Medynski v. Margolis

389 F. Supp. 743, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14458

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 8, 1975
• Docket: Civ. A. 1570-73
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

This matter is before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Dismiss ¹ and plaintiff’s opposition thereto. Pursuant to this Court’s Order of February 21, 1974, the parties also submitted supplemental memoranda which the Court has considered. Oral argument by counsel was presented on May 8,1974.

Plaintiff Elsie Medynski alleges, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated², that the procedure for involuntary detention and commitment of mentally ill persons, pursuant to 21 D.C.Code § 901 et seq. (Mentally 111 Persons Found in Certain Federal Reservations) is violative of due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff Medynski was detained on a federal reservation, the Washington National Airport in Virginia, pursuant to 21 D.C.Code § 901 et seq., supra. She was thereafter admitted to Saint Elizabeths Hospital in conformity with the statutory provisions of § 901 et seq. The plaintiff has since been released from the Hospital and has presumably returned to Canada, her place of residence.

The first issue before the Court is that of mootness because of plaintiff Medynski’s discharge from the Hospital during the pendency of this litigation. The Court concludes that this case is not moot. Inherent in mental health proceedings is the occurrence of short-term detention and/or confinement. In the Case of John Ballay, Judge Tamm concluded, as we must, that mental health proceedings often fall outside the customary definition of mootness. In re Ballay, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648, 651-653 (1973). The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this narrow “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (decided April 23, 1974), citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Plaintiff Medynski may, in the future, attempt to travel by air in the United States and Canada and be forced to stop at the National Airport. She may again be detained pursuant to § 901, supra, and advance the same alleged violations of the Constitution. Plaintiff should not therefore be deprived of an opportunity to be heard simply because she is discharged from the Hospital before her legal remedies have been perfected.

An additional, independent reason for deciding that this case is not moot exists — “the collateral consequences of being adjudged mentally ill remain to plague appellant”. In re Ballay, supra, 482 F.2d at 651-653. A case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequence will be imposed on the basis of a challenged conviction. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Our Court of Appeals has subsequently extended this holding to cases involving contested civil commitment adjudications. Justin v. Jacobs, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 355, 449 F. 2d 1017, 1018-1020 (1970). In the case at bar, plaintiff may suffer the collateral consequences of rehospitalization based on this “past record” of hospitalization. Further, her non-citizen status may be affected in that her right to travel, work or reside in the United States may be restricted by virtue of having been found mentally ill. Plaintiff therefore needs to be advised by a court of law whether her complaint has any on-going validity.

Turning now to the substance of plaintiff’s claim³, the Court concludes that 21 D.C. § 901 et seq. and the application thereof does not present a substantial question of deprivation of the plaintiff’s right to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff bases her complaint on a comparison between the detention provisions of 21 D.C.Code § 901 et seq. (Mentally 111 Persons Found in Certain Federal Reservations) and the detention provisions of 21 D.C.Code § 501 et seq. (Hospitalization of the Mentally 111). Plaintiff alleges that the two statutes do not contain the same provisions and that therefore those mentally ill persons detained on federal reservations adjacent to the District of Columbia (§ 901) are treated differently from those detained within the District of Columbia (§ 501).

The Court does not find that the differences between 21 D.C.Code § 901 and 21 D.C.Code § 501 rise to the level of presenting a substantial constitutional question. A reading of the two statutes reveals some minor procedural differences ⁴, but none which can be construed by this Court as significant. In fact, this Court is guided by the Supreme Court’s warning “that a statute should be interpreted, if fairly possible, in such a way as to free it from not insubstantial • constitutional doubts”. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962) and-cases cited therein. The comparison which plaintiff finds so damaging, in reality reveals that the two statutes are to be read together in a parallel and consistent fashion. For example, 21 D.C. Code § 906 specifically provides that the laws of the District of Columbia — that is, 21 D.C.Code § 501 et seq. — apply to the adjudications of those found mentally ill under § 901 et seq. That this was Congress’ intent is clear since § 901 et seq. has been changed twice since the passage of § 501 et seq. Therefore, the two statutes, when read together, do not present any major constitutional inconsistencies.

The Court further notes that simply because Congress has legislated two statutes for detaining mentally ill persons, one applicable to the Metropolitan District of Columbia area containing federal reservations and one applicable to the District of Columbia does not present a constitutionally suspect situation. Because the District of Columbia is neither a state nor territory, but a federal enclave, housing the federal government, Congress may legislate a detention statute applicable only within the District. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed. 2d 613 (1972). The District’s statute need not contain the same provisions as those embodied in surrounding jurisdictions to pass constitutional muster.

The Court therefore concludes that the claim raised by the plaintiff does not present a substantial constitutional question which would justify further consideration by us.

In accordance with this Opinion, this Court would dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Circuit Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, would dismiss the action for failure of plaintiff’s complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as more fully set forth in his concurring opinion.

1 . This case came on as a request for a Temporary Restraining Order. Judge Parker, sitting as Motions Judge, heard and denied both the T.R.O. (August 6, 1973), and subsequently, plaintiff’s request for convention of a three-judge court (August 23, 1973). Plaintiff filed an appeal for summary reversal which was granted January 15, 1974. The case was remanded to the District Court “for further proceedings”. Thereafter, this three-judge court was convened (January 25, 1974).

2 . Since plaintiff has never defined or pursued the class action allegations in conformity with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 1-13 of the Rules of the District Court for the District of Columbia, the Court declines to act on the class action allegations.

3 . Tlie plaintiff has twice amended her complaint, once to allege diversity, jurisdiction and later to join proper party defendants.

4 . Defendant’s Opposition to Application for convening a Three-Judge Court, pp. 3-5.