Matter of Reynolds

17 B.R. 489, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1578, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2588
United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia·Decided November 12, 1981·No. 19-51494·Published·Cited by 18 cases

Opinion

OPINION

WILLIAM L. NORTON, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came on before this court for a hearing on March 23, 1981, on the objection of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) to confirmation of the debtor’s plan, on GMAC’s motion to dismiss, and on GMAC’s request for a valuation hearing pursuant to Sections 506 and 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. Testimony was submitted by GMAC and the debtor, Tommy Reynolds. After consideration of the record, the evidence submitted in behalf of the parties and the arguments of counsel, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACTS

On December 19, 1980, the debtors (husband and wife) filed a joint petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 United States Code. Their proposed plan, as amended, provides for full payment of allowed secured claims and for 1% payment of each unsecured claim.

GMAC is the only secured creditor to be paid under the plan. The claim of GMAC is based upon an installment sales contract secured by a 1980 Oldsmobile Cutlass automobile purchased new by the debtors on June 3, 1980. The purchase price was $8,634.00. In addition to the purchase price, less the down payment of $800.00, the debtors financed the premium for credit life insurance ($361.05) and the cost of extended warranty protection ($320.00). The total amount financed was $8,596.55, which along with a finance charge of $3,438.49 calculated at an annual percentage rate of 17.60%, was to be paid over 48 months at $250.23 *491 per month. The debtors paid three (3) installments and then defaulted. When the Chapter 13 petition was filed on December 19, 1980, the debtors were behind three (3) installments for a total of $752.19.

The net outstanding balance due GMAC (i.e., the amount required under the contract to pay off the claim as of this date) is $8,643.54. According to the NADA guide book the retail value of the vehicle, including its optional equipment, is $7,125.00. The wholesale value is $6,100.00. At the § 341 meeting of creditors the trustee recommended a value for the vehicle of $6,800.00. The trustee also suggested the value of the unexpired portion of the extended warranty agreement to be $280.00 and the unearned credit life insurance premiums to be $250.00. .The contract provides that GMAC’s security interest extends to these items. On the basis of these values, the trustee’s recommendation to the creditor and debtor was that GMAC’s secured claim be valued at $7,330.00 and that this amount plus “present value” calculated at the contractual annual percentage rate of 17.60%, be paid out at the rate of $250.73 per month for the 36 months term of the plan. This $7,330.00 figure is less than the $8,643.54 (net balance of the debt) which GMAC now contends should be the appropriate value of its principal secured claim.

The debtor, Tommy Reynolds, testified that the vehicle is necessary for him and his wife to commute to and to retain their respective employment. He has no present intent to surrender the vehicle or to replace it with a less expensive means of transportation. His financial problems were aggravated soon after the debtors purchased the vehicle when his employment situation changed for the worse.

In support of its position GMAC makes the following arguments:

(a)In valuing its allowed secured claim, the finding of the court should be bound by the $8,684.00 purchase price for the vehicle agreed to by the debtors just six (6) months prior to the filing of the petition.
(b) Alternatively, the appropriate valuation standard under Section 506 in a Chapter 13 case should at a minimum be the retail value or replacement cost to the debtor.
(c) That in addition to the value of its collateral, the determination of GMAC’s allowed secured claim should take into account and include the total of monthly installments past due and unpaid at the time of filing (i.e., $752.19). 1
(d) That the “present value” of its allowed secured claim should be calculated at the annual percentage rate agreed to by the parties in the contract to wit: 17.60%, there being no evidence of any other rate in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In this contested proceeding the court is concerned with an interpretation of § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and the application of § 506(a) in a Chapter 13 case. Section 506(a) states:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to set-off under Section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to the setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest. 2

*492 [Emphasis supplied.]

Valuation of GMAC’s Allowed Secured Claim

The recommendation of the trustee of a value of $6,800.00 is clearly a compromise between the NADA reported wholesale and retail values. GMAC argues first for a valuation based upon the purchase price bargained for by the debtors just six (6) months previous to this Chapter 13 petition; or, secondly, at the very least, a retail or replacement cost valuation. GMAC also argues that the valuation should take into account the $752.19 in the past due installments as of the time of filing. GMAC objects to the recommended value of the trustee. Hence, the court will resolve the dispute and make a finding of value based on the evidence at the confirmation hearing.

Purpose of Valuation

The purpose of the valuation in this composition case which proposes payments totaling 1% of the unsecured claims, is to set the total amount the debtors must now pay to the creditor on its claim in order for the debtors to retain and use this vehicle over the life of the plan. While there may be other purposes for a valuation in a Chapter 13 case, no other purpose appears to be present here. The valuation is not made to reduce the debtors’ monthly burden of payments on the vehicle. The plan proposes to pay GMAC a monthly amount essentially equal to that called for in the contract: (i.e., $250.23 over 48 months under the contract compared to $250.73 over 36 months under the plan). Thus, we are not concerned with debtors who cannot presently afford the agreed-upon monthly costs of the vehicle. 3 This valuation is not for the purpose of allocating monies for other creditors to be paid under the plan. Because the payment on claims of unsecured creditors is fixed at 1% under the plan, no benefit would inure to other creditors in setting as low a valuation as possible.

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Matter of Reynolds, 17 B.R. 489, 5 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1578, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 2588 (Ga. 1981).

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