Mary Doe v. United States

Fourth Circuit

Mary Doe v. United States

769 F.2d 174, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 21876

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedJuly 1, 1985

Docket19-7795

StatusPublished

Cited by24 cases

This text of 769 F.2d 174 (Mary Doe v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mary Doe v. United States, 769 F.2d 174, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 21876 (4th Cir. 1985).

Pincite

Opinion

HARRISON L. WINTER, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff, a military dependent, sues under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. She alleges that the deviant sexual conduct of an Air Force clinical social worker, who was treating her for “blackouts,” made her a victim of medical malpractice. The district court ruled that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity to plaintiff’s suit because the conduct complained of constituted an assault under applicable South Carolina law, and 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) preserves immunity from suit on “[a]ny claim arising out of assault____” The court further held that § 2680(h) had not been superseded in this case by the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1089, because the officer’s conduct was not within the scope of his duties or employment. Accordingly, it dismissed plaintiff’s claim.

Plaintiff appeals and we affirm. We agree with the district court that Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4 Cir.1984), is inapposite. In that case, the plaintiff consented to sexual advances offered as “treatment”, and hence there was neither assault nor battery. In this case, plaintiff did not consent to the Air Force social worker’s perverted behavior, so that the officer’s conduct did constitute assault. Thus the § 2680(h) assault exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity is fully applicable. We also agree that 10 U.S.C. § 1089 does not permit plaintiff’s suit. That provision waives governmental immunity only for claims involving a medical professional acting “within the scope of his duties or employment.” § 1089(a). Here, if plaintiff’s allegations are true, the Air Force officer clearly was acting for his personal gratification rather than within the scope of his employment.

Plaintiff’s other theories of recovery either were not raised administratively in satisfaction of the condition precedent to suit, or are so closely related to the barred assault claim that they also are barred by sovereign immunity.

AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

HARRISON L. WINTER, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff, a military dependent, sues under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. She alleges that the deviant sexual conduct of an Air Force clinical social worker, who was treating her for “blackouts,” made her a victim of medical malpractice. The district court ruled that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity to plaintiff’s suit because the conduct complained of constituted an assault under applicable South Carolina law, and 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) preserves immunity from suit on “[a]ny claim arising out of assault____” The court further held that § 2680(h) had not been superseded in this case by the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1089, because the officer’s conduct was not within the scope of his duties or employment. Accordingly, it dismissed plaintiff’s claim.

Plaintiff appeals and we affirm. We agree with the district court that Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4 Cir.1984), is inapposite. In that case, the plaintiff consented to sexual advances offered as “treatment”, and hence there was neither assault nor battery. In this case, plaintiff did not consent to the Air Force social worker’s perverted behavior, so that the officer’s conduct did constitute assault. Thus the § 2680(h) assault exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity is fully applicable. We also agree that 10 U.S.C. § 1089 does not permit plaintiff’s suit. That provision waives governmental immunity only for claims involving a medical professional acting “within the scope of his duties or employment.” § 1089(a). Here, if plaintiff’s allegations are true, the Air Force officer clearly was acting for his personal gratification rather than within the scope of his employment.

Plaintiff’s other theories of recovery either were not raised administratively in satisfaction of the condition precedent to suit, or are so closely related to the barred assault claim that they also are barred by sovereign immunity.

AFFIRMED.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

769 F.2d 174, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 21876, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mary-doe-v-united-states-ca4-1985.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack