McAdams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Fifth Circuit

McAdams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

198 F.2d 54, 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 1008, 42 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 310, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 4036

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided June 24, 1952·No. 13560·Published·Cited by 45 cases

Opinions

[55]*55HUTCHESON, Chief Judge.

The Commissioner determined and the Tax Court held that petitioners were not entitled to deduct in taxable years 1944 and 1945 moneys repaid their co-owner in those years in reimbursement of their pro rata shares of drilling and development expenses incurred and paid for them by Luse, their co-owner in 1941.

Taxpayers, aggrieved by the decision,¹ petitioned for review, and are here insisting that what occurred in 1941 was not a payment by their co-owner, the brother and brother-in-law of taxpayers, of the whole of the debt on his and their account, but a payment by the co-owner of his part of the debt and a purchase from the creditor of taxpayers’ part of it, with a subrogation of the co-owner to the creditor’s position against the taxpayers as to their part of the debt.

The theory thus advanced is, in our opinion, fanciful and unreal, and wholly without support in the record which shows plainly: that the taxpayers, with the assistance of Luse, borrowed from the banks in 1941 all the money they could borrow and paid this to Luse for payment on the obligations; that they took a deduction for these borrowed moneys in that year; and that, while they did not borrow the balance from the banks, they did, in fact, borrow it from Luse, who paid the obligation in full, both for himself and for the taxpayers in 1941.

There is no evidence, whatever, that Luse purchased any part of the obligation from the creditor. The evidence, on the contrary, is that the obligations to the driller were fully discharged by Luse in 1941, and, while the record is silent as to Luse’s tax treatment of his share of these costs, it does show that the taxpayers deducted as drilling and development costs, that is as expenses, in that year, the amount they had borrowed from the bank to pay and had paid Luse.

Finding ourselves, therefore, in full agreement with the opinion and decisions of the Tax Court, we deny the petition for review and order the judgments affirmed.

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[55]*55HUTCHESON, Chief Judge.

The Commissioner determined and the Tax Court held that petitioners were not entitled to deduct in taxable years 1944 and 1945 moneys repaid their co-owner in those years in reimbursement of their pro rata shares of drilling and development expenses incurred and paid for them by Luse, their co-owner in 1941.

Taxpayers, aggrieved by the decision,¹ petitioned for review, and are here insisting that what occurred in 1941 was not a payment by their co-owner, the brother and brother-in-law of taxpayers, of the whole of the debt on his and their account, but a payment by the co-owner of his part of the debt and a purchase from the creditor of taxpayers’ part of it, with a subrogation of the co-owner to the creditor’s position against the taxpayers as to their part of the debt.

The theory thus advanced is, in our opinion, fanciful and unreal, and wholly without support in the record which shows plainly: that the taxpayers, with the assistance of Luse, borrowed from the banks in 1941 all the money they could borrow and paid this to Luse for payment on the obligations; that they took a deduction for these borrowed moneys in that year; and that, while they did not borrow the balance from the banks, they did, in fact, borrow it from Luse, who paid the obligation in full, both for himself and for the taxpayers in 1941.

There is no evidence, whatever, that Luse purchased any part of the obligation from the creditor. The evidence, on the contrary, is that the obligations to the driller were fully discharged by Luse in 1941, and, while the record is silent as to Luse’s tax treatment of his share of these costs, it does show that the taxpayers deducted as drilling and development costs, that is as expenses, in that year, the amount they had borrowed from the bank to pay and had paid Luse.

Finding ourselves, therefore, in full agreement with the opinion and decisions of the Tax Court, we deny the petition for review and order the judgments affirmed.

McAdams v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 198 F.2d 54, 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 1008, 42 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 310, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 4036 (5th Cir. 1952).

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