BISTLINE, Justice.
During the 1979-1980 school year, appellant Lawrence Durtschi was employed as a fourth grade teacher at the Ammon Elementary School. Durtschi transferred to Ammon from Iona Elementary School in the same district. The school district employing Durtschi was School District No. 93 of Bonneville and Bingham Counties, Idaho (hereinafter “the school district”). The minor plaintiffs in the various cases on appeal [469]*469were all female students in Durtschi’s class. These plaintiffs, through their parents as guardians ad litem, alleged in their complaints that Durtschi, during school hours and while conducting or supervising school activities, sexually molested them. They further alleged that (1) the school district knew of Durtschi’s acts against the plaintiff children, but nevertheless allowed him to continue as a teacher and to retain the children in his classroom, and (2) the school district knew or should have known that Durtschi had committed such acts against other children on prior occasions at Iona, but nevertheless had transferred him to the school in which the minor plaintiffs were enrolled.
Plaintiffs filed complaints for damages, naming both Durtschi and the school district as defendants. Plaintiffs’ action against Durtschi was for lewd and lascivious conduct toward the minor plaintiffs. Their action against the school district sounded in negligence in its hiring and retaining Durtschi, and breach of its duty of care toward the minor plaintiffs. In all three cases, plaintiffs stated that as a result of Durtschi’s conduct, the individual minor plaintiffs suffered irreparable physical injury and severe psychological injury with physical manifestations, and that the parents of the minor plaintiffs suffered physical and psychological injuries, as well as incurring the future financial obligations of providing treatment and care for their children. Recognizing that the three cases raised the same questions of law, the district court consolidated them for purposes of determining liability.
Durtschi answered the complaints, admitting some of the conduct alleged. Durtschi then cross-claimed against the school district for indemnification under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, I.C. § 6-901 et seq. (ITCA). The school district answered Durtschi’s cross-claim by denying any liability, and cross-claimed itself against Durtschi for indemnification. The school district answered plaintiffs’ complaints by denying liability and counter-claiming for attorney’s fees.
The school district moved for summary judgment against the plaintiffs’ claim for negligence. The district court held that the plaintiffs were precluded from recovery under the assault and battery exception to the ITCA. Judgment was entered accordingly, from which plaintiffs appeal. The district court also denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration; plaintiffs appeal that decision as well.
Thereafter, the school district moved for summary judgment against Durtschi’s cross-claim for indemnification. Ultimately, the district court held that, as a matter of law, Durtschi was precluded from seeking indemnification from school district under the ITCA, because defendant-teacher was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when he committed the lewd sexual acts. Once again, judgment was entered for the school district. Both the plaintiffs and Durtschi appeal from that decision and judgment.
As a preliminary matter we briefly review the law of summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment is proper only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). When the motion is supported by depositions or affidavits, the adverse party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” I.R.C.P. 56(e). The latter requirement, however, does not change the standards applicable to the summary judgment motion. Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 310, 442 P.2d 442, 446 (1968). Those standards require the district court, and this Court upon review, to liberally construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923, 925 (1982). In this process the Court must look to the “totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, plead[470]*470ings, and attached exhibits,” not merely to portions of the record in isolation. Central Idaho Agency, supra, 92 Idaho at 310, 442 P.2d at 446. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868-69, 452 P.2d 362, 365-66 (1969). “[A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the moving party.” Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979). The motion must be denied “if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable [people] might reach different conclusions.” Id.
With that as background and as explained below, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment against Durts-ehi, though on different grounds. We reverse the summary judgment against plaintiffs. Finally, we reject the school district’s suggestion that we uphold the summary judgment against certain of the plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to provide timely notice as required in the ITCA.
I. DEFENDANT DURTSCHI’S CROSS-CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION.
I.C. § 6-903(c) of the ITCA provides:
The defense of its employee by the governmental entity shall be undertaken whether the claim and civil lawsuit is brought in Idaho district court under Idaho law or is brought in a United States court under federal law. The governmental entity may refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment for its employee if it is determined that the act or omission of the employee was not within the course and scope of his employment or included malice or criminal intent. (Emphasis added.)
In support of its motion for summary judgment against Durtschi’s cross-claim for indemnification, the school district argued that it was excused from indemnification because Durtschi acted outside the scope of his employment, or alternatively because Durtschi acted with criminal intent. See, e.g., R., Vol. 2, pp. 263-64. The district court tackled the difficult “scope of employment” question, ultimately holding that as a matter of law Durtschi indeed had acted outside the scope of his employment, and thus was due no indemnification. The district court did not reach the question of criminal intent, though it noted:
[A]t least in Case No. 29,029 [Doe], Durtschi admitted performing the acts alleged, [and] thus the Court can conclude that a battery occurred. The only affirmative defense raised by the defendant is that he is protected by provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. R., Vol. 3, p. 174.
While we admire the district court’s courage and scholarly effort, we believe it chose the more troublesome and less certain of the two alternative routes. Upon reviewing the record in accordance with the standards set out above, we find that Durtschi unquestionably acted with criminal intent in all three cases. Being wary of recrossing the district court’s bumpy route, we do not reach the question of scope of employment.
The “criminal intent” provision “is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed, the proscribed acts____” State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 767-68, 554 P.2d 944, 945-46 (1976); see also, e.g., State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1981) (“A person acts with intent when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result.”). Ordinarily, criminal intent would be a question for the trier of fact. However, in this case Durtschi has left no doubt that he acted with criminal intent.
Durtschi admitted to performing the lewd and lascivious acts on the minor plaintiffs. R., Deposition of Durtschi, pp. 22-23. He specifically named each of the minor plaintiffs as the objects of his actions. Id. at 32. He expressly stated that he acted intentionally. Id. at 22-23. In the face of the school district’s arguments that he acted with criminal intent, Durtschi made no denials. In fact, he pled guilty to [471]*471related criminal charges of lewd and lascivious conduct. R., Vol. 2, p. 250. Every indication points to Durtschi knowingly and consciously performing criminal acts. We find nothing from which we can infer at all, much less reasonably infer, that Durtschi acted in any way but with criminal intent.
In light of these facts, pursuant to I.R. C.P. 56(c), summary judgment was appropriate. “[Tjhere is no genuine issue as to any material fact” that Durtschi acted with criminal intent. Id. In such an event, I.C. § 6-903(c) makes clear that the school district is absolved from indemnifying him as a matter of law. On these grounds, we affirm the district court’s granting summary judgment to the school district against Durtschi’s cross-claim.
II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Pursuant to I.C. § 33-512(4), school districts in the state of Idaho are under a statutory duty to protect the morals and health of their students. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have alleged not only that the school district transferred Durts-chi with knowledge that he had previously sexually abused students entrusted to his care, but that even after learning of his abuse of the plaintiff children, the school district allowed him to continue teaching, retaining those same children in his classroom. In its arguments and briefing to both the district court and this Court, the school district has not argued that there is no genuine issue of negligence;1 rather, the school district asked the district court and this Court to assume “that that negligence actually occurred” for the purposes of considering its motion. R., Vol. 1, p. 121; Respondents’ Brief, p. 15. The school district’s position is that even if we assume that the plaintiffs’ allegations are true— that the district has breached its statutory duty to the plaintiff children — the district is nevertheless absolved from any independent responsibility for its own negligence under the provisions of the ITCA. The district court, which had the full record before it, did not question the existence of a genuine issue as to the school district’s negligence, but held the school district to be immune under the ITCA. R., Vol. 3, p. 122; Vol. 1, pp. 121-22. We agree that a genuine issue of fact exists as to the school district’s negligence, but disagree that the school district is immune from liability for its own negligence.
With the enactment of the ITCA, the state has subjected itself to liability for its own negligent acts and the negligent acts of its employees. Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197, 199-200, 668 P.2d 73, 75-76 (1983). The ITCA makes every state governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its own negligent acts or omissions. I.C. § 6-903. Liability is the rule with some specific exceptions. One of those exceptions is that a governmental entity is not liable for any claim which “[ajrises out of assault [or] battery____” I.C. § 6-904(4). The school district contends that the plaintiffs’ action against it for negligent retention arose out of Durtschi’s assault and battery on the plaintiff children, and therefore that the school district is immune from liability under § 6-904(4).
There is a distinction between the conduct which forms the basis of a cause of action in negligence and one for assault and battery. A cause of action in negligence requires the breach of a duty which is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328A (1965). A battery, on the other hand, requires intentional bodily contact which is either harmful or offensive. Id. § 13. Under the plaintiffs’ allegations, the children’s injuries arose out of the basic negligence of the school district. The injuries were the foreseeable consequence of the school district’s negligence in retaining Durtschi despite full knowledge of his proclivities.
The fact that the plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by a third party does not [472]*472absolve the school district from liability for its negligence. The concept of supervening causation is inapplicable, under the allegations of the present case. Durtschi’s actions were the foreseeable result of the school district’s alleged failure to exercise due care to protect its students. The very risk which constituted the district’s negligence was the probability that such actions might occur.
It is clearly unsound to afford immunity to a negligent defendant because the intervening force, the very anticipation of which made his conduct negligent, has brought about the expected harm. Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3rd Cir.1972). To do so would fly in the face of basic principles of tort law, as recounted in the Restatement:
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449. See Smith v. Sharp, 82 Idaho 420, 428, 354 P.2d 172, 176 (1960).
The fact that the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal misconduct is irrelevant; the school district had a statutory duty to make reasonable efforts to protect its students from such a danger. A breach of that duty constitutes negligence. Under the allegations of the present case, Durtschi’s actions would not constitute a supervening cause, and the school district’s tortious conduct would not arise out of assault and battery. Rather, the roots of the assault and battery would be in the district’s own negligence.
The instant appeal presents a question of first impression in Idaho.2 Because there is no legislative history interpreting I.C. § 6-904(4) (the assault and battery exception to the ITCA) and because there is no Idaho case on point, we have considered cases interpreting a similar provision under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1974)) and under analogous state acts in reaching our decision that the school district is not immune from liability under the ITCA. The authorities are divided in defining the scope of actions which are excluded by statute from a waiver of sovereign immunity. A number of federal cases have held that the assault and battery exception to the FTCA bars recovery when a party seeks to hold the government directly liable for its negligence, which negligence is in turn alleged to be the proximate cause of an assault or battery committed by a government employee. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 769 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.1985); Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.1981); Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.1980) cert. denied 449 U.S. 885, 101 S.Ct. 240, 66 L.Ed.2d 111. Although the federal cases barring recovery are in the numerical majority, a number of federal courts as well as some state courts, have held for the plaintiff in situations analo[473]*473gous to the case at bar. See, e.g., Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102 (3rd Cir.1984), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Shearer,3 — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985); Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391 (3rd Cir.1972); Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 923 (E.D.Mich.1981); Loritts v. United States, 489 F.Supp. 1030 (D.Mass.1980); Ortiz v. County of Hampden, 16 Mass.App. 138, 449 N.E.2d 1227 (1983); Zerbe v. State, 578 P.2d 597, reh. denied 583 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1978). We find this line of authority to be the better reasoned.
The cases barring recovery do so, in large part, in a conclusory fashion without any analysis of the important policy considerations which bear on this issue. See, e.g. Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.1981). Many of the cases contain no allegations that the government knew or should have known that one of its employees was likely to commit an intentional tort and are therefore distinguishable from the instant case. See Doe v. United States, 769 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.1985); Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.1980); Johnson v. United States, 547 F.2d 688 (D.C.Cir.1976). We do not believe that the Idaho legislature, by creating an exception to governmental liability for actions arising out of assault and battery, thereby intended to relieve state agencies from any duty to safeguard the public from employees whom they know to be dangerous. The factual situation alleged in the present case presents a haunting example. Surely the Idaho legislature could not have intended that school districts could ignore their statutory duty and retain known child molesters in the classroom with total impunity under the ITCA. We can find no justification for such immunity.
Of course, a plaintiff cannot merely point to an assault and battery and then claim, based simply on its occurrence, that the state was negligent in not preventing it. For example, in the present case the school district would clearly not be liable if it had no knowledge of Durtsehi’s proclivities. In order to withstand dismissal under the intentional tort exception to the ITCA, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts which, if proven, would demonstrate that the governmental entity should have reasonably anticipated that one of their employees would commit an intentional tort. In the instant case, the plaintiffs allegations, if proven, would permit a court to find that the school district’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff children’s injuries. We therefore reverse the district court’s award of summary judgment to the school district under I.C. § 6-904(4) of the ITCA.
III. NOTICE OF CLAIM.
The school district urges us to affirm the district court’s summary judgment as to plaintiffs Doe and Smith on a basis which the district court itself did not address: that plaintiffs failed to give notice of their claims within the required time period. This argument is without merit. Clearly unresolved questions of fact remain regarding when the adult plaintiffs ought to have given notice of their claim. The minor plaintiffs, on the other hand, gave timely notice as a matter of law.
[474]*474A. The Adult Plaintiffs.
At the time this action arose, I.C. § 6-906 provided:4
All claims against a political subdivision arising under the provisions of this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later. (Emphasis added.)
To avoid thwarting meritorious claims on nonmeritorious, technical grounds, this Court consistently has taken a “liberal approach to interpreting the notice requirement of the ITCA.” Farber v. State of Idaho, 102 Idaho 398, 402, 630 P.2d 685, 689 (1981).
Obviously, a claim is not necessarily discovered the instant the injury or damages occur. The claimant only knows of his or her claim against the governmental entity and the 120-day limit only begins to run after the claimant becomes fully apprised of not only the injury or damages, but also of the governmental entity’s role. In Prosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P.2d 33 (1978), the plaintiff in a wrongful death action learned of Canyon County’s interest in the gravel excavation pond in which the decedent drowned and filed notice of the claim against the county over a year after the drowning incident. Id. at 55, 577 P.2d at 34. In a per curiam opinion, we rejected the same argument advanced today — that the claim was too late because over 120 days had passed since the incident. Id. The critical date was not and is not the date of injury, but is the date of reasonable discovery of the claim. We held:
Determining when the county’s interest in the gravel pond reasonably should have been discovered is a question of material fact which, by its very nature, is inappropriate for determination on a motion for summary judgment. Id. (emphasis original).
Contrary to the representations of the school district, Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977) upholds the rule that the 120-day period runs only after discovery of the claim. In Ralphs, the majority held that as a matter of fact:
[Ojn the date of the incident plaintiff Ralphs was aware that he had been attacked, assaulted and battered, that the Chief of Police was allegedly negligent in permitting the attack and that the city of Spirit Lake was negligent in employing a man of Newton’s alleged characteristics and in failing to discharge him. Id. at 228, 560 P.2d at 1318.
The 120-day period began to run because the plaintiff knew of his claim against the city on the date in question, not because the plaintiff was injured on the date in question. The majority held that the plaintiff could not put off the date of discovery to the time when he learned of the greater extent of his injuries. Id. Here, plaintiffs allege they knew nothing of the role of the school district until a point well within the 120-day period preceding their notices.
Surely the school district does not suggest that every wrong-doing by one of its employees raises a presumption that it negligently retained that employee. The instant plaintiffs made no such presumption. They assert that they learned of the negligence of the school district in early August, 1980. At that time, during a presentence investigation of Durtschi, they discovered that the school district had retained Durtschi even after knowing of his illicit tendencies. R., Vol. 3, pp. 12, 17, and 43. They then filed their claims in less than 120 days. R., Vol. 3, pp. 14-15,17, 20, 46-47. If these facts are established at trial, the plaintiffs hardly could have discovered the negligent retention of the [475]*475school district until early August, 1980. If this is the case, notice for the adult plaintiffs’ claims was entirely adequate.
B. The Minor Plaintiffs.
The determination of reasonable discovery and notice on the part of minor plaintiffs is a different matter which this Court has yet to satisfactorily resolve.5 In Independent School District of Boise City v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975), we held that minority was a factor “in deciding whether a claim reasonably should have been discovered,” which consequently would determine the date from which the 120 days would run. Id. at 62, 539 P.2d at 990. However, we did not establish in Callister the extent to which minority was a factor. Nor did we have the opportunity to thoroughly consider the implications of Idaho’s general tolling statute, I.C. § 5-230. As a result, the implications of a plaintiff’s minority status for the notice requirement remained murky. We now undertake to clear the waters.
The long-standing policy of Idaho has been to shelter minor plaintiffs from the insensitive ticking of statutory clocks. See Chapin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306, 311, 230 P.2d 998, 1001 (1951). At the time of the instant cases, this policy was embodied in I.C. § 5 — 230(1),6 which stated in pertinent part:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, ... [w]ithin the age of majority ... the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, provided however, that the time limited for the commencement of an action shall not be tolled for a period of more than six (6) years on account of minority, incompetency, a defendant’s absence from the jurisdiction, any legal disability or for other cause or reason except as specifically provided in section 5-213, Idaho Code.
Despite such statutes, some courts have refused to toll the time in which minors must give notice of their claims to governmental entities. These courts reason that the requirement of notice is not a statute of limitation, and that any exception from the notice requirement must come from the legislative branch. See generally 56 Am. Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 782, 783. The majority in Callister apparently took this approach. Callister, supra, 97 Idaho at 63, 539 P.2d at 991.7
Such an approach ignores the fact that whether the requirement is to file notice or to file an action, the policy concerns of the state and the consequences for the minor litigant are the same. In a leading opinion, the Texas Court of Appeals aptly described the state’s interests:
The purpose of the various statutes of limitations in Texas is to require one to present his claim before evidence to rebut it is apt to be destroyed or lost____ The purpose of the charter provisions by many of the home rule cities in the State of Texas requiring a specified timely notice as a condition to the city’s liability for damages for personal injuries, whether they be considered statutes of limitations or not, is similar in nature — to permit the city to investigate the basis of the claim while the facts are fresh.
City of Houston v. Bergstrom, 468 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex.Civ.App.1971), [476]*476writ of error refused; approved in McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.1972) (citations omitted).
Accord, Farber, supra, 102 Idaho at 401, 630 P.2d at 688. The majority in Callister implicitly concedes the similarity between deadlines to file notice and statutes of limitation when it on the one hand denies that the notice of claim requirement is a statute of limitation, then on the other asserts that such “ [statutes of limitation in Idaho are not tolled by judicial construction but rather by the expressed language of the statute.” Callister, supra, 97 Idaho at 63, 539 P.2d at 991.
The consequences of failing to apply Idaho’s tolling statute — I.C. § 5-230 — to notice requirements for the minor litigant are immediate, severe, and incongruous with the policy of § 5-230. Minors lack the judgment, experience, and awareness to protect their rights with appropriate, timely civil action; they also lack the ability to appear in court on their own behalf. I.C. § 5-306. To strictly apply the notice requirement to minors would inevitably result in the elimination of meritorious and justified claims, through no fault of the innocent minors. The notice requirement would accomplish this elimination just as surely and completely as would a running statute of limitation. Thus, it makes no sense to toll a statute of limitation because of the injured party’s minority, while at the same time require that party to provide notice of his or her claim within 120 days. See Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879, 881 (1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 598, 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (“The requirement of giving notice presupposes the existence of an individual capable of giving it.”); McCrary, supra, 482 S.W.2d at 153 (“ [PJersons of tender years ... are powerless to comply with such conditions.”); Lazich v. Belanger, 111 Mont. 48, 105 P.2d 738, 739 (1940) (“It would be unreasonable to require that to be done which plaintiff was incapable of doing.”); cf. Callister, supra, 97 Idaho at 66, 539 P.2d at 994 (Bakes, J., dissenting) (“To hold [that the general tolling statute tolls statute of limitations but not the notice of claim statute] would be to reach the ridiculous conclusion that a 10 year old injured by a governmental entity must file his notice of claim within 120 days of his injury, but then, because I.C. § 5-230 will toll the running of the statute during his minority, may wait the remaining 8 years of his minority before initiating suit in the district court.”).
The provision in I.C. § 6-907 — that the minor’s claim “may be presented and filed on behalf of the claimant by any relative, attorney, or agent representing the claimant” (emphasis added) — does not diminish the harshness of the consequences. As Justice Bakes noted in his dissent to Callis-ter, “[t]he section [6-907] recognizes that others may act to protect a minor’s rights, but it does not require them to act in order to preserve the minor’s rights.” Callister, supra, 97 Idaho at 65, 539 P.2d at 993 (Bakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Minors should not have to rely upon others to protect their rights. The Washington Court of Appeals stated:
[I]t would be fundamentally unfair for a minor to be denied his recourse to the courts because of circumstances which are both legally and practically beyond his control. The legal disabilities of minors have been firmly established by common law and statute. They were established for the protection of minors, and not as a bar to the enforcement of their rights. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 19 (1945). The legislature recognized this when it inserted the provision in RCW 4.96.020 allowing a relative, agent or attorney to file a claim on behalf of the minor. However, ... his right of action should not depend on the good fortune of having an astute relative or friend to take the proper steps on his behalf.
Hunter v. North Mason High School, 12 Wash.App. 304, 529 P.2d 898, 899-900 (1974), aff'd, 85 Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975); reaffirmed in Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wash.2d 574, 649 P.2d 98 (1982).
[477]*477See also Lazich, supra, 105 P.2d at 739 (“Neither should his [the minor’s] right of action be frittered away because of the omission of the parents to give notice.”); McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N.E. 476, 478 (Ill.1918) (“A child with a meritorious cause of action but incapable of initiating any proceeding for its enforcement will not be left to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend to enforce its rights.”).
A number of courts have held that the enforcement of notice requirements against minor plaintiffs despite their inability to comply with it violated their rights to due process. Tafoya v. Doe, 100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582, 585-86 (1983); Hunter, supra, 529 P.2d at 899-900; Turner, supra, 510 P.2d at 881-82; McCrary, supra, 482 S.W.2d at 154; Lazich, supra, 105 P.2d at 739; McDonald, supra, 120 N.E. at 478. At the very least, such enforcement violates the policy of tolling statutes like I.C. § 5-230.
To bring notice of claim requirements in alignment with due process and with general tolling statutes, many courts have applied the policy of their general tolling statute to the notice statute — in effect applying the tolling statutes by analogy. The Texas Court of Appeals provides an example:
Insofar as the limitation statutes are concerned, the Legislature has expressed the public policy of this state in Articles 5518 and 5535, V.A.T.S. Those statutes, generally, provide that the time during which a claimant is under disability such as that of minority, shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited for the commencement of an action on his claim. It seems reasonable that such policy should apply to the time limit fixed for giving a city a notice of a claim against it. Bergstrom, supra, 468 S.W.2d at 590.
See also Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 33 Ill.2d 425, 211 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1965); Hunter, supra, 529 P.2d at 900; City of Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okl. 39, 191 P. 186, 194 (Okla.1920); Webster v. City of Charlotte, 222 N.C. 321, 22 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1942); Girman v. County of Cook, 103 Ill.App.3d 897, 59 Ill. Sec. 534, 431 N.E.2d 1291 (Ill.App.1981). These courts come within a hair’s breadth of applying the tolling statute without quite doing so.
We feel on firmer ground by directly applying the general tolling statute, I.C. § 5-230, to the notice statute, I.C. § 6-906. This is the more straightforward course suggested by Justice Bakes in his dissent to Callister, and taken by several jurisdictions. Besette v. Enderlin School Dist. No. 22, 288 N.W.2d 67, 74-75 (N.D.1980); City of Barnesville v. Powell, 124 Ga.App. 132, 183 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1971); Barnum v. Martin, 135 Ga.App. 712, 219 S.E.2d 341, 344 (1975), cited with approval in Shoemaker v. Aldmor Mgt., Inc., 249 Ga. 430, 291 S.E.2d 549, 550 (1982). Cf. Goldberg v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 423 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.1982) (Construes notice of claim period as a statute of limitations which was tolled by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C.App. § 525). Indeed, the legislature has compelled us to liberally construe its statutes “with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.” I.C. § 73-102. In this case, any reasonable construction of the general tolling statute results in its application to the ITCA notice provisions.
Both the plain meaning and the policy of I.C. § 5-230 reinforce this approach. Section 5-230 does not toll just the time after which the minor plaintiff must file an action; rather, it tolls the time after which the minor must commence the action. Section 6-906 requires the minor plaintiff to commence the action by filing notice. As Justice Bakes observed in his dissent to Callister, “The filing of the notice of claim is an integral part of the initiation of an action against a governmental entity.” Callister, supra, 97 Idaho at 66, 539 P.2d at 994 (Bakes, J., dissenting). It follows that § 5-230 tolls the running of the 120-day period before the minor plaintiffs file notice, which filing would commence their action.
This surely reflects the legislative policy behind these statutes. If it were otherwise, as Justice Bakes noted, even [478]*478children orphaned by automobile accidents would be required to file notice, or otherwise be deprived of their access to the courts:
It cannot be seriously asserted that children in such circumstances are capable of protecting their interests or that there will be a party available who can protect the children’s interest by filing a notice of claim within 120 days. I cannot believe the legislature intended to prevent such claimants from bringing their action by non-compliance with the notice of claim statute. Id. at 67, 539 P.2d at 995.
The obvious intent of I.C. § 5-230 is to preserve the rights of injured minors until they are old enough to take appropriate action. We must construe the statute in harmony with its objective. Local 1494 of Internat’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978); I.C. § 73-102.
To interpret I.C. §§ 6-906 and 6-907 as somehow placing the notice requirement beyond the reach of the tolling statute would be to read these statutes as impliedly repealing the tolling statute’s protection of minors injured through the wrongdoing of the government. According to a well-established rule of statutory construction, we must presume the legislature did not intend to limit the pre-existing general tolling statute by mere implication. Jordan v. Pearce, 91 Idaho 687, 691, 429 P.2d 419, 423 (1967); see also, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855, 103 S.Ct. 3369, 3380, 77 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1983) reh. denied 463 U.S. 1250, 104 S.Ct. 39, 77 L.Ed.2d 1457; see generally, 1A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 23.10 (4th ed. 1973) (“[Court] [r]eports abound with decisions reflecting and endorsing a presumption against repeal by implication.”), and 22.13 (“Amendments by implication, like repeals by implication, are not favored and will not be upheld in doubtful cases____”) (4th ed. 1985) (footnotes omitted). The reason for this presumption one commentator explained as follows:
The presumption against implied repeals is founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is presumed to envision the whole body of the law when it enacts new legislation. There is also the assumption that existing statutory and common law is representative of popular will. This presumption has been said to have special application to important public statutes of long standing. Singer, supra at § 23.10 (emphasis added).
The general tolling statute certainly is an important public statute of long standing which the legislature would not amend or repeal without specific mention.
Only when new legislation is irreconcilable with and repugnant to a pre-existing statute may we find an implied repeal. Jordan, supra, 91 Idaho at 691, 429 P.2d at 423; Brady v. Place, 41 Idaho 747, 750, 242 P. 314, 315 (1925); see generally, Singer, supra at § 23.09. Far from being repugnant and irreconcilable, the notice statute and the statute providing for a minor’s agent to give notice, I.C. § 6-907, co-exist harmoniously with the general tolling statute, even when the tolling statute is applied to the notice requirement. The effect of the notice statute merely is delayed until the plaintiff reaches the age of majority, or for six years, whichever comes first. The opportunity for an agent to file on behalf of the minor continues, just as the opportunity for a minor’s agent to commence any tort continues regardless of the tolling of statutes of limitation. As Justice Bakes said, “I cannot believe it was in the contemplation of the legislature to implicitly repeal I.C. § 5-230 by a sentence in the Idaho Tort Claims Act allowing a minor’s adult representative to protect the minor’s interest by filing a claim on the minor’s behalf.” Callister, supra, 97 Idaho at 66, 539 P.2d at 994 (Bakes, J., dissenting). More likely the legislature contemplated that § 5-230 would continue to guard the rights of minors from the ravages of relentless and insensitive deadlines.
A final motive for our applying I.C. § 5-230 itself rather than just its “policy” is that § 5-230 is a qualified tolling [479]*479statute. Rather than delay the running of time provisions until the age of majority, it delays the running until the age of majority or for six years, whichever comes first. Since the policy of § 5-230 involves more than just tolling until the age of majority is reached, that policy is best served by applying the statute directly to the notice statute. Thus, a minor must give notice within 120 days of his or her attaining the age of majority, but not later than 120 days after six years from the date the claim arose or should reasonably have been discovered.8 Of course, the minor’s age and level of maturity is still a factor in determining when the claim should reasonably have been discovered.
The legislature recently amended the ITCA in a fashion which substantiates our present holding. New § 6-906A makes clear both the legislature’s intent to protect minor claimants from the running of the notice time period, and its intent to apply the precise policy of I.C. § 5-230, including the six-year maximum, to notice requirements:
No person who is a minor shall be required to present and file a claim against a governmental entity or its employee under this act [this section] until one hundred twenty (120) days after said person reaches the age of majority or six (6) years from the date the claim arose or should reasonably have been discovered, whichever is earlier. 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 77, § 1, p. 151.
The legislature rejected the holding to the contrary in Callister. It demonstrated that the notice of claim requirement was never meant to be magically exempted from the tolling statute — that the interests of minors who had suffered injury at the hands of the government were never meant to be abandoned.
In sum, we hold that the general tolling provision, I.C. § 5-230, applies to all procedures integral to commencing actions against private or public defendants, including the notice procedure of I.C. § 6-906. Consequently, § 5-230(1) tolled the running of the time within which § 6-906 required the minor plaintiffs to give notice to the school district. Thus, the notice given on their behalf was adequate as a matter of law. To the extent Callister is inconsistent with our holding today, we acknowledge its disapproval by the legislature and acquiesce therein.
IV. CONCLUSION.
The district court’s granting of summary judgment against Durtschi’s cross-claim is affirmed. The district court’s granting of summary judgment against plaintiffs is reversed, and the matter is remanded for trial on the question of the school district’s negligence.
The school district’s costs related to the cross-claim to be paid by Durtschi; the plaintiff’s costs related to their claims to be paid by the school district. No attorney’s fees.9
DONALDSON, C.J., and HUNTLEY, J„ concur.