Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 16, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-03202·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBERT MERCER, Plaintiff, 22-CV-3202 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, invokes the Court’s federal question and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, alleging that Defendant violated his rights when a lead paint test detected lead in his apartment. Plaintiff asserts constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as claims under 24 C.F.R. § 5.703. By order dated April 26, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead a claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court

must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Robert Mercer invokes the Court’s federal question and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.1 He names as Defendant the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On March 17, 2022, a lead paint test was conducted at 255 West 127th Street, a NYCHA housing complex in which Plaintiff resides. The

1 Because both Plaintiff and NYCHA are citizens of New York, Plaintiff fails to allege complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. test detected a lead measurement of 0.8, which Plaintiff maintains exceeds the 0.5 threshold for non-hazardous conditions. Plaintiff asks the Court to “allow [him] . . . the power and authority . . . to use the Constitution and the laws statutes, policies, treaty’s, rules and regulations imposed by Acts, Congress and agency of the government of the United States of America . . . to protect my

persons, my intellectual properties, my entities and my rights to life and Liberty, to ensure my own safety, protection and self-interest.” (ECF 2, at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that NYCHA violated his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and under 24 C.F.R. § 5.703, a regulation governing the Housing and Urban Development program. Plaintiff seeks $10 million in damages, plus a “civil penalty” of $5 million. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Constitutional Claims Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant violated his federal constitutional rights arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was

violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). When a plaintiff sues a municipality or a municipal entity such as NYCHA under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against NYCHA, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a NYCHA policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691

F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted); Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that Section 1983 claims against NYCHA can only be brought if the alleged deprivation of rights occurred pursuant to NYCHA practice or policy). Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that NYCHA violated his constitutional rights.

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Mercer v. New York City Housing Authority, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

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