1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 NATASHA MORA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00017-RBM-AHG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 14 BLACK HORSE CAPITAL INC., et al., JURISDICTION 15 Defendants. 16 17 This action relates to an unlawful detainer action adjudicated in the Superior Court 18 of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”). (Doc. 1, Complaint 19 [“Compl.”] ¶ 11 (citing Black Horse Capital Inc. v. Bula Developments Inc., Case Number: 20 24UD012825C).) On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff Natasha Mora (“Plaintiff”) commenced 21 this action by bringing a single cause of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 22 Due Process Clause against Defendants Black Horse Capital Inc., Bula Developments, Inc., 23 Walter R. Dahl, the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Kelly A. Martinez, and Does 24 1–50 (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1, Complaint [“Compl.”] ¶¶ 1–7.) Plaintiff then 25 filed an Ex Parte Application to Rescind Post Judgment Lockout (“Ex Parte Application”) 26 requesting that this Court rescind, or direct the Sheriff to rescind, “its Restoration Notice 27 served on Plaintiff on January 8, 2025 in connection with its enforcement of post judgment 28 lockout.” (Doc. 6 at 2.) 1 On January 21, 2025, the Court denied the Ex Parte Application and issued an Order 2 to Show Cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter 3 jurisdiction. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff responded to the Order on January 30, 2025. (Doc. 11.) 4 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES this action for lack of subject matter 5 jurisdiction. 7 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 8 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by [the] 9 Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal 10 citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, 11 and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. 12 (internal citations omitted). It is well-established that “a district court’s duty to establish 13 subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See United 14 Inv’rs Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may 15 consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th Cir. 16 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an 17 ‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo 18 Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States v. S. 19 Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)). 21 Plaintiff argues this Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action because: 22 (1) her constitutional right to testify was violated; and (2) her claims relate to bankruptcy 23 proceedings which are exclusively handled by federal courts. (Doc. 11 at 2–3.) Because 24 Plaintiff attempts to collaterally attack the state court’s judgment, the Court finds it lacks 25 subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 26
27 1 Plaintiff relies on the Grable test, which states that federal courts have jurisdiction over 28 1 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction 2 to hear cases that are, in effect, appeals from state court judgments. See Carmona v. 3 Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010).2 This is because, “[a]bsent express 4 statutory authorization, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state 5 court judgment.” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). As the 6 Supreme Court has noted, this doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers 7 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 8 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 9 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 10 A complaint is a “forbidden de facto appeal” when the plaintiff (1) “asserts as a legal 11 wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court,” and (2) “seeks relief from a state 12 court judgment based on that decision.” Carmona, 603 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 13 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, federal claims that are inextricably 14 intertwined with the relevant state court judgement are also barred. Fontana Empire Ctr., 15 LLC v. City. of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Here, Plaintiff’s claims stem from the outcome of unlawful detainer proceedings in 17 San Diego Superior Court. After the San Diego Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s right of 18 possession claim, she filed an emergency writ of mandamus with the California Court of 19 Appeal, Fourth District that was subsequently denied. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff now asserts 20 21 22 Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 311–12 (2005). Grable, however, is 23 inapplicable in this case because Plaintiff does not assert a state law claim. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 259–60 (holding that under the Grable rule, a state law claim must 24 be facially premised on a substantial federal issue). Moreover, as the Court noted in its 25 OSC, Plaintiff further failed to assert her due process claim through a proper statutory vehicle because the Constitution, itself, does not provide a private right of action. 26
27 2 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 28 | || that the state court’s decision to not hear her live testimony before denying her claim for 2 || possession amounted to a due process violation. (/d. § 12.) However, it is clear that the 3 ||claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment because Plaintiff 4 ||‘‘complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court” and “seeks relief from 5 judgment of that court” by requesting that this Court review the state court’s decision 6 ||to not allow Plaintiff's testimony and rescind the state court’s writ of possession. See 7 || Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC, 307 F.3d at 992 (“A claim is inextricably intertwined with a 8 court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court 9 || wrongly decided the issues before it, or if the relief requested in the federal action would 10 || effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.”) (cleaned up). 11 Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. 12 || Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d at 1163; see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 13 ||(1999) (courts have obligation to sua sponte dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); 14 R.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 NATASHA MORA, Case No.: 3:25-cv-00017-RBM-AHG
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 14 BLACK HORSE CAPITAL INC., et al., JURISDICTION 15 Defendants. 16 17 This action relates to an unlawful detainer action adjudicated in the Superior Court 18 of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”). (Doc. 1, Complaint 19 [“Compl.”] ¶ 11 (citing Black Horse Capital Inc. v. Bula Developments Inc., Case Number: 20 24UD012825C).) On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff Natasha Mora (“Plaintiff”) commenced 21 this action by bringing a single cause of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 22 Due Process Clause against Defendants Black Horse Capital Inc., Bula Developments, Inc., 23 Walter R. Dahl, the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Kelly A. Martinez, and Does 24 1–50 (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1, Complaint [“Compl.”] ¶¶ 1–7.) Plaintiff then 25 filed an Ex Parte Application to Rescind Post Judgment Lockout (“Ex Parte Application”) 26 requesting that this Court rescind, or direct the Sheriff to rescind, “its Restoration Notice 27 served on Plaintiff on January 8, 2025 in connection with its enforcement of post judgment 28 lockout.” (Doc. 6 at 2.) 1 On January 21, 2025, the Court denied the Ex Parte Application and issued an Order 2 to Show Cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter 3 jurisdiction. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff responded to the Order on January 30, 2025. (Doc. 11.) 4 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DISMISSES this action for lack of subject matter 5 jurisdiction. 7 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 8 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by [the] 9 Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal 10 citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, 11 and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. 12 (internal citations omitted). It is well-established that “a district court’s duty to establish 13 subject matter jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See United 14 Inv’rs Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may 15 consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th Cir. 16 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an 17 ‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo 18 Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States v. S. 19 Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)). 21 Plaintiff argues this Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action because: 22 (1) her constitutional right to testify was violated; and (2) her claims relate to bankruptcy 23 proceedings which are exclusively handled by federal courts. (Doc. 11 at 2–3.) Because 24 Plaintiff attempts to collaterally attack the state court’s judgment, the Court finds it lacks 25 subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 26
27 1 Plaintiff relies on the Grable test, which states that federal courts have jurisdiction over 28 1 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts do not have jurisdiction 2 to hear cases that are, in effect, appeals from state court judgments. See Carmona v. 3 Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010).2 This is because, “[a]bsent express 4 statutory authorization, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state 5 court judgment.” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). As the 6 Supreme Court has noted, this doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers 7 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 8 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 9 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 10 A complaint is a “forbidden de facto appeal” when the plaintiff (1) “asserts as a legal 11 wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court,” and (2) “seeks relief from a state 12 court judgment based on that decision.” Carmona, 603 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 13 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, federal claims that are inextricably 14 intertwined with the relevant state court judgement are also barred. Fontana Empire Ctr., 15 LLC v. City. of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 Here, Plaintiff’s claims stem from the outcome of unlawful detainer proceedings in 17 San Diego Superior Court. After the San Diego Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s right of 18 possession claim, she filed an emergency writ of mandamus with the California Court of 19 Appeal, Fourth District that was subsequently denied. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff now asserts 20 21 22 Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 311–12 (2005). Grable, however, is 23 inapplicable in this case because Plaintiff does not assert a state law claim. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 259–60 (holding that under the Grable rule, a state law claim must 24 be facially premised on a substantial federal issue). Moreover, as the Court noted in its 25 OSC, Plaintiff further failed to assert her due process claim through a proper statutory vehicle because the Constitution, itself, does not provide a private right of action. 26
27 2 “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 28 | || that the state court’s decision to not hear her live testimony before denying her claim for 2 || possession amounted to a due process violation. (/d. § 12.) However, it is clear that the 3 ||claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment because Plaintiff 4 ||‘‘complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court” and “seeks relief from 5 judgment of that court” by requesting that this Court review the state court’s decision 6 ||to not allow Plaintiff's testimony and rescind the state court’s writ of possession. See 7 || Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC, 307 F.3d at 992 (“A claim is inextricably intertwined with a 8 court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court 9 || wrongly decided the issues before it, or if the relief requested in the federal action would 10 || effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.”) (cleaned up). 11 Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. 12 || Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d at 1163; see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 13 ||(1999) (courts have obligation to sua sponte dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); 14 R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the action if subject matter 15 jurisdiction is lacking). 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court sua sponte DISMISSES the action for lack of 18 || subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file 19 |}an amended complaint or, in the alternative to file a notice of voluntary dismissal under 20 || Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 is DENIED AS MOOT. 22 ||DATE: July 10, 2025 2 Zak smu, Mitten > HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ'MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28