Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

845 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 2012 WL 84723, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3871
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJanuary 11, 2012
DocketCase No. CV 11-07720 MMM (FMOx)
StatusPublished
Cited by104 cases

This text of 845 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 2012 WL 84723, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3871 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND; DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT

MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge.

On August 16, 2011, plaintiffs filed this action in Los Angeles Superior Court.1 Defendants removed the case to this court on September 16, 2011, asserting that the action was a “mass tort” action and invoking jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).2 Defendants also invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).3 On October 14, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion to remand.4 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss one week later, on October 21, 2011.5 Both motions are opposed.6

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Complaint’s Factual Allegations

The complaint in this action was filed on behalf of 108 named plaintiffs. It is a sprawling document that is 84 pages and 387 numbered paragraphs long; many paragraphs contain multiple subparagraphs. The court summarizes the complaint’s allegations below.

The complaint alleges that “[a]s the result of an aggressive and relentlessly pursued growth strategy between 2003 and 2009,” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) became the fourth largest banking institution in the nation, and was the “master servicer” for loans and mortgages at issue in this action.7 As part of a massive scheme of investor fraud, defendants allegedly inflated property appraisals, disregarded underwriting standards, sold' predatory loan products, and promised refinancing packages, all while asserting that they were “prudently lending to qualified homeowners.”8 Defendants allegedly sold mortgage products to borrowers who could not otherwise meet traditional underwriting standards for such loans, and thereby contributed to a massive housing price bubble.9 After the bubble collapsed, plaintiffs’ net worth and [1040]*1040credit ratings were devastated.10 The complaint alleges that defendants are responsible for a host of other ills related to the current economic crisis, including a “mortgage meltdown in California that was substantially worse than any economic problems facing the rest of the United States,” 11 and a “knowing[ ] and systematic ] destruction of] California home values.” They assert that defendants “acted with callous or reckless disregard” for the fact that “their actions [might] cause California home prices to plummet.”12

Defendants allegedly created risky “mortgage pools,” promising investors lucrative benefits, and “managed risk through leverage and derivatives trading.” 13 They purportedly knew that the mortgage pools contained loans that were at very high risk of default.14 Borrowers like plaintiffs were allegedly “handcuffed” and required to accept these “dangerous products” because defendants imposed substantial early payment penalties if borrowers “tried to get out of the[] toxic loans [and replace them with] more stable fixed rate products.” 15

With the proceeds of TARP funds, defendants allegedly committed numerous fraudulent acts, including issuing notices of default in violation of California law, misrepresenting their intention to arrange loan modifications for plaintiffs, and failing to respond to plaintiffs’ communications.16 Plaintiffs assert that defendants have been foreclosing on their homes without proof that defendants hold the notes and deeds of trust they seek to enforce, and without being able to demonstrate ownership of notes and trust deeds in question.17

The complaint also contains a number of allegations regarding Wachovia, and its acquisition of Golden West Financing Corporation (“Golden West”). Golden West was an Oakland, California-based mortgage lender run by Herbert and Marion Sandler.18 It offered a product known as the “Pick-A-Pay” mortgage.19 This type of mortgage permitted borrowers to choose from multiple payment options every month: (1) full payment of interest and principal sufficient to pay down the loan over a traditional 30 year term; (2) a higher payment that would pay off the [1041]*1041loan in 15 years; (3) an interest-only payment; or (4) a minimum payment that did not cover interest, and caused the unpaid interest to be added to the loan balance.20 Plaintiffs contend that the fourth option resulted in “negative amoritization,” i.e., in growth of the outstanding balance over time.21 Plaintiffs contend that this product lured borrowers to take out loans by offering low “teaser” rates that “ratcheted sharply upwards as interest rates increased.” 22 It was purportedly marketed to unsophisticated home buyers who did not understand the financial risks they faced if they entered into such a loan.23 Plaintiffs assert that Golden West’s loans were labeled the “Typhoid Mary of the mortgage industry” by The New York Times, and that the Sandlers were included on a list of “25 people to blame for the financial crisis” by Time Magazine,24 After Wachovia acquired Golden West, its mortgage portfolio was dominated by Pick-A-Pay mortgages. By the end of 2007, it held $120 billion of these mortgages, compared with $50 billion of “traditional mortgages.”25 More than $70 billion of Wachovia’s Pick-A-Pay mortgages were issued to California borrowers.26

When Wachovia announced its purchase of Golden West, the housing market was already beginning to decline, and investors were concerned about their potential exposure.27 To reassure its investors, Wachovia’s officers made various representations regarding the safety and stability of Golden West’s portfolio, and claimed to have implemented policies to ensure that borrowers could pay their loan obligations.28 Wachovia stated in 2007 that it did not “anticipate any meaningful potential impact to earnings with the sub prime going forward.”29

The Pick-A-Pay loans were allegedly concentrated in California, and when these loans “reset prematurely due to the contractual breaches by Wells Fargo,” many homeowners lost their homes through foreclosure.30 Plaintiffs allege that defendants were motivated to foreclose on properties quickly so that the homes could be added to their growing inventory of Real Estate Owned (“REO”) properties.31 When Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia, it allegedly took a large ‘paper loss’ on Wachovia’s nonperforming loans and mortgages, so [1042]*1042that whatever money or benefits it was able to recoup on the defaulted mortgages could be reflected as new profits.32

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Bluebook (online)
845 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 2012 WL 84723, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3871, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mireles-v-wells-fargo-bank-na-cacd-2012.