Castelazo & Associates Atwood Imports, Inc. v. United States

64 Cust. Ct. 508, 314 F. Supp. 38, 1970 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3124
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJune 2, 1970
DocketC.D. 4027
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 64 Cust. Ct. 508 (Castelazo & Associates Atwood Imports, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Castelazo & Associates Atwood Imports, Inc. v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 508, 314 F. Supp. 38, 1970 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3124 (cusc 1970).

Opinion

Rosenstein, Judge:

The merchandise involved in the consolidated protests herein consists of various types of woodworking machines, each imported with one or more electric motors. The machines and accompanying motors were appraised as entireties, and assessed for duty at 13% or 12% per centum ad valorem, depending on the date of entry, as “Articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device, * * *, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of metal, and not specially provided for,” under paragraph 353 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the Torquay Protocal to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.D. 52/39, or by the Trade Concessions negotiated at the 1960-61 Tariff Conference, T.D. 55615. [509]*509Plaintiffs contend tliat the electrical equipment imported with the machines are not essential elements thereof, and that the machines are properly dutiable at 11% or 10% per centum ad valorem, depending on the date of entry, under paragraph 372 of said act, as modified by the Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as other machines, finished or unfinished, not specially provided for, or as modified by T.D. 55615, supra, as other woodworking machines.

Plaintiffs subsequently “proposed” amendments claiming the motors to be classifiable under the provision for electric motors in paragraph 353. However, they “have not pressed the issue of the allowance” [italics supplied] (brief, page 2) of these amendments, which had been objected to by defendant, on the ground that, if successful in their primary claim, the appraisements of the machines and motors as entireties must be considered null and void and the protests remanded to a single judge to find separate values for each item pursuant to 28 U.S.'C. § 2636(d)1

The affirmative language used by plaintiffs has long been construed to mean the voluntary election of a party not to urge upon the court one of its claims and, hence, an abandonment or withdrawal of that claim. R. U. Delapenha & Co., Inc. v. United States, 50 Cust. Ct. 144, C.D. 2403 (1963). Therefore, we cannot reach a determination on, or consider those matters of record which might relate to, the classification of the motors as entireties separate and apart from the machines.

The interpretation and application of the phrase, “articles having as an essential feature an electrical element or device,” have been the subject of considerable litigation. A leading case on this point is United States v. Dryden Rubber Co., 22 CCPA 51, T.D. 47050 (1934), which holds that, for an article to fall within the purview of the aforesaid provisions, “the electrical feature must be an essential feature, without which the article will not function, normally, for the purposes intended, * * In Keer, Maurer Company v. United States, 48 Cust. Ct. 205, 208, C.D. 2336 (1962), this court, interpreting the criteria set forth in Dryden, stated:

* * * In other words, if an article has been designed to operate by electrical power, and cannot normally function otherwise, it is an article with an essential electrical feature, within the scope of paragraph 353. If, however, the substitution of nonelectric features for the electrical ones can be made without substantial modification or reconstruction of the functional [510]*510properties of the machine, it is not an article having as an essential feature an electrical element or device, within the meaning of said paragraph 353. * * *

See also Ralph C. Coxhead Corp. v. United States, 22 CCPA 96, T.D. 47080 (1934); Castelazo & Associates, Atwood Imports, Inc., et al. v. United States, 62 Cust. Ct. 148, C.D. 3707, 296 F. Supp. 25 (1969); Gene Miller, Atwood Imports, Inc. v. United States, 59 Cust. Ct. 212, C.D. 3125 (1967) (reversed in part on other grounds on rehearing, Id. v. Id., 63 Cust. Ct. 452, C.D. 3934 (1969)); Arnhold Ceramics, Inc. v. United States, 56 Cust. Ct. 416, C.D. 2668 (1966); F. B. Vandegrift & Co., Inc. v. United States, 56 Cust. Ct. 325, C.D. 2644 (1966); Frank P. Dow Co., Inc., and Evergreen Distributors, Inc. v. United States, 52 Cust. Ct. 235, Abstract 68234 (1964); W. C. Sullivan & Company v. United States, 46 Cust. Ct. 31, C.D. 2229 (1961).

Our appellate court, in the frequently cited case of United States v. Baker Perkins, Inc., R. F. Downing Co., Inc., 46 CCPA 128, C.A.D. 714 (1959), gave a narrower construction to this provision which has influenced the disposition of succeeding cases arising thereunder. The court held that the fact that an imported cocoa liquor grinding mill was to be powered by an electric motor which, from a practical, commercial standpoint, was the only motive power that could be employed for the operation of the mill, was not determinative of the issue. As it was shown that it could be operated by other than electrical power, selection of an electric motor did not make the mill an essentially electrical article.

In short, proof that, from a “practical commercial standpoint” (Baker Perkins at page 130), electricity is the only power that can be employed is not the desideratum for classification under paragraph 353: if a machine can be powered by a nonelectric force without requiring substantial modification, it does not have as an essential feature an electrical element or device.2

Furthermore, when it is shown that in changing over to another source of power most of the changes or modifications are made outside* the machines, such as in the use of pulleys and shafts to connect the substituted mode of power to the articles, this court has held that no [511]*511substantial modification of the machines is involved and that they are not essentially electrical articles. Gene Miller, Atwood Imports, Inc. v. United States, supra, and cases cited therein.

Nor is it essential in many instances to spell out in detail the time and cost involved in making these modifications. The court held, in Gene Miller, Atwood Imports, Inc. v. United States, supra:

While the testimony did not establish either the cost of substituting another source of power or the time required to do it, the un-contradicted description of the work to be done is sufficient to indicate, prima facie, that the modifications required were not substantial. The situation 'here is quite different from that in the Berkley Machine Company case supra, where the machine was very complex and there was convincing evidence by a well-qualified expert that the machine could not be converted without substantial modifications.

As Chief Judge Rao stated, in John H. Faunce Phila., Inc. v. United States, supra:

Testimony regarding the time and expense involved in the replacement of electric power is of critical importance only when the extent of change required in the substitution of other power is not apparent from a description of the work to be done or where a conflict exists between expert witnesses. * * *

With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the machines in issue, which are described on the invoices as follows:3

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. United States
804 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (Court of International Trade, 2011)
Miller v. United States
67 Cust. Ct. 50 (U.S. Customs Court, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
64 Cust. Ct. 508, 314 F. Supp. 38, 1970 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/castelazo-associates-atwood-imports-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1970.