OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
United Parcel Service (UPS) seeks review of an interlocutory order of the Public Utility Commission (Commission) that was certified to this Court by the Commission in the belief that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Commission Order of July 20, 2006, at p. 10. UPS contends that the Commission does not have the authority to group all common carriers into one utility group [673]*673for assessment purposes under the Public Utility Code,1 as the Commission held. Rather, UPS contends that utility groupings can be established only after an evi-dentiary hearing is conducted or a regulation is adopted.
The background and procedural history of this case is as follows. Public utilities, such as UPS, pay assessments to fund the Commission’s costs of administering the Public Utility Code. UPS filed objections to its assessments for fiscal years 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06, asserting that the Commission’s method for allocating assessments among the various public utilities was inappropriate under Section 510(b) of the Public Utility Code.2 Specifically, UPS has asserted that the Commission has not properly identified “each group of utilities furnishing the same kind of service” for the purpose of allocating the Commission’s expenses to regulate that group of utilities. 66 Pa.C.S. § 510(b)(1).
The question of how to allocate assessments among utilities has been a matter of previous litigation. UPS objected to its fiscal year assessments for 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000. A brief discussion of that prior litigation will assist in understanding the issues raised in this appeal.
The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), effective January 1, 1995, substantially deregulated certain categories of motor carrier transportation from state regulatory authority. In response to the deregulation act, the Commission created two different categories of motor carriers. Those carriers still subject to extensive regulation were called “motor common carriers” and those to which the substantial deregulation applied were called “motor carriers of property.” UPS was classified as a “motor carrier of property.” After 1994, the Commission determined that the groups of utilities “furnishing the same kind of service” fell into the following 11 utility groups: Aircraft; Boats and Ferries; Electric; Gas; Motor Carriers of Property; Motor Common Carriers; Pipe[674]*674lines; Railroads; Steam Heat; Telephone and Telegraph; and Water/Sewer.
UPS challenged its assessments for fiscal years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000. It argued that with deregulation, UPS demanded much less Commission time and attention. Accordingly, direct expenses attributable to the regulation of motor carriers of property under Section 510(b)(1) decreased. This resulted in an excessive assessment for UPS, a motor carrier of property. UPS also contended that the Commission’s allocation of indirect expenses under Section 510(b)(2) had resulted in an excessive assessment. UPS was ultimately successful in its litigation on this point. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court specifically stated as follows:
Given the limited scope of these proceedings, our determination here pertains solely to assessments to UPS during the periods under review [1997 to 2000]; we offer no opinion concerning assessment methodology that may be available to the Commission within the confines of the guiding statute on a prospective basis.
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 574 Pa. 304, 317 n. 15, 830 A.2d 941, 949 n. 15 (2003) (emphasis added).
Thereafter, the Commission changed its overall utility groupings for assessment purposes, reducing the number of groups by combining all groups related to transportation into a single group providing the same kind of service. The Commission combined aircraft, boats and ferries, motor carriers of property, motor common carriers, and railroads into a single “common carrier” transportation group for purposes of both Section 510(b)(1) and Section 510(b)(2).
UPS then filed objections to its assessments for 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, and 2005-06, prepared under this new methodology, contending that the Commission’s assessments on UPS for those years were too high. The matter was assigned to an administrative law judge (ALJ).
The Commission’s Fiscal Office moved to dismiss UPS’s objections, arguing that UPS’s challenge to the Commission’s application of the Section 510 formula was meritless ■ as a matter of law. The ALJ denied the motion, holding that the Fiscal Office was prematurely seeking summary judgment when a full factual record was needed to resolve UPS’s issue. The Fiscal Office then filed a “petition for interlocutory review and answer to material question” with the Commission, requesting interlocutory review and answers to the following questions:
1. Does the Commission have the authority under the Public Utility Code to group all common carriers in one utility group for assessment purposes?
2. Can the Commission establish utility groups for assessment purposes without holding hearings or using the rulemak-ing process?
3. Can a utility assert a valid “unreasonably-high-assessment” claim if the Commission has correctly applied its assessment formula to that utility?
UPS Brief, Appendix A, pp. 1-2.
The Commission allowed interlocutory review and issued an opinion and order regarding the questions on May 22, 2006. The Commission answered the first two questions in the affirmative. The Commission determined that the decision to group all common carriers into one utility group for assessment purposes was consistent with a plain reading of the Public Utility Code. The new grouping expressed an interpretation of the Public Utility Code; accordingly, the adoption of a regulation was not the necessary prerequisite to implementing a new assessment methodolo[675]*675gy. The Commission also answered the third question in the affirmative, determining that
the statutory scheme of Section 510 of the [Public Utility] Code expressly contemplates the opportunity for hearing and the development of a record of all points of error on which the utility/claimant would rely in order to establish its opposition to the reasonableness of an assessment.
Commission Order of May 19, 2005, at 18. Noting that there were questions of disputed fact in this case, such as UPS’s claim of bad faith and improper calculations, the Commission “returned [the matter] to the Office of Administrative Law Judge for such further proceedings as may be necessary.” Id. at 20.
UPS then requested the Commission to certify its interlocutory order for immediate appeal to this Court pursuant to 52 Pa.Code § 5.633.3
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OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
United Parcel Service (UPS) seeks review of an interlocutory order of the Public Utility Commission (Commission) that was certified to this Court by the Commission in the belief that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Commission Order of July 20, 2006, at p. 10. UPS contends that the Commission does not have the authority to group all common carriers into one utility group [673]*673for assessment purposes under the Public Utility Code,1 as the Commission held. Rather, UPS contends that utility groupings can be established only after an evi-dentiary hearing is conducted or a regulation is adopted.
The background and procedural history of this case is as follows. Public utilities, such as UPS, pay assessments to fund the Commission’s costs of administering the Public Utility Code. UPS filed objections to its assessments for fiscal years 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06, asserting that the Commission’s method for allocating assessments among the various public utilities was inappropriate under Section 510(b) of the Public Utility Code.2 Specifically, UPS has asserted that the Commission has not properly identified “each group of utilities furnishing the same kind of service” for the purpose of allocating the Commission’s expenses to regulate that group of utilities. 66 Pa.C.S. § 510(b)(1).
The question of how to allocate assessments among utilities has been a matter of previous litigation. UPS objected to its fiscal year assessments for 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000. A brief discussion of that prior litigation will assist in understanding the issues raised in this appeal.
The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), effective January 1, 1995, substantially deregulated certain categories of motor carrier transportation from state regulatory authority. In response to the deregulation act, the Commission created two different categories of motor carriers. Those carriers still subject to extensive regulation were called “motor common carriers” and those to which the substantial deregulation applied were called “motor carriers of property.” UPS was classified as a “motor carrier of property.” After 1994, the Commission determined that the groups of utilities “furnishing the same kind of service” fell into the following 11 utility groups: Aircraft; Boats and Ferries; Electric; Gas; Motor Carriers of Property; Motor Common Carriers; Pipe[674]*674lines; Railroads; Steam Heat; Telephone and Telegraph; and Water/Sewer.
UPS challenged its assessments for fiscal years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000. It argued that with deregulation, UPS demanded much less Commission time and attention. Accordingly, direct expenses attributable to the regulation of motor carriers of property under Section 510(b)(1) decreased. This resulted in an excessive assessment for UPS, a motor carrier of property. UPS also contended that the Commission’s allocation of indirect expenses under Section 510(b)(2) had resulted in an excessive assessment. UPS was ultimately successful in its litigation on this point. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court specifically stated as follows:
Given the limited scope of these proceedings, our determination here pertains solely to assessments to UPS during the periods under review [1997 to 2000]; we offer no opinion concerning assessment methodology that may be available to the Commission within the confines of the guiding statute on a prospective basis.
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 574 Pa. 304, 317 n. 15, 830 A.2d 941, 949 n. 15 (2003) (emphasis added).
Thereafter, the Commission changed its overall utility groupings for assessment purposes, reducing the number of groups by combining all groups related to transportation into a single group providing the same kind of service. The Commission combined aircraft, boats and ferries, motor carriers of property, motor common carriers, and railroads into a single “common carrier” transportation group for purposes of both Section 510(b)(1) and Section 510(b)(2).
UPS then filed objections to its assessments for 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, and 2005-06, prepared under this new methodology, contending that the Commission’s assessments on UPS for those years were too high. The matter was assigned to an administrative law judge (ALJ).
The Commission’s Fiscal Office moved to dismiss UPS’s objections, arguing that UPS’s challenge to the Commission’s application of the Section 510 formula was meritless ■ as a matter of law. The ALJ denied the motion, holding that the Fiscal Office was prematurely seeking summary judgment when a full factual record was needed to resolve UPS’s issue. The Fiscal Office then filed a “petition for interlocutory review and answer to material question” with the Commission, requesting interlocutory review and answers to the following questions:
1. Does the Commission have the authority under the Public Utility Code to group all common carriers in one utility group for assessment purposes?
2. Can the Commission establish utility groups for assessment purposes without holding hearings or using the rulemak-ing process?
3. Can a utility assert a valid “unreasonably-high-assessment” claim if the Commission has correctly applied its assessment formula to that utility?
UPS Brief, Appendix A, pp. 1-2.
The Commission allowed interlocutory review and issued an opinion and order regarding the questions on May 22, 2006. The Commission answered the first two questions in the affirmative. The Commission determined that the decision to group all common carriers into one utility group for assessment purposes was consistent with a plain reading of the Public Utility Code. The new grouping expressed an interpretation of the Public Utility Code; accordingly, the adoption of a regulation was not the necessary prerequisite to implementing a new assessment methodolo[675]*675gy. The Commission also answered the third question in the affirmative, determining that
the statutory scheme of Section 510 of the [Public Utility] Code expressly contemplates the opportunity for hearing and the development of a record of all points of error on which the utility/claimant would rely in order to establish its opposition to the reasonableness of an assessment.
Commission Order of May 19, 2005, at 18. Noting that there were questions of disputed fact in this case, such as UPS’s claim of bad faith and improper calculations, the Commission “returned [the matter] to the Office of Administrative Law Judge for such further proceedings as may be necessary.” Id. at 20.
UPS then requested the Commission to certify its interlocutory order for immediate appeal to this Court pursuant to 52 Pa.Code § 5.633.3 The Commission entered an opinion and order on June 27, 2006, granting UPS’s motion, certifying for appeal the following issues: (1) the Commission’s authority under the Public Utility Code to group all common carriers in one utility group for assessment purposes and (2) the Commission’s authority to establish utility groups for assessment purposes in the absence of evidentiary hearings or formal rulemaking. In addition, the Commission stayed the proceedings before the ALJ pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. On July 20, 2006, the Commission denied the Fiscal Office’s petition for reconsideration, rejecting the Fiscal Office’s contention that an appeal to this Court is inappropriate and that matters concerning assessments must be brought in this Court as original jurisdiction actions.4 The Commission explained that it has not yet decided “the ultimate question of the propriety of the assessment amount levied against UPS.” Opinion and Order of July 20, 2006, at 12. UPS filed a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order with this Court, and by order dated July 24, 2006, we allowed the appeal.5
On appeal,6 UPS presents two issues. First, UPS argues that the Corn-[676]*676mission lacked authority to change the utility groups because it failed to conduct a formal rulemaking or other proceeding to implement the change, or to engage in any factfinding in advance of making the change. Second, UPS argues that the Commission’s regrouping of utilities does not satisfy the requirement of Section 510(b)(1) of the Public Utility Code that groups combined for assessment purposes must furnish the same kind of service.
We do not reach those issues because this appeal was improvidently granted. In Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 923 A.2d 1244 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007), we held that a challenge to the Commission’s decision on an assessment “must be brought as an action at law” in our original jurisdiction. Id. at 1247. We concluded that there is no appellate review of a Commission decision rendered as a result of a hearing conducted under Section 510(c) of the Public Utility Code.7 Id. Here, the objections of UPS are in the middle of a hearing being conducted by the Commission pursuant to Section 510(c) of the Public Utility Code, and under Mercury Trucking the outcome of that hearing is not subject to appellate review. A fortiori, there can be no appellate review of interlocutory orders entered in the course of a Section 510(c) hearing.8 UPS must make the payment of the assessment ordered at the outcome of that Section 510(c) hearing and then seek to recover that payment by filing an original jurisdiction action with this Court, asserting that its assessment was “excessive, erroneous, unlawful, or invalid, in whole or in part....” 66 Pa.C.S. § 510(d).9
[677]*677Because we have improvidently allowed UPS to appeal the Commission’s interlocutory order, we quash UPS’s appeal for lack of any appellate jurisdiction.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of August, 2007, the appeal filed by United Parcel Service in the above captioned case is hereby QUASHED.