Michigan Carton Co. v. Sutherland Paper Co.

29 F.2d 179, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2641
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedNovember 10, 1928
Docket4956-4958
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 29 F.2d 179 (Michigan Carton Co. v. Sutherland Paper Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Michigan Carton Co. v. Sutherland Paper Co., 29 F.2d 179, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2641 (6th Cir. 1928).

Opinion

KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge.

This suit was brought by the Sutherland Paper Company, of Kalamazoo, Mich., and the Menasha Printing & Carton Company, of Menasha, Wis., against the Michigan Carton Company, of Battle Creek, Mich., for the alleged infringement of United States patents No. 1,316,120, September 16, 1919, and No. 1,359,546, November 23, 1920, on machine for and method of sealing cartons, both granted to Fred W. Sutherland and by him assigned one-half to each of the plaintiffs. 1

The machine claims in suit are No. 10 of the first patent (No. 1,316,120) and Ños. 10 and 11 of the second patent (No. 1,359,546). The method claims in suit are No. 13 of the first patent and No. 12 of the second patent. The District Court held the three machine claims not infringed, and method claim No. 13 (first patent) invalid, and method claim No. »12 (second patent) valid and infringed, and on July 21, 1926 [13 F.(2d) 884], entered interlocutory decree accordingly, including reference to master for accounting and a provision for perpetual injunction restraining infringement of claim 12 (second patent).

Later, plaintiffs filed in the Patent Office a partial disclaimer of claim 13, and thereupon petitioned the District Court for leave to amend their bill of complaint by alleging such disclaimer, and for a hearing upon that claim as modified or restricted by the dis *181 claimer. The petition was denied. 14 F. (2d) 700. All parties have appealed from the interlocutory decree, and plaintiffs have appealed also from the subsequent denial of their petition for amendment of bill and rehearing.

Defendant questions the jurisdiction of this court over plaintiffs’ appeal, especially because not taken within 30 days from the time of the decree, as provided by section 129 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 227). The interlocutory decree appealed from was entered July 21, 1926. Before time for appeal elapsed, viz. on August 16, 1926, plaintiffs’ petition to amend by alleging the disclaimer above referred to and for rehearing was presented. The petition was denied September 20, 1926. Within 30 days thereafter, viz. on October 16, 1926, plaintiffs, by a single proceeding, appealed from the original decree, as well as from the denial of the proposed amendment. We think the appeal was taken in time, and that the appeal from the decree carried with it jurisdiction to review the denial of motion to amend and rehear, set up in the petition for appeal and assigned as error. Moreover, apparently from abundant caution, plaintiffs, on March 30, 1927, took also an appeal on both branches of the ease under the Act of February 28, 1927 (44 U. S. Stat. e. 228 [28 USCA § 227a]), amending section 129 of the Judicial Code, by allowing an appeal in patent infringement suits “final except for the ordering of an accounting” (as was the case here) within 30 days from the entry of the decree or from the date of the amendment referred to. That appeal seems to fall within the language of the act.

The Merits. In the manufacture of par-affine coated pasteboard cartons, specially available for holding and distributing certain articles of food, such as butter and ice cream, and excluding such contents from contact with dirt, odors, and impurities in the air, and to some extent from contact with the air itself, it is necessary, when a glossy surface is desired, to dip the cartons into a bath of hot paraffine, whereby no unparaffined margin is left at the surface edges, which are required to be joined together in the folding of the carton blank, and to secure the most effective results it becomes necessary to de-"wax these surface edges by applying a melting heat thereto. By the first patent in suit the heat is applied by steam jets directed against the surface edges of the carton which are to receive the glue, as well as the surface edges to be lapped thereon. This result is accomplished by carrying the cartons along so that the edges to be dewaxed project from the edges of the conveyor belts, and so alone receive the heat. The ■ dewaxing method of the second patent differs from that of the first in no way important here, except that the heat is applied to the margins by the use of hot plates, instead of steam jets.

The machine claims in suit read as follows:

First patent: “10. In a machine for sealing waxed cartons the combination of a carton conveying means, means for heating the surfaces adapted to he glued together, removing or driving off of a substantial portion of the wax thereon, and means for applying glue and folding the carton.”

Second patent: “10. In a machine for sealing waxed cartons, the combination of a carton conveying means, means for heating the surfaces to be glued together to soften the wax, comprising heating plates aeross which such portions of cartons are carried, and means for applying the glue and folding the cartons.”

Second patent: “11. In a machine for sealing waxed cartons, the combination of a carton conveying means, means for removing or driving off a substantial portion of the wax from the surfaces to be glued together, comprising heating plates with which such surfaces are brought into contact, and means for applying the glue and folding the cartons.”

The device of these claims is a single machine, mechanically operated throughout, which successively dewaxes the cartons, applies the glue, folds the cartons, brings the glued edges together, and so holds them until the glue is set.

’ The District Judge held, and we think rightly, that neither of these claims is infringed by defendant, which dewaxes the cartons in a given room by one machine, keeping therein on hand a large quantity of such dewaxed products until ready to complete the work of manufacturing the same, when they are, by truck, manually removed to another room, where, on another entirely distinct machine, they are glued, folded, and fastened together, the operations on the two machines not being necessarily even closely consecutive. We agree with the District Judge that “the work of removing the par-affine is an entirely separate operation, so far as mechanics are concerned, from the operation of applying the glue and bringing the parts together so that the glue will set. * • * The wax might be removed in one *182 eity on one day and the gluing might be performed in another eity many months thereafter without interfering in any way with the actual mechanical result.”

Defendant thus does not employ “a machine” which responds to the claims in question, for successive mechanical operations. The most which can be said is that defendant has two machines, the use of which, the one before, the other after, and by the aid of an intervening manual trucking operation, accomplishes the work of the single machine of the patent claims we are considering, which are for “a machine,” and not for a process. Other considerations aside, and even were the combined effect of defendant’s two machines otherwise the equivalent of that of the device of the claims in question, it • seems enough to say that defendant’s manual trucking of the dewaxed cartons to the gluing and folding machine located in another room is not the equivalent of plaintiffs’ mechanical delivery of the carton from the dewaxing mechanism to the gluing and folding mechanism of its machine. Brown v. Davis, 116 U. S. 237, 249, 6 S. Ct.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

M & R Dietetic Laboratories, Inc. v. Dean Milk Co.
203 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Illinois, 1961)
Protective Closures Co. v. Clover Industries, Inc.
112 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. New York, 1953)
Myerson v. Dentists' Supply Co. of New York
66 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. New York, 1946)
Benz v. Celeste Fur Dyeing & Dressing Corp.
136 F.2d 845 (Second Circuit, 1943)
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Refining, Inc.
135 F.2d 900 (Fourth Circuit, 1943)
Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co.
122 F.2d 920 (Third Circuit, 1941)
McEuen v. Kelley-Koett Mfg. Co.
34 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Kentucky, 1940)
Mantz v. Kersting
29 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. California, 1939)
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fisk Rubber Corp.
104 F.2d 740 (Sixth Circuit, 1939)
American Bitumuls Co. v. Union Oil Co.
24 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. California, 1938)
Aero Neck-Band & Collar Co. v. Fenway Fabrics, Inc.
19 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. New York, 1937)
Byrne Mfg. Co. v. American Flange & Mfg. Co.
87 F.2d 783 (Sixth Circuit, 1937)
Good Roads Co. v. Charles Hvass & Co.
70 F.2d 625 (Second Circuit, 1934)
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Penick & Ford, Ltd.
63 F.2d 26 (Seventh Circuit, 1932)
Respro, Inc. v. Vulcan Proofing Co.
1 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. New York, 1932)
Hartford-Empire Co. v. Nivison-Weiskopf Co.
58 F.2d 701 (Sixth Circuit, 1932)
Frigidaire Corp. v. General Necessities Corp.
46 F.2d 58 (Sixth Circuit, 1931)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 F.2d 179, 1928 U.S. App. LEXIS 2641, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/michigan-carton-co-v-sutherland-paper-co-ca6-1928.