Milliken v. Court of Portage

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: August 12, 2024
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00747
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

JOSHUA MILLIKEN,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:24-cv-747

v. Honorable Sally J. Berens

COURT OF PORTAGE et al.,

Respondents. ____________________________/ OPINION Petitioner Joshua Milliken is a county detainee currently incarcerated at the Berrien County Jail in St. Joseph, Michigan. He has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1), alleging that his detention violates his constitutional rights. This mater is presently before the Court on Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), and for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 4.) Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243.1 The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Service of the petition on the respondent is of particular significance in defining a putative respondent’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority,

by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority- asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Rule 4, by requiring courts to review and even resolve the petition before service, creates

a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the petitioner. Because Respondent has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Respondent is not presently a party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review of the petition. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties

1 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be applied to petitions filed under Section 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).2 Petitioner’s consent is sufficient to permit the undersigned to conduct the Rule 4 review. After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, it plainly appears from the face of the petition that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Accordingly, the Court will summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice.

Discussion I. Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis The filing fee for a habeas corpus action is $5.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). While Petitioner has not formally requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, he has submitted a financial affidavit (ECF No. 2) indicating that he is indigent. It reasonably appears that paying the cost of this filing fee would impose an undue financial hardship. Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court will grant Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. II. Factual Allegations As noted above, Petitioner is currently detained at the Berrien County Jail in St. Joseph, Michigan. A letter attached to his petition indicates that Petitioner has been sentenced in Berrien County, and that Petitioner may “serve [that] sentence in any penal institution.” (ECF No. 1-1,

PageID.4.) While unclear, it appears that Petitioner had written a letter to the Berrien County Public Defender’s Office asking if they “handle writs to other courts.” (Id.)

2 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). Petitioner has named the Court of Portage and the City of Kalamazoo as Respondents in this matter. Public records indicate that Petitioner is facing one charge of possession of methamphetamine in the Kalamazoo County District Court, and that on October 12, 2023, a bench warrant was issued for Petitioner’s failure to appear. See Register of Actions, State v. Milliken, Case No. 2023-2300932FY-FY, available at https://micourt.courts.michigan.gov/case-

search/court/D08 (type “Milliken” for “Last Name or Business,” select Search, then complete the CAPTCHA and select the link for case number 2023-2300932FY-FY) (last visited July 26, 2024). In his Section 2241 petition, Petitioner “seek[s] access of the following cases/warrants: failure [to] appear/POS/meth.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Petitioner indicates that he is exercising his right to “be brought before the Portage court to clear up these matters.” (Id.) He avers that if he does not hear from the court within 10 days, he “does declare this matter closed.” (Id.) It appears that Petitioner intended to submit this petition to the Kalamazoo County District Court, as the envelope in which he mailed it is addressed to “Portage Court.” (Id., PageID.2.) Nevertheless, the Court construes Petitioner to be asserting a speedy trial claim in his Section 2241 petition.

III. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers upon federal courts the jurisdiction to consider petitions for writ of habeas corpus of state pretrial detainees. Atkins v. People of the State of Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981). While petitions under Section 2241 are not subject to all of the specific statutory requirements set forth in Section 2254, a pretrial detainee may not simply seek relief in federal court under Section 2241 where state relief is still available. Thus, a federal court ordinarily “should abstain from the exercise of that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state courts or by other state procedures available to the petitioner.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546 & n.1; see also Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton Cnty, Ohio, 668 F.3d 804, 810 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Unlike exhaustion under § 2254, exhaustion under § 2241 is not a statutory requirement. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), with id. § 2241. Rather, in the § 2241 context, ‘decisional law has superimposed such a requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.’”). The Sixth Circuit has approved consideration of a pretrial Section 2241 petition only in three exceptional circumstances: (1) when the petitioner seeks a speedy trial, Atkins 644 F.2d at

546–47; (2) when a petitioner seeks to avoid a second trial on double jeopardy grounds, Delk v. Atkinson, 665 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1981); and (3) when a petitioner faces prejudice from prior ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations on retrial, Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1204 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1989). Petitioner’s claim suggests that he is being denied the right to a speedy trial. Even in a case such as this where a pretrial detainee articulates a claim of the type that may constitute an exceptional circumstance, a habeas petitioner must still properly exhaust available state court remedies before proceeding in federal court. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490–91 (1973) (recognizing the long-standing judicial doctrine of exhaustion of state-

court remedies in all habeas action); Klein v. Leis, 548 F.3d 425, 429 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008); Delk, 665 F.2d at 93 (holding that a pretrial detainee may file a Section 2241 petition after state remedies are exhausted). The requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust state-court remedies before seeking relief in federal court “protect[s] the state courts’ opportunity to confront initially and resolve constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions and to limit federal judicial interference in state adjudicatory processes.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. To properly exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner must have fairly presented each claim to the state court of appeals and to the state supreme court before raising claims in a federal habeas corpus petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45, 847 (1999); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414-15 (6th Cir. 2009). Petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion. See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). Here, Petitioner does not indicate that he has sought relief in the Michigan Supreme Court for the violation of his speedy trial rights. A challenge to pretrial detention in Michigan is governed by Mich. Comp. Laws § 765.1 et seq. Under those provisions and the Michigan Court Rules, it

appears that state-court remedies are still available to Petitioner. Michigan Court Rule 6.106(H) provides for modification of pretrial custody orders—indeed, the rule contemplates circumstances that warrant emergency release. Additionally, the rule provides for appeal of the custody decision by motion. Mich. Ct. R. 6.106(H)(1). Alternatively, the state habeas corpus remedy may provide a means to obtain relief. Petitioner must pursue the remedies afforded by Michigan Court Rule 6.106 or by the Michigan habeas corpus statute, including all available appeals. Relief under Section 2241 is not available until after Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies. IV. Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of

appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s application is properly denied for lack of exhaustion or, alternatively, because the relief he seeks is not available by way of a pretrial habeas petition. Under Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only “when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Both showings must be made to warrant the grant of a certificate. Id.

The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not find it debatable whether Petitioner’s application should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion or, based on the relief requested, as premature. Therefore, a certificate of appealability will be denied. Moreover, for the same reasons the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under Section 2241 and has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, the Court also concludes that any issue Petitioner might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Conclusion The Court will enter an order and judgment granting Petitioner’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissing the petition for lack of exhaustion, and denying a certificate

of appealability.

Dated: August 12, 2024 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS United States Magistrate Judge