In Re Smith

42 B.R. 198, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5197
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedAugust 15, 1984
Docket13-23249
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 42 B.R. 198 (In Re Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Smith, 42 B.R. 198, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5197 (Ga. 1984).

Opinion

ORDER

W. HOMER DRAKE, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

This case is before the Court on the objection by the above-named debtor to the claim filed by the General Finance Corporation of Georgia (“General Finance”). Following a hearing on May 24, 1984, this matter was taken under advisement.

The claim by General Finance arises from a purchase-money contract executed by the debtor with Hub Motor Company on November 26, 1982 to purchase a 1979 Chevrolet Camero for a price of $6,548.40. The debtor’s objection to the claim by General Finance is two-fold. First, the debtor objects to the valuation of the automobile used in determining the amount of the allowed secured claim under Bankruptcy Code § 506(a). 1 Secondly, the debtor objects to the interest rate used by the Chap *200 ter 13 Trustee to compute the total payout of the claim by General Finance such that General Finance will receive the present value of its allowed secured claim in accordance with Bankruptcy Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 2 The Court will address these issues in seriatim.

VALUATION OF THE COLLATERAL

At the § 341 Meeting of Creditors, the Chapter 13 Trustee valued the automobile at $4,200.00 based upon its average NADA book value. The debtor testified at the May 24, 1984 hearing that he had received two oral offers to purchase the automobile in the price range of $2,900.00 to $3,000.00. Counsel for the debtor argues that these alleged oral offers indicate the value that a prospective purchaser would place upon the automobile in an arms-length transaction. However, the Court is not persuaded to adopt the debtor’s valuation.

First, there is no evidence to corroborate the debtor’s testimony that the alleged oral offers were made. Secondly, the debtor declined to sell his automobile to either of the alleged offerors. The Court must presume that the offers, if they were actually made, were rejected by the debtor as being too low. Finally, General Finance elicited testimony from an expert witness at the May 24, 1984 hearing, Mr. Gene Hornsby, who appraised the automobile at $5,300.00 based upon his own experience and the black book value of the automobile.

The Court notes that the Chapter 13 Trustee undertakes to value automobiles in Chapter 13 proceedings in a manner that has been determined to be the most equitable and efficient. Generally, the parties find the Chapter 13 Trustee’s valuation to be acceptable. However, the Chapter 13 Trustee’s valuation is not conclusive when the Court is presented with expert testimony from an experienced automobile appraiser who has actually inspected the subject automobile. Accordingly, the Court values the automobile in the case sub judice at $5,300.00.

PRESENT VALUE UNDER § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)

The Chapter 13 Trustee applied the interest rate from the purchase-money contract executed by the debtor with Hub Motor Company in order to calculate the total amount of payments that the debtor must make in order to comply with the requirement of Bankruptcy Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) that General Finance receive the present value of its allowed secured claim. The fact that the Chapter 13 Trustee applied the contract rate hasv apparently invoked some confusion between the parties as to whether the Chapter 13 Trustee’s interest computation was made pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 506(b) 3 or Bankruptcy Code *201 § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 4 Such confusion between Bankruptcy Code §§ 506(b) and 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is not uncommon. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy U 506.05, pp. 506-37 through 506-39 (15th ed. 1984).

With respect to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), Collier has stated as follows:

... In order to implement section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) the court must capitalize deferred payments by converting the deferred payments proposed to be distributed under the chapter 13 plan into an equivalent capital sum as of the effective date of the plan. Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) cannot be faithfully implemented simply by comparing the sum total of all deferred payments proposed by the plan with the amount of the allowed secured claim. An appropriate discount factor must be arrived at by the court, so as to fairly discount [the] value proposed to be given in the future on account of the allowed secured claim.
The simplest method of equating present value of deferred future payments with the amount of the allowed secured claim is to propose interest payments over and above the face amount of the allowed secured claim at whatever interest rate is equivalent to the discount rate selected by the court or agreed upon by the parties. Accordingly, in addition to deferred principal payments aggregating the face amount of the allowed secured claim, a chapter 13 plan need only propose to pay interest on the face amount of the allowed secured claim at the appropriate discount rate over the course of the payment extension. (emphasis added)

5 Collier on Bankruptcy II 1325.01, p. 1325-26 (15th ed. 1984). The question before the Court is whether the discount rate used to equate the discounted value of the future stream of payments to General Finance with the allowed amount of its secured claim as of the effective date of the Chapter 13 plan should be the interest rate provided in the purchase-money contract or some other rate.

This Court has previously held that the contract rate is presumed to be the correct rate to apply for purposes of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code where the debt owed on an automobile is being paid under a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. In re McMichen, 23 B.R. 497, 7 CBC 2d 618 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1982) (Drake, J.). Accord: In the Matter of Reynolds, 17 B.R. 489, 5 CBC 2d 1578 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1981) (Norton, J.); In the Matter of Clements, 11 B.R. 38 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1981; and November 6, 1981) (Kahn, J.). Cf. In re McLeod, 5 B.R. 520 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1980); In re Weaver, 5 B.R. 522 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ga.1980) (Robinson, J.) (In both McLeod and Weaver, Judge Robinson determined the appropriate interest rate to be 10% per annum, citing In re Lum, 1 B.R. 186 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Tenn.1979).) The Court takes note of the fact that the general policy of the Chapter 13 Trustee for this Court is to use the contract rate, unless, upon objection by a party in interest, the Court orders otherwise.

In the instant case, the annual percentage rate specified in the purchase-money contract is 22.75%. As stated by Judge Norton in In the Matter of Cooper, 11 B.R.

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Bluebook (online)
42 B.R. 198, 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-smith-ganb-1984.