Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 31, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-02271·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBERT MERCER, Plaintiff, 22-CV-2271 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. By order dated April 22, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough

facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff lives in a New York City Housing

Authority (NYCHA) housing project in Manhattan. In February 2022, a flyer was posted in the lobby of Plaintiff’s building accusing him of being a rapist and drug addict who had been violent with the police, and warning other residents not to ride the elevator with him. According to Plaintiff, the management office of the project posted the flyer, the assertions in the flyer are false, the flyer “tarnished” his name, and it is defamatory. (ECF 2 at 1-2.) A copy of the flyer is attached to the complaint. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges that “someone” called the police on him; that the police and EMS “broke into” his apartment and took him to the hospital “for no reason”; and that there are no police or medical records of these events (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction,1 but also alleges violations of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and he seeks $20 billion in damages. (Id.) DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff alleges that NYCHA violated his constitutional rights, the Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under

Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). When a plaintiff sues a municipality or a municipal entity such as NYCHA under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Deep’s of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against NYCHA, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a NYCHA policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted); Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 576-

1 Because both Plaintiff and NYCHA are citizens of New York, Plaintiff fails to allege complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 77 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that Section 1983 claims against NYCHA can only be brought if the alleged deprivation of rights occurred pursuant to NYCHA practice or policy). The allegations might be liberally construed as a Section 1983 claim under the “stigma- plus” doctrine. Where a plaintiff sues “to enforce procedural due process rights, a court must

determine (1) whether a [liberty or] property interest is implicated, and if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).

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Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

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