ARCHER, Chief Justice.
This suit was filed by appellee for damages for permanent personal injuries sustained when a pickup truck, in which he was riding, was hit from the rear by an automobile owned by appellant and being driven by Jimmy Wilson. The car had been loaned by appellant to Wilson to make a personal trip and the suit is founded on the theory of “Negligent Entrustment.”
The petition alleged, and plaintiff secured jury findings, that appellant was guilty of negligence in lending his automobile to Wilson without first ascertaining whether Wilson had a driver’s license, or knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver.
The case was tried with the aid of a jury which found that the injuries and damages were proximately caused by Wilson’s negligent driving and that appellant was negligent in permitting Wilson to drive the car.
The defendant, appellant herein, filed his special exceptions, which were overruled and requested the submission of his special issue No. 1 which was refused.
Based on the jury’s verdict, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee and against both Wilson and appellant for $36,293.45. Wilson has not appealed.
Appellant filed his motions for instructed verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which were overruled.
The appeal is founded on 25 assignments of error and are to the effect that the Court erred in overruling the motion for instructed verdict, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in overruling special exception No. 1, in refusing to submit defendant’s requested issues Nos. 1 and 2, in failing to give special instruction No. 1 so as to include element of foreseeability, in holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding in response to special issues Nos. 9, 11 and 12, in overruling special exception No. 2, in refusing to define “reckless and incompetent” as used in the charge, in permitting proof of Wilson’s incompetence and recklessness by specific acts instead of by general reputation, in permitting proof that Wilson had pleaded guilty to being drunk on the public streets, in permitting proof that Wilson’ had pleaded guilty on several occasions to being drunk in a public place, and disturbing the peace, to running stop signs and lights, and driving without a driver’s license, and driving while intoxicated, and that he was unable to pass driver’s license [888]*888test, that he had been convicted of driving without a driver’s license, and finally in including as a recoverable item of damage future nursing expense.
Appellant and a partner operate a “One Stop Fishing Center” under the name of “Sam, the Minnow Man” on the Fredericks-burg Road outside of Austin.
Three or four days before the date of injury, and while appellant was out of town, Sam Davidson, the partner, employed Wilson as porter and general handyman for the business. Wilson had been recommended by a man named Hilliard who worked at a Barbecue Stand about 2 miles from the place of business. Appellant did not know what other investigation Mr. Davidson made but he respected Davidson’s judgment.
Appellant on Thursday before Saturday, the day the accident occurred, told Wilson to take his personal car and go a short distance for some eggs and observed Wilson’s manner in operating the car, and that Wilson was gone about 10 minutes. On the next day appellant requested Wilson to take the car and go get some sandwiches at a Barbecue Stand about 2 miles out the highway, and Wilson returned in about 30 minutes. Appellant further testified that he saw nothing wrong with Wilson’s driving, who appeared to be a competent driver.
On Saturday Wilson asked appellant to lend him his car to go to a fraternity house in Austin to' get a check, and gave the address. Appellant testified that he asked Wilson if he had a driver’s license and that Wilson said that he did.
The car was loaned to Wilson at 9 o’clock Saturday morning and instead of returning as he had promised, Wilson found some friends and began to drink beer at various places, and started to Manor, Texas, in appellant’s car to get some money which one of the friends had, and en route the collision occurred.
Special Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 are directed to the rate of speed Wilson was driving and proximate cause arising, and' Issues Nos. 5 and 6 concerning the question of driving while intoxicated. Special Issues Nos. 7 and 8 are directed to the question of proper lookout, and these issues and the answers thereto are not under attack.
The Court defined “Negligence”, “Ordinary Care”, and “Proximate Cause” as follows :
“ ‘Negligence’, as that term is used in this charge, means the doing of that which a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the failure to do that which a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care would have done under the same or similar circumstances.
“ ‘Ordinary care’, as that term is used in this charge, means that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
“ ‘Proximate cause’, as that term is used in this charge, means a cause without which the result complained of would not have occurred, and from which cause, such result, or some similar result, might reasonably be anticipated as a natural and probable consequence by a person of ordinary care and prudence, in the light of attending circumstances. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.”
Among issues submitted were:
“Special Issue No. 9:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that McCord Mclntire was negligent, as that term is herein defined, by lending Jimmy Wilson his automobile without first ascertaining whether the said Jimmy Wilson had a driver's license?
“Answer this special issue ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
[889]*889“Answer: Yes.
“In connection with the foregoing special issue, you are instructed that the word ‘ascertain’ means to find out or learn for a certainty.
“Special Issue No. 10:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time he borrowed McCord Mclntire’s automobile, Jimmy Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver?
“Answer this special issue ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
“Answer: Yes.
“If you have answered the foregoing special issue ‘Yes’, and only if you have so answered, you will answer the following special issue.
“Special Issue No. 11:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at said time, Mc-Cord Mclntire, by the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that Jimmy Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver, if you have so found ?
“Answer this special issue ‘Yes’ or ■‘No.’
“Answer: Yes.
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ARCHER, Chief Justice.
This suit was filed by appellee for damages for permanent personal injuries sustained when a pickup truck, in which he was riding, was hit from the rear by an automobile owned by appellant and being driven by Jimmy Wilson. The car had been loaned by appellant to Wilson to make a personal trip and the suit is founded on the theory of “Negligent Entrustment.”
The petition alleged, and plaintiff secured jury findings, that appellant was guilty of negligence in lending his automobile to Wilson without first ascertaining whether Wilson had a driver’s license, or knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver.
The case was tried with the aid of a jury which found that the injuries and damages were proximately caused by Wilson’s negligent driving and that appellant was negligent in permitting Wilson to drive the car.
The defendant, appellant herein, filed his special exceptions, which were overruled and requested the submission of his special issue No. 1 which was refused.
Based on the jury’s verdict, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee and against both Wilson and appellant for $36,293.45. Wilson has not appealed.
Appellant filed his motions for instructed verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which were overruled.
The appeal is founded on 25 assignments of error and are to the effect that the Court erred in overruling the motion for instructed verdict, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in overruling special exception No. 1, in refusing to submit defendant’s requested issues Nos. 1 and 2, in failing to give special instruction No. 1 so as to include element of foreseeability, in holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding in response to special issues Nos. 9, 11 and 12, in overruling special exception No. 2, in refusing to define “reckless and incompetent” as used in the charge, in permitting proof of Wilson’s incompetence and recklessness by specific acts instead of by general reputation, in permitting proof that Wilson had pleaded guilty to being drunk on the public streets, in permitting proof that Wilson’ had pleaded guilty on several occasions to being drunk in a public place, and disturbing the peace, to running stop signs and lights, and driving without a driver’s license, and driving while intoxicated, and that he was unable to pass driver’s license [888]*888test, that he had been convicted of driving without a driver’s license, and finally in including as a recoverable item of damage future nursing expense.
Appellant and a partner operate a “One Stop Fishing Center” under the name of “Sam, the Minnow Man” on the Fredericks-burg Road outside of Austin.
Three or four days before the date of injury, and while appellant was out of town, Sam Davidson, the partner, employed Wilson as porter and general handyman for the business. Wilson had been recommended by a man named Hilliard who worked at a Barbecue Stand about 2 miles from the place of business. Appellant did not know what other investigation Mr. Davidson made but he respected Davidson’s judgment.
Appellant on Thursday before Saturday, the day the accident occurred, told Wilson to take his personal car and go a short distance for some eggs and observed Wilson’s manner in operating the car, and that Wilson was gone about 10 minutes. On the next day appellant requested Wilson to take the car and go get some sandwiches at a Barbecue Stand about 2 miles out the highway, and Wilson returned in about 30 minutes. Appellant further testified that he saw nothing wrong with Wilson’s driving, who appeared to be a competent driver.
On Saturday Wilson asked appellant to lend him his car to go to a fraternity house in Austin to' get a check, and gave the address. Appellant testified that he asked Wilson if he had a driver’s license and that Wilson said that he did.
The car was loaned to Wilson at 9 o’clock Saturday morning and instead of returning as he had promised, Wilson found some friends and began to drink beer at various places, and started to Manor, Texas, in appellant’s car to get some money which one of the friends had, and en route the collision occurred.
Special Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 are directed to the rate of speed Wilson was driving and proximate cause arising, and' Issues Nos. 5 and 6 concerning the question of driving while intoxicated. Special Issues Nos. 7 and 8 are directed to the question of proper lookout, and these issues and the answers thereto are not under attack.
The Court defined “Negligence”, “Ordinary Care”, and “Proximate Cause” as follows :
“ ‘Negligence’, as that term is used in this charge, means the doing of that which a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the failure to do that which a person of ordinary prudence in the exercise of ordinary care would have done under the same or similar circumstances.
“ ‘Ordinary care’, as that term is used in this charge, means that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
“ ‘Proximate cause’, as that term is used in this charge, means a cause without which the result complained of would not have occurred, and from which cause, such result, or some similar result, might reasonably be anticipated as a natural and probable consequence by a person of ordinary care and prudence, in the light of attending circumstances. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.”
Among issues submitted were:
“Special Issue No. 9:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that McCord Mclntire was negligent, as that term is herein defined, by lending Jimmy Wilson his automobile without first ascertaining whether the said Jimmy Wilson had a driver's license?
“Answer this special issue ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
[889]*889“Answer: Yes.
“In connection with the foregoing special issue, you are instructed that the word ‘ascertain’ means to find out or learn for a certainty.
“Special Issue No. 10:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time he borrowed McCord Mclntire’s automobile, Jimmy Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver?
“Answer this special issue ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’
“Answer: Yes.
“If you have answered the foregoing special issue ‘Yes’, and only if you have so answered, you will answer the following special issue.
“Special Issue No. 11:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at said time, Mc-Cord Mclntire, by the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that Jimmy Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver, if you have so found ?
“Answer this special issue ‘Yes’ or ■‘No.’
“Answer: Yes.
“If you have answered the foregoing special issue ‘Yes’, and only if you Rave so answered, you will answer the following special issue.
’“Special Issue No. 12:
“Do you find from a preponderance ■of the evidence that McCord Mclntire was negligent, as that term is herein ■defined, by lending Jimmy Wilson his .automobile when the said McCord Mc-lntire, by the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that Jimmy Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver, ;if you have so found?
“Answer this special issue ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ '
“Answer: Yes.”
Special Issues Nos. 1 and 2 requested by appellant read:
“If you have answered Special Issue No. 9 ‘Yes’ you will answer the following special issue; otherwise you need not answer it.
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any you have so found, was a proximate cause of the collision in question?
“Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ ”
“If you have answered Special Issue No. 12 ‘Yes’ you will answer the following special issue; otherwise you need not answer it.
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any you have so found, was a proximate cause of the collision in question?
“Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.”
These requested issues were refused.
The other issues are in regard to medical, hospital, etc. bills, and to future nursing cost.
The jury fixed the total damages at $36,-293.45.
A final determination of the liability of appellant as a matter of law, the facts surrounding the lending of the car and the collision are not in dispute, except as inquiry as to Wilson having a driver’s license, depends upon the construction of the cases on negligent entrustment.
A prime question is the liability of one who lends his car to another without using ordinary care to ascertain if such person is an incompetent, reckless or unlicensed 'driver, under the facts, is guilty of negli- ‘ gence.
Appellant takes the position that he is not ' guilty of negligence in lending his car to an [890]*890incompetent or reckless driver, or that he has no driver’s license unless he, the owner of such car, actually knew of such incompetence or recklessness, and then only in case such negligence was found to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage and cite in support of his position the case of Seinsheimer v. Burkhart, 132 Tex. 336, 122 S.W.2d 1063; Jones v. Gibson, Tex.Civ.App., 18 S.W.2d 744; Worsham-Buick Co. v. Isaacs, 126 Tex. 546, 87 S. W.2d 252, and other cases most of which are cited in the above cases.
Appellee relies on the cases of Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d 587, and Spratling v. Butler, 150 Tex. 369, 240 S.W.2d 1016.
Jimmy Wilson, called as a witness by plaintiff, testified that he was driving Mr. Mclntire’s Pontiac Station Wagon when he crashed into the rear of Mr. Van Sellers’ truck on September 15, 1956; that he met Mr. Mclntire on Wednesday before the collision; that he had been employed by Mr. Sam to work as a porter mostly, and did anything they asked him to do; that he was recommended by a colored boy named Walter Hilliard and who was working at a Barbecue Stand about a mile from Sam’s Place; that he was not asked if he knew how to drive an automobile, or about his past history by Mr. Davidson or if he had a driver’s license. That he asked Mr. Mclntire if he could borrow his car to pick up a check at a fraternity house on Saturday; that he had seen Mr. Mclntire during the days of Wednesday, Thursday and Friday before borrowing the car on Saturday; that Mr. Mclntire did not inquire about his driving ability or of his record or past history or past employers; that he wanted the car for his own personal business. The witness then detailed his movements and activities up to and including the collision, and that he drank beer all morning and was driving over 70 miles per hour at the time of the collision. The witness further testified that he did not have a driver’s license, and had been unable to get one, and had pled guilty to driving without a license three or four times, and also had pled guilty to driving while under the influence of liquor, and had been arrested for traffic violations, speeding, running stop signs and lights, and was guilty of all of such named violations.
Wilson testified that on Thursday Mr. Mclntire told him to take his car and go a short piece for some eggs, and again on Friday Mr. Mclntire sent him to a Barbecue Stand about 3 miles down the highway for some sandwiches and he was gone about thirty minutes.
Wilson further testified that he told Mc-lntire that he wanted to go to town to get a check at a fraternity house on San Jacinto Street, but went to his mother’s house and got the check. The witness testified that:
“Q. When Mr. McIntyre loaned you his car on the 15th of September, the day of this accident, I believe you have already said that he didn’t ask you to show him your driver’s license? A. No, sir.
“Q. But he did ask you if you had one? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What did you tell him? A. I told him that I had.”
On redirect examination the witness testified :
“Q. Now, the third time when you borrowed his car is when this catastrophe happened to Mr. Sellers, isn’t it?
A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did he ask you at that time to show him your driver’s license? A. No, he didn’t ask me to show it.
“Q. Now, I want to ask you one question: Is it a fact, or is it not a fact, that Mr. McIntyre didn’t ask you even whether you had a license this third time, just as he didn’t on these first two. A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Now, what do you mean by ‘Yes, sir’? A. He did ask me.
[891]*891“Q. Let me ask you this, Jimmy: Will you state whether or not some people that represented Mr. McIntyre’s interest in this lawsuit came to see you in the jailhouse the very day .after this collision occurred? A. Someone did come up there and said they represented Mr. McIntyre.
“Q. They said they represented Mr. McIntyre? A. Yes.
“Q. Did you talk to them about how this thing happened? A. Yes, •sir.
* * *
“Q. Isn’t it a fact, or is it a fact, that these people that interviewed you, took your statement I believe, or talked to you about how this accident occurred over in the jailhouse were the ■same people who said they represented Mr. McIntyre’s interest in this lawsuit, and didn’t they tell you that you ought to say that he asked you about your license in order to help him in this lawsuit; isn’t that a fact. Now, look at me; don’t look at Mr. McIntyre.
“Mr. Gay: Your Honor, it is not necessary for him to badger this witness. We have no objection to his asking him in a gentlemanly way if somebody told him to lie about this matter.
“Q. Did they tell you that? A. Yes, sir.”
On recross examination:
“Q. You have said now today that Mr. McIntyre asked you whether or not you had a driver’s license? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Is that the truth or not the truth? A. He did ask me.
“Q. He did ask you? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Now, you are not lying about that, are you? A. No, sir; he asked me the last time.”
Mr. Mclntire testified that he was in business with Sam Davidson in “Sam, the Minnow Man” on the Fredericksburg Road, as a one stop fishing center, selling gas, oil, groceries, fishing tackle, etc. and had several employees, and among them Jimmy Wilson, whose duties were never outlined specifically, but generally as a porter and clean-up boy; that he made no inquiries with reference to Jimmy’s background.
The witness testified that on Thursday he sent Wilson to get 6 or 8 dozen eggs from a Mr. Buaas about 400 yards down the road; that he did not ask Wilson if he had a driver’s license, and made no inquiry about what kind of a driver he was, but watched Wilson drive down the road.
That the next time he let Wilson take his car was on Friday to go and get some sandwiches at Foy’s Barbecue about 2 miles distance, and on this occasion made no inquiries as to a driver’s license or anything else concerning Wilson’s background.
Mr. Mclntire further testified that on Saturday morning Jimmy Wilson asked for the car to pick up a check, and that he asked Wilson, if he had a driver’s license, who his former employer was and how long he would be gone, and Wilson replied that he had been employed by a fraternity house on North Guadalupe, and would be back in 45 minutes, and that he had a driver’s license, but that he did not ask to see it.
Mr. Mclntire further testified that he observed Wilson for the three days prior to the day of the collision and that Wilson was a good employee, did not drink and he believed Wilson had a driver’s license, and would not have let Wilson have the car for a longer time than 45 minutes, and of his activities in calling the police when Wilson did not return as promised and of filing a complaint against Wilson in the afternoon.
We believe that it was incumbent on appellant to have ascertained that Wilson had a driver’s license, and appellant by the exercise of ordinary care knew or should have known that Wilson was a reckless and [892]*892incompetent driver, and that appellant was negligent in lending his car to Wilson.
The question in negligent entrustment cases is:
Whether, under the facts, the owner of the automobile was guilty of negligence, as that term is defined, in lending his automobile to an incompetent, reckless or unlicensed driver, without using ordinary care in ascertaining whether such person had a driver’s license, or whether he was an incompetent and reckless driver.
We base our holding on and quote excerpts from the following cases: Spratling v. Butler, 150 Tex. 369, 240 S.W.2d 1016, and on the holding in Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S. W.2d 587, 590.
“The statute, as we construe it, prohibits the lending of an automobile only where the owner knows that the driver does not have a license. We do not think, therefore, that the mere proof, in the absence of actual knowledge, that the defendant’s agents in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that Dickson did not have a license would show a violation of the statute. However, we think that the facts that the driver did not have a license and that the defendant’s agents by the exercise of due care could have ascertained that he did not have a license may be alleged and proved by the plaintiff for the purpose of showing that the defendant’s agents were in fact negligent in permitting Dickson to take and drive the automobile.”
There was no error in overruling defendant’s Motion for Instructed Verdict, since the jury found that defendant was guilty of negligence in lending his car to Wilson under the circumstances, and this was a proper fact issue to be resolved by the jury.
We have given careful consideration to the cases relied on by-appellant and see no necessity to attempt to review them as we have concluded that the decisions in the Spratling case and in the Mundy case, supra, are the law now, and reflect the view of the Supreme Court.
In the Mundy case the court stated:
“An examination of our statute requiring operators of automobiles to have licenses discloses that its principal purpose is to insure a minimum of competence and skill on the part of drivers for the protection of persons who might be injured or have their property damaged by negligent or reckless operation of motor vehicles on the highways. * * *
“ * * * the danger anticipated and intended to be prevented by the statute is that such persons, if given the opportunity to drive, will do so negligently and will cause damage to other persons.”
The jury found that appellant failed to-ascertain whether Wilson had a driver’s-license prior to lending Wilson his car;, and that Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver and that McCord Mclntire by the use of ordinary care should have known, that Wilson was a reckless and incompetent, driver, and that Mclntire was negligent by lending Wilson his automobile when Mc-lntire by the use of ordinary care should have known that Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver.
Since this case stems on the construction-of “negligent entrustment” or lending of an. automobile as have hereinabove been discussed, there is no absolute necessity to discuss all of appellant’s points, other tham to overrule the same.
Appellant’s points Nos. 4 and 5 are-directed to the refusal of the court to submit issues as to whether the alleged negligence in entrusting the car to a reckless and' incompetent driver or in failing to ascertain whether Wilson had a driver’s license was a. proximate cause of the collision.
We do not believe that it was necessary to submit an issue of “proximate-[893]*893cause” insofar as concerned the owner’s negligence in entrusting the automobile to an unlicensed driver. In the Spratling case the Supreme Court quoted from the Mundy case as follows [150 Tex. 369, 240 S.W. 2d 1017]:
“If, after the automobile is entrusted to such driver, he operates it negligently, and thereby causes damages to a third person, the causal connection is shown between the negligence of the owner in lending him the automobile and the damage to the third person.”
And while the Supreme Court did not expressly write on the question as to whether it was necessary to submit a subsidiary issue of “proximate cause” where the jury found the owner was negligent in lending his car to a driver when the owner, by the use of ordinary care, should have known that the driver was reckless and incompetent, but see no reason why the rule should not be the same as in negligent en-trustment cases where the negligence of an unlicensed driver is involved.
Russell Construction Company v. Ponder, Tex.Com.App., 143 Tex. 412, 186 S.W.2d 233, adopted by the Supreme Court.
We do not believe that the admission of testimony showing that Jimmy Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver and an irresponsible person was objectionable, since all of the testimony was to the effect that Wilson was an habitual traffic Violator and had the reputation of being reckless. Wilson admitted to various violations of the law, such as driving while under the influence of liquor, driving without a driver’s license and traffic violations.
The deputy clerk of the Corporation Court in Austin testified from the records in the Corporation Court, giving dates and docket numbers of charges against Wilson and admitted by him.
The admissions by Wilson and other testimony show that Wilson was a reckless and incompetent driver, and the intemperate habits and driving records were an issue in the case, and appellant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care, should have known of such habits and driving records and the entrustment of his car to such a person formed the basis of Mclntire’s negligence, and such testimony was admissible.
McCarty v. Gappelberg, Tex.Civ.App., 273 S.W.2d 943, er. ref. N.R.E.
We overrule appellant’s point complaining of the allowance of damage in the sum of $2125 as future nursing expense.
Dr. Robert H. Farris testified as to Mr. Sellers’ injuries and that he would not be able ever to do manual labor, and that Mr. Sellers would not in all probability at any time in the future be able to take care of all of his personal needs without help.
Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Gerald, 60 Tex.Civ.App. 151, 128 S.W. 166, er. ref.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.