YOUNG, J.
Petitioners, two organizations representing the interests of Michigan chiropractors, challenged the validity of the “Preferred Provider Option” offered by appellants to their policyholders. In count I of their petition, petitioners claimed that the option violated the rights of the appellants’ insureds. In count II of their petition, petitioners claimed a violation of the rights of chiropractic providers. Regarding count I, we hold that [367]*367petitioners do not satisfy the test for third-party standing, and may not litigate the claims of appellants’ insureds. Regarding count II, assuming arguendo that petitioners have standing to sue on behalf of their membership, petitioners have not established an actual or imminent injury. Thus, petitioners’ claim is not ripe for judicial review. Therefore, we vacate the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Services (the Commissioner).1
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellant-insurers offer a “Preferred Provider Option” (PPO) to their no-fault automobile insurance policyholders, allowing their insureds to elect to limit their choice of medical care providers in the event they require personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. In exchange for reduced PIP premiums, insureds agree to receive treatment from a network of medical care providers maintained by Preferred Providers of Michigan (PPOM). In the event that a policyholder seeks treatment from a provider outside the PPOM network, the insured must pay a deductible, and provider reimbursement is limited to PPOM’s customary reimbursement rate. The “Preferred Provider Option” is entirely voluntary; if policyholders do not opt for the endorsement, they do not receive the premium discount and are not limited to the PPOM network of providers.
Appellants began offering the discounted policy option in July 2000.2 In August 2000, petitioners filed a [368]*368request with the Commissioner for a contested case hearing pursuant to MCL 500.2028 and MCL 500.2029, claiming that the PPO endorsement violated the Insurance Code, MCL 500.100 et seq. Petitioners asked the Commissioner to withdraw approval of the endorsement pursuant to MCL 500.2236(5) and to issue a cease and desist order to respondents.3
The Commissioner sought additional information from respondents and petitioners, which petitioners refused to supply. On the basis of the record established, the Commissioner rejected petitioners’ request for a contested case hearing. The Commissioner concluded that the endorsement did not violate the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. Petitioners appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the decision of the Commissioner and held that the “Preferred Provider Option” was not authorized by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment, holding that respondents’ PPO endorsement was inconsistent with the no-fault act and that the authority to issue the endorsement must emanate from the Legislature.4
[369]*369We granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to address among the issues briefed whether petitioners had standing to challenge the Preferred Provider Option on behalf of appellants’ insureds and chiropractic providers.5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a party has standing is a question of law that we review de novo.6 Moreover, questions of justiciability implicate constitutional separation of powers principles.7 Constitutional questions are likewise reviewed de novo.8
III. ANALYSIS
a. JUSTICIABILITY
Our tripartite system of government is constitutionally established in both our state and federal constitutions. US Const, art III, § 1 confers upon the courts only “judicial power”; US Const, art III, § 2 limits the judicial power to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.” Similarly, our state constitution, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, provides:
The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.
[370]*370The powers of each branch are outlined in the Michigan Constitution, which assigns to the Legislature the task of exercising the “legislative power,”9 the Governor the task of exercising the “executive power,”10 and the judiciary the task of exercising the “judicial power.”* 11
In Nat’l Wildlife, this Court described and defined the Court’s constitutionally assigned “judicial power”:
The “judicial power” has traditionally been defined by a combination of considerations: the existence of a real dispute, or case or controversy; the avoidance of deciding hypothetical questions; the plaintiff who has suffered real harm; the existence of genuinely adverse parties; the sufficient ripeness or maturity of a case; the eschewing of cases that are moot at any stage of their litigation; the ability to issue proper forms of effective relief to a party; the avoidance of political questions or other non-justiciable controversies; the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional issues; and the emphasis upon proscriptive as opposed to prescriptive decision making. [471 Mich 614-615.]
In seeking to make certain that the judiciary does not usurp the power of coordinate branches of government, and exercises only “judicial power,” both this Court and the federal courts have developed justiciability doctrines to ensure that cases before the courts are appropriate for judicial action.12 These include the doctrines of stand[371]*371ing,13 ripeness,14 and mootness.15
Federal courts have held that doctrines such as standing and mootness are constitutionally derived and jurisdictional in nature, because failure to satisfy their elements implicates the court’s constitutional authority to exercise only “judicial power” and adjudicate only actual cases or controversies.16 Because these doctrines [372]*372are jurisdictional in nature, they may be raised at any time and may not be waived by the parties.17
Likewise, our case law has also viewed the doctrines of justiciability as affecting “judicial power,” the absence of which renders the judiciary constitutionally powerless to adjudicate the claim.18 This is a point made in Anway v Grand Rapids R Co:19
“The duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it. When, in determining such rights, it becomes necessary to give an opinion upon a question of law, that [373]*373opinion may have weight as a precedent for future decisions.
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YOUNG, J.
Petitioners, two organizations representing the interests of Michigan chiropractors, challenged the validity of the “Preferred Provider Option” offered by appellants to their policyholders. In count I of their petition, petitioners claimed that the option violated the rights of the appellants’ insureds. In count II of their petition, petitioners claimed a violation of the rights of chiropractic providers. Regarding count I, we hold that [367]*367petitioners do not satisfy the test for third-party standing, and may not litigate the claims of appellants’ insureds. Regarding count II, assuming arguendo that petitioners have standing to sue on behalf of their membership, petitioners have not established an actual or imminent injury. Thus, petitioners’ claim is not ripe for judicial review. Therefore, we vacate the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Services (the Commissioner).1
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellant-insurers offer a “Preferred Provider Option” (PPO) to their no-fault automobile insurance policyholders, allowing their insureds to elect to limit their choice of medical care providers in the event they require personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. In exchange for reduced PIP premiums, insureds agree to receive treatment from a network of medical care providers maintained by Preferred Providers of Michigan (PPOM). In the event that a policyholder seeks treatment from a provider outside the PPOM network, the insured must pay a deductible, and provider reimbursement is limited to PPOM’s customary reimbursement rate. The “Preferred Provider Option” is entirely voluntary; if policyholders do not opt for the endorsement, they do not receive the premium discount and are not limited to the PPOM network of providers.
Appellants began offering the discounted policy option in July 2000.2 In August 2000, petitioners filed a [368]*368request with the Commissioner for a contested case hearing pursuant to MCL 500.2028 and MCL 500.2029, claiming that the PPO endorsement violated the Insurance Code, MCL 500.100 et seq. Petitioners asked the Commissioner to withdraw approval of the endorsement pursuant to MCL 500.2236(5) and to issue a cease and desist order to respondents.3
The Commissioner sought additional information from respondents and petitioners, which petitioners refused to supply. On the basis of the record established, the Commissioner rejected petitioners’ request for a contested case hearing. The Commissioner concluded that the endorsement did not violate the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. Petitioners appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the decision of the Commissioner and held that the “Preferred Provider Option” was not authorized by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment, holding that respondents’ PPO endorsement was inconsistent with the no-fault act and that the authority to issue the endorsement must emanate from the Legislature.4
[369]*369We granted leave to appeal, directing the parties to address among the issues briefed whether petitioners had standing to challenge the Preferred Provider Option on behalf of appellants’ insureds and chiropractic providers.5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a party has standing is a question of law that we review de novo.6 Moreover, questions of justiciability implicate constitutional separation of powers principles.7 Constitutional questions are likewise reviewed de novo.8
III. ANALYSIS
a. JUSTICIABILITY
Our tripartite system of government is constitutionally established in both our state and federal constitutions. US Const, art III, § 1 confers upon the courts only “judicial power”; US Const, art III, § 2 limits the judicial power to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.” Similarly, our state constitution, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, provides:
The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.
[370]*370The powers of each branch are outlined in the Michigan Constitution, which assigns to the Legislature the task of exercising the “legislative power,”9 the Governor the task of exercising the “executive power,”10 and the judiciary the task of exercising the “judicial power.”* 11
In Nat’l Wildlife, this Court described and defined the Court’s constitutionally assigned “judicial power”:
The “judicial power” has traditionally been defined by a combination of considerations: the existence of a real dispute, or case or controversy; the avoidance of deciding hypothetical questions; the plaintiff who has suffered real harm; the existence of genuinely adverse parties; the sufficient ripeness or maturity of a case; the eschewing of cases that are moot at any stage of their litigation; the ability to issue proper forms of effective relief to a party; the avoidance of political questions or other non-justiciable controversies; the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional issues; and the emphasis upon proscriptive as opposed to prescriptive decision making. [471 Mich 614-615.]
In seeking to make certain that the judiciary does not usurp the power of coordinate branches of government, and exercises only “judicial power,” both this Court and the federal courts have developed justiciability doctrines to ensure that cases before the courts are appropriate for judicial action.12 These include the doctrines of stand[371]*371ing,13 ripeness,14 and mootness.15
Federal courts have held that doctrines such as standing and mootness are constitutionally derived and jurisdictional in nature, because failure to satisfy their elements implicates the court’s constitutional authority to exercise only “judicial power” and adjudicate only actual cases or controversies.16 Because these doctrines [372]*372are jurisdictional in nature, they may be raised at any time and may not be waived by the parties.17
Likewise, our case law has also viewed the doctrines of justiciability as affecting “judicial power,” the absence of which renders the judiciary constitutionally powerless to adjudicate the claim.18 This is a point made in Anway v Grand Rapids R Co:19
“The duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it. When, in determining such rights, it becomes necessary to give an opinion upon a question of law, that [373]*373opinion may have weight as a precedent for future decisions. But the court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. No stipulation of parties or counsel, whether in the case before the court or in any other case, can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the court in this regard.” [Citation omitted.]
Similarly, in Novi v Robert Adell Children’s Funded Trust,20 this Court recently stated:
Where the facts of a case make clear that a litigated issue has become moot, a court is, of course, bound to take note of such fact and dismiss the suit, even if the parties do not present the issue of mootness. “ 1 “Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority, and a court may, and should, on its own motion, though the question is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing the action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the proceeding.” ’ ” Because “ ‘[t]he judicial power... is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,’ ” a court hearing a case in which mootness has become apparent would lack the power to hear the suit. [Citations omitted.][21]
Because “the most critical element” of the “judicial power” requires that a case contain a genuine controversy between the parties,22 we must ensure that one exists before exercising our judicial authority. The judiciary arrogates to itself the powers of the executive and [374]*374legislative branches whenever it acts outside the constitutional confines of “judicial power.” Fidelity to our constitutional structure compels this Court to be “vigilant in preventing the judiciary from usurping the powers of the political branches.”23 Thus, we reiterate that questions of justiciability concern the judiciary’s constitutional jurisdiction to adjudicate cases containing a genuine controversy.24 Questions of justiciability may be raised at any stage in the proceedings, even sua sponte, and may not be waived by the parties.25 Where a lower court has erroneously exercised its judicial power, an appellate court has “jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.”26
[375]*375b. THIRD-PARTY STANDING
In count I of their amended petition, petitioners challenge appellants’ policy endorsement as violating the rights of appellants’ insureds. Thus, count I of the petition concerns third-party standing — whether petitioners may litigate to vindicate the rights of others.
The general rule is that a litigant cannot vindicate the rights of a third party.27 The rule disfavoring jus tertii — litigating the rights of a third party — “assumes that the party with the right has the appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation.”28 Furthermore, this rule reflects a “healthy concern” that if the claim is brought by a third party, “the courts might be ‘called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.’ ”29
As is often the case with general rules, there are recognized exceptions. While third-party standing is generally disfavored, federal jurisprudence has permitted, under certain limited circumstances, a litigant to assert the rights of another. In addition to requiring [376]*376that the litigant establish standing,30 the litigant must also make two additional showings. First, the litigant must have a sufficiently “close relation to the third party.”31 Second, “there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.”32
Michigan’s third-party standing jurisprudence is considerably less developed. In Mary v Lewis,33 a garnishee defendant challenged the constitutionality of a codefendant’s prejudgment garnishment. This Court discussed and denied third-party standing to the defendant after discussing factors from a United States Supreme Court dissenting opinion:34
As a general rule, one party may not raise the denial of another person’s constitutional rights... . Defendant quotes portions of Justice Brennan’s dissent in Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1; 94 S Ct 1536; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974), where two exceptions to this general rule are discussed: first, those situations where there is evidence that the direct consequence of the denial of the constitutional rights of the other would impose substantial economic injury upon the party asserting the right; second, those instances where the litigant’s interest and the other’s interest intertwine and the latter’s rights may not be [377]*377effectively vindicated in any other manner because they are capable of evading constitutional review.
In this case the bank does not show how it qualifies under either of these exceptions.... We therefore conclude that the bank has no standing to interpose the due process rights of the principal defendant regarding the prejudgment garnishment. [399 Mich at 416.]
Thus, the Mary Court would permit jus tertii where a litigant could establish an economic injury, show that the interests between the litigant and the party possessing the right “intertwine,” and show that the third party’s rights “are capable of evading constitutional review.”
In our judgment, the test utilized by the Mary Court is analytically deficient. Requiring that a litigant establish an injury, economic or otherwise, is merely a component of our traditional standing doctrine.35 Moreover, that the litigant and the third party have “intertwining interests” does not lead to the inference that the party establishing jus tertii will be an ardent proponent of the rights of the third party. The third factor is the most curious, for whether a claim is capable of evading review is a consideration that is recognized as relevant to mootness, not standing.36
Accordingly, we adopt the traditional federal test for third-party standing as articulated in Tesmer. A party seeking to litigate the claims of another must, as an initial matter, establish standing under the test established in Lee, supra 37 Second, the party must have a “close relationship” with the party possessing the right [378]*378in order to establish third-party standing. Last, the litigant must establish that there is a “hindrance” to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.
As applied to the facts of this case, petitioners cannot meet the requirements of third-party standing and cannot litigate the rights of appellants’ insureds. Assuming arguendo that petitioners could satisfy the Lee elements,38 and assuming without deciding that petitioners share a sufficiently “close relationship” with appellants’ insureds,39 there is absolutely no evidence that any obstacle or hindrance prevents appellants’ insureds from protecting their own interests through litigation. Therefore, we hold that petitioners do not have standing to assert that the rights of appellants’ insureds were violated by appellants’ managed care endorsement.
c. RIPENESS
The doctrine of ripeness is closely related to the doctrine of standing, as both justiciability doctrines assess pending claims for the presence of an actual or imminent injury in fact.40 However, standing and ripe[379]*379ness address different underlying concerns.41 The doctrine of standing is designed to determine whether a particular party may properly litigate the asserted claim for relief.42 The doctrine of ripeness, on the other hand, does not focus on the suitability of the party; rather, ripeness focuses on the timing of the action.43
Count II of the petitioners’ petition asserts that appellants’ managed care option violates the rights of chiropractic providers, including petitioners’ membership. As a nonprofit organization, petitioners have standing to litigate on behalf of their members to the degree that their members would have standing as individual plaintiffs.44 The petition asserts that provid[380]*380ers “are entitled to be paid their reasonable and customary charge,”45 but significantly, appellees assert as their injury that appellants’ policy endorsement violates MCL 500.3157 by reimbursing providers at a rate less than their customary charged.46 Review of the record in this case reveals no evidence that any of petitioners’ members have experienced an actual injury as a result of appellants’ policy endorsement. Because petitioners seek relief for a hypothetical injury, the ripeness of the claim comes into question.
The ripeness doctrine is supported by both constitu[381]*381tional and prudential principles.47 As a threshold matter, the Michigan Constitution permits the judiciary to exercise only “judicial power,” the “most critical element” of which is the requirement that a genuine controversy exist between the parties.48 A claim lacks ripeness, and there is no justiciable controversy, where “the harm asserted has [not] matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention ... .”49
Petitioners’ allegation that appellants’ policy endorsement violates the rights of their members in violation of MCL 500.3157 is not yet ripe for review. Nothing in the record before us indicates that petitioners’ members have in fact been reimbursed at less than a reasonable amount. The lack of ripeness is further buttressed by the particularly fact-intensive nature of petitioners’ claim. MCL 500.3157 provides that chiropractors “may charge a reasonable amount” for services rendered. Petitioners have the burden of establishing the reasonableness of their members’ charges in order to impose liability on the insurer.50 Moreover, questions surrounding the reasonableness of petitioners’ members’ charges are factual in nature and must be resolved by the jury.51 Because the record is completely devoid of [382]*382any facts supporting an actual or imminent injury in fact, we conclude that petitioners’ claim is not ripe for review at this juncture and is not justiciable.52
IV CONCLUSION
Issues of justiciability concern the judiciary’s constitutionally delineated jurisdiction to exercise only “judicial power” and hear only cases involving an actual controversy. Therefore, questions of justiciability may be raised at any stage in the proceedings and may not be waived by the parties.
Regarding count I, we hold that petitioners do not satisfy the test for third-party standing, and may not litigate on behalf of appellants’ insureds. In count II, petitioners assert the rights of their members. Assuming that petitioners could otherwise litigate the claims of their members, petitioners have not established an actual or imminent injury; thus, the claim is not ripe for review.
We therefore vacate the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Commissioner.
Taylor, C. J., and Corrigan, J., concurred with Young, J.