McKinley v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

849 F. Supp. 2d 47, 2012 WL 1034464, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43034
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 29, 2012
DocketCivil Action No. 2010-0751
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 849 F. Supp. 2d 47 (McKinley v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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McKinley v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 849 F. Supp. 2d 47, 2012 WL 1034464, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43034 (D.D.C. 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, District Judge.

This action involves two requests under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), made by plaintiff Vern McKinley (“McKinley”), seeking documents related to deliberations undertaken by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”) concerning what systemic effect, if any, the failure of American International Group (“AIG”) and Lehman Brothers might have on financial markets. McKinley seeks a declaratory judgment that the Board violated FOIA by failing to fulfill his requests for non-exempt responsive records and an injunction compelling the Board to comply with the FOIA requests. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment [Dkt. # 13,17, and 19]. Because the Court finds that the Board conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA exemptions, the Court will grant both of the Board’s motions for partial summary judgment [Dkt. # 13 and 17] and will deny McKinley’s cross-motion [Dkt. #19].

I. Background

The Federal Reserve System is composed of the Board and twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks (“FRBs”). The Board is the central supervisory authority of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2006). It oversees the operation of the system, promulgates and administers regulations, and plays a major role in the supervision and regulation of the United States banking system. The Board is “authorized and empowered ... (1) [t]o examine at its discretion the accounts, books, and affairs of each Federal reserve bank and of each member bank and to require such statements and reports as it may deem necessary” and (2) “[t]o require any depository institution specified in this *53 paragraph to make, at such intervals as the Board may prescribe, such reports of its liabilities and assets as the Board may determine to be necessary or desirable to enable the Board to discharge its responsibility to monitor and control monetary and credit aggregates.” 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2006). Most pertinent to this case, section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, as it was in effect in 2008, gives the Board the power to authorize, in unusual and exigent circumstances, any FRB to extend credit to any individual, partnership, or corporation that is secured to the satisfaction of the lending FRB and meets other specified criteria. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2008), amended by Pub.L. No. 111-203, § 1101(a), 124 Stat. 2113 (2010). However, before the Board may authorize a FRB to make a loan, the FRB must make an independent determination concerning whether adequate credit is available from other banking institutions and whether the target institution has sufficient lendable collateral to support a loan of the magnitude required to meet its expenses. Mosser Decl. ¶ 7.

A. The Board’s Response to the Financial Crisis and the Worsening Liquidity Problems of AIG and Lehman Brothers.

AIG and Lehman Brothers were among several institutions facing severe capital and liquidity problems toward the end of 2008. Thro Decl. ¶ 11. At that time, the Board became increasingly concerned about the effects that a possible AIG or Lehman Brothers bankruptcy would have on financial markets and individual financial institutions, including on large complex banking organizations (“LCBOs”). Foley Decl. ¶ 6. As a result, the Board undertook to determine whether or not to authorize the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) to extend a loan to either or both institutions under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. In making this determination, the Board sought information from the FRBNY concerning the real-time exposures of certain counterparties to AIG and Lehman Brothers. 1 Id. In addition to the information supplied by FRBNY examiners, the Board also exchanged information with domestic and foreign banking supervisors to assess the potential impact of AIG’s and Lehman Brothers’ funding difficulties on regulated financial institutions and markets. Id.

Over the weekend of September 13, 2008, the Board, FRBNY, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and Securities and Exchange Commission brought together leaders of major financial firms in an attempt to craft a private sector solution to address Lehman Brothers’ worsening capital and liquidity shortfalls. Thro Decl. ¶ 11. No solution could be crafted and Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2010. Id. “Convinced,” however, “that the failure of AIG would be catastrophic for a financial system already in acute distress,” the Board invoked section 13(3) and authorized the FRBNY to loan up to $85 billion to AIG. Mosser Decl. ¶ 6. The FRBNY, in turn, approved the loan. Id.

B. The FOIA Requests

McKinley made two separate but related FOIA requests that give rise to this action. *54 On March 21, 2010, McKinley submitted his first request (the “AIG request”) to the Board seeking “further detail on information contained on p. 3 of the [September 16, 2008] minutes of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserved] ... The source of power referenced in the minutes is Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.” Ex. A to Thro Decl. McKinley specifically sought “any and all communications and records concerning or related to the Board’s decision that detail that ‘the disorderly failure of AIG was likely to have a systemic effect on financial markets that were already experiencing a significant level of fragility’ ” as described in the meeting minutes. Id. The following week, McKinley submitted his second request (the “Lehman request”) to the Board seeking:

[A]ny and all communications and records regarding analysis undertaken regarding Lehman Brothers and the assessment in September 2008 or earlier of what ‘contagion’ might have flowed from Lehman Brother’s filing of bankruptcy as the word contagion was used in the case of the Board of Governors’ deliberations over Bear Stearns: or ‘systemic effect on financial markets’ that might have flowed from a Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as those terms were used in the Board’s deliberations over American International Group.

Ex. E to Thro Decl. “Th[is] analysis,” McKinley asserts in his request, “would likely have been undertaken in the context of considering whether to take action under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to avoid a Lehman bankruptcy.” Id.

The Manager of the Freedom of Information Office at the Board acknowledged receipt of the AIG request on March 22, 2010 and the Lehman request on March 30, 2010. Thro Decl. ¶4, 8. On May 11, 2010, prior to the Board’s review and release of the responsive documents, but after the statutorily prescribed waiting period for filing a FOIA action had expired, McKinley brought this suit.

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849 F. Supp. 2d 47, 2012 WL 1034464, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43034, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mckinley-v-board-of-governors-of-the-federal-reserve-system-dcd-2012.