Miller v. United States

59 Cust. Ct. 212, 1967 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2207
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedSeptember 20, 1967
DocketC.D. 3125
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 59 Cust. Ct. 212 (Miller v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miller v. United States, 59 Cust. Ct. 212, 1967 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2207 (cusc 1967).

Opinion

Beckwohth, Judge:

The merchandise involved in this case consists of woodworking machines of different types with electric motors imported from England or West Germany and entered at the port of Los Angeles on various dates in September, October, and November 1962. The machines and motors were assessed with duty as entireties at 12½ per centum ad valorem under paragraph 353 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by Presidential proclamations, 97 Treas. Dec. 157, T.D. 55615, and 97 Treas. Dec. 430, T.D. 55649, as articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device. It is claimed that the machines are properly dutiable at 10½ per centum ad valorem under paragraph 372 of said tariff act, as modified, as woodworking or other machines, not specially provided for, and that the electric motors themselves are dutiable under paragraph 353 of said tariff act, as modified by the .Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 91 Treas. Dec. 150, T.D. 54108, as motors of more than 1/10 horsepower but less than 200 horsepower.

The pertinent provisions of the said tariff act, as modified, are as follows:

Paragraph 353, as modified by T.D. 55615 and T.D. 55649:

Articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device, such as * * *, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of metal, and not specially provided for:
Other (* * 12%%adval.

[214]*214Paragraph 372, Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by T.D. 55615 and T.D.55649:

Machines, finished or unfinished, not specially
provided for:
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜
Sawmill and other wood-working machines (except reciprocating gang-saw machines) _ 10½% ad val.
¾: ‡ ⅝ ⅜ ⅞: ⅝ *
Other (except * * *; sawmill and other woodworking machines; ** *)_ 10%%adval.

Paragraph 353, as modified by T.D. 54108:

Articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device, such as * * *, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of metal, and not specially provided for: .
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ :J: ⅜ *
Motors:
Of more than 1/10 horsepower but less than 200 horsepower_ 10½% ad val.

Plaintiff claims that the case of Supreme Woodworking Machine et al. v. United States, 54 Cust. Ct. 368, Abstract 69204, is controlling of the issues herein. The evidence in that case was summarized by the court as follows (p. 369) :

The testimony of Mr. Stone, president of plaintiff corporation, established that the imported machines were operated from a power source by means of V or flat belts; that the source of power in each instance was a standard electric motor, produced in accordance with NEMA, National Electrical Manufacturers Association, specifications; that, in each instance, the motor could be used for many other purposes; that each machine as imported contained such a motor, except exhibit 8, which contained two of such motors, which were bolted to the machine by the use of three or four bolts; that the motors were easily subject to removal by unscrewing the three or four bolts holding the motor and attaching the belts to any other source of power, such as water, steam, or diesel; that, in addition thereto, the machines contained an on-off switch with wiring to the electric motor; that this on-off switch controlled the starting and stopping of the machine; that the machines had no other electrical feature.

The court held, following the principles set forth in United States v. Dryden Rubber Co., 22 CCPA 51, T.D. 47050, and United States v. Baker Perkins, Inc., et al., 46 CCPA 128, C.A.D. 714, that the woodworking machines and their accompanying motors did not have as an essential feature an electrical element or device within the meaning of paragraph 353 and that the machines and motors did not constitute an entirety and should have been appraised separately.

[215]*215The cases cited by the court enunciated the principle that if the imported article is designed and constructed to use electrical power or other power, interchangeably, it does not have as an essential feature an electrical element or device, but that if the article is so constructed as to utilize electrical power solely, it does have as an essential feature an electrical element or device.

In Ralph G. Coxhead Corp. v. United States, 22 CCPA 96, T.D. 47080, the court stated (pp. 101-102) :

* * * We think Congress, by that term, meant that the motor or the electrical feature of the article must be essential to the operation of the article and that if the article was so designed and constructed that it could normally operate in two ways, both by electrical power and by hand power, interchangeably, it would not be an electrical article and the electrical element or device would not be an essential element or device. If, however, the article was so designed and constructed as to be operated normally by means of the electrical element, the fact that it might be operated by hand in emergencies or at such times as when the motor would be broken or out of repair, would, in our opinion, not destroy its inherent electrical character and remove it from the paragraph. The motor would not be an essential element of a calculating machine if the machine as imported was so designed and constructed that it might, without substantial modification, be interchangeably operated by hand or by electrical power. [Emphasis quoted.]

The Baker Perkins case, supra, held that the fact that the use of sources of power other than electricity would not be practical from a commercial standpoint was not controlling in view of the fact that the condition of the machine did not limit the drive to an electric motor.

The Government has conceded in its brief in this case that the woodworking machines are capable of use with sources of power other than electric, but claims that such other sources of power could not be substituted for the electric motors without substantial modification or reconstruction of the machines.

With the issue thus narrowed, we turn to the evidence presented. This consists of the testimony of one witness and three documents depicting some of the machines involved.

The witness was Milton E.

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Bluebook (online)
59 Cust. Ct. 212, 1967 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miller-v-united-states-cusc-1967.