Mora v. Black Horse Capital Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 21, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00017
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 NATASHA MORA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00017-RBM-AHG

11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING EX PARTE 12 v. APPLICATION TO RESCIND POSTJUDGMENT LOCKOUT 13 BLACK HORSE CAPITAL INC., et al.,

14 Defendants. [Doc. 6]

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Natasha Mora’s (“Plaintiff”) Ex Parte 22 Application to Rescind Post Judgment Lockout against Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s 23 Department and Defendant Sheriff Kelly A. Martinez (the “Sheriff Defendants” or the 24 “Sheriff”)1 (the “Ex Parte Application”). (Doc. 6.) In support of her Ex Parte Application, 25 Plaintiff filed: (i) the Eviction Restoration Notice (Doc. 6-1); (ii) a Minute Order in the 26

27 1 Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s Department is now known as the San Diego County 28 1 unlawful detainer proceeding (Doc. 6-2); (iii) the declaration of attorney Marc Applbaum 2 (Doc. 6-3, “Applbaum Declaration” or “Applbaum Decl.”); and (iv) the declaration of 3 Plaintiff (Doc. 6-4, “Mora Declaration” or “Mora Decl.”). The Sheriff Defendants oppose 4 the Ex Parte Application (“Sheriff’s Opposition” or “Sheriff’s Opp’n”).2 (Doc. 8.) The 5 Sheriff Defendants concurrently filed a Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”). (Doc. 8-1.) 6 Defendant Black Horse Capital, Inc. (“Defendant BHC”) also filed an opposition 7 (“Defendant BHC’s Opposition”). (Doc. 9.) 8 The Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument 9 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Ex Parte 10 Application is DENIED. 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Black Horse Capital Inc., Bula 13 Developments, Inc., Walter R. Dahl, the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Kelly A. 14 Martinez, and Does 1–50 (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. 1, Complaint [“Compl.”] ¶¶ 15 1–7.)3 Plaintiff alleges this action relates to an unlawful detainer case adjudicated in the 16 Superior Court of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”) captioned 17 Black Horse Capital Inc. v. Bula Developments Inc., Case Number: 24UD012825C (the 18 “State Court Action”). (Compl. ¶ 11.) The State Court Action concerned the property 19 located at 6389 Castejon Drive, La Jolla, California 92037 (the “Property”). (Doc. 6-1, 20

21 2 On January 13, 2025, at 12:45 a.m., Plaintiff filed a Notice of Non-Opposition asserting 22 that “[n]o interested party has objected or opposed the relief as requested herein.” (Doc. 7 23 at 2.) Under this Court’s Chambers Rules, only “ex parte applications that are not opposed within three (3) Court days may be considered unopposed.” The Hon. Ruth Bermudez 24 Montenegro Civ. Chambers R. VI (emphasis in original). Since Plaintiff filed the Ex Parte 25 Application on January 9, 2025, Defendants were required to file an opposition by January 14, 2025. Thus, the Sheriff Defendants and Defendant BHC timely filed their respective 26 oppositions. 27 3 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Complaint and the CM/ECF electronic 28 1 Eviction Restoration Notice [“Restoration Notice”] at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that she has held 2 an enforceable lease for the Property since January 2023. (Mora Decl. [Doc. 6-4] ¶ 2.) 3 On December 16, 2024, Superior Court Judge Wendy M. Behan denied the claims 4 of the right of possession by Plaintiff, and an individual named Cesar Mora, finding their 5 claims invalid. (Doc. 6-2, Superior Court Minute Order [“Min. Order”] at 1.) Superior 6 Court Judge Behan ordered the Sheriff to “proceed with enforcement of the original writ 7 of possession as deemed amended to include the claimant occupants, Cesar and [Plaintiff].” 8 (Id.) On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed an emergency writ of mandamus with the 9 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, which the Court of Appeal denied on that same 10 day. (Compl. ¶ 13.) On the following day, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, 11 which provided an active automatic stay of the eviction. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that she 12 informed the Sheriff Defendants of the automatic stay, but they continued with their 13 enforcement of the eviction. (Id.) Possession of the Property was restored to the landlord 14 on January 8, 2025. (See Restoration Notice [Doc. 6-1] at 1.) 15 On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court asserting a single 16 cause of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. (Compl. 17 ¶¶ 21–28.) Plaintiff alleges that “the trial court by refusing to permit Plaintiff to testify on 18 her own behalf violated her due process … .” (Id. ¶ 12.) On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff 19 filed the instant Ex Parte Application, requesting this Court rescind, or direct the Sheriff to 20 rescind, “its Restoration Notice served on Plaintiff on January 8, 2025 in connection with 21 its enforcement of post judgment lockout.”4 (Doc. 6, Ex Parte Application [“Appl.”] at 2.) 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 24 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 25 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff 26

27 4 On January 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining 28 1 “must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to suffer 2 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in 3 [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. 4 Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 5 20). The “[l]ikelihood of success on the merits ‘is the most important’ Winter factor[.]” 6 Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 7 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015)). 8 Most preliminary injunctions “prohibit[ ] a party from taking action and ‘preserve[] 9 the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits.’” Marlyn 10 Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2009) 11 (quoting Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988)). “Where, by 12 contrast, a requested injunction would require the nonmovant to take affirmative action to 13 alter the status quo (i.e., a mandatory injunction), the movant must ‘establish that the law 14 and facts clearly favor her position.’” Fujikura Composite Am., Inc. v. Dee, No. 24-CV- 15 782 JLS (MSB), 2024 WL 3261214, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2024) (quoting Garcia, 786 16 F.3d at 740). Mandatory injunctions “go[ ] well beyond simply maintaining the status quo” 17 and are accordingly “particularly disfavored.” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740. Such injunctions 18 are subject to “heightened scrutiny and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly 19 favor the moving party.” Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993) 20 (citation omitted). “[M]andatory injunctions should not issue in doubtful cases.” Garcia, 21 786 F.3d at 740 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 22 III. JUDICIAL NOTICE 23 The Sheriff Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the Writ of 24 Possession of Real Property issued by in the State Court Action on October 31, 2024 (“Writ 25 of Possession”). (RJN [Doc. 8-1] at 2; see Doc. 8-2.) Additionally, Defendant BHC 26 appended the following documents to its Opposition: (1) “Supplemental Opposition to 27 Mora Claims of Right to Possession” submitted by Defendant BHC in the State Court 28 Action; (2) two status reports filed by the Chapter 11 Trustee in a case captioned In re: 1 Bula Developments, Inc., Case No. 23-24619-C-11 before the United States Bankruptcy 2 Court, Eastern District of California (“Bula Bankruptcy Action”); and (3) an Order 3 Denying Motion for Derivative Standing to Pursue Claims on Behalf of Estate issued in 4 both the Bula Bankruptcy Action and a related adversary action captioned Mora v Bula 5 Developments Inc., Adversary No. 24-02175-C (“Related Adversary Action”). (Doc. 9, 6 Defendant BHC’s Opposition [“BHC Opp’n”] at 4–26.) 7 “Judicial notice under Rule 201 permits a court to notice an adjudicative fact if it is 8 ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.’” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 9 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). The Court may take judicial notice of 10 documents referenced in the complaint, as well as undisputed matters of public record. Lee 11 v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). Public records, including 12 judgments and other documents on file in federal or state courts, are proper subjects of 13 judicial notice. Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2012). 14 The Writ of Possession and court filings referenced above are all proper subjects of 15 judicial notice. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th 16 Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice of “several other pleadings, memoranda, expert reports, 17 etc.” in related court proceeding). The Court therefore GRANTS the Sheriff Defendants’ 18 RJN (Doc. 8-1) and sua sponte takes judicial notice of Defendant BHC’s attached exhibits. 19 See Bryan v. City of Carlsbad, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (citations 20 omitted) (“The Court may take judicial notice sua sponte, and must take notice if a party 21 requests it and if the Court is supplied with the necessary information.”). 22 IV. DISCUSSION 23 Rule 65(a)(1) permits the Court to issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to 24 the adverse party. The Sheriff Defendants and Defendant BHC confirm they have not been 25 properly served with the Complaint. (Sheriff’s Opp’n at 2; BHC Opp’n ¶ 12.) Nothing in 26 the record indicates Plaintiff has made any attempt to serve each Defendant with a copy of 27 the Ex Parte Application or the Complaint, and Defendants have not otherwise appeared in 28 this action to date. 1 Nor has Plaintiff complied with the procedural requirements for ex parte applications 2 mandated by the Local Rules and this Court’s Civil Chambers Rules. See S.D. Cal. Civ. 3 R. 83.3(g)(2); The Hon. Ruth Bermudez Montenegro Civ. Chambers R. VI. The Complaint 4 and the Ex Parte Application lack any allegation as to why notice should not be required 5 for the mandatory injunction. 5 See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 83.3(g)(2) (the moving party must 6 show “that for reasons specified the party should not be required to inform the opposing 7 party or the opposing party’s attorney.”). Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 8 requirements of Civil Local Rule 83.3(g) is sufficient justification to deny the Ex Parte 9 Application. See Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 10 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well within 11 a district court’s discretion.”). 12 Nonetheless, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to meet her burden on the threshold 13 inquiry of likelihood of success on the merits and DENIES the Ex Parte Application on 14 that basis. 15 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 16 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not provide the appropriate analysis for 17 granting injunctive relief. Beyond a conclusory allegation that her “case has sufficient 18 merit to warrant a finding that the status quo should be preserved,” Plaintiff neglects to 19 substantiate her contentions with analysis or argument. (See Appl. [Doc. 6] at 3.) Thus, 20 Plaintiff fails to address, much less establish, any of the Winter factors. See Winter, 555 21 U.S. at 20 (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 22 succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 23

24 25 5 While the Ex Parte Application is unclear as to the type of injunctive relief requested, the Court construes the Ex Parte Application as a motion for a preliminary injunction. See 26 Devasahayam v. DMB Cap. Grp., No. 3:17-cv-02095-BEN-WVG, 2017 WL 6547897, at 27 *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (“When the Rule 65(b) requirements for issuance of a TRO without notice have not been met, the motion may be converted to a Rule 65(a) motion for 28 1 preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction 2 is in the public interest.”). Moreover, Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the 3 merits because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter, and the Sheriff Defendants are 4 immune from liability based on their conduct in enforcing judicial orders. 5 1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 6 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts do not have jurisdiction 7 to hear de facto appeals from state court judgments.” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 8 1041, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2010); see Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. 9 of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). A federal action is a “de facto 10 appeal” of a state court decision where the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly 11 committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. 12 Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may not hear a de facto appeal and 13 must refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is “inextricably intertwined” with the 14 state court proceedings. Id. at 1158; see also Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th 15 Cir. 2013) (“The ‘inextricably intertwined’ language from Feldman is not a test to 16 determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in 17 the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”). 18 Both conditions are present here. Plaintiff seeks rescission of the Writ of Possession 19 issued “in connection with its enforcement of post judgment lockout” in the State Court 20 Action. (Appl. at 2.) The Ex Parte Application thus “rel[ies] on the premise that Plaintiff 21 [ ] w[as] in fact entitled to remain in possession,” meaning that the judgment in the state 22 court was “wrongful.” Koshak v. Cnty. of Orange, No. SACV 13-01732-CJC(ANx), 2014 23 WL 12626351, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 323 (9th Cir. 2016). 24 “The issue of enforcing an unlawful detainer judgment is inextricably intertwined with the 25 judgment itself.” Iula v. Voos, No. 23-CV-2277 JLS (AHG), 2024 WL 171395, at *7 (S.D. 26 Cal. Jan. 16, 2024) (citation omitted). In seeking a remedy by which this Court would 27 invalidate a state court’s unlawful detainer judgment, Plaintiff clearly asks the Court to 28 “review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings,” which is at the 1 core of Rooker-Feldman’s prohibition. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000); 2 see Richards v. Mercy Hous. Cal., No. C 12-00234 JW, 2012 WL 174186, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 3 Jan. 18, 2012) (“[I]nsofar as [she] requests that the Court ‘stop’ the eviction,” Plaintiff is 4 unavoidably “seeking relief from the state court judgment.”).6 5 As the Court has no jurisdiction to review or invalidate the state court’s judgment, 6 Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, or even a “serious 7 question,” as to her claims. See In re Bauman, No. 3:24-CV-1564 JLS (BLM), 2024 WL 8 4647299, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2024) (holding Rooker-Feldman precluded TRO where 9 plaintiff sought to prevent “the state court’s eviction order from being carried out,” and 10 challenged the unlawful detainer because “the clerk of the Superior Court” allegedly failed 11 to file debtor’s answer); Lara v. Servs., No. 12cv904-LAB (POR), 2012 WL 12872451, at 12 *1 (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (denying injunction where “[plaintiff] had the opportunity to 13 contest his eviction in San Diego Superior Court, and he lost. The Rooker-Feldman 14 doctrine bars him from seeking relief from that loss in federal court.”). 15 2. The Sheriff Defendants’ Immunity 16 Plaintiff also fails to show her due process claim against the Sheriff Defendants is 17 likely to succeed based on their enforcement of the Writ of Possession. Under California 18 law, the Sheriff is statutorily required to levy on a writ of possession and is thereby 19 “immune from liability in the execution of ‘all process and orders regular on their face and 20 issued by competent authority, whatever may [be] the defect in the proceedings upon which 21 they were issued.’” Lyons v. Santa Barbara Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 231 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 22 1503 (2014) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 262.1; George v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 78 23

24 25 6 This analysis applies equally to Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief and claims for damages in the Complaint, as Plaintiff also asserts legal errors by the state court as an injury 26 and seeks relief from the state court judgment as a remedy. See Grimes v. Alameda County 27 Social Servs., 2011 WL 4948879, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (holding claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman where plaintiff sought an order restoring custody of children 28 1 Cal. App. 4th 1048, 1054–1055 (2000)). Indeed, a sheriff or other public official is entitled 2 to immunity from suit for civil rights claims arising out of his execution or enforcement of 3 a facially valid court order. See Ezor v. McDonnell, No. CV 19-8851-JVS (AGR), 2020 4 WL 2813538, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2020) (citing Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 5 1034, 1039–41 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2013)). Because Plaintiff’s claims are solely based on the 6 Sheriff Defendants’ execution of judicial orders, they are entitled to immunity. 7 To the extent Plaintiff argues the Sheriff Defendants waived immunity by ignoring 8 the automatic stay arising from her recent bankruptcy petition, Plaintiff’s claim similarly 9 fails.7 Plaintiff cites no authority, and the Court has located none, that would impose a 10 legal duty on the Sheriff to investigate the legality of the court orders before enforcement. 11 See Engebretson, 724 F.3d at 1039–41 & n.7 (rejecting argument that officials have 12 independent duty to investigate legality of court order before enforcing it); see also Arrieta 13 v. Mahon, 31 Cal. 3d 381, 392 (1982) (function of Sheriff is to execute writ or other orders 14 that are “regular on their face and issued by competent authority” and does not “include a 15 determination of the merits of the underlying action”). 16 Plaintiff has not alleged any factual basis to argue that the court orders are facially 17 invalid. See Engebretson, 724 F.3d at 1039–41 & n.7 (holding officials immune for 18 executing facially valid court order); George, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 1054 (immunizing Sheriff 19 from liability for executing orders, including writ of possession of real property, that “are 20 regular on their face”). Rather, as the Sheriff Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s allegations 21 show the bankruptcy petition did not stay the eviction because Plaintiff no longer possessed 22 a legal interest in the Property. (See Doc. 8 at 5.) Indeed, Plaintiff expressly alleges the 23 Superior Court Judge denied her claim for possession as invalid on December 16, 2024. 24

25 7 In a declaration by Plaintiff’s counsel, Marc Applbaum, Attorney Applbaun contends that 26 Defendant CSD denied Plaintiff’s due process rights by ignoring the automatic stay 27 pursuant to Plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceeding. (Doc. 6-3 [“Applbaum Decl.”], ¶ 8.) The Court notes that Plaintiff did not include this allegation in her Complaint or in her Ex Parte 28 1 (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff filed her bankruptcy petition on December 31, 2024 (id. ¶ 15), 2 which acted as an automatic stay of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate 3 or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. 4 § 362(a)(3). However, the bankruptcy petition did not stay the eviction because the 5 Superior Court’s judgment terminated her possessory interests two weeks before her filing. 6 See In re Perl, 811 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2016) (the “entry of judgment and a writ of 7 possession following unlawful detainer proceedings extinguishes all other legal and 8 equitable possessory interests in the real property at issue.”). On this additional basis, 9 Plaintiff fails to show that she is likely to succeed on the merits. 10 Where, as here, the moving party fails to meet their burden on the threshold inquiry 11 of likelihood of success on the merits, “the court need not consider the other factors[ ] in 12 the absence of serious questions going to the merits.” Disney Enterprises, 869 F.3d at 856 13 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As Plaintiff has wholly failed to satisfy 14 her burden and does not establish any serious questions on the merits of her claims, the 15 Court does not consider the other factors. The Ex Parte Application is therefore DENIED. 16 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 forbids an attorney from making claims that are 18 not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 19 reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Plaintiff’s 20 attempts to obtain possession of the Property have been rejected numerous times by 21 different courts, including the Bankruptcy Court (BHC Opp’n [Doc. 9] at 23–26), the San 22 Diego Superior Court (Min. Order [Doc. 6-2] at 1), and the California Court of Appeal 23 (Compl. ¶ 13). This calls into question whether Plaintiff’s counsel conducted “an inquiry 24 reasonable under the circumstances” to confirm that their legal contentions were warranted 25 under law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). 26 Additionally, the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s similar filings before several 27 state and federal courts suggests Plaintiff may have filed this action in federal court for an 28 improper purpose. Rule 11(b)(1) makes clear that an intent to cause unnecessary delay is 1 an improper purpose. This action appears to be another attempt by Plaintiff to delay the 2 owner’s possession of the Property, namely, through the vehicle of a due process claim. 3 Notably, the Bankruptcy Court has previously observed Plaintiff’s “unclean hands” and 4 found Plaintiff intended to “delay in order to continue living rent-free in the property as 5 long as possible.” (BHC Opp’n [Doc. 9] at 25–26.) The Court warns Plaintiff that a legally 6 meritless complaint could expose Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel to sanctions or referral 7 to the State Bar of California for violation of his Rule 11 obligations. 8 V. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 9 When a complaint clearly does not state a claim upon which the court can grant 10 relief, a court can dismiss the case sua sponte, and without leave to amend, after it provides 11 the plaintiff with proper notice and an opportunity to respond. Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 12 1196, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2017). Further, the Court has a sua sponte duty to confirm that it 13 has subject matter jurisdiction over the cases on its docket. See Allen v. Santa Clara Cnty. 14 Corr. Peace Officers Ass’n, 400 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1001 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Ruhrgas 15 AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). 16 Having reviewed the Complaint’s allegations, the Court has reservations that it has 17 subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, including whether Plaintiff has standing under 18 Article III. See Steinmeyer v. Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks, 715 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1312 (S.D. 19 Cal. 2024) (noting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Article III standing are threshold 20 issues that “go to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); see also Lopez v. Trendacosta, 21 No. LA CV 14-05406 JAK (MANx), 2014 WL 6883945, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2014) 22 (finding that plaintiffs cannot establish an injury-in-fact for standing because the court 23 lacked jurisdiction to order the relief sought in accordance with Rooker-Feldman); Riding 24 v. Cach LLC, 992 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“A challenge under the Rooker– 25 Feldman doctrine is a challenge for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and may be raised 26 at any time by either party or sua sponte by the court.”). 27 “[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the 28 threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case 1 || or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). Although Plaintiff 2 || asserts federal question jurisdiction based on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 3 || Fourteenth Amendment does not itself provide for a private right of action. Plaintiffs must 4 point to an appropriate statute that does, as this 1s not a responsibility that the Court 5 || will assume. See Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 6 1992) (finding plaintiff had “no cause of action directly under the United States 7 || Constitution.”); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Rooker - 8 || Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 9 ||a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.”) 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing as to why this 11 || action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on or before January 12 2025. If Plaintiff fails to file a timely response to the OSC, the Court will dismiss this 13 action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without further notice. 14 VI. CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application (Doc. 6) is DENIED. 16 || Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing as to why this action should not 17 || be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by January 31, 2025. 18 IT ISSO ORDERED. 19 ||} DATE: January 21, 2025 2 Get Bermuls, Micteryys > HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ'MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12