LIPEZ, Justice.
[¶ 1] Julie .A Melanson appeals from the judgment entert?d in the Superior Court (Oxford County, Parkins, J.) affirming the judgment entered in the District Court (Riimford, Field, J.) denying her ¡notion to modify the child support provision in her dworee decree by extending the child support payments from Terrence L. Belyea to them ehildrtm’s 19th birthdays or high school graduations, whichever occur first. Melanson contends that the District Court erred by concluding that it had no statutory authority pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A §§ 311-320, § 752(10) & (12) (Supp.1996) to so modify child support orders when the underlying divorce decree was entered prior to January 1990. We agree and vacate the judgment.
[493]*493I.
[¶2] The underlying facts are not in dispute. Melanson and Belyea were parties to an uncontested divorce entered in April 1982. Pursuant to the judgment Belyea was ordered to pay support to Melanson, the custodial parent, of $35 per week per child for their daughters Tammy and Samantha, who were five and two years old respectively at the time of the divorce. The judgment did not address the duration of the support payments.
[¶3] In June 1995 Melanson sought to amend the judgment, asking for both an increase in child support and the extension of payments for her daughters Tammy and Samantha until their high school graduations. Tammy was 18 years of age on June 3, 1995, and still had a year to complete before graduating from high school. Samantha also will be 18 years of age before finishing her senior year of high school in June 1998. In November 1995 the court ordered an increase to $112 per week in accord with the Child Support Guidelines. The court decided, however, that it had no authority to order support for either child beyond the age of 18, even though the children would still be attending high school, because the divorce judgment was entered prior to January 1, 1990. The court found that neither the plain language of what it deemed the relevant statutory provisions nor the legislative history indicate that a court may so modify a divorce judgment of that vintage. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment.
II.
[¶ 4] When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, we review directly the decision of the District Court. Casco N. Bank, N.A. v. Estate of Grosse, 657 A.2d 778, 780 (Me.1995). We review a trial court’s interpretation of a statute for errors of law. Daniels v. Tew Mac Aero Servs., Inc., 675 A.2d 984, 987 (Me.1996). We first examine the plain meaning of the statutory language, seeking to give effect to the legislative intent, id., and construe that language to avoid absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable or illogical results. Thibeault v. Larson, 666 A.2d 112, 114 (Me.1995); Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 741 (Me.1992) (“Such interpretation of the words used will be adopted as shall appear most reasonable and best suited to accomplish the objects of the statute.”). Thus, we consider the whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved. Daniels, 675 A.2d at 987. Only when the statutory language is ambiguous will we look beyond its plain meaning and examine other indicia of legislative intent, including legislative history. Berube v. Rust Eng’g, 668 A.2d 875, 876 (Me.1995).
[¶ 5] The statutory provision on which the court focused primarily1 was amended during the First Regular Session of the 114th Legislature to read in pertinent part:
10. Support order_ For divorces ordered after January 1, 1990, the order for child support may run until the child graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school ... or attains the age of 19 years, whichever first occurs after the child attains the age of 18 years....
19 M.R.S.A. § 752 (P.L.1989, ch. 156, § 7 (effective Sept. 30, 1989))(emphasis added). This language authorized the courts to extend child support until a child’s high school graduation or 19th birthday, whichever comes first, only when ordering child support pursuant to divorce decrees entered after January 1,1990. Neither section 752(10) nor any other provision enacted by chapter 156 addressed the court’s authority to so extend child support when modifying orders con[494]*494tained in pre-1990 divorce judgments.2
[¶ 6] That oversight was corrected during the 114th Legislature’s Second Regular Session, when it codified the Child Support Guidelines that previously had been adopted by court rule. 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 311-320 (P.L. 1989, ch. 834 (effective Apr. 17, 1990)). The law’s emergency preamble asserts that its enactment was in response to (1) a federal requirement that states adopt child support guidelines to maintain their eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children funds, (2) fears that Maine’s Guidelines might not survive constitutional challenges unless codified, and (3) a recognition that “existing statutory provisions conflict with the [C]hild [SJupport [GJuidelines.” P.L.1989, ch. 834. Thus, the Guidelines provide that, “[n]ot-withstanding any other provisions of law, this subchapter applies to any court action or administrative proceeding in which a child support order is issued or modified under this Title or Title 22.3” 19 M.R.S.A. § 312(emphases added). In particular, section 752(10) was amended to read: “A determination or modification of child support under this section must comply with chapter 7, subchapter I-A [19 M.R.S.A. §§ 311-320].” P.L.1989, eh. 834, § B-ll (emphasis added). Although the Legislature chose not to delete the language in section 752(10) that provides for extensions of child support pursuant to post-January 1990 divorces, nothing in that language negates the amendments just quoted to the extent they pertain to modifications of existing support orders.
[¶ 7] Pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, support orders must be calculated with reference to the tables and age categories of children and the income of the parties as defined by statute. 19 M.R.S.A. § 316(1). The relevant definitional section requires that support be ordered for children who are below age 19 but still attending secondary school:
Twelve through 17 years; between the ages of 12 and 18 years. The age categories “12 through 17 years” and “between the ages of 12 and 18 years” as used in the child support table and elsewhere in the support guidelines are deemed to include children between the ages of 18 and 19 years who are attending a secondary school for whom an obligation of support is established or deemed to remain in force pursuant to Public Law 1989, chapter 156.
19 M.R.S.A. § 311(11). The Guidelines therefore dictate that child support obligations terminate once a child reaches the age of 18, unless that child continues to attend high school. If the child’s parents are divorced after January 1, 1990,4 the court [495]
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LIPEZ, Justice.
[¶ 1] Julie .A Melanson appeals from the judgment entert?d in the Superior Court (Oxford County, Parkins, J.) affirming the judgment entered in the District Court (Riimford, Field, J.) denying her ¡notion to modify the child support provision in her dworee decree by extending the child support payments from Terrence L. Belyea to them ehildrtm’s 19th birthdays or high school graduations, whichever occur first. Melanson contends that the District Court erred by concluding that it had no statutory authority pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A §§ 311-320, § 752(10) & (12) (Supp.1996) to so modify child support orders when the underlying divorce decree was entered prior to January 1990. We agree and vacate the judgment.
[493]*493I.
[¶2] The underlying facts are not in dispute. Melanson and Belyea were parties to an uncontested divorce entered in April 1982. Pursuant to the judgment Belyea was ordered to pay support to Melanson, the custodial parent, of $35 per week per child for their daughters Tammy and Samantha, who were five and two years old respectively at the time of the divorce. The judgment did not address the duration of the support payments.
[¶3] In June 1995 Melanson sought to amend the judgment, asking for both an increase in child support and the extension of payments for her daughters Tammy and Samantha until their high school graduations. Tammy was 18 years of age on June 3, 1995, and still had a year to complete before graduating from high school. Samantha also will be 18 years of age before finishing her senior year of high school in June 1998. In November 1995 the court ordered an increase to $112 per week in accord with the Child Support Guidelines. The court decided, however, that it had no authority to order support for either child beyond the age of 18, even though the children would still be attending high school, because the divorce judgment was entered prior to January 1, 1990. The court found that neither the plain language of what it deemed the relevant statutory provisions nor the legislative history indicate that a court may so modify a divorce judgment of that vintage. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment.
II.
[¶ 4] When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, we review directly the decision of the District Court. Casco N. Bank, N.A. v. Estate of Grosse, 657 A.2d 778, 780 (Me.1995). We review a trial court’s interpretation of a statute for errors of law. Daniels v. Tew Mac Aero Servs., Inc., 675 A.2d 984, 987 (Me.1996). We first examine the plain meaning of the statutory language, seeking to give effect to the legislative intent, id., and construe that language to avoid absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable or illogical results. Thibeault v. Larson, 666 A.2d 112, 114 (Me.1995); Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 741 (Me.1992) (“Such interpretation of the words used will be adopted as shall appear most reasonable and best suited to accomplish the objects of the statute.”). Thus, we consider the whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved. Daniels, 675 A.2d at 987. Only when the statutory language is ambiguous will we look beyond its plain meaning and examine other indicia of legislative intent, including legislative history. Berube v. Rust Eng’g, 668 A.2d 875, 876 (Me.1995).
[¶ 5] The statutory provision on which the court focused primarily1 was amended during the First Regular Session of the 114th Legislature to read in pertinent part:
10. Support order_ For divorces ordered after January 1, 1990, the order for child support may run until the child graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school ... or attains the age of 19 years, whichever first occurs after the child attains the age of 18 years....
19 M.R.S.A. § 752 (P.L.1989, ch. 156, § 7 (effective Sept. 30, 1989))(emphasis added). This language authorized the courts to extend child support until a child’s high school graduation or 19th birthday, whichever comes first, only when ordering child support pursuant to divorce decrees entered after January 1,1990. Neither section 752(10) nor any other provision enacted by chapter 156 addressed the court’s authority to so extend child support when modifying orders con[494]*494tained in pre-1990 divorce judgments.2
[¶ 6] That oversight was corrected during the 114th Legislature’s Second Regular Session, when it codified the Child Support Guidelines that previously had been adopted by court rule. 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 311-320 (P.L. 1989, ch. 834 (effective Apr. 17, 1990)). The law’s emergency preamble asserts that its enactment was in response to (1) a federal requirement that states adopt child support guidelines to maintain their eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children funds, (2) fears that Maine’s Guidelines might not survive constitutional challenges unless codified, and (3) a recognition that “existing statutory provisions conflict with the [C]hild [SJupport [GJuidelines.” P.L.1989, ch. 834. Thus, the Guidelines provide that, “[n]ot-withstanding any other provisions of law, this subchapter applies to any court action or administrative proceeding in which a child support order is issued or modified under this Title or Title 22.3” 19 M.R.S.A. § 312(emphases added). In particular, section 752(10) was amended to read: “A determination or modification of child support under this section must comply with chapter 7, subchapter I-A [19 M.R.S.A. §§ 311-320].” P.L.1989, eh. 834, § B-ll (emphasis added). Although the Legislature chose not to delete the language in section 752(10) that provides for extensions of child support pursuant to post-January 1990 divorces, nothing in that language negates the amendments just quoted to the extent they pertain to modifications of existing support orders.
[¶ 7] Pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, support orders must be calculated with reference to the tables and age categories of children and the income of the parties as defined by statute. 19 M.R.S.A. § 316(1). The relevant definitional section requires that support be ordered for children who are below age 19 but still attending secondary school:
Twelve through 17 years; between the ages of 12 and 18 years. The age categories “12 through 17 years” and “between the ages of 12 and 18 years” as used in the child support table and elsewhere in the support guidelines are deemed to include children between the ages of 18 and 19 years who are attending a secondary school for whom an obligation of support is established or deemed to remain in force pursuant to Public Law 1989, chapter 156.
19 M.R.S.A. § 311(11). The Guidelines therefore dictate that child support obligations terminate once a child reaches the age of 18, unless that child continues to attend high school. If the child’s parents are divorced after January 1, 1990,4 the court [495]*495must establish a support obligation that continues until the child reaches the age of 19 or graduates from high school, whichever occurs first. If the child’s parents were divorced prior to January 1990, and a support order is already in place, the Guidelines do not automatically modify that support order to provide for the extended period of payment. Instead, the custodial parent must file a motion seeking a modification of the support order for that purpose. Unless the relevant circumstances justify a deviation from the Guidelines, see 19 M.R.S.A. § 316(4) (subsections addressing “special circumstances”), the court must modify the order of support to extend the obligation through the child’s 19th birthday or high school graduation.
[¶ 8] Although we conclude that the statutory language, properly analyzed, is clear, we acknowledge that the statutory scheme’s complexity may create some ambiguity. We therefore note that the Statement of Fact accompanying the legislation to enact the Child Support Guidelines states that the bill’s purpose was to amend “current law to mandate the usage of the [C]hild [Sjupport [Gjuidelines in any action under the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 19 and Title 22, to determine or modify child support.” L.D. 2358 (114th Legis.1989) (emphases added).
[¶ 9] Our interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions also effectuates the legislative intent in a manner that is “mindful of the whole statutory scheme ... so that a harmonious result may be achieved,” Daniels, 675 A.2d at 987, and it avoids “absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable, or illogical results.” Thibeault, 666 A.2d at 114; Maha-ney, 610 A.2d at 741. It would be illogical and unreasonable to establish a statutory scheme that authorizes extensions of child support for some 19-year-olds and not others based on the vintage of their parents’ divorces.5 It would be inconsistent to disallow such extensions when a child support order arises out of a pre-1990 divorce, given the availability of extensions in situations in which the date of divorce is irrelevant. For example, the statutory provision for child support orders issued pursuant to agency proceedings draws no distinction based on the date of an underlying divorce decree, and requires only that the child support order in question-including “any judgment or order for the support of dependent children issued by any court of the State of Maine,” 19 M.R.S.A. § 493(2)-have been issued since January 1, 1990. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 493(4)(1981 & Supp.1996).6 Moreover, when a child’s parents have never been married, and therefore can never have been divorced, the statutory scheme provides simply that
[ajfter January 1, 1990, the court may order either parent to provide child support beyond the child’s 18th birthday if the child is attending secondary school ..., until the child graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school or attains the age of 19, whichever first occurs.
19 M.R.S.A. § 214(9) (Supp.1996).
[¶ 10] In summary, we conclude that the courts, in response to a motion for a modification, have the authority to modify divorce judgments entered prior to January 1990 to provide support payments until a child’s 19th birthday or high school graduation, whichever occurs first, in compliance with the Child Support Guidelines. Absent [496]*496some justification for a deviation, the Guidelines require the extension of child support until the age of 19 for those children still attending secondary school.7
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment vacating the judgment of the District Court and remanding to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.