Lewis v. Inhabs. of the Town of Rockport

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 12, 2002
DocketKNOap-01-007
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lewis v. Inhabs. of the Town of Rockport (Lewis v. Inhabs. of the Town of Rockport) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lewis v. Inhabs. of the Town of Rockport, (Me. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinion

TATE OF MAINE a oe ee SUPERIOR COURT 7 CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. AP-01-007

DHM- KNO- fia} 2002.

st STATE OF MAINE Kus KNOX; ss.

SALIM B. LEWIS,

Petitioner Vv. DECISION AND ORDER INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN OF ROCKPORT . AND THE CODE ENFORCEMENT oe OFFICER OF SAID TOWN, DONALD L. GARBRECHT LAW LIBRARY Respondent FEB 21 2002

and MARSHA and VICTOR STEINGLASS,

Parties-In-Interest

This matter is before the court on appeal from the Rockport Zoning Board of Appeals, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B. In his complaint, the plaintiff/appellant Salim Lewis explains that he is an abutter to property owned by Marsha and Victor Steinglass located on Ship Street in the Town of Rockport. He is challenging a decision by the Rockport Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) affirming the Code Enforcement Officer’s decision to issue a building permit to the Steinglasses for construction of a garage on their nonconforming waterfront property. The plaintiff contends the decision was arbitrary and capricious and constituted an error of law.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Marsha and Victor Steinglass acquired shorefront property in Rockport in 1973. The property is located within the Village District (District 901) under the Rockport Land Use Ordinance and also within the Shoreland Zone Overlay District, which encompasses all property within 250’ of the normal high water mark of Rockport harbor. The Steinglass property is considered a lawfully nonconforming lot by the Town because the principal buildings that violate current setback requirements were in existence prior to the adoption of the Land Use Ordinance in 1974. In 1986, the Steinglasses sold a portion of their property to Salim Lewis, the appellant in this case. Also in 1986, the Steinglasses received a building permit to construct a 3-car garage on their property. There is dispute among the parties over whether this permit should have been issued, but it was not challenged at the time.

In December, 1999, the Steinglasses applied for another building permit, this time to remove the 3-car garage and construct a dwelling in its place. After a public hearing, the ZBA approved the application! and the permit was issued on March 14, 2000. Lewis appealed the ZBA decision in July, and a stop work order was issued following review by the Town’s new Code Enforcement Officer (CEO). At the time of the stop work order, the Steinglasses had removed most of the garage structure, leaving only a concrete foundation. The Steinglasses subsequently abandoned the plan for a new dwelling and instead applied for a permit to rebuild the garage. On November 14, 2000, the CEO issued a permit to rebuild the garage on the condition it meet the dimensional and setback requirements of the Land Use Ordinance. Lewis appealed the permit, but the permit was affirmed by the ZBA in February, 2001. The ZBA decision is

now the subject of this appeal. Lewis argues that the renovated garage is an

1 Victor Steinglass was the chairman of the ZBA at the time, but he recused himself from the Board to represent himself in the presentation of the permit application. impermissible accessory structure under Rockport’s Land Use Ordinance and that certain conditions regarding the enlargement of a structure on nonconforming lot were not met in this case. Specifically, he objects to the location of the garage in the “front yard,” which he claims is prohibited by the ordinance as well as the height of the garage (28’) which he argues increases the square footage in violation of the ordinance’s

prohibition on enlargement of a structure on a nonconforming lot.

II. Discussion When the decision of a governmental body is appealed pursuant to Rule 80B,

this court independently examines the record and reviews the decision for abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence. York v. Town of Ogunquit, 2001 ME 53, I 6, 769 A.2d 172, 175; Ranco v. City of Bangor, 1997 ME 65, { 6, 691 A.2d 1238, 1239. “Interpretation of zoning ordinance is a question of law.” Lewis v. Town of Rockport, 1998 ME 144, J 11, 712 A.2d 1047, 1049; Oliver v. City of Rockland, 1998 ME 88, J 8, 710 A.2d 905, 908. “A court must interpret an ordinance by first looking at the plain meaning of the language to give effect to legislative intent.” Banks v. Maine RSA #1, Inc., 1998 ME 272, J 4, 721 A.2d 655, 657. “The terms or expressions are construed reasonably with regard to both the objects sought to be obtained and to the general structure of the ordinance as a whole.” Oliver, 1998 ME 88, J 8, 710 A.2d at 908. “A court’s interpretation of an ordinance must not create ‘absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable or illogical results.’ “ Banks, 1998 ME 272, J 4, 721 A.2d at 657 (quoting Melanson v. Belyea, 1997 ME 150, { 4, 698 A.2d 492.

The appellant takes the position that the garage in question is an accessory structure and that Rockport’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO) limits the location of accessory structures to side and rear yards only. The Steinglass garage, he argues, is in the front yard, and therefore the CEO erred when he issued the building permit. Section 302 of the ordinance defines accessory structure as follows:

Accessory Building or Structure: A subordinate building or structure or a portion of the main building the use of which is incidental to that of the main or principal building.

e+ + %

In all districts, accessory buildings or structures, including, but not limited to woodsheds, garden sheds and tool houses, may be placed within the side or rear yards under the following conditions: 1. Total ground coverage shall not exceed 150 square feet. 2. Building height shall not exceed 8 feet. 3. The building shall not be used for storage of flammable liquids or gases of more than 5 gallons. 4. No portion of the building shall be placed closer than 6 feet from the property line. 5. More than one accessory structure under these criteria is prohibited.

The appellant maintains that this definition means accessory structures can only be located in side or rear yards and must be very limited in size. It follows, he argues, that accessory structures are not allowed in the front yard. As “front yard” is not specifically defined in the ordinance, he constructs his definition of front yard from the setback definitions contained in section 302: Setback, Front (Front Yard): The distance measured from the edge

of pavement to the nearest part of any principal or accessory structure

provided that along Routes 1, 17 and 90 such distance shall be measured

from the edge of the State right-of-way. Lewis maintains this definition “freezes” the front yard as soon as a structure has been

constructed on the lot and prevents any other structure from being erected between

the first structure and the street. Based on this front yard restriction, he claims the original Steinglass garage built in 1986, was illegally constructed in the front yard and as such, can never be considered a legally nonconforming use. As the newly permitted Steinglass garage is located in the same location as the prior structure, between the principal structure and the street, the appellant contends that it falls within the ordinance’s definition of front yard, and is therefore unlawful as well.

The Steinglasses rely on the doctrine of estoppel to preclude the Town from rescinding a building permit upon which they have reasonably relied to their detriment. They contend they reasonably relied on the 1986 building permit in constructing the original garage and relied again on the March, 2000 permit in deconstructing the garage to build a dwelling. The appellant contends the Steinglasses abandoned any claim of estoppel when they voluntarily tore down the garage. Lewis Brief, p. 18, n. 8.

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Related

Henry Banks v. Maine RSA 1
1998 ME 272 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Oliver v. City of Rockland
1998 ME 88 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Lewis v. Town of Rockport
1998 ME 144 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Melanson v. Belyea
1997 ME 150 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
Shackford & Gooch, Inc. v. Town of Kennebunk
486 A.2d 102 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1984)
York v. Town of Ogunquit
2001 ME 53 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2001)
Ranco v. City of Bangor
1997 ME 65 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1997)
Lippman v. Town of Lincolnville
1999 ME 149 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
Lewis v. Inhabs. of the Town of Rockport, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lewis-v-inhabs-of-the-town-of-rockport-mesuperct-2002.