Montgomery, Jr. - Adams-II v. Anderson

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedJune 9, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-02432
StatusUnknown

This text of Montgomery, Jr. - Adams-II v. Anderson (Montgomery, Jr. - Adams-II v. Anderson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CINDY ADAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2432

CONSUELLEO ANDERSON, ET AL. SECTION “R” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court are four motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction from five different defendants.1 Plaintiff has not opposed any of the motions. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motions.

I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of a series of disjointed events that occurred throughout plaintiff’s life.2 Plaintiff Cindy Adams initially filed a complaint in this Court pro se in October 2024,3 and acquired counsel in December 2024. Counsel filed a first amended complaint in January 2025, in which plaintiff alleged causes of action against nineteen named defendants, as well

1 R. Docs. 53, 54, 77, & 78. 2 R. Doc. 11. 3 R. Doc. 1. as Does 1 through 20 and six unknown insurance companies.4 The complaint asserted claims for a range of disconnected conduct dating back to 2002.5

Four defendants named in the suit—Norfolk Public School District (“NPS”), Chesapeake Police Department (“CPD”), Samantha Bates, and Earnell Patterson—independently moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).6

The Court considers the motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Personal jurisdiction “is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district court, without which it is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (internal citation

omitted). When a nonresident defendant moves the court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden to show that personal jurisdiction exists. Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185,

1192 (5th Cir. 1985). When the court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in the present case, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing.

4 R. Doc. 11. 5 Id. 6 R. Docs. 53, 54, 77, & 78. Godhra v. United States Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999). The allegations of the complaint, except as controverted by opposing

affidavits, must be taken as true, and all conflicts in the facts must be resolved in favor of plaintiffs. Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985). A court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if

(1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant, and (2) the forum state’s exercise of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Latshaw v. Johnson,

167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). Because Louisiana’s long-arm statute, La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201, et seq., extends jurisdiction to the full limits of due process, the Court’s focus is solely on whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case satisfies federal due process requirements. Dickson Marine Inc.

v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201(B)). The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself

of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum contacts” with that state, and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wa., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

There are two ways to establish minimum contacts: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994). General jurisdiction will attach, even if the act or transaction sued upon is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, if the

defendant has engaged in “continuous and systematic” activities in the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984); Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. Contacts between a defendant and the forum

state must be “extensive” to satisfy the “continuous and systematic” test. Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2001); see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the

exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”). Specific jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant “has

purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 2001); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. Minimum contacts may be established by actions, or even just a single act, by the nonresident defendant

that “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). “When the cause of action relates to the defendant’s contact with the

forum, the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement is satisfied, and ‘specific’ jurisdiction is proper, so long as that contact resulted from the defendant’s purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activity of the plaintiff.” Bearry v.

Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.”). This restriction on the

minimum contacts inquiry ensures that the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of the benefits of the forum state such that it could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474);

see also Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375. III. DISCUSSION Because plaintiff did not respond to the four motions to dismiss for

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Related

Latshaw v. Johnston
167 F.3d 208 (Fifth Circuit, 1999)
Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc.
179 F.3d 331 (Fifth Circuit, 1999)
Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co.
188 F.3d 619 (Fifth Circuit, 1999)
Alpine View Co Ltd v. Atlas Copco AB
205 F.3d 208 (Fifth Circuit, 2000)
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
326 U.S. 310 (Supreme Court, 1945)
Hanson v. Denckla
357 U.S. 235 (Supreme Court, 1958)
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S. A. v. Hall
466 U.S. 408 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
471 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown
131 S. Ct. 2846 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Dorothy Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation
818 F.2d 370 (Fifth Circuit, 1987)

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