Medical Center at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Premier Health Partners

294 F.R.D. 87, 86 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1607, 2013 WL 5657568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148839
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedOctober 16, 2013
DocketNo. 3:12-cv-26
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 294 F.R.D. 87 (Medical Center at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Premier Health Partners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Medical Center at Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Premier Health Partners, 294 F.R.D. 87, 86 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1607, 2013 WL 5657568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148839 (S.D. Ohio 2013).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO COMPEL (Docs. 59 and 63)

TIMOTHY S. BLACK, District Judge.

This civil action is before the Court on Defendants’ and Plaintiffs motions to compel (Docs. 59 and 63) non-party subpoena recipient Community Insurance Company d/b/a Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield (“Anthem”) to produce documents. Anthem has [91]*91filed its comprehensive memorandum contra (Doe. 66), and the moving parties have filed reply memoranda (Docs. 70, 74). The Court heard oral argument on September 30, 2013.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Anthem is the largest insurer in the Dayton area. Plaintiffs theory is essentially that Plaintiff was denied contracts with managed care providers as a result of a purported conspiracy orchestrated by Premier (and including Anthem) to exclude Plaintiff from the marketplace.

The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants “coerc[ed], compelled], co-opted] or financially induced] commercial health insurers or managed care providers, including Anthem ... to refuse to permit [MCEP] full access to their respective networks.” (Doc. 7 at ¶ 74(a) (emphasis added)). The Amended Complaint further alleges that Defendants coerced commercial health insurers “to provide reimbursement rates that were below market and below the rates and on different terms from the Hospital Defendants demanded for the exact same services.” (Id. at ¶ 74(f)).

The parties maintain that the documents they seek from Anthem go directly to these allegations. The Court agrees that the nature of and rationale for Anthem’s actions in its relationship with Plaintiff are central to evaluating the claim that Anthem acted in concert with Premier to harm Plaintiff.

Both Plaintiff and Defendant served subpoenas on Anthem to obtain documents related to the alleged conspiracy. Anthem has agreed to produce its communications with each of the parties, but not its internal deliberations regarding the parties. Anthem claims that the parties seek to compel a burdensome array of highly confidential documents that would, among other things, disclose Anthem’s strategies in negotiating contracts with the parties.

Anthem has agreed to produce the following: 1

(1) Anthem preserved the electronic mailboxes of the three employees responsible for hospital contracting in the Dayton area from 2006 to 2009 and would search those e-mailboxes as well as the e-mailboxes of the two people responsible for hospital contracting in the Dayton area since 2009. Anthem requested that the parties agree on one set of search terms to be applied to the five e-mailboxes;
(2) Contracts with Plaintiff and Defendants from 2006 to the present, with all pricing terms redacted, subject to a modified protective order;
(3) Communications between Anthem and Plaintiff about contracting from 2006 to the present, with the production focused on searches of the five employee e-mailboxes described above;
(4) Communications between Anthem and Plaintiff about Premier and between Anthem and Premier about Plaintiff from 2006 to the present, with the production focused on searches of the five employee e-mailboxes described above;
(5) Communications between Anthem and Kettering about a contract with Plaintiff from 2006 to the present, with the production focused on searches of the five employee e-mailboxes described above;
(6) For the period 2006 to the present, a list and summary of each product it offered in the Dayton area and a list and summary of the number of its subscribers enrolled in each product; and
(7) Non-eonfidential documents that set forth its policies, rules, and access standards for participation in Anthem networks.

Anthem claims that the production of these documents alone will cost in excess of $100,000.00. (Doc. 66-1 at ¶ 7).

Anthem refuses to produce the following three categories of documents unless the Court orders it to do so:

[92]*92(1) Anthem’s internal communications, analyses and claims paid data relating to Plaintiff;
(2) Anthem’s contracts with other providers in the Dayton area, and documents reflecting the negotiations, communications and internal analyses regarding such contracts and providers; and
(3) Documents reflecting Anthem’s policies toward physician-owned hospitals in the Dayton area.

(Doc. 59, Ex. D).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant parties the right to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Relevance for discovery purposes is extremely broad. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir.1998). However, “district courts have discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome to produce.” Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir.2007).

Under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may command a nonparty to, inter alia, produce documents. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(a)(1). Rule 45 further provides that “the issuing court must quash or modify a subpoena that ... requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii), (iv). Although irrelevance or overbreadth are not specifically listed under Rule 45 as a basis for quashing a subpoena, courts “have held that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26.” Hendricks v. Total Quality Logistics, 275 F.R.D. 251, 253 (S.D.Ohio 2011).

In striking the balance between a party’s need for discovery and a non-party’s interest in protecting confidential information, courts apply a three-pronged test. First, the court considers whether the entity seeking protection has shown that the information sought is proprietary and that its disclosure might be harmful. If so, the court looks to whether the party seeking the discovery has established that the information is relevant and necessary to the underlying action. Spartanburg Reg. Healthcare Sys. v. Hillenbrand Indus., No. 1:05mc107, 2005 WL 2045818, at *4, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30594, at *11 (W.D.Mich. Aug. 24, 2005).

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294 F.R.D. 87, 86 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1607, 2013 WL 5657568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/medical-center-at-elizabeth-place-llc-v-premier-health-partners-ohsd-2013.