Pope, Judge.
Plaintiffs Marjette Lacey McDonnell and Mitchell Todd Lacey are the surviving children of the late Dr. J. Allen Lacey and Meredith D. Lacey. Dr. and Mrs. Lacey were killed when an airplane piloted by Dr. Lacey crashed soon after takeoff from Peachtree-DeKalb Airport in DeKalb County on October 1, 1989. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Roy E. Beatty & Associates, Inc., alleging that the crash occurred as a result of instrument failure due to defendant’s faulty maintenance of the plane. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct additional discovery. Plaintiffs appeal.
The record shows defendant is a Florida corporation. Defendant owned the plane and leased it to Lacey-Champion Carpets of Florida, Inc., another Florida corporation, of which Dr. and Mrs. Lacey were officers and shareholders. The plane was used primarily by the Laceys for personal trips. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, defendant had the duty to provide service and maintenance for the plane. Defendant presented evidence that its only place of business is in Florida; that it [808]*808never operated in Georgia and never bought a plane from or sold a plane to anyone in Georgia; that it never conducted or solicited business in Georgia or engaged in any persistent course of conduct in Georgia; that it never derived substantial revenue from goods used or services rendered in Georgia; and that it never engaged in consulting work or airplane management services in Georgia. The trial court found defendant’s sole contact with Georgia was an isolated appraisal of an aircraft performed almost one year after the crash, and that this activity was neither substantial nor sufficiently related causally to the plaintiffs’ claim to trigger personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that defendant benefitted from their parents’ use of Georgia airport facilities. Plaintiffs point out that Mr. Roy E. Beatty, sole shareholder and president of the defendant corporation, was a close personal friend of their father. They argue that because Mr. Beatty was allowed to fly the plane frequently for his own use, because he accompanied Dr. Lacey on several pleasure trips to Georgia and because he knew when the defendant leased the plane that the Laceys would use the plane in Georgia then jurisdiction may be exercised over the defendant corporation because Georgia is a convenient forum in which to litigate the matter.
1. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendant in this case is a Florida corporation which merely leased an airplane to another Florida corporation. The lessee of the plane flew it to Georgia where it crashed. It is undisputed that defendant lessor conducted no business and engaged in no activity in Georgia except for an unrelated act after the crash occurred. We cannot justify the imposition of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant because of the unilateral acts of the lessee, over which the defendant had no control.
A nonresident defendant may be held liable for a tortious injury which occurred in this state only under two circumstances: either because the injury was due to a tortious act committed by the defendant within the state (OCGA § 9-10-91 (2)) or because the injury was caused by an act or omission of the defendant outside the state and defendant “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state . . . .” OCGA § 9-10-91 (3).
The Georgia Long-Arm Statute is different from the corresponding statute in some other states because it “requires that an out-of-state defendant must do certain acts within the State of Georgia before [it] can be subjected to personal jurisdiction.” Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 130 (356 SE2d 513) (1987). In Georgia, a due process analysis is appropriate only after it is first established that the nonresident defendant committed one of the acts described in the Long-[809]*809Arm Statute. Thus, the due process analysis advocated by the dissenting judges is inappropriate because the record shows the defendant in this case did not commit any act which would subject it to jurisdiction in Georgia.
In opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs relied on the fact that the owner and president of the defendant corporation accompanied the owner and president of the lessee of the airplane on several pleasure trips to Georgia. Plaintiffs argue these trips somehow show that the defendant corporation engaged in activity in Georgia. These trips, however, were purely personal and arose out of the friendship between Mr. Beatty and Dr. Lacey. They in no way established a course of conduct by the defendant corporation and in no way resulted in substantial revenue to the defendant corporation. Moreover, even when Mr. Beatty accompanied Dr. Lacey on personal trips to Georgia, it was the lessee (by and through Dr. Lacey) and not the defendant corporation which controlled the plane. The dissenting opinion jumps to the conclusion that Mr. Beatty was the “alter ego” of the defendant corporation. Even if he was, it cannot be said that Mr. Beatty was acting as the alter ego of the corporation on these personal trips. Mr. Beatty’s personal hunting trips to Georgia or his acts of friendship in accompanying Dr. Lacey to visit family members in Georgia in no way benefitted the corporation. Moreover, the alleged negligent act of the corporation was the improper maintenance of the airplane. The plaintiffs do not contend Mr. Beatty personally serviced the airplane. Instead, the plane was serviced by qualified aviation mechanics in the employ of the corporation. It is not Mr. Beatty, individually, who is sued, but the corporation. And the facts do not support the exercise of jurisdiction over the corporation.
The defendant’s knowledge that the lessee planned to use the plane in Georgia provides no basis on which to attribute the lessee’s acts to the defendant. All of the acts which occurred in Georgia were merely the unilateral acts of the injured party. In this case, the plane crashed in Georgia. But that was not an act of the defendant. Neither was the flying and landing of the plane in Georgia an act of the defendant. The plane was under the exclusive control of the lessee. Defendant was, in essence, an airplane dealer and the fact that it was foreseeable that the party to whom it leased the plane would fly the plane to Georgia is an insufficient basis upon which to impose jurisdiction in Georgia. To do so would violate the nonresident defendant’s right to due process because it does not establish the required minimum contacts with this state. The facts of this case are similar to those in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 (100 SC 559, 62 LE2d 490) (1980), in which the United States Supreme Court held that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction over an automobile dealer and a regional automobile distributor, both located [810]
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Pope, Judge.
Plaintiffs Marjette Lacey McDonnell and Mitchell Todd Lacey are the surviving children of the late Dr. J. Allen Lacey and Meredith D. Lacey. Dr. and Mrs. Lacey were killed when an airplane piloted by Dr. Lacey crashed soon after takeoff from Peachtree-DeKalb Airport in DeKalb County on October 1, 1989. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant Roy E. Beatty & Associates, Inc., alleging that the crash occurred as a result of instrument failure due to defendant’s faulty maintenance of the plane. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct additional discovery. Plaintiffs appeal.
The record shows defendant is a Florida corporation. Defendant owned the plane and leased it to Lacey-Champion Carpets of Florida, Inc., another Florida corporation, of which Dr. and Mrs. Lacey were officers and shareholders. The plane was used primarily by the Laceys for personal trips. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, defendant had the duty to provide service and maintenance for the plane. Defendant presented evidence that its only place of business is in Florida; that it [808]*808never operated in Georgia and never bought a plane from or sold a plane to anyone in Georgia; that it never conducted or solicited business in Georgia or engaged in any persistent course of conduct in Georgia; that it never derived substantial revenue from goods used or services rendered in Georgia; and that it never engaged in consulting work or airplane management services in Georgia. The trial court found defendant’s sole contact with Georgia was an isolated appraisal of an aircraft performed almost one year after the crash, and that this activity was neither substantial nor sufficiently related causally to the plaintiffs’ claim to trigger personal jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that defendant benefitted from their parents’ use of Georgia airport facilities. Plaintiffs point out that Mr. Roy E. Beatty, sole shareholder and president of the defendant corporation, was a close personal friend of their father. They argue that because Mr. Beatty was allowed to fly the plane frequently for his own use, because he accompanied Dr. Lacey on several pleasure trips to Georgia and because he knew when the defendant leased the plane that the Laceys would use the plane in Georgia then jurisdiction may be exercised over the defendant corporation because Georgia is a convenient forum in which to litigate the matter.
1. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendant in this case is a Florida corporation which merely leased an airplane to another Florida corporation. The lessee of the plane flew it to Georgia where it crashed. It is undisputed that defendant lessor conducted no business and engaged in no activity in Georgia except for an unrelated act after the crash occurred. We cannot justify the imposition of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant because of the unilateral acts of the lessee, over which the defendant had no control.
A nonresident defendant may be held liable for a tortious injury which occurred in this state only under two circumstances: either because the injury was due to a tortious act committed by the defendant within the state (OCGA § 9-10-91 (2)) or because the injury was caused by an act or omission of the defendant outside the state and defendant “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state . . . .” OCGA § 9-10-91 (3).
The Georgia Long-Arm Statute is different from the corresponding statute in some other states because it “requires that an out-of-state defendant must do certain acts within the State of Georgia before [it] can be subjected to personal jurisdiction.” Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 130 (356 SE2d 513) (1987). In Georgia, a due process analysis is appropriate only after it is first established that the nonresident defendant committed one of the acts described in the Long-[809]*809Arm Statute. Thus, the due process analysis advocated by the dissenting judges is inappropriate because the record shows the defendant in this case did not commit any act which would subject it to jurisdiction in Georgia.
In opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs relied on the fact that the owner and president of the defendant corporation accompanied the owner and president of the lessee of the airplane on several pleasure trips to Georgia. Plaintiffs argue these trips somehow show that the defendant corporation engaged in activity in Georgia. These trips, however, were purely personal and arose out of the friendship between Mr. Beatty and Dr. Lacey. They in no way established a course of conduct by the defendant corporation and in no way resulted in substantial revenue to the defendant corporation. Moreover, even when Mr. Beatty accompanied Dr. Lacey on personal trips to Georgia, it was the lessee (by and through Dr. Lacey) and not the defendant corporation which controlled the plane. The dissenting opinion jumps to the conclusion that Mr. Beatty was the “alter ego” of the defendant corporation. Even if he was, it cannot be said that Mr. Beatty was acting as the alter ego of the corporation on these personal trips. Mr. Beatty’s personal hunting trips to Georgia or his acts of friendship in accompanying Dr. Lacey to visit family members in Georgia in no way benefitted the corporation. Moreover, the alleged negligent act of the corporation was the improper maintenance of the airplane. The plaintiffs do not contend Mr. Beatty personally serviced the airplane. Instead, the plane was serviced by qualified aviation mechanics in the employ of the corporation. It is not Mr. Beatty, individually, who is sued, but the corporation. And the facts do not support the exercise of jurisdiction over the corporation.
The defendant’s knowledge that the lessee planned to use the plane in Georgia provides no basis on which to attribute the lessee’s acts to the defendant. All of the acts which occurred in Georgia were merely the unilateral acts of the injured party. In this case, the plane crashed in Georgia. But that was not an act of the defendant. Neither was the flying and landing of the plane in Georgia an act of the defendant. The plane was under the exclusive control of the lessee. Defendant was, in essence, an airplane dealer and the fact that it was foreseeable that the party to whom it leased the plane would fly the plane to Georgia is an insufficient basis upon which to impose jurisdiction in Georgia. To do so would violate the nonresident defendant’s right to due process because it does not establish the required minimum contacts with this state. The facts of this case are similar to those in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 (100 SC 559, 62 LE2d 490) (1980), in which the United States Supreme Court held that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction over an automobile dealer and a regional automobile distributor, both located [810]*810in New York, simply because it was foreseeable that the automobile sold to plaintiffs in New York could be transported to Oklahoma and involved in an accident there. “[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. at 297. The facts establish that defendant committed no tortious act in Georgia out of which the injury arose. Thus, jurisdiction may not be imposed pursuant to subsection (2) of the Long-Arm Statute.
Neither can it be said that the defendant conducts business in Georgia or derives substantial revenue “from goods used or consumed or services rendered in the state,” as set forth in subsection (3) of the Long-Arm Statute. The plane was leased for a flat monthly rate; no additional charge was made for miles flown or hours of use. Defendant lessor made no more money when the plane was flown to Georgia, or any other jurisdiction, than it made when the plane was sitting idle in Florida. Unlike the facts in this court’s recent opinion of Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 202 Ga. App. 245 (414 SE2d 658) (1991), this is not a case in which the defendant introduced a product into the stream of commerce and therefore availed itself of the market for its product in Georgia. Thus, the plaintiffs’ attempt to analogize this case to “stream of commerce” cases is misplaced. Rather, defendant merely leased a plane in Florida to another Florida resident. Naturally, the lessee could use the plane anywhere it wished. In this case, the lessee unilaterally chose to use the plane in Georgia. That the defendant knew the lessee would use the plane in Georgia makes no difference: the act of bringing the plane into this forum cannot be attributed to defendant lessor, nor did it benefit the defendant in any way.
It is true, as plaintiffs argue, that a single event may be sufficient to impose jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant under the Long-Arm Statute, but that event must be an act of the defendant. “[A] single act by the nonresident in the forum . . . may satisfy the ‘minimum contacts’ test.” (Emphasis supplied.) Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 404 (227 SE2d 266) (1976). Jurisdiction is not appropriate where, as here, the nonresident defendant’s only connection with the state was due to the unilateral acts of the plaintiff. “[A] mere demonstration that an injury has occurred here due to an act or omission by a nonresident outside this forum does not necessarily show that the defendant had such ‘contact’ with Georgia to confer jurisdiction over him, i.e., that he has purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting some activity here rather than being merely involved in a ‘connection’ with a forum plaintiff due to [the injured party’s] unilateral actions within the state.” Id. at 409.
[811]*811Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the facts involved in this court’s earlier opinion in Value Engineering v. Gisell, 140 Ga. App. 44 (230 SE2d 29) (1976) are distinguishable and the holding in that case does not require the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. In Value Engineering, the nonresident defendant “took affirmative action in introducing an allegedly defective and dangerous article into the stream of commerce” by shipping the goods via a bill of lading indicating that they would be routed through Georgia. Id. at 47. In this case, however, the plane ended up in Georgia through no affirmative action of the defendant. The plane was not transported into Georgia by the defendant on its way to delivery to a customer in another state. Consequently, we agree with the trial court that jurisdiction cannot be imposed.
2. We also affirm the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to conduct additional discovery which was filed after the court had already granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was filed January 24, 1991. The trial court issued a consent order extending the time in which plaintiffs could respond to the motion. In plaintiffs’ brief in response to the motion to dismiss, filed March 19, 1991, plaintiffs asked the trial court to withhold ruling on the motion for 60 days until further discovery could be conducted. The transcript of the hearing on the motion, held May 8, 1991, indicates plaintiffs requested no further continuance before ruling on the motion. The order dismissing the case was issued June 25, 1991, over 90 days from the date plaintiffs’ brief was filed requesting an additional 60 days in which to pursue further discovery. Plaintiffs were afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery in response to defendant’s motion and we fail to see how plaintiffs were prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of the motion for leave to conduct additional discovery.
Judgment affirmed.
Sognier, C. J., Carley, P. J., Beasley, Cooper, Andrews and Johnson, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., and Birdsong, P. J., dissent.