Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A.

816 F.2d 533, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5093
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 17, 1987
DocketNo. 84-2738
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 816 F.2d 533 (Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Meyer v. Dans un Jardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5093 (10th Cir. 1987).

Opinion

LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir.R. 34.1.8(c) and 27.-1.2. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

In March 1982 plaintiffs, Donna Gates Meyer and Diana Meyer Reynolds, entered into a franchise agreement with defendant Century Franchising Company, an American subsidiary of defendant Dans un Jar-din, S.A., a French corporation. Plaintiffs paid an initial franchise fee of $15,000, plus $5,000 to cover start-up promotional expenses. Under the agreement, plaintiffs were to own and operate a retail boutique in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the sale of beauty and perfumery products manufactured or distributed by defendants. The boutique opened for business in June 1982 and ceased operating approximately ten months later, having failed to cover its costs.

In their suit against defendants, plaintiffs alleged that the franchise agreement constituted a security under both federal and state securities laws and that defendants were liable to them for various misrepresentations and omissions in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)), Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5), and § 408 of the Oklahoma Securities Act, Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 71. Plaintiffs also alleged common law fraud.

The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the securities law claims, finding that the franchise agreement was not a security under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), and not an investment contract as defined in Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 71, § 2(20)(P). The court dismissed plaintiffs’ other state law claims in favor of arbitration, as demanded by defendants, pursuant to paragraph 7.4 of the franchise agreement. The issues on appeal are whether these determinations were erroneous.

I

A

We first consider whether the franchise agreement in the instant case is a security under the federal law. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contain virtually identical definitions of the term “security.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l) and 78c(a)(10); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 88 S.Ct. 548, 552-53, 19 L.Ed.2d 564 (1967). Neither definition refers specifically to franchise agreements. Both, however, contain the general term “investment contract.” In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946), the Court said that “an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party,” 328 U.S. at 298-99, 66 S.Ct. at 1103.

[535]*535Under a strict application of the Howey test, it is clear that the franchise agreement iii this case would not constitute an investment contract, because plaintiffs did not expect.their profits to come solely from the efforts of others. Plaintiffs expected to commit and did commit their full time and best efforts to the management of their retail store in attempting to make it profitable.

In many situations, however, a strict interpretation of the word “solely” would run counter to the broad remedial purposes of the securities acts and defeat the Court’s intent to follow “a flexible rather than a static principle.” Howey, 328 U.S. at 299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103. Accordingly, we have adopted the view that the reliance element is met when “ ‘the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.’ ” Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir.1975) (Crowley I) (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973)).1

It is undeniable that the product, the reputation, and the promotional and managerial expertise developed by a franchisor are material to the success of its franchisees. Benefits expected from the franchisor provide incentives for entering into a franchise agreement rather than undertaking a wholly independent business. But that does not mean the typical franchisee can expect to profit from the investment without regard to the franchisee’s own business skills. See Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir.1972) (contrasting franchise with “the usual investor-promoter situation, where the skill or ingenuity of the investor does not determine the success or failure of the venture”).

In Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir.1978) (Crowley II), we held that a franchise agreement was not a security even under the less restrictive test adopted in Crowley I. The plaintiffs in Crowley entered into “Catalog Sales Agency Agreements” with Montgomery Ward. The agreements required the plaintiffs to provide and maintain “Agency Stores” at their own expense, to purchase and display merchandise in the minimum amounts and types provided by Montgomery Ward, and to devote their “full time and best efforts to the operation of the Agency.” Crowley I, 570 F.2d at 876. The plaintiffs were able to sell merchandise at a discount if they were willing to accept a smaller profit margin, and they “had the responsibility of hiring and firing personnel, maintaining customer relationships, and making practically all of the decisions relating to the day-to-day operation of the agency.” Crowley II, 570 F.2d at 880-81. Under those circumstances, we concluded that the economic success of each franchise was primarily dependent on factors controlled by the franchisee, not factors controlled by the franchisor.

The facts in this case are substantially identical to those we considered in Crowley II. Under the franchise agreement here, the plaintiffs were responsible for constructing the franchise store, paying rent, salaries, and advertising expenses, hiring and firing employees, maintaining customer relationships, ordering inventory, and devoting their full time and best efforts to the day-to-day management of the franchise store.

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816 F.2d 533, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 5093, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/meyer-v-dans-un-jardin-sa-ca10-1987.