Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
This text of 923 A.2d 1244 (Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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OPINION BY
Mercury Trucking, Inc. (Mercury) appeals from an order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission) reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sustaining Mercury’s objection to its revenue assessment for the 2004 operating period and granting its petition for a refund.
Mercury is a Pennsylvania trucking company and considered a public utility under Section 102 of the Public Utility [1245]*1245Code (Code), 66 Pa.C.S. § 102. Pursuant to Section 510(a) of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 510(a), all public utilities operating in Pennsylvania, including Mercury, are required to pay assessments levied by the Commission to cover its estimated costs of administering the Code. The Commission’s assessment methodology is a two-step process. First, it must determine the amount to be assessed against all public utilities and, then, the Commission must allocate the cost among groups according to Section 510(b) of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 510(b), which, in pertinent part, provides:
(b) Allocation of assessment. On or before March 31 of each year, every public utility shall file with the commission a statement under oath showing its gross intrastate operating revenues for the preceding calendar year. If any public utility shall fail to file such statement on or before March 31, the commission shall estimate such revenues, which estimate shall be binding upon the public utility for the purposes of this section. (Bold and emphasis added.)
Mercury failed to timely file a statement of its operating revenues for the period from January 1, 2004, to December 31, 2004, with the Commission by March 31, 2005, because it had shrinking operations in 2005, reduced its staff, and its employee who was responsible for filing reports of this nature suffered from an illness and had not made the filing. When the Commission had not received the 2004 revenue report, after reminding Mercury that none had been filed, it issued Mercury a notice of assessment and a general assessment invoice dated August 17, 2005, for $32,310. The invoice calculated Mercury’s revenues for the 2004 operation period based on its 2003 revenues plus a 12% increase.1 Mercury paid the invoice, but alleging that the amount due was erroneous and excessive, it filed a timely objection to the assessment and a petition for a refund for $12,242.98.2 The Law Bureau Prosecutory Staff (Prosecutory Staff), counsel for the Commission’s Fiscal Office, filed a motion to dismiss Mercury’s objection and petition, arguing that the Commission based its assessment on the estimate mandated by Section 510(b) of the Code, and this estimate was binding on Mercury. The matter was assigned to an AL J.
Determining that the Commission’s 2004 estimate was excessive, the ALJ sustained Mercury’s objection to the assessment and granted it a refund of $12,242.98. Although the Prosecutory Staff argued that [1246]*1246pursuant to Section 510(b) of the Code, the Commission’s assessment was binding on a public utility which failed to timely file its statement of revenue, the ALJ reasoned that this argument created an inconsistency between Sections 510(b) and 510(c) of the Code because Section 510(b) mandated that the Commission’s revenue estimates were binding, while Section 510(c) allowed a utility to challenge the assessments that had been generated by the Commission. The ALJ stated that the General Assembly did not intend such an unreasonable result. He also stated that the Prosecuto-ry Staffs interpretation of Section 510(b) would “thwart the right of a utility to bring an action against the Commonwealth to recover the amount of the assessment the utility paid upon the ground that ‘the assessment was excessive, erroneous, unlawful, or invalid,’ ” and would violate Mercury’s due process right to a hearing to contest the Commission’s revenue estimate. Concluding that Mercury was entitled to a hearing, the ALJ denied the Prosecutory Staffs motion to dismiss.
In its exceptions to the Commission from the ALJ’s decision, the Prosecutory Staff contended that no inconsistency existed between Sections 510(b) and 510(c) of the Code because a public utility which failed to timely file a statement of revenue and was bound by a revenue estimate could still object to an assessment, but could not attack the Commission’s revenue estimate by producing its actual revenue figures. It also argued that based on Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), which provides that every statute shall be construed to give effect to all of its provisions, the ALJ’s interpretation of Section 510(b) left that term “binding” without effect if a revenue estimate could be subsequently challenged. As a final contention, the Pro-secutory Staff suggested that the ALJ’s reasoning, if upheld, would impede the Commission’s assessment process by creating a disincentive for utilities to timely file annual revenue reports.
Mercury responded to the Prosecutory Staffs exceptions contending that if the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended to eliminate the right of a public utility that had not timely filed its revenue report to challenge the Commission’s estimated revenue figure, it would have indicated such in Section 510(c) of the Code. In addressing the Prosecutory Staffs argument that the ALJ’s decision would impede the Commission’s assessment process, Mercury noted that Section 510(b) continued to “bind” utilities in those situations where an objection was not filed within 15 days after receipt of its assessment invoice.
The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision, determining that the language of Section 510(b) of the Code contained no ambiguity which would lead to alternate interpretations or constructions, and that the section expressly stated that the failure of a utility to file its annual revenue report operated as a bar to it seeking to overturn the assessment. It also concluded that Sections 510(b) and 510(e) could be applied consistently as Section 510(c) permitted a utility to object to its general assessment, but Section 510(b) prevented a utility that had failed to timely file an annual revenue report from revisiting the revenue estimate once one has been generated by the Commission. Mercury appeals this order.3
[1247]*1247This appeal is not properly before us, however, because a challenge to the Commission’s assessment must be brought as an action at law. Section 510(d) of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 510(d), provides:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the purpose of restraining or in anyway delaying the collection or payment of any assessment made under subsections (a), (b) and (c), but every public utility against which an assessment is made shall pay the same as provided in subsection (c). Any public utility making any such payment may, at any time within two years from the date of payment, sue the Commonwealth in an action at law to recover the amount paid, or any part thereof, upon the ground that the assessment was excessive, erroneous, unlawful, or invalid, in whole or in part, provided objections, as hereinbefore provided, were filed with the commission, and payment of the assessment was made under protest either as to all or part thereof.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
923 A.2d 1244, 2007 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 237, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mercury-trucking-inc-v-pennsylvania-public-utility-commission-pacommwct-2007.