OPINION
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.
Kevin Lee McCarroll, an inmate acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for expunction. Appellant raises five issues on appeal. In his first three issues appellant asserts that he was entitled to expunction because two of his twelve criminal cases have been dismissed, a conviction for driving while intoxicated will prevent him from obtaining a commercial driver’s license when he is released from prison, and he was not convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the twelve arrests. In his fourth issue, appellant asserts that the expunction statute “is unclear and appellant can not fully understand it.” In his fifth issue, he claims that the trial court was required to conduct a hearing at which appellant was present and its failure to do so violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights. Appellant argues all of these issues together in one-half page of his brief. The State did not file a brief in this appeal. We will affirm.
[378]*378BACKGROUND FACTS
On November 6, 2000, appellant filed a pro se petition for expunction in the trial court, seeking to expunge “all records and files arising out of [his] confinement in Wichita County on Causes listed above.” At the top of the petition was a series of twelve cause numbers. The only ground for expunction raised in appellant’s petition was “[p]ursuant to 55.01(2)(b), and timely removal of records after 5 yr. period.” On November 6, 2000, the trial court signed an order scheduling a hearing on the petition for expunction for December 29, 2000.
On December 11, 2000, appellant filed a motion for bench warrant to attend the December 29 hearing on his petition for expunction “so that I may give testimony.” There is nothing in the record indicating that the motion for bench warrant was set for hearing or whether the trial court conducted a hearing on appellant’s motion.
The State filed a general denial on December 18, 2000. The trial court denied the petition on December 29.
EXPUNCTION
The right to an expunction is neither a constitutional nor common law right but, rather, is a statutory privilege. Quertermous v. State, 52 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); Ex parte Myers, 24 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.). Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides wrongfully arrested persons the opportunity to expunge their arrest records. Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 55.01 (Vernon Supp.2002). While article 55.01 is included in the code of criminal procedure, an expunction proceeding is civil rather than criminal in nature, and, consequently, the burden of proving compliance with the statute is on the petitioner rather than the State. Kendall v. State, 997 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied). The petitioner is entitled to expunction only when all of the statutory conditions have been met. Quertermous, 52 S.W.3d at 864; Kendall, 997 S.W.2d at 631.
The trial court is required to set a hearing on a petition for expunction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.02(2)(c). But see Ex parte Current, 877 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.App.-Waco 1994, no writ) (holding that trial court may rule on expunction petition without hearing when all facts necessary to determine the issue were available to the court). The State did not file a brief contesting appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing on appellant’s petition for expunction with appellant present. We hold, however, that the error was harmless because of the improbability of appellant’s success on the merits. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1); see also Jones v. Jones, 64 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.) (listing eight balancing factors trial courts should use in determining whether to permit an incarcerated party to appear at trial).
Article 55.01 provides that a petitioner is entitled to expunction when:
(1) the person is tried for the offense for which the person was arrested and is:
(A) acquitted by the trial court, except as provided by Subsection (c) of this section; or
(B) convicted and subsequently pardoned; or
(2) each of the following conditions exist:
(A) an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony has not been presented against the person for an offense arising out of the transaction for which [379]*379the person was arrested or, if an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony was presented, the indictment or information has been dismissed or quashed, and:
(i) the limitations period expired before the date on which a petition for expunction was filed under Article 55.02; or
(ii) the court finds that the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because the presentment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense or because it was void;
(B) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court ordered community supervision under Article 42.12; and
(C) the person has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the date of the arrest.
TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 55.01(a). In his first three issues, appellant asserts that he is entitled to expunction on the grounds that he has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the arrests for the twelve offenses he seeks to expunge and because two of those matters were dismissed. As a matter of law, these grounds alone are not sufficient to entitle appellant to expunction. See generally TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(1), (2). Issues one, two, and three are overruled.
In issue four, appellant argues that article 55.01 “is unclear and appellant can not fully understand it.” The only other mention of this issue is in the summary of the argument section of his brief in which appellant states “[t]he Judge as well as myself have failed to completely understand the meanings and statutory language of the 55.00 Art.” Appellant must state in his brief a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h). Because appellant does not explain what it is about article 55.01 that is unclear or confusing to him, we overrule issue four as inadequately briefed. See id.; Keever v. Finlan, 988 S.W.2d 300, 314 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. dism’d) (op. on reh’g).
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OPINION
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.
Kevin Lee McCarroll, an inmate acting pro se, appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for expunction. Appellant raises five issues on appeal. In his first three issues appellant asserts that he was entitled to expunction because two of his twelve criminal cases have been dismissed, a conviction for driving while intoxicated will prevent him from obtaining a commercial driver’s license when he is released from prison, and he was not convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the twelve arrests. In his fourth issue, appellant asserts that the expunction statute “is unclear and appellant can not fully understand it.” In his fifth issue, he claims that the trial court was required to conduct a hearing at which appellant was present and its failure to do so violated his procedural due process and equal protection rights. Appellant argues all of these issues together in one-half page of his brief. The State did not file a brief in this appeal. We will affirm.
[378]*378BACKGROUND FACTS
On November 6, 2000, appellant filed a pro se petition for expunction in the trial court, seeking to expunge “all records and files arising out of [his] confinement in Wichita County on Causes listed above.” At the top of the petition was a series of twelve cause numbers. The only ground for expunction raised in appellant’s petition was “[p]ursuant to 55.01(2)(b), and timely removal of records after 5 yr. period.” On November 6, 2000, the trial court signed an order scheduling a hearing on the petition for expunction for December 29, 2000.
On December 11, 2000, appellant filed a motion for bench warrant to attend the December 29 hearing on his petition for expunction “so that I may give testimony.” There is nothing in the record indicating that the motion for bench warrant was set for hearing or whether the trial court conducted a hearing on appellant’s motion.
The State filed a general denial on December 18, 2000. The trial court denied the petition on December 29.
EXPUNCTION
The right to an expunction is neither a constitutional nor common law right but, rather, is a statutory privilege. Quertermous v. State, 52 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); Ex parte Myers, 24 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.). Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides wrongfully arrested persons the opportunity to expunge their arrest records. Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 55.01 (Vernon Supp.2002). While article 55.01 is included in the code of criminal procedure, an expunction proceeding is civil rather than criminal in nature, and, consequently, the burden of proving compliance with the statute is on the petitioner rather than the State. Kendall v. State, 997 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied). The petitioner is entitled to expunction only when all of the statutory conditions have been met. Quertermous, 52 S.W.3d at 864; Kendall, 997 S.W.2d at 631.
The trial court is required to set a hearing on a petition for expunction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.02(2)(c). But see Ex parte Current, 877 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.App.-Waco 1994, no writ) (holding that trial court may rule on expunction petition without hearing when all facts necessary to determine the issue were available to the court). The State did not file a brief contesting appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing on appellant’s petition for expunction with appellant present. We hold, however, that the error was harmless because of the improbability of appellant’s success on the merits. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1); see also Jones v. Jones, 64 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.) (listing eight balancing factors trial courts should use in determining whether to permit an incarcerated party to appear at trial).
Article 55.01 provides that a petitioner is entitled to expunction when:
(1) the person is tried for the offense for which the person was arrested and is:
(A) acquitted by the trial court, except as provided by Subsection (c) of this section; or
(B) convicted and subsequently pardoned; or
(2) each of the following conditions exist:
(A) an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony has not been presented against the person for an offense arising out of the transaction for which [379]*379the person was arrested or, if an indictment or information charging the person with commission of a felony was presented, the indictment or information has been dismissed or quashed, and:
(i) the limitations period expired before the date on which a petition for expunction was filed under Article 55.02; or
(ii) the court finds that the indictment or information was dismissed or quashed because the presentment had been made because of mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense or because it was void;
(B) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court ordered community supervision under Article 42.12; and
(C) the person has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the date of the arrest.
TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 55.01(a). In his first three issues, appellant asserts that he is entitled to expunction on the grounds that he has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the arrests for the twelve offenses he seeks to expunge and because two of those matters were dismissed. As a matter of law, these grounds alone are not sufficient to entitle appellant to expunction. See generally TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(1), (2). Issues one, two, and three are overruled.
In issue four, appellant argues that article 55.01 “is unclear and appellant can not fully understand it.” The only other mention of this issue is in the summary of the argument section of his brief in which appellant states “[t]he Judge as well as myself have failed to completely understand the meanings and statutory language of the 55.00 Art.” Appellant must state in his brief a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h). Because appellant does not explain what it is about article 55.01 that is unclear or confusing to him, we overrule issue four as inadequately briefed. See id.; Keever v. Finlan, 988 S.W.2d 300, 314 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. dism’d) (op. on reh’g).
In issue five, appellant argues that his procedural due process and equal protection rights were violated because the trial court did not conduct a hearing on his petition for expunction with appellant present. To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(1). If a party fails to do this, error is not preserved, and the complaint is waived. Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex.1991) (op. on reh’g). Moreover, on appeal the appellant has the burden of showing that any trial court error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals. Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a).
Appellant failed to preserve error on his complaint about the trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing with appellant present because he never explained to either the trial court or this court what his testimony would establish, why his testimony would be helpful to his case, or how he was harmed by not being allowed to “give testi[380]*380mony” either by personally appearing in court or by alternative means. He has, therefore, waived this complaint. Issue five is overruled.
CONCLUSION
We overrule all of appellant’s issues and affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition for expunction.
DAUPHINOT, J. filed a dissenting opinion.