MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION v. LOURDES TRICHE, etc.

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 15, 2023
• Docket: 21-0803
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed March 15, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-803 Lower Tribunal No. 17-15147 ________________

Mazda Motor Corporation, etc., Appellant,

vs.

Lourdes Triche, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Alexandre Arrata Acevedo, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Beatrice Butchko, Judge.

Bowman and Brooke, LLP, and Stephanie M. Simm, John C. Seipp, Jr., and Daniel A. Rock, for appellant.

Clark, Fountain, La Vista, Prather, & Littky-Rubin, LLP, and Julie H. Littky-Rubin (West Palm Beach); Halpern Santos & Pinkert, P.A., and Ian D. Pinkert, Jay Halpern, and Jacqueline Halpern, for appellees.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and LOBREE, JJ.

LOGUE, J. Mazda Motor Corporation (“Mazda Japan”), a company incorporated

and headquartered in Japan, is a defendant in a products liability case over

the design of a Mazda vehicle. The vehicle was sold in Florida to a Florida

resident and, when rear-ended, burst into flames on the streets of Florida

killing its owner. Mazda Japan appeals from a non-final order denying its

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It challenges only whether

Mazda Japan has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida for the State of

Florida to assert personal jurisdiction consistent with federal due process.

Although Mazda Japan contends that the targeting of Mazda products

to Florida was done solely by an American corporate subsidiary, the record

before us shows Mazda Japan itself did more than simply place its vehicles

in the global stream of commerce heedless of the American and Florida

markets. Instead, it engaged in the sort of “additional conduct” “indicat[ing]

an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State” that the U.S.

Supreme Court has held warrants specific jurisdiction. Among other actions

detailed below, Mazda Japan admitted that its vehicles are “intended for the

United States market, including Florida” (emphasis added), that it designed

the vehicles for that market, registered trademarks to advertise the vehicles

in that market, and, from Japan, ordered recalls expressly naming Florida.

2 The U.S. Supreme Court recently identified “this exact fact pattern (a

resident-plaintiff sues a global car company, extensively serving the state

market in a vehicle, for an in-state accident) as an illustration—even a

paradigm example—of how specific jurisdiction works.” Ford Motor Co. v.

Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021) (emphasis added).

Following this precedent, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Lourdes Triche, as personal representative of the estate

of Alexandre Arrata Acevedo, filed a products liability action in the Miami-

Dade County Circuit Court on behalf of her son who died when his 2016

Mazda3 Sport caught fire after a rear-end collision in Florida.

The subject vehicle was designed and developed by Mazda Japan in

its company headquarters in Japan. The vehicle was manufactured and

assembled in Mexico by Mazda Motor Manufacturing de Mexico, S.A. de

C.V., (“Mazda Mexico”), a subsidiary of Mazda Japan. Mazda Japan

purchased the vehicle from Mazda Mexico and then re-sold it to Mazda Motor

of America, Inc., (“Mazda North America”) a subsidiary of Mazda Japan. After

taking title, Mazda Japan shipped the vehicle from Mexico to the United

States f/o/b Mexico with Mazda North America as the buyer.

3 Thereafter, Mazda North America sold the vehicle to South M.M., LLC

d/b/a South Motors Mazda (“Mazda South Florida”). The decedent

purchased the vehicle from Mazda South Florida.

In March 2019, the Plaintiff sued multiple Mazda entities, including

Mazda Japan, Mazda North America, and Mazda South Florida, alleging

claims for strict liability and negligence pertaining to a design or

manufacturing defect of the subject vehicle. Mazda North America has

submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court and remains a defendant below.

In the course of the litigation, however, Mazda North America insists it can

provide no discovery regarding the design of the vehicle because all such

information is possessed only by Mazda Japan, which refuses to provide

American-style discovery concerning the design.

Mazda Japan moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

asserting that it was not subject to general or specific jurisdiction because it

lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Florida such that the State of

Florida’s assertion of personal jurisdiction violated the due process clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

In support of dismissal, Mazda Japan submitted two declarations from

Osamu Yamashina, an official of Mazda Japan. In his declarations, Mr.

Yamashina averred:

4 • Mazda Japan is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Hiroshima, Japan;

• Mazda Japan has never been incorporated in the State of Florida and its principal place of business has never been located in the State of Florida;

• Mazda Japan does not manufacture, design, or service vehicles in the State of Florida;

• Mazda Japan does not distribute at the wholesale level vehicles to or within the State of Florida;

• Mazda Japan does not sell at the retail level vehicles in the State of Florida;

• Mazda Japan does not advertise or market its products in Florida or to Florida residents;

• Such activities are conducted exclusively by independent dealers all of whom are independent corporate entities from Mazda Japan;

• Mazda Japan does not advise Mazda North America into which states vehicles purchased from Mazda Japan should be distributed;

• Mazda Japan and Mazda North America are separate legal entities whose corporate structures have been incorporated and maintained separately;

• Mazda Japan and Mazda North America engage in separate and distinct activities relative to the Mazda brand; and

• The Mazda dealer network in the United States consists of independent corporate entities and are overseen by Mazda North America.

5 In response to the motion, Plaintiff filed various materials obtained in

discovery. These materials reflect Mazda Japan is the leader of a world-wide

conglomerate of corporations that design, manufacture, and market a

renowned brand of vehicles internationally. In its “Company Profile 2018,

Mazda in Brief,” an annual statement of the consolidated financials of over

68 Mazda corporations world-wide, Mazda Japan described its “main

business” as the “manufacture and sales of passenger cars and commercial

vehicles.”

In response to requests for admissions, Mazda Japan freely admitted

that its vehicles are “intended for the United States Market, including Florida.”

(emphasis added). In the Company Profile, Mazda Japan reported the

growth of sales of Mazda vehicles in the U.S.: 2012 – 273, 307; 2013 – 283,

721; 2014 – 305, 788; 2015 – 305, 783; 2016 – 302, 195; and 2017 – 304,

394. The Profile has a section entitled “Reforming Our Sales Network (For

the US Market).” “We have,” the Profile stated, “been focusing on reforming

our sales network in the United States and other areas while enhancing

customer care and developing new-generation dealerships.” “We are

planning to develop a new marketing strategy that is adapted to the

characteristics of the US market, which is crucial for Mazda, in order to build

a sales system with a goal set at 400,000 units for 2021.”

6 The Company Profile reported that Mazda Japan’s Executive Vice

President, Mr. Kiyoshi Fujiwara, is responsible for “oversight of operations in

North America.” In the Profile, Mazda Japan stated it had a U.S. product

lineup consisting of 6 makes of vehicles. It numbered its U.S. dealerships at

582. Elsewhere, it named Mazda North America as “the authorized

distributor of Mazda brand vehicles in the United States.” Among other

things, Mazda Japan reported it had research and development facilities in

California and Michigan, operated by Mazda North America.

Declarations and responses to request for admissions provided further

information. Mazda Japan designed vehicles to comply with U.S. regulations.

Mazda Japan has registered trademarks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark

Office for the following: “Mazda,” “MazdaUSA,” “Zoom-Zoom,” “Mazda

Dealer Online,” “Reward Performance by Mazda,” “RPM Reward

Performance by Mazda,” “Mazda Zero to Drive Event,” and “Mazda Capital

Services.” Mazda Japan provided the warranties, at least in part, for Mazda

vehicles sold in the U.S.

Mazda Japan has shipped at least 493 vehicles to Florida ports during

the period 2006 to 2020. These vehicles were sold to Mazda North America,

f/o/b Mexico or f/o/b Japan. In December 2015, Mazda Japan showcased

how its designs combine Japan’s famous aesthetics with advanced

7 ergonomics at an event in Miami, Florida. Illustrating Mazda Japan’s ongoing

involvement with vehicles sold in the U.S. and Florida, on many occasions,

Mazda Japan ordered recalls of Mazda vehicles including recalls of the make

and model of the car at issue and recalls specifically naming Florida.

ANALYSIS

1. Determining factual basis for deciding motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

We have explained the procedure for establishing the facts regarding

claims of personal jurisdiction as follows:

If the allegations in the complaint sufficiently establish long-arm jurisdiction, then the burden shifts to the defendant to contest the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, or to claim that the federal minimum contacts requirement is not met, by way of affidavit or other similar sworn proof. If properly contested, the burden then returns to the plaintiff to refute the evidence submitted by the defendant, also by affidavit or similar sworn proof.

The trial court can resolve the jurisdictional question solely on the basis of the affidavits, so long as they do not conflict. If the affidavits do conflict, however, then the trial court must conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual dispute.

Belz Investco Ltd. P'ship v. Groupo Immobiliano Cababie, S.A., 721 So. 2d

787, 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citations omitted). In most cases, however,

“the affidavits can be harmonized.” Estes v. Rodin, 259 So. 3d 183, 190 (Fla.

3d DCA 2018).

8 Here, neither party requested an evidentiary hearing, raised the lack of

an evidentiary hearing as a ground for error, or contended an actual conflict

existed in the specific facts presented by the parties. In these circumstances,

the plaintiff continues to bear the burden of presenting facts that support a

prima facie case of jurisdiction. However, since the posture of the case is a

motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing, the facts presented by the

plaintiff must be taken as true and the plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable

inferences from those facts.1 Once the factual basis for the motion is

established, the legal question of whether the facts are sufficient to make a

prima facie case for jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Highland Stucco & Lime

Prods., Inc. v. Onorato, 259 So. 3d 944, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

1 Hawkins v. i-TV Digitalis Tavkozlesi zrt., 935 F.3d 211, 226–27 (4th Cir. 2019) (“When personal jurisdiction is addressed under [a motion to dismiss] without an evidentiary hearing, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of jurisdiction . . . . That is, the [trial] court must determine whether the facts proffered by the party asserting jurisdiction—assuming they are true—make out a case of personal jurisdiction over the party challenging jurisdiction. Unlike [when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action], the court may also consider affidavits submitted by both parties, although it must resolve all factual disputes and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. The existence of a prima facie case of jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.” (citations omitted)). See generally The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (Fla. 2006) (In the posture of a motion to dismiss, the nonmovant’s allegations must be taken as true and “all reasonable inferences therefrom construed in favor of the nonmoving party.”).

9 2. Due Process and Specific Personal Jurisdiction

The main issue before us is whether Mazda Japan’s contacts with

Florida are sufficient to establish specific or case-linked jurisdiction that

would allow Florida to offer its resident a convenient forum to redress the

injuries caused to the decedent by Mazda Japan’s allegedly defective design

of the vehicle at issue. 2 To resolve this issue we must interpret the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State

without general jurisdiction over a defendant may still exercise specific

jurisdiction to hear the specific claim against the defendant presented by the

case before it in certain circumstances. For due process to be satisfied by a

court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a defendant located outside its

territory, the defendant’s contacts must meet three conditions. First, the

contacts must involve “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum . . . , thus

2 The general background law concerning personal jurisdiction is well established and we will not rehearse it here. See, e.g., Highland Stucco, 259 So. at 947. At the outset, we narrow our analysis in three ways. First, Mazda Japan concedes for the purposes of this appeal that the requirements of the long arm statute are met. Next, we summarily reject the claim that Mazda Japan’s contacts with Florida are sufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction. Finally, we note Plaintiff dropped any claim to “pierce the corporate veil” between Mazda Japan and Mazda North America.

10 invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357

U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 475 (1985). Second, the contacts must be related to the plaintiff's cause

of action or have given rise to it. Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1019. Third,

the defendant's contacts with the forum must be “such that [the defendant]

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World–Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

3. “Purposeful Availment”

A State cannot assert case-specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign

defendant merely because the foreign defendant’s product appears in the

State’s territory and injures one of its residents. Nor can a State assert

personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant merely because the foreign

defendant placed its product in the global stream of commerce without any

actions by the foreign defendant to access the State’s markets. This is true

even if the foreign defendant, in placing its product in the stream of

commerce, could foresee or predict that the product would reach the markets

of the forum State. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882

(2011) (observing “it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted

that its goods will reach the forum State.”) (Kennedy J., plurality opinion).

11 Due process, however, allows a State to assert specific personal

jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when that foreign defendant has

“purposefully availed” itself of the benefits of the laws and markets of the

forum State. “In other words, submission through contact with and activity

directed at a sovereign may justify specific jurisdiction in a suit arising out of

or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum.” Id. at 881 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The targeting required for “purposeful availment” may be done “directly

or indirectly.” In a comment remarkably pertinent to this case, the Supreme

Court has explained, “if the sale of a product of a [foreign] manufacturer or

distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence,

but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly

or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable

to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective

merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.”

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added).

To a great extent, the law in this area derives from the reasoning of

seminal Supreme Court case on specific jurisdiction, Asahi Metal Indus. Co.

v. Superior Court of California, Solano City, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). Asahi

involved an attempt by a California court to assert jurisdiction over a

12 Japanese manufacturer of tire assemblies who sold its product to a separate

corporation in Taiwan, which then incorporated the assemblies into

motorcycles and sold them in California. Id. at 106-07. The plaintiff claimed

specific jurisdiction in California on the basis that the defendant had placed

a product in the steam of commerce with knowledge that the product would

eventually find its way to California. Id. A plurality of the Supreme Court

squarely rejected this argument: “The placement of a product into the stream

of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully

directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 112.

In rejecting specific jurisdiction in that case, however, the Court

emphasized that the defendant “did not create, control, or employ the

distribution system that brought its valves to California. [And] [t]here is no

evidence that [the defendant] designed its product in anticipation of sales in

California.” Id. at 112–13 (citations omitted). The Court took pains to note

that the result would be different if the defendant’s conduct had included

“designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the

forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers

in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has

agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.” Id. at 112.

13 This “additional conduct of the defendant” is a basis for specific

jurisdiction because it “indicat[es] an intent or purpose to serve the market in

the forum State,” id.; or indicates that the product is “purposely directed

toward the forum State,” id. (emphasis added); or is “targeted” at the forum

State, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added). “The

question is whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed

at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign,

so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to judgment

concerning that conduct.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 884.

In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified the following conduct

as examples of “additional conduct” indicating an intent or purpose to serve

the market in the forum State: (1) sending products to the forum State; 3 (2)

“designing the product for the market in the forum State;” (3) “advertising in

the forum State”; (4) “establishing channels for providing regular advice to

customers in the forum State;” (5) “marketing the product through a

distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State;”4

3 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 882 (“Sometimes a defendant [submits to the jurisdiction of the forum state by] sending its goods rather than its agents.”) 4 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112.

14 and (6) the sale of the product in the forum State is “not simply an isolated

occurrence.” 5

Mazda Japan contends that these types of actions may have been

taken by its American subsidiary but were not taken by Mazda Japan.

Applying these criteria, however, we are persuaded that the record in this

case supports a reasonable inference that Mazda Japan itself has

purposefully availed itself of the markets of the U.S. and Florida. Mazda

Japan—not its American subsidiary—developed lines of vehicles, including

the subject vehicle, for the U.S. market. Mazda Japan—not its American

subsidiary—designed those vehicles to comply with U.S. regulations. Mazda

Japan—not its American subsidiary—registered and owns the U.S.

trademarks under which these vehicles are marketed and sold in the U.S.

and Florida. Mazda Japan—not its American subsidiary—in its annual

reports, states its goals for sales in the U.S. Mazda Japan—not its American

subsidiary—announced its plans to improve the Mazda sales force, Mazda

franchises, and Mazda marketing strategy “adapted to the characteristics of

the US market,” which, it announced was “crucial for Mazda [Japan].” Mazda

Japan, in an ongoing relationship with its customers, ordered multiple recalls

from Japan.

5 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297.

15 In these matters, Mazda Japan made clear that Florida—the third

largest State in the U.S. and presumably the third largest car market—was

specifically being targeted. Mazda Japan admitted that its vehicles are

“intended for the United States market, including Florida.” It also backed up

these words with direct contacts with Florida. It shipped hundreds of vehicles

to Florida. From Japan it ordered recalls, expressly naming and including

Florida, which is evidence of Mazda Japan’s efforts to foster an ongoing

relationship with the owners of its cars in Florida. It promoted its new design

concepts at an event in Florida.

If not Florida, what market were these actions of Mazda Japan

intended to reach? Put another way, if not to serve the State’s market, what

was the purpose of Mazda Japan designing vehicles for, shipping vehicles

to, and continuing to provide technical support in the form of recalls for its

vehicles owned in Florida? Whatever other markets Mazda Japan was

targeting, these circumstances support a reasonable inference that Mazda

Japan targeted its vehicles toward Florida, which is all the Plaintiff must show

to overcome a motion to dismiss.

While these facts alone are sufficient to support a reasonable inference

that Mazda Japan is targeting the U.S. and Florida market, there is an

additional fact that does so. As mentioned above, one of the factors the U.S.

16 Supreme Court identified as “additional conduct” indicating a foreign

defendant’s “intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State”

justifying specific jurisdiction is “marketing the product through a distributor

who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”6

Under this law, courts have found that a defendant had “purposefully

availed” itself of the privilege of doing business within a jurisdiction when the

defendant had not itself marketed products in the jurisdiction but had entered

into an exclusive agreement with a third party to market its product within the

jurisdiction. For example, in Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d

1534, 1550 (11th Cir. 1993), the Eleventh Circuit found that Renault, a

French corporation that did not itself do business in the U.S., was subject to

personal jurisdiction because Renault had entered into an exclusive

marketing agreement with a third party that “targeted its LeCars toward the

United States.” In these circumstances, Renault “fairly could expect to

defend in this country the very type of action this case presents: a personal

injury action challenging the car's design and safety.” Id.

What is true for an agreement with a third party is even more true for

use of a wholly owned subsidiary created for the purposes of marketing a

6 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112.

17 product within a jurisdiction. Indeed, “[m]any courts have held that a foreign

manufacturer that utilizes an American subsidiary to target distribution of its

product to the forum State is appropriately subject to those states’

jurisdiction.” Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1239

(S.D. Fla. 2021).

In facts remarkably similar to this case, the court in Lewis found that

the German corporation, Daimler AG, while not itself doing business in

Florida, had nevertheless purposefully availed itself of the Florida market for

cars by creating a wholly owned subsidiary to market its cars in Florida and

actively supporting its subsidiary’s marketing of the cars in Florida by, among

other things, licensing the subsidiary to use its trademarks registered in the

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Id. The Court explained, “Daimler's

utilization of its [American] subsidiary MBUSA to cultivate business in

Florida, which included licensing its trademarks to MBUSA as well as to

dealerships in the State of Florida, properly subjects Daimler to the

jurisdiction of Florida courts.” Id. (collecting and discussing cases).7 See also

Thurman v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 22-CV-04007-WJE, 2022 WL

7 The court considered the reach of personal jurisdiction under Florida law because federal courts sitting in diversity look to state law to determine personal jurisdiction. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2010).

18 4292331, at *3-4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2022) (same); Opheim v. Volkswagen

Aktiengesellschaft, No. 20-CV-02483-KM-ESK, 2021 WL 2621689, at *4

(D.N.J. June 25, 2021) (same); Hatton v. Chrysler Canada, Inc., 937 F. Supp.

2d 1356, 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (same).

Applying this law, Mazda Japan’s act of creating, deputizing, and

utilizing Mazda North America qualifies as “marketing the product through a

distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”

Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112. It therefore provides more

“additional conduct” of the type that the Supreme Court identified as

necessary to establish specific jurisdiction in Asahi. Id. at 112–13.8

We believe this conclusion is consistent with Kellogg-Borchardt v.

Mazda Motor Corp., No. 18-CV-01105-JHR-KK, 2019 WL 2189527, at *4

(D.N.M. May 21, 2019), which held that Mazda Japan was not subject to the

personal jurisdiction of the courts in New Mexico on a very different record.

In Kellogg-Borchardt, there was “no information in the record that indicate[d]

how the vehicle came to be in New Mexico.” Id. at *5. Here, Mazda Japan

8 While the record before us does not include an express agreement to market as in Vermeulen and Lewis, see Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1549; Lewis, 530 F. Supp. 3d at 1237, this absence is made up by the explicit statements in Mazda Japan’s Annual Reports regarding Mazda Japan’s use of Mazda North America to accomplish its intermediate and long-term marketing goals and by Mazda Japan’s own actions regarding Florida.

19 shipped the vehicle to the U.S. where it was purchased by the decedent from

a Mazda-branded dealer in Florida. Also, the record in Kellogg-Borchardt

failed to “indicate whether [Mazda Japan] play[ed] any role in directing

marketing to particular states.” Id. at *4. As discussed above, Mazda Japan

admitted it intended its vehicles for Florida and had various contacts

indicating an intent to promote its vehicles in Florida that it did not have with

New Mexico.

In sum, we find Mazda Japan has purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting business in Florida because it directed the distribution

of its vehicles to the State and sold Florida residents its cars through its

distributor Mazda North America at a Mazda-branded dealership in Florida.

This is not the case of mere “placement of a product into the stream of

commerce, without more.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112.

4. “Arise Out of or Relate To”

The second condition required by due process for specific jurisdiction

is that the dispute must “arise out of or relate to” the non-resident defendant’s

contacts with the forum State. This requirement was recently discussed in

Ford Motor Company, 141 S. Ct. at 1019. In Ford, the Court examined

whether Montana and Minnesota had properly asserted personal jurisdiction

over Ford. Id. at 1023-24. The case arose from separate lawsuits in which

20 State residents sued Ford for defective designs concerning car accidents

within those States. Id. Ford had dealers that sold vehicles in those States,

advertised in those States, and generally encouraged residents to buy and

drive Ford vehicles. Id. at 1022-23. Ford conceded that it had purposefully

availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in those States. Id. at

1026. Ford’s argument was that the “arise out of or relate to” prong required

the plaintiffs to show that the disputes at issue would not have occurred “but

for” Ford’s contacts with the States. Id. This high causation requirement

could not be shown, Ford maintained, because Ford had designed,

manufactured, and sold the cars at issue not in Montana or Minnesota, but

in other States. Id.

The Court unanimously rejected Ford’s argument. Writing for the

majority, Justice Kagan noted that the traditional statement of this prong did

not limit jurisdiction to cases that “arose out of” the non-resident defendant’s

contacts, but also recognized jurisdiction that simply “related to” those

contacts. Id. She found that the disputes, although not directly stemming

from Ford’s contacts in a “but for” manner, nevertheless “related to” those

contacts because “by making it easier to own a Ford, [the contacts]

encourage Montanans and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.” Id.

at 1028.

21 As discussed above, we determined that Mazda Japan purposefully

availed itself of the Florida market for vehicles in numerous ways. Under the

law described above, we conclude that the Plaintiff’s claims in this case arise

out of or relate to Mazda Japan’s contacts with Florida, all of which related

to facilitating the sale of its vehicles in Florida. Indeed, as noted previously,

Ford stated that a case where “a resident-plaintiff sues a global car company,

extensively serving the state market in a vehicle, for an in-state accident.”

was a “paradigm example of how specific jurisdiction works.” Id.

5. “Fair Play and Substantial Justice”

In products liability cases like this one, where the plaintiff is a State

resident who purchased a vehicle in State and was damaged by the allegedly

defective design of a vehicle in an accident that occurred on the roads or

highways of a State, a finding that the defendant purposefully availed itself

of the State’s markets goes a long way toward establishing that personal

jurisdiction is consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 880 (“In products-liability cases

like this one, it is the defendant's purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction

consistent with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”).

Once it is established that the non-resident defendant purposefully

availed itself of the market (and therefore the laws) of a State, the interest of

22 the State to oversee the safety of its residents within the State is obvious and

compelling. As Justice Alito wrote in his concurrence in Ford regarding the

interests of Minnesota and Montana to assert jurisdiction over the wrongful

death actions in those cases, “[t]heir residents, while riding in vehicles

purchased within their borders, were killed or injured in accidents on their

roads. Can anyone seriously argue that requiring Ford to litigate these cases

in Minnesota and Montana would be fundamentally unfair?” Ford Motor Co.,

141 S. Ct. at 1032 (Alito, J. concurring). See also id. at 1030. (“States have

significant interests at stake—'providing [their] residents with a convenient

forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors,’ as well as

enforcing their own safety regulations.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial judge was

eminently correct in finding that the jurisdictional allegations and facts in this

case support a determination that Mazda Japan had sufficient contacts with

Florida for a Florida court to assert personal, case-specific jurisdiction in this

matter.

Affirmed.

23 Mazda Motor Corp. v. Triche 3D21-0803

LINDSEY, J., concurring.

I agree that on the facts before us, Appellant Mazda Motor Corporation

(“Mazda Japan”) has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to subject it to

specific jurisdiction here. 9 I acknowledge the precise contours of personal

jurisdiction are at times unclear. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud.

Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1039 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“The real

struggle here isn’t with settling on the right outcome in these cases, but with

making sense of our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence . . . .”). But nothing

in the Due Process Clause or controlling case law demands that we insulate

Mazda Japan, a global automobile company, from liability in the underlying

action.

Recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its conclusion

in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) that

“if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi [a

9 I fully agree with my colleagues that Mazda Japan cannot be subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because its contacts are not so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in this State. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign- country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”).

24 German automobile manufacturer] or Volkswagen [Audi’s nationwide

importer] is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of

the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for

its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of

those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source

of injury to its owner or to others.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1027. Importantly,

specific jurisdiction “is not limited to where the car was designed,

manufactured, or first sold.” Id. at 1028.

Here, the sale of Mazda Japan-designed vehicles in Florida is not an

isolated occurrence. To the contrary, Mazda vehicles are sold throughout

Florida because Mazda Japan designs its vehicles for the U.S. market, which

it serves, albeit indirectly, through an authorized U.S. distributor and

authorized Mazda dealers. In other words, the vehicles Mazda Japan

designs do not end up in Florida as the result of random, fortuitous, or

attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third

person. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)

(“This ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not

be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or

‘attenuated’ contacts . . . or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third

person[.]’” (citations omitted)).

25 Under the dissent’s approach, a global automobile company, like

Mazda Japan, that designs its vehicles for the United States and

unquestionably serves the U.S. market with hundreds of thousands of Mazda

Japan-designed vehicles each year 10 could not be sued in any state.11 This

cannot be, even under the “stream of commerce plus” test, which requires

more than merely placing a product into the stream of commerce. I write

separately to more fully explain why I believe Mazda Japan is subject to

specific jurisdiction in this case, even under the more demanding stream of

commerce plus test.

The dissent primarily relies on three cases to explain the stream of

commerce plus test. The first case involved Asahi, a Japanese manufacturer

10 According to the record, Mazda Japan had a U.S. market sales goal of 400,000 units for 2021. 11 The dissent’s approach only insulates foreign-country automobile companies from liability. But similarly situated domestic global automobile competitors, like Ford, would still be subject to jurisdiction. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Since International Shoe, the rule has been that a state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum—which means that the contacts must be such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. That standard is easily met here. . . . In entertaining these suits, [the target forum’s] courts have not reached out and grabbed suits in which they have little legitimate interest. Their residents, while riding in vehicles purchased within their borders, were killed or injured in accidents on their roads. Can anyone seriously argue that requiring Ford to litigate these cases in [the target forums] would be fundamentally unfair?” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

26 of tire valves that were sold to several manufacturers of finished tire tubes,

including a Taiwanese manufacturer. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct.

of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987). The total sales of tire

valves to the Taiwanese tube manufacturer amounted to no more than 1.24

percent of Asahi’s yearly income during the relevant period. Id. The

Taiwanese tube manufacturer, which also used valves from other

manufacturers, sold some of its finished tubes in the United States

(approximately 20 percent of sales). Id. Asahi’s representatives admitted to

knowing that some of the valves it sold to the Taiwanese tube manufacturer

would make their way to the United States (and to California in particular),

but Asahi never contemplated that its limited sales of valves to the

Taiwanese tube manufacturer would subject it to a lawsuit in California. Id.

at 107.

Justice O’Connor’s plurality12 held that Asahi’s mere placement of

valves into the stream of commerce, without additional conduct, did not

subject it to jurisdiction in California, even though some of its valves

12 A unanimous Court agreed that California’s “exercise of personal jurisdiction over [Asahi] would be unreasonable and unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102. But competing pluralities disagreed over the interpretation of the stream of commerce test. Justice O’Connor’s plurality essentially adopted a stream of commerce plus test. Id. at 103-04. Justice Brennan’s plurality disagreed with this approach. Id. at 104.

27 ultimately ended up there. Id. at 112. “Additional conduct of the defendant

may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for

example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising

in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to

customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor

who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.” Id.

The second case the dissent relies on was a products liability action in

New Jersey involving a metal-shearing machine manufactured by J.

McIntyre in England. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886

(2011). “[A]fter discovery the trial court found that ‘[J. McIntyre] does not

have a single contact with New Jersey short of the machine in question

ending up in this state.’” 13 Id.

A majority held that there could be no jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.

Consistent with Asahi, a plurality, authored by Justice Kennedy, held that J.

McIntyre did not have sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey because

the record reflected there was no additional conduct apart from placing its

13 According to the record, only one machine ended up in New Jersey, but there were perhaps more. At most, four machines made their way to New Jersey. Id. at 878.

28 machines in the stream of commerce indicating intent or purpose to serve

New Jersey. 14 Id. at 887.

In addition to Asahi and J. McIntyre, the dissent also relies on a case

from this Court in support of its application of the stream of commerce plus

test: Highland Stucco & Lime Prod., Inc. v. Onorato, 259 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2018). Highland Stucco was a products liability case involving a

California manufacturer (“Highland”) of asbestos-containing products. Id. at

946. The record reflected that “[t]he overwhelming majority of HIGHLAND's

business was conducted in California. During the time period when

HIGHLAND used asbestos, its products were primarily sold to building

supply dealers within a 60 mile radius of its Van Nuys, California plant.” Id.

at 947. This Court, relying on the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre, held that

“[i]t is not enough that Highland’s products may have found their way into

Florida or that Highland may have predicted that they might reach Florida,

as foreseeability that a product may find its way into a forum state is not

14 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment but did not join the plurality’s “strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not ‘inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign’ and cannot ‘be said to have targeted the forum.’” Id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring). According to the concurrence, there was no need to create a new rule because the outcome was determined by existing precedent: “None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient. Rather, this Court’s previous holdings suggest the contrary.” Id. at 888.

29 enough, by itself, to allow that state to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction

over an out-of-state defendant.” Id. 950.

What is clear from the two United States Supreme Court plurality

opinions—Asahi and J. McIntyre—and this Court’s Highland Stucco opinion

is that the stream of commerce plus test has been developed at the margins

of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. All three cases involved relatively

small manufacturers, foreign to the target forum, that merely placed products

in the stream of commerce, a miniscule number of which ended up in the

target forum. This is not one of those cases. Mazda Japan is a global

automobile company, and its vehicles do not end up in Mazda dealerships

all over Florida by happenstance.

The record reflects that Mazda Japan designs vehicles for the U.S.

market, and its annual reports reflect sales goals of hundreds of thousands

of vehicles in this country. Even if Mazda Japan does not directly control

Mazda North America, its authorized U.S. distributor, or the authorized

Mazda dealerships in Florida, the sale of Mazda vehicles in Florida is not an

isolated occurrence but undoubtedly arises, even if indirectly, from Mazda

Japan’s efforts to serve the Florida market. Cf. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1027 (“[I]f

the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an

isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or

30 distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in [several

or all] other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those

States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of

injury to its owner or to others.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.

at 297)).

This is true even under the more rigorous stream of commerce plus

test, which requires more than simply placing a product in the stream of

commerce. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (“Additional conduct of the defendant

may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for

example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising

in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to

customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor

who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”).

Nothing in the Due Process Clause or controlling case law demands

insulating a foreign global automobile company like Mazda Japan from

liability when it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of selling vehicles,

directly or indirectly, in this State. I therefore concur in affirming the order on

appeal.

31 Mazda Motor Corp. v. Triche 3D21-0803

LOBREE, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the decision to affirm the order denying

Mazda Japan’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, essentially

on two bases. In my view, the majority misplaces its reliance on the Supreme

Court’s statement in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,

141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021), that “this Court has used this exact fact pattern

(a resident-plaintiff sues a global car company, extensively serving the state

market in a vehicle, for an in-state accident) as an illustration—even a

paradigm example—of how specific jurisdiction works.” This statement was

made in the context of the “arise out of or relate to” factor of the personal

jurisdiction inquiry. Unlike Mazda Japan, the defendant in Ford Motor Co.

conceded purposeful availment as it had a “veritable truckload of contacts”

with the forum states’ markets, and “[t]he only issue [in the case was]

whether those contacts [were] related enough to the plaintiffs’ suits.” Id. at

1031.

Further, I disagree with the majority’s view of the record, in particular,

the characterization of Mazda Japan as having directed the distribution of its

vehicles to Florida. This finding is not supported by the record. While 493

vehicles were offloaded at the Port of Jacksonville—with Mazda North

32 America as the importer—there is no evidence that Mazda Japan controlled

or decided whether its vehicles would be offloaded and distributed into this

state, its designation as the “shipper” in a compilation of U.S. Custom’s data

notwithstanding. As detailed below, I do not believe that the evidence relied

on by the plaintiff demonstrates under our current personal jurisdiction

jurisprudence that Mazda Japan has purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting business in Florida. Thus, on this record, I agree with

Mazda Japan’s contention that it lacks sufficient minimum contacts with

Florida to comport with the constitutional standard for exercising specific

jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As the majority states, Mazda Japan supported its motion to dismiss

the second amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction with affidavits

from Osamu Yamashina. In addition to the averments relied upon by the

majority, notably Yamashina also averred that Mazda Japan “had no

involvement with the manufacture, assembly, wholesale distribution to the

retail dealer, marketing, retail sale, warranty administration, service or

maintenance” of the vehicle at issue. In his second affidavit, Yamashina

further averred that:

• After assembly, the vehicle was sold to Mazda North America in Mexico and shipped to the United States f.o.b. Mexico;

33 • The vehicle was imported to the United States by Mazda Motor of America, Inc. d/b/a Mazda North America;

• Mazda North America distributed the vehicle to an independent dealer;

• Mazda Japan had no involvement with the importation, distribution, or retail sale of the vehicle;

• Mazda Japan had no control over the distribution of the vehicle within the United States;

• Mazda Japan has no involvement in Mazda North America’s decision into which states to distribute vehicles purchased from Mazda Japan and does not advise Mazda North America into which states to distribute vehicles;

• Mazda Japan does not advertise or market its products in Florida or to Florida residents;

• The Mazda dealer network in the United States has been established by Mazda North America and is managed by Mazda North America.

The plaintiff and decedent’s personal representative, Lourdes Triche,

responded to Mazda Japan’s motion to dismiss by asserting that Mazda

Japan had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida because it had “engaged

in substantial business in Florida.” As evidence of that “substantial

business,” Triche pointed to: (1) Mazda Japan’s shipment of goods into

Florida ports; (2) the admitted fact that Mazda Japan decides whether to

initiate recalls of vehicles; (3) Mazda Japan’s stated goal of working with U.S.

dealerships to increase sales; (4) the admitted facts that Mazda Japan owns

34 Mazda-related U.S. trademarks and designs vehicles to comply with U.S.

regulations; as well as (5) “miscellaneous connections,” like Mazda Japan

displaying its “Bike by KODO Concept” and “Sofa by KODO Concept” car in

Miami to highlight its KODO-Soul in Motion design theme. Triche relevantly

supported her response with the affidavit of Nickie Bonenfant, the chief

operating officer at ImportGenius, a company that provides data from U.S.

Customs agencies and U.S. Customs Bills of Lading; annual reports,

company profiles and a sustainability report of Mazda Japan; recall

notifications to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(“NHTSA”); and U.S. trademark registrations.

In denying Mazda Japan’s motion to dismiss, the trial court focused

primarily on the global aspects of Mazda Japan’s business, considering a

pronouncement by Mazda Japan’s president and CEO in a 2016

sustainability report that “Mazda sells vehicles in more than 130 countries

and regions, and has production sites in seven countries around the world”

to be “very important,” because it did not distinguish between Mazda Japan

and Mazda North America. The trial court further asserted it did not think

Mazda Japan and Mazda North America are “really separate and distinct.”

35 ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mazda Japan focuses primarily on the “purposeful

availment” factor of the minimum contacts analysis, asserting that Triche

failed to establish that Mazda Japan purposefully availed itself of the privilege

of conducting business in Florida. Advancing a stream of commerce theory,

Triche responds that Mazda Japan placed the vehicle into the stream of

commerce with the expectation it would end up in Florida, and that she

presented evidence showing that Mazda Japan “purposeful[ly] target[ed] .

. . Florida for its own business endeavors.” Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Personal

Juris. 13.

The constitutional prong of our long-arm personal jurisdiction analysis

“is controlled by United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the

Due Process Clause.” Highland Stucco & Lime Prods. Inc. v. Onorato, 259

So. 3d 944, 950 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). Indeed, “[t]he Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to bind a

nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Walden v. Fiore, 571

U.S. 277, 283 (2014). “For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with

due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial

connection with the forum State.” Id. at 284. For that reason, “the

nonresident generally must have ‘certain minimum contacts . . . such that the

36 maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.”’” Id. at 283 (quoting International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of

California, City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).

“In products liability cases like this one, it is the defendant’s purposeful

availment that renders jurisdiction consistent with ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’” Highland Stucco, 259 So. 3d at 950 (quoting J.

McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011)). “[W]here the

defendant ‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within” the forum

state, or “has created ‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents

of” the forum state, the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege

of conducting business within the forum, “and because his activities are

shielded by ‘the benefits and protections’ of the forum’s laws it is

presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of

litigation in that forum as well.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 475–76 (1985). In other words, the nonresident’s actions must be

“purposefully directed” toward the forum state. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).

In the personal jurisdiction context, the stream of commerce theory

originated with the United States Supreme Court’s statement in World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), that a forum state

37 “‘does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts

personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the

stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by

consumers in the forum State’ and those products subsequently injure forum

consumers.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen,

444 U.S. at 297–98). The Supreme Court subsequently addressed the

stream of commerce theory again in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior

Court of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). There, in a fractured

decision, the plurality opinion stated that “[t]he ‘substantial connection,’

between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of

minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant

purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 112 (citation omitted)

(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). “The placement of a product into the

stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant

purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the

defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum

State . . . .” Id. “Such [additional] conduct could include ‘designing the

product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State,

establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum

State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve

38 as the sales agent in the forum State.’” Shin-Kobe Elec. Mach. Co. v.

Rockwell, 750 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (quoting id.).

Later, in J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion espoused

what is often cited as the “stream of commerce plus” test, see In re Chinese-

Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liability Litigation, 753 F.3d 521, 540 (5th Cir.

2014), stating that “[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the

exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted

the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have

predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.” 564 U.S. at 882

(emphasis added). The plurality further explained that “[t]his Court’s

precedents make clear that it is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations,

that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.” Id. at 883.

While neither Asahi nor J. McIntyre commanded a majority opinion on

the stream of commerce theory, when confronted with the issue, this court

leaned toward the stream of commerce standard set forth in the J. McIntyre

plurality. Specifically, in Highland Stucco, this court followed the Supreme

Court’s most recent pronouncement on the stream of commerce theory, and

stated that “[i]t is not enough that [defendant manufacturer’s] products may

have found their way into Florida or that [defendant manufacturer] may have

predicted that they might reach Florida, as foreseeability that a product may

39 find its way into a forum state is not enough, by itself, to allow that state to

constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.” 259 So.

3d at 950. Because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the nonresident

defendant manufacturer “directed its product into Florida for distribution” and

never “conducted business in Florida, advertised in a Florida publication, nor

manufactured, sold, distributed, or supplied any products” in Florida, we

concluded that “the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that [the defendant]

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within the

state such that it reasonably could have anticipated being haled into court in

this state.” Id. at 951. At least two of our sister courts seemingly agree and

follow the plurality’s statement in J. McIntyre that in the stream of commerce

context, a nonresident defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum state only when it “can be said to have

targeted the forum.” 564 U.S. at 882; see Robinson Helicopter Co. v.

Gangapersaud, 346 So. 3d 134, 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); Imerys Talc Am.

V. Ricketts, 262 So. 3d 799, 803–04 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018); S. Wall Prods.,

Inc. v. Bolin, 251 So. 3d 935, 939–40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Thus, under this

court’s precedent, foreseeability alone does not govern whether a

nonresident defendant manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the

40 privilege of conducting business in Florida. Instead, it must have engaged

in actions targeting Florida.

Applying these principles, I conclude that Mazda Japan did not

purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Florida such

that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into our courts. As below,

Triche claims that the following evidence shows that personal jurisdiction

over Mazda Japan in Florida is proper: (1) Mazda Japan’s annual reports

and company profiles that “espouse lofty sales goals” for the United States’

market; (2) Mazda Japan’s United States trademarks on marketing phrases,

such as “Zoom-Zoom” and “Mazda Zero to Drive Event”; (3) Mazda Japan’s

admission that it designs vehicles to comply with United States regulations;

(4) Mazda Japan’s display of a concept car (designed as a sofa) and bicycle

at a two-day art show in Miami in 2015; (5) the fact that Mazda North America

is the authorized distributor for Mazda vehicles in the United States; (6)

Mazda Japan’s admission that it makes recall determinations for cars in the

United States; and (7) Mazda Japan’s identification as the “shipper” on a

compilation of data from United States Customs agencies listing shipments

of Mazda vehicles into Jacksonville, Florida. I take each in turn.

As to the annual reports and company profiles, Triche relies on Mazda

Japan’s stated goal “to develop a new marketing strategy that is adapted to

41 the characteristics of the US market, which is crucial for Mazda, in order to

build a sales system with the goal set at 400,000 units for 2021,” and a

statement from the President and CEO of Mazda Japan that “Mazda sells

vehicles in more than 130 countries and regions, and has production sites in

seven countries around the world. . . . [W]e will also share management

policies across all Mazda Group companies and continue developing an

environment that encourages mutual learning to help further improve our

brand value . . . .” But these national and global marketing, sales, and

management pronouncements do not show that Mazda Japan purposefully

directed or targeted its efforts toward Florida. It is Mazda Japan’s connection

to Florida that matters. See Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (“For a State to

exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related

conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.”); J.

McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S at 886 (plurality op.) (stating that “it is

petitioner’s purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the United States,

that alone are relevant” and concluding petitioner did not engage in conduct

purposefully directed at New Jersey where facts showed “an intent to serve

the U.S. market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed

itself of the New Jersey market”); Kellogg–Borchardt v. Mazda Motor Corp.,

No. 1:18-cv-01105-JHR-KK, 2019 WL 2189527, at *4 (D.N.M. May 21, 2019)

42 (rejecting plaintiffs’ assertion Mazda Japan’s 2018 annual report and a 2017

report in brief showed Mazda Japan “actively engaging the national market

in each state, including New Mexico” and engaging in “advertising in New

Mexico and marketing its products through dealers who have agreed to serve

as sales agents in New Mexico” because reports “do not indicate whether

[Mazda Japan] plays any role in directing marketing to particular states”

(emphasis added)).

Likewise, the fact that Mazda Japan owns various marketing

trademarks registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office does not

show purposeful availment, because none of the trademarked phrases are

directed specifically toward the Florida market. While the plurality opinion in

Asahi identified “designing the product for the market in the forum State” as

an action directed toward the forum state, 480 U.S. at 112, the fact that

Mazda Japan designs vehicles in accordance with U.S. regulations does not

show a “substantial connection” between Mazda Japan and Florida. See

Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (“Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the

contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant . . . that create a

‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.”). This is because “[h]ere, the

question concerns the authority of a [Florida] state court to exercise

jurisdiction, so it is [Mazda Japan]’s purposeful contacts with [Florida], not

43 with the United States, that alone are relevant.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564

U.S. at 886 (plurality op.). For this reason, Mazda Japan’s admission that

“vehicles designed by [Mazda Japan], which are intended to for the United

States market, including Florida, are designed to comply with U.S.

regulations” is not the determinative factor for minimum contacts that the

majority and concurrence want it to be. I also find the fact that Mazda Japan

displayed a concept car (designed as a sofa) and bicycle in the lobby of a

Miami Beach hotel for two days during the 2015 Art Basel exhibition, in order

to showcase design, insufficient to show an intent to target the Florida

market.

Mazda Japan also acknowledges that Mazda North America is the

authorized distributor for Mazda vehicles in the United States. On this

record, that fact does not constitute an action purposefully directed toward

Florida. Yamashina attested that: Mazda Japan had no control over the

distribution of the vehicle within the United States; Mazda Japan is not

involved in Mazda North America’s decisions about where to distribute the

vehicles it purchases from Mazda Japan; and Mazda Japan does not advise

Mazda North America into which states vehicles should be distributed. In

response, the annual reports and company profiles relied upon by Triche to

support jurisdiction do not show that Mazda Japan directs the distribution of

44 vehicles once sold to Mazda North America, and certainly does not reveal

that Mazda Japan directs distribution of vehicles to any particular submarket

or state, like Florida. In short, the fact that Mazda North America is Mazda

Japan’s authorized American distributor does not establish Florida

jurisdiction in the absence of any evidence demonstrating relevant control or

direction from Mazda Japan. 15 See Ditter v. Subaru Corp., No. 20-cv-02908-

PAB-MEH, 2022 WL 889102, at *9 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2022) (finding plaintiff

did not establish foreign manufacturer purposefully directed its activities at

forum state where manufacturer’s wholly-owned American subsidiary

controlled the distribution and sale of vehicles in the United States, including

the forum state; “[T]he creation of a global, or even nationwide, distribution

system is insufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate minimum contacts with

[the forum state].”); Fischer v. BMW of N. Am., 376 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1185–

87 (D. Colo. 2019) (granting German car manufacturer’s motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction even though manufacturer’s subsidiary and

15 Without record analysis, the concurrence concludes that Mazda North America’s distribution efforts show that Mazda Japan “indirectly” serves the Florida market. On this point, the concurrence misplaces its dependence on Ford Motor Co. Again, in Ford Motor Co., Ford did not contest that it “actively seeks to serve” the relevant states’ markets. 141 S. Ct. at 1026. More importantly, the majority opinion in Ford Motor Co. contains no discussion on the role of a domestic subsidiary in determining whether a global foreign corporation itself “deliberately extended” its business into a state’s forum. Id. at 1027.

45 exclusive United States distributor “had voluminous sales in the United

States” because “plaintiff has offered no allegations or evidence that

defendant specifically targeted [the forum state] with its distribution efforts”);

cf. Opheim v. Aktiengesellschaft, No. CV2002483KMESK, 2021 WL

2621689, at *3–4 (D.N.J. June 25, 2021) (denying without prejudice German

car manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because

importer agreement between German manufacturer and American

subsidiary indicated that “Audi AG does not simply ship a lump number of

cars to VW America to then distribute in the United States independently. . .

. Audi AG effectively ships its products to specific markets within the US,”

and thus forum-specific facts could exist); Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz USA,

LLC, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1237–39 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (finding purposeful

availment where there were uncontradicted allegations German car

manufacturer defendant directed distribution and sales of its vehicles to

Florida through control of American subsidiary, and general distributor

agreement gave German company “the right to control nearly every aspect

of [American subsidiary’s] operations, including the sales and marketing” of

relevant vehicles).

Triche also relies on Mazda Japan’s admission that it makes decisions

about defects and recalls of vehicles in the United States, and that “when a

46 recall of a Mazda vehicle is warranted, Mazda Japan directs Mazda North

America to submit the required information [to the] NHTSA.” The subject car

was included in two recalls—one for a potentially inoperative parking brake

and another for defective windshield wiper relays. 16 Mazda Japan provided

the replacement parts for the windshield wiper recall to Mazda North

America, but not for the brake recall. Mazda North America then distributed

the windshield wiper parts to authorized dealers in the United States.

Additionally, Mazda North America, on behalf of Mazda Japan, notified the

NHTSA that it was implementing a limited regional recall in Florida, Hawaii,

and Puerto Rico for vehicles with Takata Corporation airbags. A letter from

the NHTSA to Mazda North America acknowledged the limited regional

recall. The record also contains letters from Mazda North America to

dealership managers and vehicle owners addressing the airbag recall; the

letters did not come from Mazda Japan.

This evidence is insufficient to establish Mazda Japan purposefully

availed itself of conducting activities in Florida. Triche does not point to any

evidence showing that Mazda Japan is involved with the recall process in

Florida after it decides a recall is warranted and instructs Mazda North

16 At this point in the litigation, Triche does not assert that the recalls specific to the vehicle model are related to the design defect at issue.

47 America to notify the NHTSA. Although Mazda Japan provided wiper parts

for the windshield wiper repair, the parts were provided to Mazda North

America and were not sent directly to dealers or vehicle owners in Florida.

The fact that Mazda Japan’s limited regional recall for Takata airbags

included Florida shows no more than that Mazda Japan was aware some of

the relevant vehicles were in Florida. But mere foreseeability that a product

could be in the forum state is not enough to establish purposeful availment

of the forum state’s market. In short, on this record, Mazda Japan’s singular

decision to recall vehicles and the fact that it provided parts to Mazda North

America for one recall are not conduct purposefully directed toward Florida.

See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 886; S. Wall Prods., 251 So. 3d at

940.

Finally, Triche asserts that the most compelling evidence Mazda Japan

targeted Florida is the fact that Mazda Japan “shipped” vehicles to the Port

of Jacksonville, Florida. 17 In support of this contention, Triche relies upon

the Bonenfant affidavit. Attached to that affidavit is a compilation of data

17 While admitting it knows that Mazda North America distributes vehicles to Mazda dealers in Florida, in jurisdictional requests for admissions Mazda Japan denied that it “has shipped Mazda vehicles to Jacksonville Port Authority, Port Miami, and Port Everglades every year from 2006 through 2020.”

48 showing shipments of vehicles from various “Mazda entities to any Florida

port from November 1, 2006 to September 10, 2020.” Mazda Japan

acknowledges that the overall data shows 493 vehicles were offloaded at the

Port of Jacksonville. Triche subsequently narrowed its presentation to the

trial court to rely on data identifying Mazda Japan as the “shipper” of vehicles

to the Port of Jacksonville, Florida, during 2016-2017. However, based upon

my review of Bonenfant’s affidavit and attached customs data, I cannot agree

with the majority’s finding that Mazda Japan targeted the Florida market by

shipping and directing the distribution of its vehicles here.

The fact that Mazda Japan is identified as the “shipper” in customs data

does not indicate that Mazda Japan determined either that vehicles would

be offloaded at the Port of Jacksonville or distributed throughout Florida.

Mere foreseeability on the part of Mazda Japan that vehicles would end up

in Florida “is not enough by itself, to allow that state to constitutionally

exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.” Highland Stucco, 259

So. 3d at 950. Indeed, Bonenfant’s affidavit proves no more. Bonenfant

states in her affidavit that the company identified as “[c]onsignee,” here,

Mazda North America, “represents ‘[t]he company importing the shipment

into the U.S.” and a “[s]hipper,” here, Mazda Japan, is an “overseas company

exporting the shipment to the U.S.” (emphasis added). See Far East Mach.

49 Co. v. Aranzamendi, No. 05-21-00267-CV, 2022 WL 4180472, at *6 (Tex.

App.–Dallas Sept. 13, 2022) (finding “the mere fact that up to eleven percent

of [the Taiwanese steel pipe manufacturer]’s annual production was shipped

to the Port of Houston is not evidence of actions in Texas or actions targeting

Texas. Mere knowledge that Texas was the intended destination of the pipe

is insufficient to subject [the Taiwanese manufacturer] to personal jurisdiction

without evidence that it ‘took additional steps to serve the Texas Market.’”

(quoting Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex.

2021))).

Additionally, as to the vehicle, Yamashina testified in his second

affidavit that it was “sold to [Mazda North America] in Mexico and shipped to

the United States f.o.b. Mexico,” and that “Mazda North America imported

the . . . Vehicle into the United States and distributed the . . . Vehicle to an

independent dealer.” Triche presented no contrary evidence. Because the

vehicle was shipped “f.o.b. Mexico,” title to the vehicle and risk of loss passed

to Mazda North America in Mexico. See Jacobson v. Neuensorger

Korbwaren–Indus. Friedrich Kretz., K.–G., 109 So. 2d 612, 614 (Fla. 3d DCA

1959) (“The provision of the contract for sale of the merchandise stating the

price and providing ‘f.o.b. Hamburg order Bremen’ resulted in title to the

goods passing to the purchaser at that point of shipment (Hamburg). . . .

50 From that point, and during the balance of the journey, the risk of loss was

on the purchaser.” (citations omitted)); Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team,

Inc., 583 F.2d 184, 188 (5th Cir.1978) (stating that “[s]hipment ‘FOB Florida’

simply means that title to the goods and the risk of their loss passed to Charia

in Florida, and Charia bore the cost of shipping from Florida to Louisiana”).

While the fact that title and risk of loss passed to Mazda North America in

Mexico alone may not show that Mazda Japan lacks a substantial connection

with Florida, it is also true that nothing in this record shows that Mazda Japan

directed that the vehicle be offloaded at the Port of Jacksonville, or anywhere

in Florida. Nor does the record show that Mazda Japan determined the

vehicle’s distribution within Florida. Thus, the Bonenfant affidavit and

attached customs data do not prove that Mazda Japan directed or targeted

its activities toward Florida.

At its core, “[d]ue process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority

principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the

convenience of the plaintiffs or third parties.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284. After

grappling with the record before us, I am confronted with insufficient

evidence that Mazda Japan directed or targeted its activities toward Florida

such that it has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting

51 business here. Accordingly, I would find that Mazda Japan lacks sufficient

minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy the due process protections

afforded to nonresident defendants, reverse the order denying Mazda

Japan’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and remand with

instructions to dismiss Mazda Japan from the action.