gotshal, and he allegedly took charge of negotiations with the Banks and instructed NBA to cease all direct communications with the bankers. NBA also hired Huron Consulting Group (“Huron”) to perform accounting and financial analysis.

*824 In July 2008, KBC requested a written request for renewal, updated financials, and a proposed business plan from NBA. At about that time, Huron completed its initial evaluation of NBA’s financial condition and submitted a proposed business plan to Weil Gotshal. Palmer allegedly nonetheless refused to give the Huron report to KBC unless KBC signed a confidentiality agreement.

Initially, KBC was willing to sign a confidentiality agreement but did not want to sign a provision that required KBC to use the information only to consider the restructure proposals. Nevertheless, KBC eventually signed the agreement on August 18, 2003. Palmer, however, allegedly refused to provide the Huron materials and, as a result, NBA missed the renewal deadline.

Immediately after the passing of the deadline, Palmer relented and provided KBC with the Huron report. However, NBA was already bound by the mandatory purchase provision. An effort to revoke the mandatory purchase was too late, and the first payment became due on December 1, 2003. Because of the mandatory purchase, donations to NBA slowed, its bond ratings were downgraded, and potential purchasers at its senior living centers demanded refunds of their deposits. Sales halted for several months.

By late September, Weil Gotshal, along with the other consultants, presented to the Banks the first and only restructure proposal for NBA, which proposed a 40% debt reduction. The Banks disagreed with the first proposal and imposed a condition on NBA before conducting further negotiations. The Banks required NBA to agree to hire third-party professional management to operate their senior living centers. The NBA Board discussed the proposal, but Palmer allegedly advised the Board that it could not legally delegate the operation to third-party professionals. On November 12, Palmer told one of the Banks’ lawyers that NBA would not make the December 1st bond payment, the first payment pursuant to the mandatory purchase. On November 20, Palmer participated in a telephone conference among the various NBA officers and several consultants. Palmer, along with Tom Barry from Cain Brothers, advised the NBA Board not to make the December 1st payment. The Board followed Palmer’s advice, and NBA did not make the first payment.

Despite NBA’s refusal to make the payment, the Banks were still willing to renegotiate a debt restructure if NBA agreed to professional management in some capacity. However, Palmer allegedly represented to the Board and the Texas and Missouri Attorney Generals that the Banks were unwilling to permit debt restructuring and had “forced” NBA into Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.

At a NBA Board meeting on January 4, 2004, Palmer allegedly predicted that, after filing for bankruptcy, adverse summary judgments would soon occur and put the Banks in a position to forcibly sell NBA’s assets. Palmer predicted that NBA may face the appointment of a receiver. On January 9-10, 2004, Weil Gotshal made a PowerPoint presentation to the NBA board entitled “Chapter 11 Update and Strategies.” The presentation offered a positive view of bankruptcy and touted Cain Brothers, Weil Gotshal, and Huron’s value to NBA. Weil Gotshal, however, allegedly never presented possible risks to bankruptcy, such as the loss of NBA’s senior care centers.

NBA filed its bankruptcy petition on February 16, 2004. On June 1, 2004, Weil Gotshal made another proposal to the Banks offering a 20% debt reduction. The Banks rejected the proposal and informed NBA that the “starting point” for negotiations was the sale of the senior care living *825 centers. An agreement was reached regarding the marketing and sale of the centers. The centers were eventually sold to Fortress Investments for $210 million.

On March 2, 2005, NBA’s bankruptcy plan was confirmed. Creditors were paid from the sale of NBA’s real estate, including all eleven senior living centers and its St. Louis headquarters, along with NBA’s cash-on-hand and securities. HUD terminated its management arrangement with NBA in its seventy-plus residential housing projects, and the Attorney Generals of Texas and Missouri demanded the ouster of the President and the Board. Nevertheless, NBA exited the bankruptcy with significant assets, including $23.4 million in cash and marketable securities and five child-and special-care centers.

Professional fees from Weil Gotshal amounted to $34 million in a little over one year. The bankruptcy court scheduled a post-confirmation hearing in respect to Weil Gotshal’s application for a professional fee award. Before the hearing but after the plan’s confirmation, NBA filed an adversary action in the bankruptcy court against Weil Gotshal alleging legal malpractice for both pre- and post-petition conduct.

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333 F. App'x 822, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/national-benevolent-assn-of-the-christian-church-disciples-of-christ-v-ca5-2009.